ORDER M. VENKATESWARA REDDY, J. These three revision petitions by the defendants arise out of three independent but stereotype orders dated July 18, 2005, made in I.A. Nos. 747, 748 and 749 of 2005 respectively, in O.S. Nos. 1069, 1074 and 1079 of 2005 respectively on the file of the I-Additional Junior Civil Judge, Vijayawada, dismissing the applications of the defendants filed under order 7, rule 11(A), (D) and rule 14 and under section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 read with section 36 of the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1957 (for short, "the Act") praying the court to reject the plaints in the three suits. The plaintiff is M/s. Associated Auto Services, Vijayawada, which was originally a partnership-firm and later incorporated as a private limited company carrying on business in two wheeler automobiles. It is an authorised dealer of M/s. Hero Honda Motors Limited, New Delhi, for districts of Krishna, Guntur and Prakasham, having branches at different places and a registered dealer under the Act and the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956. All the three suits are filed, (1) seeking a mandatory injunction to direct the defendants, i.e., officers of the Commercial Tax Department functioning at various levels to return all the account books, records, files and floppies (for brief "documents") which were allegedly taken away by the defendants from the possession of the plaintiffs on different dates; and (2) for permanent injunction restraining the defendants from taking any action against the plaintiff or issuing any notice like show cause, etc., or from passing any orders till the account books, records and files, floppies of the plaintiff, which were taken away by them are duly returned to the plaintiff. It is alleged in O.S. No. 1069 of 2005 that the documents were seized during the course of inspection of the office of the plaintiff on March 14, 2005, while in O.S. Nos. 1074 and 1079 of 2005 the allegation is that they were seized during the course of inspection held on March 17, 2005. The plaintiff alleges in the body of plaints that the entire books of account and records pertaining to the plaintiff's business were taken away without even furnishing acknowledgement to that effect and the defendants obtained statements from the staff by threat and coercion to the effect that there are certain variations in the turnover of the stocks. The plaintiff alleges in the body of plaints that the entire books of account and records pertaining to the plaintiff's business were taken away without even furnishing acknowledgement to that effect and the defendants obtained statements from the staff by threat and coercion to the effect that there are certain variations in the turnover of the stocks. The plaintiff addressed letters to the fourth defendant on April 15, 2005 requesting the latter to issue directions to his staff to return all the articles, but there was no response from the defendant. Hence, the three suits. It appears that written statements are not filed. The case of the defendants who are seeking rejection of the plaints can be set forth in brief as under : The Hero Honda Motor Cycles India supplied two wheelers of various models and also parts and accessories to the plaintiff. The plaintiff obtained registration under the Act and also Central Sales Tax Act from the Assistant Commercial Tax Officer, Vijayawada, with effect from May 1, 2003. The plaintiff had branches at five different places, viz., Ongole, Guntur, Piduguralla, Machilipatnam and Gudivada. Later at the request of the plaintiff the branch offices were cancelled with effect from October 30, 2003. The plaintiff filed monthly A-2 returns for the year 2004-2005 and from August, 2004 to March, 2005. The business premises of the plaintiff at Vijayawada were inspected on March 17, 2005. The accountant of the plaintiff who is authorised to sign the returns evaded production of account books and furnishing of the vehicle stock details. Hence, a notice was issued to the plaintiff-company on March 17, 2005 directing them to produce account books and also produce sales details on March 19, 2005, but the plaintiff did not file the same till date. Therefore, the defendants obtained information from M/s. Hero Honda Motors Limited, New Delhi. Information was also obtained from the Income-tax Department. It came to light that the plaintiff has suppressed huge sales and evaded large amount of tax. The suppressed turnover for the years 2002-03, 2003-04 and 2004-05 is Rs. 16,70,88,241, Rs. 20,85,96,531 and Rs. 14,01,09,572, respectively. The total tax evaded by the plaintiff worked out to Rs. 6,70,54,574. The plaintiff cheated the Government without paying the correct sales tax and without giving information of sub-dealers' appointment, etc. The plaintiff approached the court with false allegations and obtained interim injunction. 