JUDGMENT As per Hon'ble Shri Sunil Kumar Sinha, J. :- 1. This appeal is directed against the judgment and decree dated 11.5.200 I passed in Civil Suit No. 16.A/1999 by the District Judge, Rajnandgaon (C.G) whereby the plaintiffs suit for declaration of title, possession and damages has been dismissed. 2. The plaintiff filed a suit for declaration, possession and damages in relation to the two suit houses described in Schedule A & B of the Plaint. He further prayed that the registered sale deed dated 04.11.1987, executed by Phoolbasa Bai (original defendant no. 1 who died during the pendency of the suit) in favour of defendant no.5, which relates to some portion of suit house, be declared illegal, void and not binding on him. 3. The following is the pedigree shown by the plaintiff in para 2 of the plaint : Shivram (died in 1932) I 2006(2) C.G.L.J. 304 IChhatrapati (Son) (died in 1945) . I Phoolbasa Sai (kept) dfd. no. I I Mannulal son) (died unmarried on 14-4-1967) ( Ganeshram (son) (Plaintiff) Shyamlal (son) Radhabai (died in 1973) (daughter) ~~--I--~I Laxmibai Gangabai (daughter) (daughter) 4. According to the plaint allegations the suit properties were the self acquired properties of Shiv Ram, who died in the year 1932. He was having two issues namely Sumitra Sai (daughter) and Chhatrapati (son). Sumitra Sai was called by Shiv Ram to live in his house and she was through out residing with her father and was looking after his properties. The further allegations are that Phoolbasa Sai, the original defendant no. I was not the married wife of Chhatrapati as she was living as a concubine alongwith him because his married wife had left his company. The son born out of relations of Chhatrapati and Phoolbasa Sai anmely Mannulal died unmarried on 14.4.1967. Chhatrapati also died in the year 1945. From the wedlock of Sumitra Sai and her husband, there were two issues namely Shyamlal and Radha Sai. The plaintiff is son of Shyamlal and there are also three daughters of Shyamlal who are shown in the pedigree. Chhatrapati also died in the year 1945. From the wedlock of Sumitra Sai and her husband, there were two issues namely Shyamlal and Radha Sai. The plaintiff is son of Shyamlal and there are also three daughters of Shyamlal who are shown in the pedigree. The plaintiff mainly based his claim on the ground that since Sumitra Sai was called by her father, and was through out living alongwith him till his death in the year 1932 and was in exclusive possession of the suit houses even after 1932 till the year 1976 (till her death), she has perfected her title by way of adverse possession excluding right and interest of all other successors if any. About Phoolbasa Sai, he based his claim on the ground that she was not the validly married wife of Chhatrapati therefore the was having no right of interest in the suit properties It was further pleaded that Phoolbasa Bai executed a sale deed of certain portion of suit property in favour of defendant no.5 on 04.11.1987 i.e., during the pendency of the suit, therefore, the said sale deed would be void, inoperative and not binding on the plaintiff as Phoolbasa Bai was having no right or authority to execute such a document because she was not the owner of the property. More over, this document shall be subject to decision of the rights and ownership of Phoolbasa Bai as the same was executed during the pendency of the suit. After disclosure of the fact in the joint written statement about a will deed dated 18.8.1977, said to have been executed by Phoolbasa Bai in favour of respondents no, 1 to 4 it was pleaded by the plaintiff that the said will deed was a fraudulent document. He challenged the legality of will on many grounds including the right and authority of the executant to execute such a document. 5. Firstly the original defe!1dants namely Phoolbasa Bai and Gaya Prasad filed their joint written statement in which, after a formal denial of facts pleaded in plaint, their simple contention was that Shiv Ram, who died in the year 1932, left behind two issues namely Sumitra and Chhatrapati, Sumitra Bai was a married daughter. After the death of Shiv Ram in the year 1932, the entire property was succeeded by Chhatrapati (his only son). After the death of Shiv Ram in the year 1932, the entire property was succeeded by Chhatrapati (his only son). Phoolbasa bai was legally wedded wife of Ghhatrapati, therefore, she was .the absolute owner of the suit properties after the death of her husband; namely Chhatrapati, in the year 1945 who has succeeded the property excluding his sister namely Sumitra Bai. 6. When Phoolbasa Bai died during the pendency of the suit, she was substituted by defendants no. 1 to 4 who are her brother's sons and who claim the property on the strength of will deed executed in their favour on 18.8.1977. When they filed a separate written statement to this effect, in addition to the written statement filed by Smt. Phoolbasa and Gaya Prasad, then only the plea challenging validity of will was taken by the plaintiff by an amendment vide para 4-A in the plaint as has been stated earlier. 