Judgment :- (Prayer: Appeals under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the common order dated 20.01.2006 passed by the learned single Judge, in W.P.Nos.3046 of 2006 and 19699 of 2000 respectively.) Common Judgment: K. Chandru, J. The appellant was working as a Salesman in the fair price shop run by the first respondent Society from the year 1992. On the charge of causing loss to the Society, he was placed under suspension with effect from 24.11.1993 pending enquiry into his conduct and not satisfied with the explanation, an enquiry was conducted on 16.3.1994 and subsequently, he was dismissed from service with effect from 23.6.1994. Thereafter, he raised a dispute under Section 2-A (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 [for short, I.D.Act] and the said dispute was taken on file by the second respondent Labour Court in I.D.No.6 of 1995 and notice was ordered to the first respondent Society and the first respondent filed a detailed counter. Thereafter, on 29.5.2000, a joint memo was filed by both sides before the second respondent Labour Court and the Labour Court passed a docket order, which reads as follows: "On the strength of joint memo by either side presented on 29.05.2000 (inward No.1908) the then Presiding Officer of this Court by his typed endorsement dated 30.05.2000 on the docket sheet, ruled on hearing both sides, that, both sides agree that the enquiry conducted by the Enquiry Officer Thiru P.Nadarajan, retired Deputy Registrar was valid under law and as per principles of natural justice. He has further ruled that preliminary issue No.1, was answered accordingly." Subsequently, there was a change of the Presiding Officer and after he took over charge, he framed the following issues for adjudication. "Whether the petitioner is entitled for relief of reinstatement of continuity of service and backwages and all other attendant benefits and that both the above issues can be taken up separately?” 2. It is not clear as to how evidence was let in by both sides when the enquiry was held to be invalid. However, documents were marked on the side of the appellant as Exs.W.1 to W.10 and on the side of the first respondent Society, Exs.M.1 to M.55 were marked. It is not clear as to how evidence was let in by both sides when the enquiry was held to be invalid. However, documents were marked on the side of the appellant as Exs.W.1 to W.10 and on the side of the first respondent Society, Exs.M.1 to M.55 were marked. It was thereafter, on consideration of the materials and arguments on both sides, the Labour Court came to the conclusion that the dismissal was illegal and directed payment of backwages from the date of dismissal till the date of Award, viz., 10.10.2000 and the Labour Court rejected the relief of reinstatement. Strangely, the Labour Court came to the conclusion that non-payment of Subsistence Allowance will vitiate the proceedings taken by them and in paragraph 11, it recorded the finding as follows: "If the non-payment of subsistence allowance is not disputed, the enquiry becomes illegal and the enquiry report cannot be justified. Further, non-payment of subsistence allowance amounts to utter violation of principles of natural justice which cannot be cured subsequently. Once, prompt and adequate non-payment of subsistence allowance had been proved it is a pointer against the employer, to strike at the root of the punishment inflicted by them on the worker, had over grave may be the charges, against the latter." In arriving at this conclusion, it also went into the oral evidence let in by the parties. 3. The first respondent Society challenged the Award directing the payment of backwages in writ petition being W.P.No.19699 of 2000 and the appellant, aggrieved by the denial of reinstatement, challenged that portion of the Award in W.P.No.3046 of 2001. 4. It is during the pendency of the proceedings, a sum of Rs.50,000/- was deposited to the credit of I.D.No.6 of 1995. When the appellant workman wanted to withdraw the amount, with the consent of the parties, both writ petitions were heard together. The learned Judge, after hearing the parties, allowed both writ petitions and directed the deposited amount to be kept pending as he had remanded the matter for disposal on the question of proportionality of the punishment to be imposed on the appellant. In paragraph 9, the learned Judge rendered a finding as follows: "I am of the view that Labour Court has not applied its mind at all. It has not followed the provisions of law while interfering with the order of punishment imposed by the management. In paragraph 9, the learned Judge rendered a finding as follows: "I am of the view that Labour Court has not applied its mind at all. It has not followed the provisions of law while interfering with the order of punishment imposed by the management. Provisions of Section 11 A of Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 will have to be strictly followed by the Labour Court. Further, the Labour Court while rejecting the claim of reinstatement ought not to have granted payment of back wages together with all attendant benefits that too on the sole ground of non-payment of subsistence allowance. In view of the above the W.P.No.19699/2000 is allowed and the award is set aside. Consequently, the matter is remanded to the Labour Court for fresh disposal on materials available. It is made clear that the Labour court need not conduct fresh enquiry once again. If the Labour Court requires any clarification it may obtain the same from the parties concerned and consider the issue of proportionality of punishment imposed and pass orders on the merits within a period of three months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. Until such time the amount of Rs.50,000/- which has been deposited to the credit of ID with the first respondent need not be disturbed." 