16,70,88,241, Rs. 20,85,96,531 and Rs. 14,01,09,572, respectively. The total tax evaded by the plaintiff worked out to Rs. 6,70,54,574. The plaintiff cheated the Government without paying the correct sales tax and without giving information of sub-dealers' appointment, etc. The plaintiff approached the court with false allegations and obtained interim injunction. The suit is not maintainable in view of the express embargo placed by the provisions of section 36 of the Act on the Civil Courts to entertain suits filed against the proceedings initiated under the provisions of the Act and, therefore, the plaints may be rejected. In the counters filed by the plaintiff it is asserted that the bar of jurisdiction alleged by the defendants is not applicable to the present suits. The learned I-Additional Junior Civil Judge, held that his court has jurisdiction to entertain the suits and consequently dismissed the three I.As. Aggrieved by the same, the three civil revision petitions are filed. The point that arises for consideration is : Whether the civil court has no jurisdiction to entertain the three suits in view of the provisions of section 36 of the Act ? Point : The relief claimed in the suit is of two-fold, namely, (1) mandatory injunction directing the defendants to return all the account books, records and files, floppies which were allegedly taken away by the defendants and (2) a permanent injunction restraining the defendants from taking any action against the plaintiff or issuing any notice like show cause, etc., or from passing any orders till the account books, records and files, floppies of the plaintiff which were allegedly taken away by them are duly returned to the plaintiff. Under the provisions of section 9, C.P.C. the courts shall have jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature excepting suits of which their cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred. There is an express bar imposed on jurisdiction of the courts under the provisions of section 36 of the Act, which runs as follows : "36. Bar of jurisdiction of courts. There is an express bar imposed on jurisdiction of the courts under the provisions of section 36 of the Act, which runs as follows : "36. Bar of jurisdiction of courts. Save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act, no court shall entertain any suit, or other proceeding to set aside or modify, or question the validity of any assessment, order or decision made or passed by any officer or authority under this Act or any Rules made thereunder, or in respect of any other matter falling within its or his scope." As long back as in 1969, a larger Bench of the Supreme Court in Dhulabhai v. State of Madhya Pradesh [1968] 22 STC 416; AIR 1969 SC 78 , laid down the following principles regarding exclusion of jurisdiction of civil court : (1) Where the statute gives a finality to the orders of the special Tribunals, the civil courts' jurisdiction must be held to be excluded if there is adequate remedy to do what the civil court would normally do in a suit. Such provision, however, does not exclude those cases where the provisions of the particular Act have not been complied with or the statutory Tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure. (2) Where there is an express bar of the jurisdiction of the court, an examination of the scheme of the particular Act to find the adequacy or the sufficiency of the remedies provided may be relevant but is not decisive to sustain the jurisdiction of the civil court. Where there is no express exclusion, the examination of the remedies and the scheme of the particular Act to find out the intendment becomes necessary and the result of the inquiry may be decisive. In the latter case, it is necessary to see if the statute creates a special right or a liability and provides for the determination of the right or liability and further lays down that all questions about the said right and liability shall be determined by the Tribunals so constituted, and whether remedies normally associated with actions in civil courts are prescribed by the said statute or not. (3) Challenge to the provisions of the particular Act as ultra vires cannot be brought before Tribunals constituted under that Act. (3) Challenge to the provisions of the particular Act as ultra vires cannot be brought before Tribunals constituted under that Act. Even the High Court cannot go into that question on a revision or reference from the decision of the Tribunals. (4) When a provision is already declared unconstitutional or the constitutionality of any provision is to be challenged, a suit is open. A writ of certiorari may include a direction for refund if the claim is clearly within the time prescribed by the Limitation Act but it is not a compulsory remedy to replace a suit. (5) Where the particular Act contains no machinery for refund of tax collected in excess of constitutional limits or illegally collected, a suit lies. (6) Questions of the correctness of the assessment apart from its constitutionality are for the decision of the authorities and a civil suit does not lie if the orders of the authorities are declared to be final or there is an express prohibition in the particular Act. In either case, the scheme of the particular Act must be examined because it is a relevant enquiry. (7) An exclusion of jurisdiction of the civil court is not readily to be inferred unless the conditions above set down apply. The Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act, 1957, is a self-contained code. Under the scheme provided in the Act, if the assessing authority is satisfied that the return submitted by the assessee appears to be incorrect or incomplete, he shall, after giving the dealer a reasonable opportunity of proving the correctness and completeness of the return submitted