7. Defendant no.5 also filed a separate written statement who claimed to be the owner of the said portion of property for which a sale deed dated 04.11.1987 was executed in his favour. He took the plea of bona-fide purchaser along-with the supporting plea of absolute ownership of phoolbasa Bai. 8. The learned trial judge recorded the finding that Sumitra Bai had not perfected her title by way of adverse possession. He also recorded the finding that the plaintiff could not establish that Phoolbasa Bai, defendant no. 1, was a concubine of late Chhatrapati. He also recorded a finding that since Phoolbasa Bai was the absolute owner of the properties after the death of her husband, she was having full right and authority to execute the sale deed in favour of defendant no.5 and was also having authority to execute will dead dated 18.8.1977 in favour of the substituted defendants no. 1 to 4. He further recorded a finding that it was not established that the will was a fraudulent and fabricated document and lastly he recorded that defendant no. 5 was a bonafide purchaser. On these findings, the plaintiffs suit was dismissed and the judgment and decree was passed accordingly. It is against this judgment and decree, the plaintiff has filed this appeal. 9. Learned counsel for the appellant mainly argued 4 points. 5 was a bonafide purchaser. On these findings, the plaintiffs suit was dismissed and the judgment and decree was passed accordingly. It is against this judgment and decree, the plaintiff has filed this appeal. 9. Learned counsel for the appellant mainly argued 4 points. His first submission was that the court below committed an error of law by not holding that Sumitra Bai had perfected her title by way of adverse possession. Secondly, he argued that it has not been established on record that Phoolbasa Bai was a legally married wife of deceased Chhatrapati. Thirdly, learned counsel argued that since Phoolbasa Bai was not a legally wedded wife, she could not succeed the properties as its absolute owner and she will have no right or authority to execute a will deed or a sale deed as has been alleged by the defendants. In continuation he submitted that the execution of a valid will deed has not been established and defendants no. 1 to 4 shall not get any right or interest in the property on the strength of the alleged will. Lastly, about defendant no.5 he argued that he was not the bonafide purchaser and since he has purchased the property during the pendency of the suit, therefore, his sale is hit by doctrine of lis pendens. 10. On the contrary, learned counsel for the respondents opposed these arguments. They supported the plea of valid marriage, execution .of a valid will deed and sale deed creating right and interest in favour of the beneficiaries of these documents. 11. I have heard learned counsel for the parties at length and have also perused the records of the civil suit. 12. Firstly, I am taking the plea of adverse possession. The question of adverse possession is a question off act which has to be determined in each case after applying a correct test to the plea retained by a party. The matter receives much importance when a plea of adverse possession is raised not by the stranger to the family, but, either by the co-sharer or by a close relation of the actual owner of the property against whom the acquisition of title by adverse possession has been pleaded. Relying on the decisions in the matter of Nirmalchand Dasand others Vs. Mohitosh Das and othersl, Abdul Wahed Vs. Mohan Bashi Saha and others, and Jagannath Marawari and others Vs. Mst. Relying on the decisions in the matter of Nirmalchand Dasand others Vs. Mohitosh Das and othersl, Abdul Wahed Vs. Mohan Bashi Saha and others, and Jagannath Marawari and others Vs. Mst. Chandni Bibi and anothe, the High Court of Madhya Pradesh held in the matter of Beharilal s/o Ramlal Vs. Jagannath s/o Ramlal that the law is well settled that as between co-owners or the co-sharers, there could be no adverse possession unless there has been a denial of title and an ouster to the knowledge of the other. No comprehensive formula can be framed to test whether the possession of a co-owner in a particular case is adverse to the other. The denial of title and the animus to hold adversely should, however, be clear and evidenced by unequivocal conduct. It is not necessary, even in cases of co-owners that for ouster of the possession of the other co-owner must be by violent or intimidating exclusion or repulsion, or under notice of the adverse holding, brought home to other co-tenant by personal or formal communication. In order to constitute ouster, there should be an intention to exclude the other co-owner of the possession. Such intention is expressed either by assertion of exclusive title or by denial of the title of other co-owner or by merely keeping out of possession the other co-owner inspite of protest. Thus the law requires that not only there should be some overt act on the part of co-owner in possession, but that other co-owner should have either actual or constructive notice of such act. The knowledge of exclusion from joint family property or the ouster may be proved directly or inferentially. 