Judgement R. S. JHA, J. :- The appellant, in the present appeal, has questioned the legality of the judgment and decree dated 16-7-2001 passed by the First Additional District Judge, East Nimar, Khandwa in Civil Suit No. 9B/2001, to the extent that the counter- claim for Rs. 3,72,000.00 filed by the appellant-defendant has been dismissed. 2. The facts of the case in brief are that the appellant and the respondent were both partners in a firm M/s. Naredi Goel Auto Services, Civil Lines, Khandwa. By a deed of dissolution (Ex.P/7) dated 16-6-91 the appellant-defendant retired from the firm with effect from 31-3-1991 and the respondent-plaintiff became the sole proprietor of the firm from 1-4-1991. On 23-7-1991 (Ex. P/8) some of the amounts to be paid to the appellant as a result of the dissolution were settled in the presence of one Basant Kumar who also acted as a guarantor on behalf of the appellant-defendant. Thereafter, the respondent-plaintiff filed a suit for accounts and for recovery of a sum of Rs. 27,731.71 with interest against the appellant-defendant and Basant Kumar Agrawal, who was impleaded as defendant No. 2. 3. The appellant-defendant initially filed a counter-claim on 21-11-94 for accounts and for his share on dissolution and in addition prayed that the plaintiffs suit for a sum of Rs. 27,732.71 be dismissed. However, subsequently the counter-claim was amended on 29-3-2000 and a relief of a decree of Rs. 3,72,000.00 with interest at the rate of 24% from 1-4-91 was incorporated. It was alleged by the appellant-defendant in the counter-claim that subsequent to the dissolution of the firm vide the deed dated 16-6-91 and pending finalization of accounts, both the partners had agreed in the presence of Basant Kumar Agrawal on 23-7-91 that the respondent/plaintiff shall pay a sum of Rs. 1,50,000.00 to the appellant/defendant against the book value of the pump, tanker and other stocks apart from the sum that would be found due to the appellant-defendant on finalization of accounts. It was also agreed that a sum of Rs. 75,000.00 deposited in the name of Rameshwar, father of the respondent-plaintiff, would also be paid to the appellant-defendant. It is alleged that admittedly the accounts of the firm were finalized as per the Chartered Accountant's Report dated 13-10-1991 in which a sum of Rs. 2,97,725.24 was shown as due to the appellant-defendant. As the respondent-plaintiff did not pay this sum of Rs. It is alleged that admittedly the accounts of the firm were finalized as per the Chartered Accountant's Report dated 13-10-1991 in which a sum of Rs. 2,97,725.24 was shown as due to the appellant-defendant. As the respondent-plaintiff did not pay this sum of Rs. 2,97,725.24 as well as the agreed sum of Rs. 75,000.00 standing in the name of Rameshwar to the appellant-defendant he was constrained to file the counter-claim. 4. The Court below by the impugned judgment and decree dated 16-7-2001 has dismissed both the suit as well as the counter-claim. The respondent-plaintiff has not challenged the dismissal of his suit while the appellant-defendant has filed the present appeal against rejection of his counter-claim. The Court below by the impugned judgment has dismissed the counter-claim of the appellant-defendant only on the ground that the same was beyond the period of limitation prescribed by Article 5 of the Act as the counter-claim was filed on 21-11-94 while admittedly the firm was dissolved with effect from 31-3-91 i.e. beyond the period of three years from the date of dissolution of the partnership. 5. The appellant-defendant has assailed the judgment and decree on the ground that the case of the appellant-defendant does not fall within the purview of Article 5 of the Act but in fact falls under Article 26 of the Limitation Act. As the accounts had been settled between the parties by the interim agreement between them dated 23-7-91 Ex.P/8 according to which the respondent-plaintiff had admittedly agreed to pay the remaining amount till 30-4-1992, therefore the limitation of three years as prescribed under Article 26 of the Limitation Act would start running from 30-4-92 under Article 26 of the Act and not from the date of dissolution under Article 5 of the Act therefore the counter-claim filed by the appellant defendant on 21-11-94 was well within limitation and the Court below has grossly erred in law in dismissing the same as barred by limitation. 6. The Learned counsel appearing for the respondent-plaintiff submits that the alleged counter-claim initially filed by the appellant on 21-11-94 did not contain any relief or prayer seeking a decree of Rs. 3,72,000.00 and was only for rendition of accounts with an additional prayer for dismissing the suit as filed by the respondent-plaintiff claiming a sum of Rs. 27,732.71. 6. The Learned counsel appearing for the respondent-plaintiff submits that the alleged counter-claim initially filed by the appellant on 21-11-94 did not contain any relief or prayer seeking a decree of Rs. 3,72,000.00 and was only for rendition of accounts with an additional prayer for dismissing the suit as filed by the respondent-plaintiff claiming a sum of Rs. 27,732.71. For the first time the appellant-defendant made certain amendments in the prayer clause on 4-5-96 seeking relief that his share in the firm be awarded to him without mentioning anything about the amount or details therein. It is submitted that the case which has been pleaded and set up by the appellant defendant before this Court in appeal was for the first time incorporated by the appellant defendant in his counter-claim vide amendment dated 29-3-2000 when a prayer for a decree/counter-claim of Rs. 3,72,000.00 was incorporated in the counter-claim. It is submitted that as per the provisions of Section 3 (2) (b) of the Limitation Act, the counter-claim as filed by the petitioner should be taken to have been filed on 29-3-2000 as prior to this date no relief or counter-claim for Rs. 3,72,000.00 was made by the appellant defendant. It is contended that as the counter-claim for this amount was made for the first time in the year 2000, even if it is conceded that Article 5 of the Act is not applicable and Article 26 or 113 of the Limitation Act is applicable even then the counter-claim as filed by the appellant defendant is clearly barred by limitation and therefore the appeal as filed by the appellant defendant should be dismissed. 7. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties at length. Before we deal with the legal issues we think it apposite to clarify the factual aspects of the case. From a perusal of the record of the case it is apparent that the counter-claim as filed by the appellant/defendant initially on 21-11-94 was only for accounts and his share on dissolution. The appellant defendant filed the first application for amendment of his written statement/counter-claim on 8-5-1996 which was taken up by the Court below for orders on 14-5-96 and was allowed. The appellant defendant filed the first application for amendment of his written statement/counter-claim on 8-5-1996 which was taken up by the Court below for orders on 14-5-96 and was allowed. A perusal of the amendment which was sought and allowed by the Court on 14-5-96 makes it clear that the amendment made by the appellant defendant in the counter-claim was only to the effect that in Para A of the prayer clause in place of the word "Hisaab" the defendant sought to replace the words "Is Pratiwadi Ki Dey Uske Hisse Ki Rashi Hetu". Similar amendment was also made in the body of the counter-claim. The second amendment application was filed by the appellant defendant on 28-3-2000 in which for the first time the appellant defendant prayed for a counter relief of Rs. 3,72,000.00 with interest at the rate of 24% from 1-4-91. He also made amendments in Paragraph-28 to the effect that the appellant was filing the counter-claim for the recovery of the above mentioned amount and in Paragraph 31 amendment was made stating that Court fees of Rs. 44,640.00 was being paid in respect of the counter-claim. This amendment application was taken by the Court below on 29-3-2000.While allowing the application, the Court below observed that the amendment had been filed with considerable delay at the stage when evidence of both the parties was nearly complete. It was also observed that though the amendment was being allowed, the question as to whether the claim was time barred or not was being kept open for decision. Thus, it is apparent that the appellant defendant for the first time sought recovery of a sum of Rs. 3,72,000/- in the counter-claim filed on 28-3-2000 which was allowed by the Court below by order dated 29-3-2000 leaving the question of the claim being barred by limitation open and therefore we find that the counter-claim filed by the appellant initially was only for accounts. We also have no hesitation in accepting the contention of the learned counsel for the respondent plaintiff that the appellant defendant for the first time made a counter-claim for a sum of Rs. 3,72,000.00 on 28-3-2000 and that the appellant defendant had not made any claim for this amount in the original/counter-claim filed on 21-11-94. 8. We also have no hesitation in accepting the contention of the learned counsel for the respondent plaintiff that the appellant defendant for the first time made a counter-claim for a sum of Rs. 3,72,000.00 on 28-3-2000 and that the appellant defendant had not made any claim for this amount in the original/counter-claim filed on 21-11-94. 8. In view of the above findings recorded by us, it is to be adjudged as to whether the counter-claim filed by the appellant defendant was barred by time as prescribed either by Articles 5 or 26 or 113 of the Limitation Act and the impact of the provisions of Section 3 (2) (b) of the Limitation Act, 1963 on the computation of limitation. 9. Article 5 of the Limitation Act prescribes three years as the period of limitation for instituting a suit for accounts and a share of the profits of a dissolved partnership to be counted from the date of the dissolution of the partnership. Article 26 of the Limitation Act also prescribes three years as the period of limitation for a suit for money on the basis of stated accounts from the date the accounts are stated in writing or if the stated accounts are made payable at a future time, and when that time arrives. Article 113 of the Limitation Act is the residuary article that prescribes a period of three years as limitation for any suit for which no period of limitation is specifically provided from the date when the right to sue accrues. Thus, the period of limitation in all the three category of cases is three years, the only difference being the starting point of limitation. 