ORDER The petitioner is a housing co-operative society registered in the year 1965 under the Karnataka Co-operative Societies Act, 1959 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act' for brevity). The petitioner-society claims to have 488 members and nominal members in addition. It is stated that the petitioner had entered into an agreement of sale dated 15-10-1975 in respect of lands bearing Survey Nos. 2/1, 4, 5, 10, 11 and 12 measuring about 60 acres 20 guntas in Srinivagilu Village, Begur Hobli, Bangalore South Taluk. Since the petitioner could not acquire the land in view of the prohibition under Section 107 of the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961, the petitioner had, with the consent of the third respondent-the owner of the said lands, made a representation to the State Government to acquire 66 acres 22 guntas of land, including the above lands, for purposes of formation of house sites for the members of the society. The third respondent had executed an agreement in Form D under Rule 16 of the Karnataka Land Acquisition Rules, 1965 agreeing that he would not challenge the acquisition and claim higher compensation in respect of the properties. Therefore, the entire acquisition proceedings had been with the consent of the third respondent, in that, the first respondent, the State of Karnataka had issued a preliminary Notification dated 12-1-1983 under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as 'the LA Act' for brevity) to acquire 66 acres 22 guntas and pursuant to this, a declaration under Section 6(1) of the LA Act was also issued as on 22-5-1983. The award in respect of the lands was passed on 12-9-1986 for a slum of Rs. 25,88,656.18 P. A notification under Section 16(2) of the LA Act as regards taking of possession was issued as on 3-11-1988. The petitioner had deposited a sum of Rs. 32,79,147.22 P. towards the cost of the land and conversion charges. The award amount was in turn paid to the third respondent. The possession of the land in question however, was handed over to the petitioner-society as on 4-7-1984 itself This was a voluntary surrender even prior to the award. The petitioner-society is in possession of the lands and it is stated that the petitioner had submitted a layout plan for approval of the Bangalore Development Authority (hereinafter referred to as 'the BDA' for brevity) in the year 1985. The petitioner-society is in possession of the lands and it is stated that the petitioner had submitted a layout plan for approval of the Bangalore Development Authority (hereinafter referred to as 'the BDA' for brevity) in the year 1985. It is stated that the plan was sanctioned the same year and a work order was issued in the year 1987. The petitioner-society claims that in view of certain subsequent developments, the petitioner had applied to the BDA for modification of the plan sanctioned and the modified plan submitted by the petitioner was said to have been approved in the year 1988. The petitioner also claims to have obtained sanctions and approvals from various other statutory authorities such as the Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board, Karnataka Electricity Board, International Air-ports Authority and the Fire Force. The petitioner claims that insofar as its plan to construct multi-storied buildings on the land, the BDA neither sanctioned the same nor refused to sanction the same in the year 1991 and for this reason, the layout was not developed, awaiting the permission of the authority concerned and it is in this background that no further development took place in respect of the land in question. In the year 1992, since the BDA had failed to grant permission, the petitioner-society had further revised the plan and had restricted the same to 42 acres 32 guntas for the formation of residential sites and the balance land for purposes of a Group Housing Scheme. A modified plan of 42 acres 32 guntas was approved and work order was issued only on 29-1-2003, pursuant to which sites have been formed and sale deeds have been executed in favour its members. The petitioner-society claims to have formed 199 sites, in respect of which 154 sale deeds have been executed in favour of its members and other sale deeds are in the process of being executed. The petitioner claims to have paid a sum of Rs. 1,14,81,730/- towards various demands made by the BDA. That, insofar as the land measuring 23 acres 22 guntas, the petitioner claims that its revised plan for Group Housing Scheme into residential layouts is pending before the BDA. The petitioner claims to have paid a sum of Rs. 1,14,81,730/- towards various demands made by the BDA. That, insofar as the land measuring 23 acres 22 guntas, the petitioner claims that its revised plan for Group Housing Scheme into residential layouts is pending before the BDA. In this background, the petitioner-society claims that the third respondent is said to have made a representation in the Chief Minister of Karnataka to revert back the possession of the land in his favour and it is on the basis of this representation, according to the petitioner, that the impugned notice dated 20-12-2004 has been issued by the second respondent. The petitioner alleges that the third respondent has initiated this action with the mala fide intention of usurping the land in question and that it has falsely been represented that the petitioner-society is not in a position to develop the lands and form the layout and that the