13. So far as the case of close relations like married daughter etc., as the present case, is concerned, first of all the factum of very entry over the property is to be seen. What was the nature of possession held by her in the property is one of the basic test in relation to adverse possession. If the nature of possession is permissive, which is an exception of adverse possession, the possession even if held exclusively by such relation can never be adverse to the title of the actual owner. What was the nature of possession held by her in the property is one of the basic test in relation to adverse possession. If the nature of possession is permissive, which is an exception of adverse possession, the possession even if held exclusively by such relation can never be adverse to the title of the actual owner. A right to take such a plea is only available to a party if she can in any manner plead and prove an ouster to the knowledge of other side and can show her possession to be adverse against the true owner of the property. More or less, the principles which are applicable to the co-sharers are also applicable in case of close relations, who are in joint or exclusive possession. If we apply these principles to the facts of the present case, it would appear that it is the case of the plaintiff himself that Smt. Sumitra Bai, daughter of Shiv Ram was called by Shiv Ram from her matrimonial house to look after his properties. That was done because no body (elder member) was there in his family to look after the property and the only son of Shiv Ram namely Chhatrapati was not in a position to immediately take this charge. This plea is suggestive of the fact that the possession of the daughter over the father's property was permissive with an intention to look after the family property for certain personal reasons and unless an ouster is pleaded and proved by her, her possession cannot be held to be adverse to the right and interest of the father. This situation shall govern the legal position till death of the father i.e. till 1932. Apparently after that date when the son becomes the owner of the property, the same principle will apply against him also and unless an ouster is specifically pleaded and proved against the son, Chhatrapati i.e., the true owner of the property after the death of Shiv Ram, the possession of the daughter cannot be held to be adverse against him also. 14. 14. If we go through the evidence of the plaintiff (P.W.1) para 6, it would appear that all the family members were residing jointly in the suit house which were looked after by her mother and when some quarrel took place among the ladies in the family i.e., Phoolbasa and her mother, they left the house and started living in a house in Hamalpara. This all goes to show that even on the evidence of the plaintiff, all the persons were living jointly and if the ouster is not pleaded by a joint possession holder of the property, whose very entry in the property was of permissive in nature, her possession cannot be adverse to the title of the true owner of the property. 15. In the facts and circumstances of this case, the trial Court has rightly held that the plaintiff could not establish that Sumitra Bai had perfected her title by way of adverse possession. This finding recorded by the trial Court is upheld and the arguments advanced by learned counsel for the appellant that Sumitra Bai had perfected her title by way of adverse possession, cannot be accepted. 16. Now the point of valid marriage of Phoolbasa with Chhatrapati is being considered. This point has been dealt with as issue no. 4 by the trial Court and the finding in this regard has been recorded vide para 24 & 25 of the impugned judgment. Admittedly, the marriage is said to have taken place in the year 1932 and no ocular witness of marriage has been produced by either of the parties. However, it comes in the evidence of Kejuram (P.W.2) that Phoolbasa entered in the life of Chhatrapati after the death of his first wife namely Champi Bai. Defendant Witness no. 2 Abdul Hafiz aged about 65 years and defendant witness no. 7 Pandit Chandra Bhushan Mishra aged about 75 years have been examined on the factum of marriage Abdul Hafiz (D.W.2) has stated that he had seen Phoolbasa residing as wife of Chhatrapati for about 20 years whereas Chandra Bhushan Mishra (D. W. 7) stated that Phoolbasa was the legally married wife of Chhatrapati and she was living with Chhatrapati in his house at Juni Hatri, where she resided with him till his last breath. He has further stated that after the marriage, Chhatrapati remained alive for about 15-20 years and there was a son namely Mannulal out of wedlock of Chhatrapati and Phoolbasa. He further submits that though he had not gone to perform the marriage of Chhatrapati and Phoolbasa, but their marriage was performed by his father who has gone as a Priest and at that time, he was aged about 18-19 years. 