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2006 DIGILAW 3613 (PNJ)

Anguri Devi v. Jasmer Singh

2006-09-20

VINOD K.SHARMA

body2006
JUDGMENT Vinod K. Sharma, J. - CM No. 23220-CII of 2005 For the reasons stated in the application the same is allowed. The order dated 20.5.2005 is recalled. The revision petition is restored to its original number and is taken up for hearing on merit. CR No. 1874 of 1993 2. Present revision petition has been filed against the order dated 14.5.1993 passed by the learned Sub Judge First Class, Rajpura vide which plaint was ordered to be returned to the petitioner for presentation before the Revenue Court by holding that the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to decide the matter in view of the provisions of Section 77(3)(n) of third Group and thus, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court was barred under Section 14 of the Punjab Tenancy Act (for short the Act). 3. The plaintiff-petitioner had filed a suit for mesne profit regarding the agricultural land measuring 84 Bighas 10 Biswas against the defendant- respondent on the plea he was in unauthorized possession of the land. It was further the case of the plaintiff-petitioner that the defendantrespondent had created a forged Will of Jai Singh deceased, father of the petitioner in respect of the suit land in his favour who was initially in possession of the suit land as a licencee and relative of the plaintiff from 1969. Later on, the respondent started claiming himself to be the owner of the suit land and filed a suit for permanent injunction on the basis of alleged forged Will of Jai Singh and obtained an ad-interim injunction against the plaintiff on 21.5.1974. The plaintiff-petitioner also filed a suit for possession of the suit land on 21.8.1974. Both the suits were consolidated. The suit filed by the plaintiff was decreed and that of defendant-respondent was dismissed. 4. During the pendency of Regular Second Appeal before this Court, the petitioner filed a suit for recovery of Rs. 6,04,800/- as mesne profits for unauthorized possession of the suit land. Consequently, on the dismissal of the Regular Second Appeal by this Court the petitioner in execution also took possession of the land in dispute. 5. The suit was contested by the respondent and on the pleadings of the parties the following issues were framed :- 1. Whether the plaintiff is the owner of the suit land and is entitled to recover Rs. 6,04,800/- as mesne profits from the defendant ?OPP 2. 5. The suit was contested by the respondent and on the pleadings of the parties the following issues were framed :- 1. Whether the plaintiff is the owner of the suit land and is entitled to recover Rs. 6,04,800/- as mesne profits from the defendant ?OPP 2. Whether this court has no jurisdiction to try and decide the present suit ? OPD 3. Whether the plaintiff is estopped by her act and conduct from filing the present suit ? OPD 4. Relief. 6. Even though the parties had led evidence on all the issues, the learned Trial Court decided only issue No. 2 and gave no findings on other issues even though it was incumbent upon the Court to have given findings on all the issues where the parties have led evidence and issue No. 2 was not treated as preliminary issue. On issue No. 2 learned Trial Court came to the conclusion that suit for mesne profits regarding agricultural land was not maintainable before the Civil Court as the jurisdiction was barred under section 77(3)(n) read with Section 14 of the Act. In order to reach to this conclusion the learned Trial Court placed reliance on the Division Bench Judgment of this Court in Pritam Singh v. Mehal Singh and others, 1986 P.L.J. 153. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the learned Trial Court has erred in law in placing reliance on the judgment of this Court referred to above as the same was contrary to the law laid down by Honble Supreme Court in Shri Raja Durga Singh of Solon v. Tholu and others, 1962 P.L.R. 837 wherein it has been held as under : "5. We are not concerned with second proviso. Below the second proviso the kind of suits which are triable by the revenue courts are set out in three groups. It is contended on behalf of the respondents that the suit in question would fall under entry (e) in the second group. We are not concerned with second proviso. Below the second proviso the kind of suits which are triable by the revenue courts are set out in three groups. It is contended on behalf of the respondents that the suit in question would fall under entry (e) in the second group. That entry reads thus : "Suits by a landlord to eject a tenant." They also contend that their suit before the revenue court was one under entry (d) which reads thus : "Suits by a tenant to establish a claim to a right of occupancy, or by a landlord to prove that a tenant has not such a right :" It would, however, appear that not only items (d) and (e) but every other item in the three groups relates to a dispute between tenants on the one hand and the landlord on the other. There is no entry or item relating to a suit by or against a person claiming to be a tenant and whose status as a tenant is not admitted by the landlord. It would, therefore, be reasonable to infer that the legislature barred only those suits from the cognizance of a civil court where there was no dispute between the parties that a person cultivating land or who was in possession of land was a tenant. This is precisely what has been held in the two decisions of the Lahore High Court relied upon by Mr. Achhru Ram. In the first of these two cases Tek Chand J., observed: "It is obvious that the bar under clause (d) is applicable to those cases only in which the relationship of landlord and tenant is admitted and the object of the suit is to determine the nature of the tenancy i.e., whether the status of the tenant falls under sections 5, 6, 7 or 8 of the Act." In that case the suit was instituted by someone claiming to succeed to the tenancy of certain land on the death of the occupancy tenant. The learned Judge observed : "In a suit like the one before us the point for decision is not the nature of the tenancy,but whether the defendant is related to the deceased tenant and if so whether their common ancestor had occupied the land. If these facts are established, the claimant ipso facto succeeds to the occupancy tenancy. The learned Judge observed : "In a suit like the one before us the point for decision is not the nature of the tenancy,but whether the defendant is related to the deceased tenant and if so whether their common ancestor had occupied the land. If these facts are established, the claimant ipso facto succeeds to the occupancy tenancy. But if they are found against him, he is not a tenant at all." 8. Learned counsel for the respondent has also placed reliance on a Division Bench judgment of this Court in Sarwan Singh and others v. Ajmer Singh and another, 1992 PLJ 422. In the said judgment reliance was placed on the judgment of this Court in Pritam Singhs case (supra). However, it may be noticed that in the said judgment also the judgment of Honble Supreme Court was not considered. 9. In view of the law laid down by Honble Supreme Court in Sarwan Singhs case (supra) the order passed by the learned Trial Court cannot be sustained as there is no relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties as admittedly, the respondent had filed a suit for permanent injunction restraining the defendant from interfering with his possession by claiming himself to be the owner of the property. 10. Accordingly, the revision petition is allowed. Findings on issue No. 2 recorded by the learned Trial Court are reversed and it is held that the Civil Court has jurisdiction to entertain and try the suit. There will be no bar to the respondent taking all available objections on merit against the suit filed by the plaintiff. Petition allowed.