5. Further, though the appellant workman, aggrieved by the order, has come before us, the first respondent Society has not challenged the same. 6. We have heard Mr.J.Saravanavel, learned counsel appearing for the appellant and Mr.John Zhacaria, learned counsel appearing for M/s T.S.Gopalan & Co for the first respondent Society and have perused the records. 7. We are of the considered opinion that both the Labour Court as well as the learned single Judge have not kept in mind the authoritative pronouncement of the Supreme Court in this regard. The Supreme Court, while interpreting Section 11-A of the I.D.Act reported in (1973) 1 SCC 813 [The Workmen of M/s Firestone Tyre and Rubber Co. of India (Pvt.) Ltd. vs. The Management and others] has held in paragraphs 35 and 36 of the judgment as follows: "Para 36: We will first consider cases where an employer has held a proper and valid domestic enquiry before passing the order of punishment. of India (Pvt.) Ltd. vs. The Management and others] has held in paragraphs 35 and 36 of the judgment as follows: "Para 36: We will first consider cases where an employer has held a proper and valid domestic enquiry before passing the order of punishment. Previously the Tribunal had no power to interfere with its finding of misconduct recorded in the domestic enquiry unless one or other infirmities pointed out by this Court in Indian Iron & Steel Co. Ltd. case (supra), existed. The conduct of disciplinary proceedings and the punishment to be imposed were all considered to be a managerial function with which the Tribunal had no power to interfere unless the finding was perverse or the punishment was so harsh as to lead to an inference of victimisation of unfair labour practice. This position, in our view, has now been changed by Section 11-A. The words "in the course of the adjudication proceeding, the Tribunal is satisfied that the order of discharge or dismissal was not justified" clearly indicate that the Tribunal is now clothed with the power to reappraise the evidence in the domestic enquiry and satisfy itself whether the said evidence relied on by an employer establishes the misconduct alleged against a workman. What was originally a plausible conclusion that could be drawn by an employer from the evidence, has now given place to a satisfaction being arrived at by the Tribunal that the finding of misconduct is correct. The limitations imposed on the powers of the Tribunal by the decision in Indian Iron & Steel Co. Ltd. Case (supra), can no longer be invoked by an employer. The Tribunal is now at liberty to consider not only whether the finding of misconduct recorded by an employer is correct; but also to differ from the said finding if a proper case is made out. What was once largely in the realm of the satisfaction of the employer, has ceased to be so; and now it is the satisfaction of the Tribunal that finally decides the matter. Para 37: ......... As pointed out by this Court in the decision just referred to above, it is open to the Tribunal to deal with the validity of the domestic enquiry, if one has been held as a preliminary issue. Para 37: ......... As pointed out by this Court in the decision just referred to above, it is open to the Tribunal to deal with the validity of the domestic enquiry, if one has been held as a preliminary issue. If its finding on the subject is in favour of the management, then there will be no occasion for additional evidence being cited by the management. But if the finding on this issue is against the management, the Tribunal will have to give the employer an opportunity to cite additional evidence justifying his action. " 8. If these principles are kept in mind, then the second respondent Labour Court would not have committed grave error in allowing the parties to lead evidence inspite of a joint memo having been filed by both parties stating that they are not questioning the validity of the enquiry. Then the Labour Court, under these circumstances, ought to have confined itself only to decide the finding rendered by the employer as it is just and proper and if the misconduct is proved still, shall decide the question of quantum of punishment imposed on the workman. On the contrary, the Labour Court held that denial of subsistence allowance will vitiate the enquiry. This was inspite of the earlier docket order made by the predecessor of the second respondent on 30.5.2000. This conduct of the Labour Court is wholly unwarranted and the Labour Court cannot go behind the endorsement made by the parties. However, when the matter was brought before the learned Judge by both parties, they have not brought to the notice of this Court the decision of the Supreme Court interpreting Section 11-A of the I.D. Act which led the learned Judge to remand the matter only on the question of proportionality of the punishment to be decided by the Labour Court thereby restricting the power of the labour Court to go into the findings rendered by the employer in the domestic enquiry conducted by the first respondent Society. We cannot fetter the right of the labour Court to go into the findings rendered by the employer and to come to the conclusion in one way or the other and thereafter, decide the question of penalty to be imposed on the workman. 