by him and making such inquiry as he deems necessary, assess to the best of his judgment, the amount of tax due from the dealer, vide section 14 of the Act. Section 19 of the Act provides appeal against the orders of the assessing authority. The aggrieved dealer can approach the appellate authority. Under the provisions of section 19(4) of the Act the appellate authority is empowered to make such enquiry as it deems fit or remand the case to any subordinate officer or authority for an enquiry and report on any specified point or points. The aggrieved dealer can approach the appellate authority. Under the provisions of section 19(4) of the Act the appellate authority is empowered to make such enquiry as it deems fit or remand the case to any subordinate officer or authority for an enquiry and report on any specified point or points. Power is conferred on the Commissioner of Commercial Taxes under the provisions of section 20 of the Act to suo motu revise the orders passed by any authority, officer or person subordinate to him under the provisions of the Act. He may revise, modify or set aside such order or proceeding. Of course, it appears to be that the suo motu power of revision has to be exercised if the order or proceeding recorded by subordinate authority is prejudicial to the interest of the revenue of the Government. As against the order passed by the appellate authority under section 19 of the Act an appeal under section 21 of the Act lies to the Appellate Tribunal. Thus, the Act provides a hierarchy of Tribunals for redressal of the grievances of the assessee. Rule 18 of the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Rules, 1957 lays down that when the assessing authority determines the turnover of the dealer at a figure different from that shown in the return, he shall record the reasons briefly in writing in the assessment order for so determining the turnover. Powers of search and seizure are conferred on the officers of the Commercial Tax Department and the assessing, appellate or revising authority can exercise the same powers as are vested in the court under the Code of Civil Procedure when trying a suit in respect of the matters like summoning of the witnesses, examining any person on oath, production of documents, etc. Thus, the assessing, appellate and revising authorities specified in the Act will be exercising civil court powers in certain respects and they are quasi-judicial authorities. The Appellate Tribunal is conferred with same powers as are vested in a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure including the power to punish for contempt. Thus, the Act itself has created special rights or liabilities and provided for the determination of the right or liability and all questions about the rights and liabilities under the Act shall be determined by the Tribunals constituted under the Act only. Thus, the Act itself has created special rights or liabilities and provided for the determination of the right or liability and all questions about the rights and liabilities under the Act shall be determined by the Tribunals constituted under the Act only. A special bar is created under the provisions of section 36 of the Act prohibiting the civil courts from entertaining any suit seeking setting aside, modification or questioning the validity of any assessment, order or decision made or passed by any officer or authority under the Act or the Rules or in respect of any other matter falling within its or his scope. The section has a long and wide sweep. It takes within its fold not only the assessments, orders or decisions made or passed, but also any other matter falling within the scope of the assessing authority or any officer or authority under the Act. In other words, the section can be divided into two independent limbs. The first limb bars the civil courts from entertaining any suit or other proceeding, interfering in any manner whatsoever with the assessment order or decision made or passed by any officer or authority under the Act or any Rules made thereunder. The second limb lays down that no civil court can entertain any suit in respect of any other matter falling within the scope, extent, domain or sphere of the officer under the Act. Thus, the horizon of the section is far and wide. However, it is equally well-settled that the civil courts can interfere if the statutory authority acts in violation of the Rules or acts in abuse of its authority or in violation of the fundamental principles of judicial procedure. A Full Bench of the Supreme Court in State of Kerala v. N. Ramaswami Iyer and Sons [1966] 18 STC 1; AIR 1966 SC 1738 held that even if the jurisdiction of the civil court is excluded by statute where provisions of statute have not been complied with or statutory Tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure, civil courts have jurisdiction to examine those cases. Another Full Bench of the apex court in Ram Swarup v. Shaikar Chand AIR 1966 SC 893 ruled that the bar created by the relevant provisions of the statute excluding the jurisdiction of the civil courts cannot operate in cases where plea raised before the civil court goes to the root of the matter and would, if upheld, lead to the conclusion that the impugned order is a nullity. The authorities are legion in this regard and there is no need to multiply the decisions. Coming