17. What evidence may be available to prove a marriage of the year 1932-33 in the year 1994-1995 is a question to be considered. Certainly looking to the long lapse of time, ocular witnesses of that period may not be available. It has been held by the High Court of M.P. in the matter of Pravinbhai Uttamrao and others Vs. Nalinikant Kishandas and others, that continuous cohabitation between man and woman raises a presumption of marriage, but it is a rebut able presumption and if there are circumstances which weaken or destroy that presumption, the court cannot ignore them. 18. Similarly, it has been held by the Division Bench of the M.P. High Court in the matter of Rajaram Vishwakarma Vs. Deepabal, that it is clear law that that long cohabitation between a man and woman raises a strong presumption of marriage, particularly when children are born and such children are treated by the community as those of the man. Such presumption is raised when there is positive evidence that the woman has been continuously cohabiting with the particular man (see para 22 of the judgment). 19. Dealing with almost a similar issue in the matter of Sobha Hymavathi Devi Vs. Setti Gangadhara Swamy and others, the Apex Court laid down vide para 6 of the aforesaid judgment as under: "6. We find that the conclusion that there was a valid marriage between Murahari Rao, the father of the appellant and Simhachalam, the mother or the appellant, stands strengthened by the presumption available in law arising out of the long cohabitation of Murahari Rao and Simhachalam. The Privy Council in Mohabbat Ali Khan Vs. Mohd. Ibrahim Khan, held that the law presumes in favour of marriage and against concubinage, when a man and a woman have cohabited continuously for a number of years. This Court in Gokalchand Vs. The Privy Council in Mohabbat Ali Khan Vs. Mohd. Ibrahim Khan, held that the law presumes in favour of marriage and against concubinage, when a man and a woman have cohabited continuously for a number of years. This Court in Gokalchand Vs. Parvin Kumari, held that continuous cohabitation of a man and a woman as husband and wife and their treatment as such for a number of years may raise the presumption of marriage. But the presumption which may be drawn from long cohabitation is rebuttable, and if there are circumstances which weaken or destroy that presumption, the court cannot ignore them. We must say that on the evidence here, including the documentary evidence relied on by the High Court, the presumption arising from long cohabitation of Murahari Rao and Simhachalam of a valid marriage between them, gets strengthened and there is no material circumstance which can be said to rebut such presumption arising from long cohabitation. The arising of a presumption, though rebuttable, has also been noticed by this Court in S.P.S. Balasubramanyam Vs. Suruttayan, and in Ranganath Parmeshwar Pnaditrao Mali Vs. Eknath Gajanan Kulkarni. We may also incidentally notice that even assuming that there was any. Earlier marriage between Simhachalam, the mother of the appellant and Ladda Appala Swamy at a time when Simhachalam was allegedly eight years old, the same also can be presumed to have been terminated .especially in the context of the subsequent long cohabitation of Murahari Rao and Simhachalam and the evidence on the side of the appellant herself that the alleged marriage between Simhachalam and Ladda Appala Swamy was when Simhachalam was eight years old; that the said marriage was never consummated and that Simhachalam had left Ladda Appala Swamy immediately after marriage and had never lived with him. It is undisputed that divorce was permitted in the community. In this context the ratio of the decision in Raja Ram Vs. Deepa Bai, could be applied. Thus, on the whole, we agree with the finding of the High Court that there was a valid marriage between Murahari Rao and Simhachalam, the father and the mother of the appellant and that the appellant was a legitimate daughter of that union." 20. Deepa Bai, could be applied. Thus, on the whole, we agree with the finding of the High Court that there was a valid marriage between Murahari Rao and Simhachalam, the father and the mother of the appellant and that the appellant was a legitimate daughter of that union." 20. If we apply the above principles laid down in this regard, first of all, there appears to be strong presumption of marriage in this case as it is I apparent from the evidence that Phoolbasa and Chhatrapati resided as husband and wife for a reasonably long period and Phoolbasa resided in the house of the deceased as his wife till his death and after his death she also continued to live in his house as the widow of the deceased. The advantageous position in this case is that it comes from the statement of D.W.7 Pt. Chandra Bhushan Mishra that his father had gone as a priest to perform the marriage of Phoolbasa and Chhatrapati and at that time, he was a person of such an age, who can notice this fact. More over, as laid down by the M.P. High Court in Pravinbai Uttamrao's cases (supra), there appears to be no circumstance which may weaken or destroy the presumption of marriage between them. In the facts and circumstances of this case and also on the basis of evidence led by the parties, the trial Court has rightly held that Phoolbasa was the legally married wife of the deceased and the arguments that the factum of valid marriage has not been proved cannot be accepted. 