9. We cannot fetter the right of the labour Court to go into the findings rendered by the employer and to come to the conclusion in one way or the other and thereafter, decide the question of penalty to be imposed on the workman. 9. Even while we are upholding the order of the learned single Judge in ordering remand of the I.D., we are only removing the fetter imposed on the Labour Court to go into the findings rendered by the employer and to find out whether the guilt or otherwise of the appellant has been established or not. However, we will have to make it clear that the Labour Court has committed grievous error with reference to allowing the parties to lead evidence even after holding that the enquiry has been held to be valid and proper and the Management not seeking any opportunity to lead fresh evidence. This is not warranted in terms of the proviso to Section 11-A of the I.D. Act. 10. In this context, it is necessary to draw the following passage of the Firestone case (cited supra), which is found in paragraphs 48-49 and 50 of the judgment: "Paras 48-49: We are not inclined to accept the above contention of Mr Deshmukh. The Proviso specifies matters which the Tribunal shall take into account as also matters which it shall not. The expression materials on record, occurring in the Proviso, in our opinion, cannot be confined only to the materials which were available at the domestic enquiry. On the other hand, the materials on record in the Proviso must be held to refer to materials on record before the Tribunal. They take in-- (1) the evidence taken by the management at the enquiry and the proceedings of the enquiry, or (2) the above evidence and in addition, any further evidence led before the Tribunal, or (3) evidence placed before the Tribunal for the first time in support of the action taken by an employer as well as the evidence adduced by the workmen contra. The above items by and large should be considered to be the 'materials on record' as specified in the Proviso. We are not inclined to limit that expression as meaning only that material that has been placed in a domestic enquiry. The above items by and large should be considered to be the 'materials on record' as specified in the Proviso. We are not inclined to limit that expression as meaning only that material that has been placed in a domestic enquiry. The Proviso only confines the Tribunal to the materials on record before it as specified above, when considering the justification or otherwise of the order of discharge or dismissal. It is only on the basis of these materials that the Tribunal is obliged to consider whether the misconduct is proved and the further question whether the proved misconduct justifies the punishment of dismissal or discharge. It also prohibits the Tribunal from taking any fresh evidence either for satisfying itself regarding the misconduct or for altering the punishment. From the Proviso it is not certainly possible to come to the conclusion that when once it is held that an enquiry has not been held or is found to be defective, an order reinstating the workman will have to be made by the Tribunal. Nor does it follow that the Proviso deprives an employer of his right to adduce evidence for the first time before the Tribunal. The expression 'fresh evidence' has to be read in the context in which it appears namely, as distinguished from the expression materials on record. If so read, the Proviso does not present any difficulty at all. Para 50: ....... When such wide powers have been now conferred on Tribunals, the legislature obviously felt that some restrictions have to be imposed regarding what matters could be taken into account. Such restrictions are found in the Proviso. The Proviso only emphasises that the Tribunal has to satisfy itself one way or other regarding misconduct, the punishment and the relief to be granted to workmen only on the basis of the 'materials on record' before it. What those materials comprise of have been mentioned earlier. The Tribunal for the purposes referred to above, cannot call for further or fresh evidence, as an Appellate Authority may normally do under a particular statute, when considering the correctness or otherwise of an order passed by a subordinate body. The 'matter' in the Proviso refers to the order of discharge or dismissal that is being considered by the Tribunal." 11. The 'matter' in the Proviso refers to the order of discharge or dismissal that is being considered by the Tribunal." 11. In the light of the above, we hereby clarify that the Labour Court should confine itself to the materials on record already recorded by the first respondent employer produced before the Labour Court and consider the same in the light of the power conferred on the Labour Court under Section 11-A of the I.D. Act and as interpreted by the Supreme Court quoted above. The Writ Appeal shall stand disposed of accordingly and the amount of deposit made by the employer shall continued to be kept with the Labour Court pending the outcome of the proceedings in I.D. No.6 of 1995. We also hereby direct the second respondent Labour Court, Vellore, to dispose of I.D.No.6 of 1995 within a period of two months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order since it is a dispute of 11 years old. However, there will be no order as to costs. In view of the same, M.P.No.2 of 2006 shall also stand dismissed.