to the relief prayed for in this suit, the first prayer is mandatory injunction directing the defendants to return all the account books, records and files, floppies which are allegedly taken away by the defendants. The allegation is that without issuing any acknowledgement or receipt they were taken away by the commercial tax authorities. Wide powers are conferred under the Act on the Commercial Tax Officers to enter the premises of the dealer, make search and seize the accounts, registers or other documents. Section 28 of the Act deals with the powers of any Commercial Tax Officer, not below the rank of the Assistant Commercial Tax Officer authorised by the State in that behalf, to order production of accounts and powers of entry, inspection, etc. Section 28(3) of the Act, which is relevant for our purpose, runs as follows : "If any such officer has reason to suspect that any dealer is attempting to evade the payment of any tax or other amount due from him under this Act, he may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, seize such accounts, registers or other documents of the dealers as he may consider necessary and shall give the dealer a receipt for the same. The accounts, registers and documents so seized shall be retained by such officer only for so long as may be necessary for their examination and for any inquiry or proceeding under this Act : Provided that such accounts, registers and documents shall not be retained for more than thirty days at a time except with the permission of the next higher authority." Rule 49 of the Rules made under the Act runs as under : "49(1) Where any officer duly authorised under section 28 of the Act conducts a search of any office, shop, shop-cum-residence, residential accommodation, godown, vessel, vehicle, or any other place of business or any premises or place where he has reason to believe that the dealer keeps or is for the time being keeping any goods, accounts, registers or other documents of his business he shall, as far as may be, follow the procedure prescribed in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Central Act 2 of 1974). (2) If on search, such officer finds any accounts, registers or other documents which he has reason to believe to relate to any evasion of tax or other fee due from the dealer under the Act, he may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, seize such accounts, registers, or other documents and shall give the dealer a receipt for the same. The accounts and registers so seized shall not be retained by such officer for more than 30 days at a time without the permission of the next higher authority." It can be seen from the above provisions that the Commercial Tax Officer while seizing the accounts, registers or other documents shall record reasons in writing for the said seizure and he shall also issue a receipt for the account books and registers seized. He cannot also retain the seized books and records for more than 30 days at a time except with the permission of the next higher authority. Rule 49 of the Rules lays down that he shall, as far as may be follow the procedure prescribed in the Code of Criminal Procedure for conducting search. He cannot also retain the seized books and records for more than 30 days at a time except with the permission of the next higher authority. Rule 49 of the Rules lays down that he shall, as far as may be follow the procedure prescribed in the Code of Criminal Procedure for conducting search. As per the provisions of section 100(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, he is expected to call upon two or more independent and respectable inhabitants of the locality in which the place to be searched is situate or of any other locality if no such inhabitant of the said locality is available or is willing to be a witness to the search, to attend and witness the search and may issue an order in writing to them or any of them so to do. Thus, a special procedure has been prescribed under the Act and Rules as to the manner of search and seizure. If the above procedure is not followed in seizing the accounts, registers or other documents, the said seizure becomes illegal. It is alleged in the plaint that the account books, records and files, floppies, etc., were seized without issuing any receipt. A reading of the plaint as well discloses that the procedure contemplated under section 28 of the Act, rule 49 of the Rules and section 100(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 is not followed at all as per plaintiff. If the allegation that the commercial tax authorities have taken away the account books, records and files, floppies, etc., without following the procedure is believed, the alleged seizure would automatically become illegal and fall outside the scope of the provisions of the Act and Rules made thereunder. It must be deemed that they were seized highhandedly. When the allegation of that sort is made, it is purely a question of fact. When there is flagrant violation of the procedure prescribed under the Act and the Rules, the civil court would certainly have jurisdiction as laid down in N. Ramaswami Iyer and Sons [1966] 18 STC 1 (SC); AIR 1966 SC 1738 and Ram Swarup's case AIR 1966 SC 893 . When there is flagrant violation of the procedure prescribed under the Act and the Rules, the civil court would certainly have jurisdiction as laid down in N. Ramaswami Iyer and Sons [1966] 18 STC 1 (SC); AIR 1966 SC 1738 and Ram Swarup's case AIR 1966 SC 893 . The fact that the Act provides for appeal and there is a further provision of revision and appeal to Special Tribunal would not stand in our way in coming to the conclusion that the suit is maintainable for the reason that the plaintiff alleges that relevant provisions of the statute and due procedure prescribed under law are not followed in taking away the books, etc., which allegation if found to be true would render the alleged seizure illegal. At this juncture, the learned Advocate-General appearing for the petitioners cited a ruling of Full Bench of our High Court rendered in Ambica Lamp House v. Commercial Tax Officer (Int.)