10. A perusal of the counter-claim filed by the appellant defendant shows that the relief claimed by him initially was only for accounts and for his share in the profits of the firm and therefore the counter-claim in respect of accounts and share in profit as filed by the appellant defendant squarely falls within the scope and ambit of Article 5 of the Limitation Act. The prescribed period of three years of limitation would start running from the date of dissolution of the partnership which in the instant case was by deed of dissolution dated 16-6-91 and, therefore, the counter-claim could have been filed by the appellant defendant up to 15-6-94. The prescribed period of three years of limitation would start running from the date of dissolution of the partnership which in the instant case was by deed of dissolution dated 16-6-91 and, therefore, the counter-claim could have been filed by the appellant defendant up to 15-6-94. As it is apparent from the record that the counter-claim was in fact filed on 21-11-94 which is clearly beyond the period of three years and, therefore, barred by limitation. In the facts and circumstances of the case we have no hesitation in affirming the findings as recorded by the Court below in this regard and hold that the counter-claim for accounts and for share in profits as filed by the appellant defendant was barred by limitation. 11. We deem it appropriate to deal with the second contention raised by the respondent plaintiff also namely whether the counter-claim for a sum of Rs. 3,72,000.00 was made for the first time on 29-3-2000 and was therefore barred by limitation as prescribed under Article 113 of the Limitation Act as it was beyond a period of three years from the date the right to sue accrued to the appellant defendant. Admittedly, the amendment in the counter-claim for recovery of a sum of Rs. 3,72,000.00 was made by the appellant for the first time on 29-3-2000. As per the provisions of Section 3 (2) (b) of the Limitation Act the counter-claim filed on 29-3-2000 was apparently beyond the prescribed period of three years on the date on which it was filed and therefore we have no hesitation in concluding that in the facts and circumstances of the case, the counter-claim of Rs. 3,72,000.00 made by the appellant defendant was barred by limitation on the date it was filed before the Court below. 12. The learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant submits that the issue that the appellant defendant for the first time made a counter-claim in the year 2000 and that it was barred by limitation was not raised by the plaintiff in the Court below nor has this issue been discussed or adverted to by the Court below and in the absence of an appeal or challenge to the same by the respondent/plaintiff he cannot be permitted to raise this issue or contest the appeal on this ground before this Court for the first time. It is also submitted that once the amendment is allowed it would date back to the date of filing of the counter-claim and, therefore, the relief sought was not barred by limitation. 13. The aforesaid objection raised by the appellant defendant is to be taken note of only to be rejected as the Court below made allowing the application for amendment by its order dated 28-3-2000 had left the question of limitation open. As the question of limitation was very much in issue before the Court below in our considered opinion allowing the amendment would not debar the respondent plaintiff from subsequently questioning its tenability on the ground of limitation. This view finds support from the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Ragu Thilak D. John v. S. Rayappan and others, (2001) 2 SCC 472 : AIR 2001 SC 699 wherein it has been held that in cases where the plea of limitation is disputed it could be made a subject-matter of issue even after the amendment is allowed. Even otherwise as in the present case the facts relating to the date of filing of the counter-claim and the date on which amendments were made in the counter-claim are not disputed, the respondent plaintiff cannot be barred from raising the plea of limitation as it is the duty of the Court to see that a suit or a counter- claim is filed within the period of limitation because of the peremptory nature of language employed under Section 3 of the Limitation Act. It is settled in law that even if the defendant does not raise the plea of limitation, the Court has an obligation to scrutinize them before entertaining the relief prayed. In this context we may refer with profit to Section 3 (2) (b) of Section 3 of the Limitation Act. It is settled in law that even if the defendant does not raise the plea of limitation, the Court has an obligation to scrutinize them before entertaining the relief prayed. In this context we may refer with profit to Section 3 (2) (b) of Section 3 of the Limitation Act. (b) any claim by way of a set off or a counter-claim, shall be treated as a separate suit and shall be deemed to have been instituted- (i) in the case of a set off, on the same date as the suit in which the set off is pleaded; (ii) in the case of a counter-claim, on the date on which the counter-claim is made in court; If the anatomy of the aforesaid provision is understood in the backdrop of the pronounced case in the field the plea of limitation can be gone into despite the fact that a defence has not been adduced. 14. Quite apart from the above, we are also of the considered opinion that in view of the provisions of Order 41 Rule 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure the respondent plaintiff has the right to support the decree even though he may not have filed an appeal and can canvass and raise all issues to support the findings recorded by the Court below. Thus it is obvious, sub-section 2 (b) of Section 3 lays down that a counter-claim shall be treated as a separate suit and shall be deemed to have been instituted on the date on which the counter-claim is made in Court, and judged from this angle, the submission of the learned counsel for the appellant does not commend acceptance. 