21. The next point is about the validity of will dated 18.8.1977. This will has been proved as Ex.P.113. After giving judgment and finding on the factum of marriage and also on the ground of adverse possession, the question of right and authority to execute the will does not remain alive for consideration. The only question remains to be considered as to whether a valid execution of the will is proved or not. In this case, the will is said to have been executed in favour of defendants no. 1 to 4 who were the sons of real brother of Phoolbasa. Phoolbasa has called her brother to live with her and to look after her properties and ultimately the will dated 18.8. 1977 was executed. There are two attesting witnesses of will. In this case, the will is said to have been executed in favour of defendants no. 1 to 4 who were the sons of real brother of Phoolbasa. Phoolbasa has called her brother to live with her and to look after her properties and ultimately the will dated 18.8. 1977 was executed. There are two attesting witnesses of will. Their names are Chhotulal Mistri and Sitaram Pardesi. It comes in para 33 of the judgment that both the attesting witnesses are not alive. Only the scribe of will namely Chandra Sekhar Shrivastava, who was a document writer was alive and he has been examined as D.W.3. He states in his examination-in-chief that he had written two documents on the same day i.e., one Muktamama and this Vasiyatnama. He proved his signature on portion "A" to "A" of EX.D. 113 and stated that the person executing the will had marked her thumb impression before him. He further stated that two witnesses of will had also signed before him and the will was got executed. About Muktamama, he stated that it was also written on the same day which has been field as EX.D.72 and it was also signed by the witnesses and the executant thereof. 22. The law in relation to the valid execution of the will is well settled. It has been held by the Apex Court in the matter of H. Venkataehala Iyengar Vs. B.N. Thimmajamma and others that the party propounding a will or otherwise making a claim under a will is no doubt seeking to prove a document and, in deciding how it is to be proved, reference must inevitably be made to the statutory provisions which govern the proof of documents. Sections 67 and 68 of the Evidence Act are relevant for this purpose. Under S. 67, if a document is alleged to be signed by any person, the signature of the said person must be proved to be in his handwriting, and for proving such a handwriting under Ss. 45 and 47 of the Act the opinions of experts and of persons acquainted with the handwriting of the person concerned are made relevant. Under S. 67, if a document is alleged to be signed by any person, the signature of the said person must be proved to be in his handwriting, and for proving such a handwriting under Ss. 45 and 47 of the Act the opinions of experts and of persons acquainted with the handwriting of the person concerned are made relevant. Section 68 deals with the proof of the execution of the document required by law to be attested; and it provides that such a document shall not be used as evidence until one attesting witness at least has been called for the purpose of proving its execution. These provisions prescribe the requirements and the nature of proof which must be satisfied by the party who relies on a document in a Court of law. Similarly, Ss. 59 and 63 of the Indian Succession Act are also relevant. Thus the question as to whether the will set up by the propounder is proved to be the last will of the testator has to be decided in the light of these provisions. It would prima facie be true to say that the will has to be proved like any other document except as to the special requirements of attestation prescribed by S. 63 of the Indian Succession Act. As in the case of proof of other documents so in the case of proof of wills it would be idle to expect proof with mathematical certainty. The test to be applied would be the usual test of the satisfaction of the prudent mind in such matters. It has been further held by the Apex Court that the propounder would be called upon to show by satisfactory evidence that the will was signed by the testator, that the testator at the relevant time was in a sound and disposing state of mind, that he understood the nature and effect of the dispositions and put his signature to the document of his own free will." 23. Following the above decision, the Apex Court further held in the matter of Smt. Jaswant Kaur Vs. Smt. Amrit Kaur and othersl4, that in cases where the execution of a will is surrounded in suspicion, its proof ceases to be a simple lis between the plaintiff and the defendant. Following the above decision, the Apex Court further held in the matter of Smt. Jaswant Kaur Vs. Smt. Amrit Kaur and othersl4, that in cases where the execution of a will is surrounded in suspicion, its proof ceases to