-I Enforcement, Hyderabad [2005] 142 STC 551; [2005] 2 ALD 704 [FB], It was a case where sales tax and compounding fee were collected on the date of inspection itself. For order of compounding to be passed as a result of inspection several steps are contemplated under the Act. Therefore, the Full Bench held that it is unimaginable that all steps starting from inspection of books and accounts and collection of amount take place on the same day and therefore action of the Department officials in demanding and collecting amounts towards arrears of tax as well as compounding fee or penalty on the same day is arbitrary, illegal and contrary to the provisions of the Act and the writ petitions were allowed. While making reference to earlier cases rendered by this court in Sree Rama Trading Company v. Commercial Tax Officer (Int.) No-I, Hyderabad [1989] 8 APSTJ 57 and Badrinath Oil Company v. Assistant Commissioner [1995] 21 APSTJ 28, with reference to section 36 of the Act, their Lordships held as under : "29. The division Bench of this court though noticed that a suit or other proceedings are not maintainable either to set aside, modify or question the validity of any assessment order or other proceedings under the Act, but, however expressed that a suit is maintainable to question the collection of tax, which is allegedly done under undue influence and coercion and under the threat of arrest and imprisonment. The division Bench also felt that there is no machinery provided under the Act to question the nature of the order, which is said to have been passed and the tax collected under undue influence and coercion as well as threat of arrest and imprisonment. In the absence of any specific machinery, the court felt that the provisions of section 36 may not come in the way to institute a suit in a civil court. But, we are unable to agree with the said view expressed by the learned Judges of this court. When the Legislature enacted a provision prohibiting any of the parties to the proceedings under the Act to approach any other forum than what is provided under the provisions of the Act, it is not for this court to hold that still a suit could be maintained, if an order or proceeding is alleged to have been passed under certain circumstances, as referred to earlier. In fact, if the assessing authorities provided enough time as provided under the Act and the Rules, the dispute could be resolved before the assessing authority himself, if not, before the other hierarchical authorities provided under the statute. Those authorities are competent to consider the factual aspects. Therefore, the same would avoid driving the parties to any other fora for seeking relief. In our opinion the provisions of section 36 were incorporated to avoid unnecessary and lengthy litigation. If once the dealers are permitted to go out of the said bar to institute proceedings on some pretext or the other, the very intention of the Legislature would be frustrated. Further, it is not for the courts to show any other forum for adjudication, which is not provided in the statute. Hence, we disapprove the same." The observation appears to be in the nature of an obiter. Further, the question related to collection of tax by coercion, undue influence and threat of arrest and imprisonment, as per the allegations. The payment of tax was a fait accompli. If the plea of payment by threat, coercion or undue influence, etc., is allowed every dealer would raise the same bogie after payment of tax and would file suit for recovery. In that context of the matter, it appears that the observations of their Lordships were made. The payment of tax was a fait accompli. If the plea of payment by threat, coercion or undue influence, etc., is allowed every dealer would raise the same bogie after payment of tax and would file suit for recovery. In that context of the matter, it appears that the observations of their Lordships were made. Here in the case on hand, the plaintiff alleges that the account books, records and files, floppies, etc., were unauthorisedly taken away by the commercial tax authorities while the Commercial Tax Officer denies any such illegal taking away of the account books, records and files, floppies, etc. Therefore, that question of fact has to be decided by taking evidence. Thus, the case on hand stands on a different footing altogether than the said case where tax was paid and thereafter it was pleaded that the payment was made under undue influence, etc. Therefore, the facts of the case on hand have to be viewed in a different perspective. A single Judge of this court in Allam Ademma