ORDER 1. This suit relates to a dispute regarding the boundaries between the States of Orissa and Andhra Pradesh. The State of Orissa which is the plaintiff claims that certain villages which fell within the territory of Orissa were being trespassed upon by the State of Andhra Pradesh. 2. The State of Andhra Pradesh raised certain preliminary objections including, inter alia, the objection that the suit was not maintainable before this Court in its original jurisdiction by virtue of the proviso to Article 131 of the Constitution of India. 3. The factual dispute relates to the question whether certain villages should form part of Salur or Pottangi taluk. Pottangi taluk appears to be within the territory of the State of Orissa whereas Salur within the territory of Andhra Pradesh. According to the State of Orissa a portion of Salur taluk plan falls within the State of Orissa. This is disputed by the State of Andhra Pradesh. 4. "On 1-12-1920, the Governor General-in-Council with the sanction of the Secretary of State for India directed that with effect from 1-12-1920, a new district called the Agency division comprising of the agency tracts of the Ganjam, Vijagapatam and Godavari districts would be constituted with Waltair as its headquarters. Pottangi is mentioned as comprising of Pottangi and the Agency villages of Salur taluk in the Parvatipuram division and made part of Ghat Agency of Waltair. On 8-10-1923, a second notification was issued by the Governor General-in-Council with the sanction of the Secretary of the State for India restoring and reconstituting certain districts in the Ganjam, Vijagapatam and Godavari districts. The Agency division constituted under notification dated 6-11-1920 was abolished with effect from 16-9-1923. A third notification was issued on 15-10-1927 by the Governor General-in-Council which was published on 25-10-1927 in the Official Gazette. The notification directed that "with effect from 1-12-1927, 115 villages of the old Salur agency, detailed in the list appended to the notification, now forming part of the Pottangi taluk of the Koraput sub-division shall be transferred to the Salur taluk of the Parvatipuram sub-division and shall be constituted as a separate agency (Salur agency)." This notification, according to the State of Andhra Pradesh, was subsequently amended by another notification dated 8-5-1928. 5. 5. In 1936 under the proviso to Section 289 sub-section (1) of the Government of India Act, 1935, the Constitution of Orissa Order, 1936 was passed carving out a new Province to be known as the Province of Orissa out of parts of Bihar, Orissa, Presidency of Madras and the Central Provinces. Para 3 of the Order provided that the new Province would consist of the area specified in Part I of the First Schedule to the Order. The external land boundaries were also specified in Part II of the Schedule. Paras 3 and 4( 1) of the Order provided for: "3. If any question arises with respect to the boundaries as existing at the date of this Order, of any district, agency, taluk, village, estate, forest or other area referred to in the said Schedule or otherwise with respect to the delimitation of the boundary of Orissa, that question shall be referred to the Governor General, whose decision thereon shall be final. 4. (1) The date on which the said provisions are to come into operation shall be the first day of April, nineteen hundred and thirty-six." 6. A map was prepared by one Gilby, Assistant Director of Survey and Land Records, Government of Madras, which sought to delineate the borders between the two Provinces of Madras and Orissa. According to the Andhra Pradesh Government the map was accepted by both the Provinces and an agreement was reached between them on 15-5-1943 accepting the Gilby Report. Reliance has been placed on an order passed by the Governor General-in-Council with regard to the demarcation of the correct boundaries between the erstwhile States of Madras and Orissa and recording that the boundaries "now settled has been accepted by the Government of Orissa". It is the submission of the State of Andhra Pradesh that this letter was the approval by the Governor General-in-Council in terms of para 3 of the Order, 1936 and therefore there was in fact no pending dispute between the parties. 7. The State of Andhra Pradesh was formed out of the erstwhile Presidency of Madras in 1953 by the Andhra Pradesh Act of 1953; in terms of Article 1 (2) of the Constitution of India, the territories of Andhra Pradesh were specified against Item 1 of the First Schedule to the Constitution of India. Orissa has been mentioned against Item 10 of that Schedule. Orissa has been mentioned against Item 10 of that Schedule. As far as the State of Orissa. is concerned, the territories have been described as follows: "10. The territories which immediately before the commencement of this Constitution were either comprised in the Province of Orissa or were being administered as if they formed part of that Province." 8. The present suit was filed by the State of Orissa in 1968 in which it has, inter alia, challenged the 1927 notification and the Gilby Report and has claimed that the 1927 notification has never been given effect to. In short the claim is that the allocation of villages which was made in 1920 to the Pottangi taluk continued and continues till today. However, its grievance is that the State of Andhra Pradesh was wrongfully trespassing into certain I villages on the basis of the 1927 notification and on the allegation that the Province of Orissa had accepted the Gilby Report and that the Central Government had accepted the position. 9. In view of this averment the question is whether this Court's jurisdiction could be invoked under Article 131 of the Constitution of India. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the State of Andhra Pradesh, submitted that the provisions of Article 131 were subject to the other provisions of the Constitution and that since the territories of State of Orissa had been demarcated under the First Schedule read with Article 1 (2) of the Constitution of India, this Court could not adjudicate on the same. The second limb of the argument is that the proviso to Article 131 showed that this Court could not go into any dispute relating to any "treaty, agreement, covenant, engagement, sanad or other similar instrument which, having been entered into or executed before the commencement of this Constitution, continues in operation after such commencement, or which provides that the said jurisdiction was not extended to such a dispute". The argument is that the challenge to the 1927 notification as well as to the 1943 agreement between the parties namely the erstwhile Provinces of Orissa and Madras would fall within the exclusionary clause in the proviso. The argument is that the challenge to the 1927 notification as well as to the 1943 agreement between the parties namely the erstwhile Provinces of Orissa and Madras would fall within the exclusionary clause in the proviso. This apart from the question that the jurisdiction of this Court could be taken to have been curtailed by virtue of para 3 of the 1936 Order which gave the exclusive jurisdiction to the Governor General-in-Council (now Parliament) to decide any territorial dispute between the parties relating to their boundaries. 10. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the State of Orissa, however, submitted that from the entry as against Entry 10 to the First Schedule, it was clear that the territory of Orissa covered not only cases which were "comprised in the Province of Orissa" but also those territories which "were being administered as if they formed part of the Province". It was the State's case that the disputed villages were being administered continuously by Orissa. It was further submitted that the disputes raised in the plaint did not arise out of any treaty, agreement, etc. since it was the State's case that the notification of 1927 was entirely void. It was not, according to the plaint, a document which created any legal right. 11. Having heard the submissions of the parties we are of the view that the proviso to Article 131 clearly indicates that this Court cannot entertain suits between the States relating to disputes arising out of agreements, san ad, etc. as particularised earlier, or "other similar instruments". 12. Article 131 has no doubt given the Supreme Court exclusive jurisdiction to resolve any dispute between, inter alia, two or more States. This exclusive jurisdiction is, however, subject to two limitations - one contained in the opening words of the article, namely, "subject to the provisions of this Constitution" and the other which is contained in the proviso to the article. 13. This exclusive jurisdiction is, however, subject to two limitations - one contained in the opening words of the article, namely, "subject to the provisions of this Constitution" and the other which is contained in the proviso to the article. 13. By Article 3 of the Constitution, Parliament by law may: (a) form a new State by separation of territory from any State or by uniting two or more States or parts of States or by uniting any territory to a part of any State; (b) increase the area of any State; (c) diminish the area of any State; (d) alter the boundaries of any State; (e) alter the name of any State; In other words it is Parliament alone which is required to determine the territorial limits of the States. 14. But it is sufficient for our purposes to consider the restrictions contained in the proviso which reads: "Provided that the said jurisdiction shall not extend to a dispute arising out of any treaty, agreement, covenant, engagement, sanad or other similar instrument which, having been entered into or executed before the commencement of this Constitution, continues in operation after such commencement, or which provides that the said jurisdiction shall not extend to such a dispute." 15. The word "or" indicates that the succeeding phrase "other similar instrument" is to be read disjunctively. At the same time the word "similar" means that the instrument must be of the same nature as those preceding. An instrument, to fall within this phrase would, in the context, have to be a formal writing by which a right or liability, is or purports to be, created, transferred, limited, extended, extinguished, or recorded. Thus a document acknowledging title in a third person has been held to be an instrument in Biswambhar Singh v. State of Orissa. 16. The words "arising out of' used in the proviso to Article 131 have a been construed to have a wider meaning than "arising under". [See Antonis P. Lemos, All ER at p. 703 and Daypack Systems (P) Ltd. v. Union of India3.] 17. The phrase may, therefore, include not only the matters "arising under" but also matters "connected with" an instrument of the kinds mentioned. Disputes, therefore, connected with an instrument similar to the instruments mentioned in the proviso would be beyond the scope of enquiry b by this Court. 18. The phrase may, therefore, include not only the matters "arising under" but also matters "connected with" an instrument of the kinds mentioned. Disputes, therefore, connected with an instrument similar to the instruments mentioned in the proviso would be beyond the scope of enquiry b by this Court. 18. The three notifications dated 1-12-1920, 8-10-1923 and 15-10-1927 are all instruments within the meaning of the word in the proviso to Article 131. The State of Orissa bases its claim to the disputed villages on the first two notifications; the State of Andhra Pradesh on the third. Despite the fact that the State of Orissa has claimed that the 1927 notification was void and C ineffective, this would also be a dispute connected with the instrument. Moreover, the State has also run an alternative case that the 1927 notification was never given effect to. Whatever the defence to the respective claims may be, the claims thereunder and the defences thereto are disputes arising out of those instruments. 19. The State of Andhra Pradesh has also raised a claim based on an agreement stated to have been entered into between the erstwhile Provinces of Madras and Orissa and approved by the Governor General-in-Council relating to the disputed villages in 1943. This would be on additional ground to justify our conclusion that the questions raised in the suit arise out of an instrument of a kind specified in the proviso to Article 131. 20. Were we to entertain the suit we would have to determine whether the 1920, 1923 and 1927 notifications and the 1943 agreement effected a reorganisation of the territories of the erstwhile Provinces of Madras and Orissa. If they have, then they continue to bind the successor States under the Constitution. It has been held in State of Punjab v. Balbir Singh: (SCC p. 249, para 12) "In our judgment when there is no change of sovereignty and 'it is merely an adjustment of territories by the reorganisation of a particular State, the administrative orders made by the Government of the erstwhile State continue to be in force and effective and binding on the successor States until and unless they are modified, changed or repudiated by the Governments of the successor States. No other view is possible to be taken. The other view will merely bring about chaos in the administration of the new States. No other view is possible to be taken. The other view will merely bring about chaos in the administration of the new States. We find no principle in support of the stand that administrative orders made by the Government of the erstwhile State automatically lapsed and were rendered ineffective on the coming into existence of the new successor States." 21. We are therefore of the opinion that the disputes raised in this suit have been excluded from the original jurisdiction of this Court by the proviso to Article 131 of the Constitution. On this short point the suit must fail and it is hereby dismissed. There will be no order as to costs. Needless to say we are not expressing any view on the respective contentions of the parties relating to the merits of the case. 22. At an interlocutory stage during the pendency of the proceedings this Court had passed an order dated 2-12-1968 directing status quo to be maintained between the parties. The parties now consent that the order of status quo may continue until it is varied by an appropriate authority in accordance with law. Since we have dismissed the suit, we can only and do hereby record this agreement between the parties.