society would have no objection for denotification of the land. Further, the impugned notice, which is said to have been served on the society, has been replied to by a purported office-bearer of the petitioner-society to state that there is no objection if the subject lands are denotified and reverted back to the original owner. The petitioner-society, it is said, was in the dark about the impugned notice and the reply given in the name of the petitioner-society. Immediately upon coming to know of the same, the petitioner-society, in turn, had responded to the notice, bringing out the facts as narrated hereinabove and questioning the bona (ides of the third respondent. The petitioner-society claims that in view of these developments, there is interference by the third respondent in the developmental work and that the petitioner, by a legal notice, had called upon the fourth respondent to initiate action against the third ·respondent on allegations of impersonation, cheating, forgery and other acts. That inspite of the complaint, it is the petitioner's case, that there is no action taken. On the other hand, the fourth respondent-police, have issued a notice calling upon the petitioner to produce various documents and the fourth respondent itself is interfering with the development activity of the petitioner and that this is at the behest of the third respondent, and that it is in this background the present petition is filed. 2. On the other hand, the fourth respondent-police, have issued a notice calling upon the petitioner to produce various documents and the fourth respondent itself is interfering with the development activity of the petitioner and that this is at the behest of the third respondent, and that it is in this background the present petition is filed. 2. The grounds on which the petition is filed are that it is not open for the third respondent to challenge the acquisition proceedings before the second respondent and the second respondent would have no jurisdiction to decide the question as to the functioning of the petitioner-society. Further, that once possession has been taken under Section 16(2) of the I.A Act by the first respondent, and the same having been handed over to the petitioner-society way back in the year 1984, it would not be permissible for the second respondent to denotify the land and restore possession to the landowners after a period of twenty years. Hence, the proceedings sought to be initiated by the second respondent at the instance of the third respondent by virtue of the impugned notice, is without authority of law. The petitioner would state that having regard to the sequence of events, whereby there was in the first instance an agreement of sale as between the petitioner-society and the third respondent in the year 1975, and there being a voluntary surrender of the lands by the third respondent as disclosed by documents which are not in dispute, it would not now be possible to set at naught those proceedings at the instance of the third respondent, who is apparently acting with mala fide intentions. The fact that a power of attorney holder of respondent 3 who is a businessman from Hyderabad, has been able to mobilize the authorities under the State Government including the police, to interfere with the developmental activity of the petitioner-society, is a case in point. 3. The State Government has filed statement of objections and several additional statements of objections, the first of which is dated 18-3-2005, wherein it is contended that the genuineness of the petitioner-society is under question and that the Additional Registrar of Co-operative· Societies had ordered an enquiry under Section 64 of the Act to enquire into certain allegations against 98 house building cooperative societies and had appointed one Sri G.V.K Rao as the Enquiry Officer. The terms of reference were: (i) To look into bogus agreements with landlords and estate agents; (ii) Bogus membership irregularities in registration of members; (iii) Irregularities in distribution of sites; (iv) Collection of exorbitant site advance from the members, etc. The Enquiry Officer had grouped the societies into four categories going by the irregularities committed by them: (i) Societies who had not committed any serious irregularity; (ii) Societies which had mainly indulged in addition of ineligible members; (iii) Societies which had indulged in serious irregularities; (iv) And those societies who had not submitted their records for verification by the Enquiry Officer. The petitioner-society is said to have been grouped in the fourth category by the Enquiry Officer and the Enquiry Officer had recommended for necessary action against them and the office-bearers, since these societies had failed to submit the records as called for. The statement of objections refers to an instance with reference to correspondence to indicate that the registration number of the petitioner-society, as stated in its audit report, was non-existent and therefore, there was a strong suspicion that the petitioner-society was a bogus one and that there was a suspected connection of the petitioner-society with one "Locandwala Builders of Revajeethu fame" (sic) and that the petitioner-society is not functioning at the address given by the petitioner-society and is under lock and further, that the petitioner themselves have submitted a Group Housing and Multi-storied Building Scheme, which itself would indicate that it is to facilitate