v. District Collector, Cuddapha [2001] 2 An.W.R. 19, held that the bar under section 36 of the Act is not an absolute one. In the case before his Lordship, the question was whether a suit challenging the order of commercial tax authorities adjusting the amounts due to a partnership firm from the Department towards commercial tax dues payable by another firm to the Commercial Tax Department on the basis of a letter given by the partner of the latter firm who happened to be the partner of the former firm also is maintainable. After making a reference to three decisions, viz., State of Andhra Pradesh v. S. Ramaiah [1971] 1 An.W.R. 112, Kamala Mills Ltd. v. State of Bombay [1965] 16 STC 613 (SC); [1965] 57 ITR 643 (SC) and Firm of Illuri S. Subbayyah Chetty and Sons v. State of Andhra Pradesh [1964] 14 STC 680 (SC); AIR 1964 SC 322 , which dealt with the question of maintainability of the suit and also the findings of the learned Senior Civil Judge in the impugned judgment, the learned single Judge held as under : "It is obvious from a reading of section 36 of the Act that bar of jurisdiction of civil courts in respect of orders or decisions passed or made by an authority under the Act is not absolute or all pervasive. The bar applies where assessment, order or decision which are sought to be challenged have been made or passed under any provision of the Act or Rules made thereunder or such assessment made or order passed was in respect of any other matter falling within the scope of the officers or authority. The bar of jurisdiction of civil courts cannot be readily presumed. The general rule of law is that when a legal right or infringement thereof is alleged, the ordinary civil courts would have jurisdiction unless there is an express or implied bar to the entertainment of the suit in that regard, in view of the provisions in section 9 of the C.P.C. If an express provision in a statute is cited as constituting the bar for entertainment of the suit in a civil court, it is necessary to examine whether all the requirements for application of the provision are satisfied." The Supreme Court in Commissioner of Income-tax v. Parmeshwari Devi Sultania [1998] 230 ITR 745, where articles were seized on search and ordered to be retained under the provisions of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and where a partition suit was filed in respect of the articles seized without filing objections before the Commissioner with reference to section 293 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, which bars filing of a suit in any civil court seeking setting aside or modification of any proceeding taken or order made under that Act, held : "We have seen above that the scope of section 293 of the Act has been widened now even to include any proceeding under the Act and it is not merely confined to set aside or modify any order. The form of the suit is not relevant. It is the substance which is to be seen. When the statute prescribed certain procedure and proceedings thereunder are held and an order passed, it is difficult to accept a contention that the proceeding and order can be modified or set aside in a civil suit filed by a third party. Section 293, is specific and does not admit the filing of a suit which has the effect of even indirectly setting aside or modifying any proceeding taken under the Act or order made thereunder. ..." In the case on hand, as already pointed out, the procedure prescribed by law is not allegedly followed. Section 293, is specific and does not admit the filing of a suit which has the effect of even indirectly setting aside or modifying any proceeding taken under the Act or order made thereunder. ..." In the case on hand, as already pointed out, the procedure prescribed by law is not allegedly followed. The bar of the suit imposed under section 36 of the Act steps in if the plaintiff is questioning the validity of any assessment order or decision made by any officer or authority or seeking modification or setting aside of any such order or decision. No any order or decision made by the officer or authority falls for consideration in the three suits. The plaintiff is alleging that the account books, records and files, floppies, etc., are taken away without following the procedure prescribed under law. It is also clear that the suit does not relate to any other matter falling within the scope of any authority or the officer since taking away the account books, records and files, floppies, etc., by the authority without following due procedure prescribed cannot be allowed under the law and the same is illegal. Therefore, we are of the clear opinion that the suit, in so far as it relates to the relief of return of the account books, records and files, floppies, etc., allegedly seized, is maintainable as that disputed question has to be decided with reference to the evidence that will be adduced by both sides. It is contended by the learned Advocate-General that this question of fact as well can be raised in the appeal. This argument would not stand since the taking away of the account books, records and files, floppies, etc., if found to be true, as alleged by the plaintiff, is an illegal act. That apart, to allow the department to sit in judgment over the disputed fact of the department taking away the account books, records and files, floppies, etc., is opposed to