be a simple lis between the plaintiff and the defendant. What, generally, is an adversary proceeding becomes in such cases a matter of the court's conscience and then the true question which arises for consideration is whether the evidence led by the propounder of the will is such as to satisfy the conscience of the court that the will was duly executed by the testator. It is impossible to reach such satisfaction unless the party which sets up the will offers a cogent and convincing explanation of the suspicious circumstances surrounding the making of the will. 24. It was again held by the Apex Court in the matter of Janki Narayan Bhoir Vs. Narayan Namdeo Kadam 15, that on a combined reading of section 63 of the Succession Act with section 68 of the Evidence Act, it appears that a person propounding the will has got to prove that the will was duly and validly executed. That cannot be done by simply proving that the signature on the will was that of the testator but must also prove that attestations were also made properly as required by clause (c) of Section 63 of the Succession Act. The Apex Court further held that it is true that section 68 of the Evidence Act does not say that both or all the attesting witnesses must be examined. But at least one attesting witness has to be called for proving due execution of the will as envisaged in section 63. 25. Therefore, it is apparent that if the attesting witnesses, atleast one of them are alive and are capable of giving evidence before the court, they are required to be brought before the Court and a valid execution has to be proved in accordance with the above provisions of law. However, section 71 of the Evidence Act is in the nature of safeguard to the mandatory provision of section 68 to meet the situation where it is not possible to prove the execution of the will by calling attesting witnesses though alive. However, section 71 of the Evidence Act is in the nature of safeguard to the mandatory provision of section 68 to meet the situation where it is not possible to prove the execution of the will by calling attesting witnesses though alive. No doubt, if the attesting witnesses are not alive these provisions may not be availed by a party, but the law permits that in such situation a valid execution can be proved by other evidence, may be the evidence of the scribe, but a settled position of law is that the scribe of a will cannot be treated as an attesting witness particularly when he has not signed the will as "Animo Attesestendi ". 26. If we apply the above law in the present matter it would appear that the attesting witnesses were not examined because they were not alive and will has been proved by only examining the scribe as P.W.3. Though it has been stated by the Scribe that he has drafted and typed the will on the instructions of the testatrix, but this fact appears to be false on the face of the document itself; There are many suspicious circumstances appearing on the face of document which go to suggest that in fact, nothing was drafted or typed by the scribe on the instructions of the testatrix, but a typed matter was placed before him for getting it registered showing as the will of the testatrix. First of all, it would appear that though the will has ended in the very second sheet but there is no space left for signature of the scribe and the scribe has inserted his signature in between the last two lines by using an ink pen. Secondly it appears that the complete date like 18.8.1977 was not typed in the second page and only -8-1977 was typed and figures like 18 have been inserted by an ink pen showing as the document was executed on 18.8.1977. EX.D-72 Muktarnama was also written and signed on the said date and the suspicious circumstance appears that when this document (Muktarnama) was being executed, the thumb impression over the alleged will was also taken by the beneficiaries and the document writer was shown to be the Scribe of the document whereas, in fact, the document was not scribed by him. EX.D-72 Muktarnama was also written and signed on the said date and the suspicious circumstance appears that when this document (Muktarnama) was being executed, the thumb impression over the alleged will was also taken by the beneficiaries and the document writer was shown to be the Scribe of the document whereas, in fact, the document was not scribed by him. Another important circumstance is that the original defendant namely Smt. Phoolbasa had died on 20.9.1992 after filing of her written statement on 14.7.1987. The date of execution of the will is 18.8.1977 but there is no whisper of her will in her written statement which she had filed on the said date. Though it was not a requirement of law, but under a normal human nature if she has pleaded the detailed administration of property, vide para 9 of her written statement, right from its acquisition by Shiv Ram to the date of filing of the suit, (please see para 9 of the written statement). She should have mentioned something about the will, if this alleged will was in her knowledge and she in fact had executed the same in favour of defendant no. 