15. The learned counsel for the appellant has canvassed that the amendment should date back to the original point of time of filing of the counter-claim. He has placed reliance on Sampath Kumar v. Ayyakannu and another, AIR 2002 SC 3369 wherein it has been held that in view of the doctrine of relation back an amendment once incorporated relates back to the date of the filing of the suit. He has placed reliance on Sampath Kumar v. Ayyakannu and another, AIR 2002 SC 3369 wherein it has been held that in view of the doctrine of relation back an amendment once incorporated relates back to the date of the filing of the suit. The appellant defendant has also sought support from the decision of the Apex Court rendered in the case of Pankaja and another v. Yellappa and others, AIR 2004 SC 4102 to reinforce that an amendment even if barred by limitation can be allowed and would relate back to the date of filing of the suit. 16. The learned counsel for the respondent-plaintiff has relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of Vishwambhar and others v. Laxminarayana and another, AIR 2001 SC 2607 wherein a prayer for amending the plaint to incorporate a relief which was barred by time was rejected and was held to be impermissible. It was also held that the doctrine of the amendment relating back to the date of filing of the suit is not applicable when the proposed amendment changes the nature of the relief claimed. It was held that such amendments have to be taken to have been filed on the date the amendment is allowed and not earlier. Paragraph 10 of the judgment may be profitably reproduced :- "10. From the averments of the plaint it cannot be said that all the necessary averments for setting aside the sale deeds executed by Laxmibai were contained in the plaint and adding specific prayer for setting aside the sale deeds was a mere formality. As noted earlier, the basis of the suit as it stood before the amendment of the plaint was that the sale transactions made by Laxmibai as guardian of the minors were ab initio void and, therefore, liable to be ignored. By introducing the prayer for setting aside the sale deeds the basis of the suit was changed to one seeking setting aside the alienations of the property by the guardian. In such circumstances the suit for setting aside the transfers could be taken to have been filed on the date the amendment of the plaint was allowed and not earlier than that." 17. In such circumstances the suit for setting aside the transfers could be taken to have been filed on the date the amendment of the plaint was allowed and not earlier than that." 17. In the case of Muni Lal v. The Oriental Fire and General Insurance Company Ltd. and another, AIR 1996 SC 642 , the Apex Court has held that a person cannot be permitted to amend the plaint if relief and plea sought to be introduced by way of amendment has become barred by limitation during the pendency of the proceedings. 18. The law as discernible from the judgments of the Supreme Court is that while the normal rule is that amendments in plaint relate back to the date of filing of the suit in view of the doctrine of relation back but in cases like the present one where while allowing the amendment the question as to whether the relief sought by way of amendment was barred by time or not has been left open and where the specific statutory provision of Section 3 (2) (b) of the Limitation Act provides that the counter-claim shall be deemed to have been instituted on the date on which it is made in Court the doctrine of relation back does not get attracted and hence, has no applicability. 19. Quite apart from the above, we deem it appropriate to observe that in Sampath Kumar, AIR 2002 SC 3369 (Supra) which has been relied upon by the learned counsel for the appellant the Supreme Court has held that the rule of relation back is not absolute and one of universal application and depends upon the discretion of the Court and the facts of each case. This dictum is also distinguishable on facts as in that case the amendment was sought to be made at the pre-trial stage and did not change the nature of the suit whereas in the present case the counter-claim for a sum of Rs. 3,72,000.00 changes the very nature of the counter-claim which, initially was only for accounts and as the computation of limitation in case of a counter-claim has been statutorily prescribed as the date on which it is made in Court and cannot by fiction relate back to the date of filing of the suit in view of the specific provision of Section 3 (2) (b) of the Limitation Act. 20. 20. We are of the opinion that the judgment in the case of Pankaja and another, AIR 2004 SC 4102 (Supra) also does not support the contention of the appellant defendant as the Supreme Court while permitting the amendment in that case has observed that the question of it being barred by limitation etc. could be subsequently made a subject-matter of the issues relying upon the judgment in the case of Ragu Thilak D. John, AIR 2001 SC 472 (Supra) and remanded the matter back to the trial Court for decision on the issue as to whether the relief sought by way of the amendment was barred by limitation. 21. As a result of the above mentioned analysis, we are of the considered opinion that the impugned judgment and decree of the trial Court deserves to be and is hereby upheld as there is no infirmity in the conclusion recorded by it that the counter-claim for accounts as initially filed by the appellant was barred by limitation as it had been filed beyond a period of three years from the date of dissolution of the firm. We further hold that the counter-claim for a sum of Rs. 3,72,000/- introduced by the appellant on 28-3-2000 is also barred by limitation having been filed beyond the period of three years from the date on which the cause of action arose. 22. In the result, the appeal filed by the appellant is dismissed. In the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, the parties shall bear their respective costs. Appeal dismissed.