principles of natural justice. Nobody can be judge of his own cause. Natural justice embodies a wider principle of fairness in decision making. That apart, to allow the department to sit in judgment over the disputed fact of the department taking away the account books, records and files, floppies, etc., is opposed to principles of natural justice. Nobody can be judge of his own cause. Natural justice embodies a wider principle of fairness in decision making. Now, we will take up the second prayer, namely, interdicting the commercial tax authorities from taking any action against the plaintiff or issuing any notice like show cause, etc., or from passing any orders till the account books, records and files, floppies, etc., which are allegedly taken away by the defendants are returned to the plaintiff. The learned Senior Counsel, Sri Prakash Reddy, contends that this relief flows from the first relief and is thereby consequential in nature. While dealing with the maintainability of the first prayer, we made the judgment on the ground that the allegation that the commercial tax authorities taking away the account books, records and files, floppies, etc., is a question of fact. However, it may be apt to point out certain things here. An omnibus allegation is made in the plaint that all the books, records, files and floppies were taken away by the defendants without issuing any receipt or acknowledgement, as if nothing is left out unseized. The plaintiff has its own establishment and an accountant who is authorised to sign the returns, etc., on behalf of the firm. The turnover of the plaintiff company is in crores of rupees. It is having sub-dealers. There must be a galaxy of accountants working under the Chief Accountant. The plaintiff has its own auditors too. We would have appreciated, had the plaintiff given the details of the books, files, floppies, etc., allegedly seized by the defendants. The accounts section of the plaintiff must be perfectly knowing what are the books, records and files, etc., seized. It is not as if the plaintiff is a novice to the business. It is a well established company doing large scale business. The plaintiff has made to himself a protective umbrella under the sweeping allegation and is seeking the second relief. It is not as if the plaintiff is a novice to the business. It is a well established company doing large scale business. The plaintiff has made to himself a protective umbrella under the sweeping allegation and is seeking the second relief. Though it is alleged that the clear sweep of the records is made by seizing all of them in the inspection dated March 14, 2005 and March 17, 2005, the plaintiff addressed letters to the defendants for return of the books seized only on April 15, 2005 nearly a month after alleged seizure. In these circumstances, the bona fides of the plaintiff are not without doubt. The lower court observed that some of the documents are produced by the defendants. It does not automatically flow therefrom that all the books were seized. It shall also be pointed out here that the manufacturer and supplier of Hero Honda motorcycles, of the plaintiff and its sub-dealers will be maintaining parallel accounts. It may not be difficult for the plaintiff to reconstruct the sale records, in case of any eventuality. Under the guise of the allegation that everything was seized, which is outrightly denied by the defendants, the plaintiff is seeking the second relief of permanent injunction against the defendants. An unscrupulous dealer may file a suit making similar allegations, seek a temporary injunction and stall any proceedings before the commercial tax authorities for years together leading to undesirable consequences and causing huge loss to the public exchequer. In fact, he may frustrate the proceedings before the commercial tax authorities. We should take abundant care not to keep in store for the dealers a Pandora's box to be opened as it would defeat the object behind legislating section 36 of the Act. Once the dealer is permitted to get over the bar and institute proceedings on one pretext or the other, the intention of the Legislature would get frustrated and the provisions of section 36 of the Act will be rendered nugatory. Now coming to the plea that the second prayer is consequential in nature, we must opine that what the plaintiff could not achieve directly it is seeking to achieve indirectly under the garb of consequential prayer. Now coming to the plea that the second prayer is consequential in nature, we must opine that what the plaintiff could not achieve directly it is seeking to achieve indirectly under the garb of consequential prayer. He wants to stop the quasi-judicial authorities from initiating proceedings or passing orders in exercise of the statutory powers vested in them and that way stall the proceedings to be initiated and orders to be passed, for years or decades together. It is the so-called consequential relief that does all the mischief. The defendants alleged that the plaintiff evaded a startling and whopping sum of Rs. 6,70,54,574 of tax for the three years, 2002-03, 2003-04 and 2004-05. The said consequential relief falls within the realm of the second limb of section 36 of the Act namely "or in respect of any other matter falling within its or his scope". The relief, if granted, would prevent the authorities from