1 to 4. These circumstances which are highly suspicious, have not been removed or cleared by the beneficiaries of the will and only by examining the scribe, who is not an attesting witness and whose statement is not very satisfactory in appreciation on all above points, particularly in the situation when the testatrix was residing in the dominion of the beneficiaries and their father and was keeping a fiduciary relations with them, it cannot be held that a due execution of will has been proved by the defendants in accordance with the provisions of section 68 or other provisions of the Evidence Act. The finding recorded by the court below that due execution of the will is proved, is not in accordance with law and the same is set aside. The will is held to be not proved in this case. 27. Coming to the last point about the sale deed executed in favour of defendant no. 5, this point has been dealt with vide issue no. 19 in the trial Court. This sale deed has been proved as EX.D.72-A. This document is dated 19.10.1987. The will is held to be not proved in this case. 27. Coming to the last point about the sale deed executed in favour of defendant no. 5, this point has been dealt with vide issue no. 19 in the trial Court. This sale deed has been proved as EX.D.72-A. This document is dated 19.10.1987. The witnesses Nand Kumar Chaurasia (D.W.4), Mukesh KUmar Chaurasia (D.W.5), Sharad Shrivastava (D.W.6) and Mahesh Kumar Sharma (D.W.8) have been examined on the point of execution of the sale deed. It appears from their evidence that the sale deed was executed and got registered after calling Sub-Registrar in the house of the executant and after payment of due consideration. It has not been brought on record by evidence that the purchaser was having the knowledge of pendency of suit 'or a dispute between the parties. After appreciation of their evidence, it clearly appears that the purchaser in all his bonafide has purchased this property from the seller and a due and valid execution of the document has been proved. Since I have already held that the seller namely Smt. Phoolbasa was the absolute owner of the property, she was having full authority to alienate this property to the subsequent purchaser and if she has executed a sale deed on 19.10.1987 (Ex.D-731 A) and the purchaser has bonafidely purchased this property, it cannot be said that the aforesaid transaction was bad in law . 28. So far as the arguments of lis pendens is concerned, it has to be borne in mind that section 52 of the Transfer of the Property Act does not wipe out the sale, which was pendente-lite but subordinates it to the rights in suit decree. Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act intends to prevent one party to a suit making an assignment inconsistent with the rights which may be established in the suit and which may require a further party to be impleaded in order to make effective the Court's decree as the doctrine of lis pendens not only binds the parties to the suit, but also purchasers pendente-lite in relation to the subject-matter of the suit. Section 52 of the Act does not wipe out the sale pendente-lite altogether, but subordinates it to the rights based on the decree in the suit. Section 52 of the Act does not wipe out the sale pendente-lite altogether, but subordinates it to the rights based on the decree in the suit. The transfer pendente-lite is, good except to the extent that it might conflict with rights decreed under 'the decree or order. (Please see Nagu Bai Ammal Vs. B. Shama Rao & ors, Ashok Kumar Vs. Sunnukhan and Kamta Prasad and others Vs. Vidyawati and others). 29. In the facts and circumstances, the sale in favour of defendant no.5 was a valid sale and the same cannot be held to be illegal, void and not binding against the plaintiff. The arguments advanced in this regard cannot be accepted. 30. Now the question arises, that should be the legal position after the death of Smt. phoolbasa and her son namely Mannulal when it has been held that the alleged wil1 executed in favour of defendants no. 1 to 4 was not proved Certainly these properties were succeeded by her from her husband or from her father in law, therefore according to section 15(2)(b) of the Hindu Succession Act, this shall devolve, in the absence of any son or daughter of the deceased (including the children of any predeceased son or daughter) upon the heirs of her husband. In this case, if we look to the pedigree set forth in the plaint, the succeeding heir of her husband, namely Chhatrapati, would be sister's daughter which finds place as serial no.4 in Entry IV of Class II of Schedule. When Radha Bai, the sister's daughter is said to be alive on the date of succession according to the plaint allegations itself, then the plaintiff, in the reversionary right will not get the ownership of the property. 31. In the result, the appeal is dismissed. The judgment and decree passed by the trial Court are hereby confirmed with the aforesaid modifications in the finding regarding the will. Looking to the facts and circumstances of this case, there shall be no orders as to costs. Appeal Dismissed.