reopening the assessment and passing orders thereon. In other words, it restrains the authorities from performing statutory functions, such a relief in our opinion cannot be granted as a consequential relief. The suits are not filed seeking any declaratory relief. There is yet another dimension. There is a hierarchy of Tribunals after the assessment is made or orders are made after reopening of the assessment. The plaintiff will have an opportunity to approach the appellate authority, which is endowed with the power to stay the proceedings of the lower authority, to confirm, reduce, enhance or annul the assessment or penalty or both, to set aside the assessment or penalty or both and direct the assessing authority to pass fresh order after such further enquiry as may be directed or such other orders as it may thinks fit. It has also got power to make such enquiry as it deems fit or remand the matter to any subordinate officer or authority for an enquiry and report on any specified point or points. Of course, the appeal has got to be filed within 30 days from the date on which the order or proceeding was served on the assessee. After the lapse of 30 days also, the appellate authority can entertain the appeal within a further period of 30 days provided sufficient cause is shown. The appellate authority is clothed with all the powers of the court. As already pointed out, a further appeal lies to the Sales. After the lapse of 30 days also, the appellate authority can entertain the appeal within a further period of 30 days provided sufficient cause is shown. The appellate authority is clothed with all the powers of the court. As already pointed out, a further appeal lies to the Sales. Tax Appellate Authority against the orders passed by the appellate authority within 60 days from the date of receipt of the appellate authority's orders by the dealer. The Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal is given discretion to entertain the appeal even after limitation within a further period of 60 days provided it is satisfied that the dealer had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within the period prescribed. The Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal has the same powers as are vested in a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure including the power to punish for contempt. If the suits ended in favour of the plaintiff, the said fact can be brought to the notice of either the appellate authority or the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal, which have got power to annul, set aside the assessment or remand the matter to the assessing authority. Thus, the dealer has opportunity at different stages to agitate his case if the suits are decreed in his favour. If a direction is given for early disposal of the suits it would enable the plaintiff to approach either the appellate authority or the Sales Tax Appellate Tribunal before the logical termination of the proceedings of the reassessment, if any, made. At this juncture, we have to mention that the learned Advocate - General stated across the Bar that if assessment is reopened it will be made only on the basis of the statements/returns submitted to income-tax and sales tax departments and bank. In such a case, all the documents which the plaintiff wants return and the details of which are not furnished in the plaint are not necessary to give his explanation before the commercial tax authorities. Therefore, for the foregoing reasons we are of the opinion that the suits in so far as they related to the second relief of permanent injunction cannot be maintained. In the result, these three C.R.Ps. are allowed in part with proportionate costs setting aside the order of the I-Additional Junior Civil Judge, Vijayawada made in I.A. Nos. 747, 748 and 749 of 2005, respectively, in O.S. Nos. In the result, these three C.R.Ps. are allowed in part with proportionate costs setting aside the order of the I-Additional Junior Civil Judge, Vijayawada made in I.A. Nos. 747, 748 and 749 of 2005, respectively, in O.S. Nos. 1069, 1074 and 1079 of 2005, respectively to the extent those orders related to the second relief in the suits, i.e., for permanent injunction restraining the defendants from taking any action against the plaintiff or issuing any notice like show cause, etc., or from passing any orders till the account books, records and files, floppies of the plaintiff, which are taken away by them are duly returned to the plaintiff. The three I. As, in so far as the above second relief is concerned, are allowed. In other respects the impugned orders stand confirmed. The lower court is directed to dispose of the suits within four months from the date of filing of written statement. J. CHELAMESWAR J. After the judgment is pronounced, the learned Senior Counsel Sri Prakash Reddy, submitted that in view of the decision, the proceedings for reopening of the assessments would now continue, and there is need for him to reply the show cause notice issued and therefore, some reasonable time be fixed to enable the respondents to reply the show cause notice. Heard the learned Advocate-General. In the circumstances, we deem it appropriate to grant five weeks time to the respondents, to offer whatever explanation they wish to the show cause notice already issued, from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.