the developers with whom the society was acting in tandem. Therefore, the acquisition of the land in favour of the society suffers from vice and would not fall under the description of "public purpose". Thus, it is being handed over to private developers. The State has referred to the judgment in the case of H.M.T. House Building Co-operative Society v Syed Khader and Others1, wherein it was demonstrated that no public purpose was served by the acquisition of the land for the purposes of the said society and the lands should be handed over to the original owners. The statement of objections concludes by stating that the writ petition is misconceived. This statement of objections is supported by the affidavit of the Deputy Registrar of the Co-operative Societies. The statement of objections concludes by stating that the writ petition is misconceived. This statement of objections is supported by the affidavit of the Deputy Registrar of the Co-operative Societies. Thereafter, a second statement of objections is filed in addition to the one filed on 18-3-2005 dated 28-3-2005, to add that Viveknagar Police Authorities have requested the Registrar of Co-operative Societies to clarify as to which of the rival societies is genuine, namely, the second society which was impleaded as fifth respondent, or the petitioner, was the genuine society and based on this requisition of Registrar of Co-operative Societies, the jurisdictional Deputy Registrar of Co-operative Societies had made an enquiry and spot inspection and had submitted his report dated 26-3-2005, which is appended to the said statement of objections, to state that the petitioner-society is a fictitious and non-existent one. The statement of objections further avers that the possession of the land was taken over by the petitioner-society from the landowner through the Revenue Inspector on 4-7-1984. The award under Section 11 of the L.A Act was made on 12-9-1986 and thereafter the notification under Section 16(2) of the L.A Act was issued as on 21-10-1988. It is therefore contended that the possession of the land was never taken over by the Government and it did not vest in the State Government as contemplated under Section 16 or 17 of the said Act. Hence, the question of delivery of possession to the petitioner-society would not arise at all and the possession of the petitioner-society was no possession at all in the eye of law. For this proposition, reliance is placed on M/s. Jetmull Bhojraj v State of Bihar and Others2 and on the case of H. Muninanjappa v State of Karnataka and Another3. It is further stated that Section 48 of the L.A Act, empowers the State Government to withdraw from the land acquisition if possession is not taken over. In the case on hand, as there is no delivery of possession, the State Government would have jurisdiction to take steps to de-notify the acquisition of lands in question and therefore, the show-cause notice which is under challenge, cannot be questioned. In the case on hand, as there is no delivery of possession, the State Government would have jurisdiction to take steps to de-notify the acquisition of lands in question and therefore, the show-cause notice which is under challenge, cannot be questioned. The State has filed yet another additional statement of objections as on 18-6-2005 to add that it is reported by the Co-operation Department that the petitioner-society is not at all in existence and that it is a bogus society created for the purposes of grabbing land. Further, the earlier allegations, are reiterated. 4. The objections on behalf of the third respondent-owner are to the effect that the action initiated by the State Government is on the ground that the petitioner-society was a defunct society and was not functioning at all and since the land which was acquired through the medium of the State Government, has not been utilised for the purposes for which it was acquired, for more than twenty years; that the land should be restored to the third respondent and it is on this representation and on the State Government's own verification as to the non-existence of the petitioner-society, that a show-cause notice, which is impugned in the writ petition, was issued. The said third respondent alleges that the petitioner-society is not a registered society and it is a name sake society formed by a break-away group of the original society to accommodate a developer from Mumbai, who was operating through them and that therefore, in view of these irregularities, action ought to be initiated to prevent the lands from falling into the hands of unscrupulous private parties, thereby defeating the very purpose for which the land was acquired through the medium of the State Government. The third respondent further contends that the revenue records continued to be in the name of the third respondent, despite the acquisition having taken place over two decades ago. The third respondent further contends that the revenue records continued to be in the name of the third respondent, despite the acquisition having taken place over two decades ago. The procedure followed for the acquisition was irregular and that having regard to the present position, the instrumentality of the State has been misused for the benefit of unscrupulous third parties and that there was no vesting of the property in favour of the State in accordance with law, coupled with the circumstance that the three man committee headed by Sri G.V.K Rao has held that the petitioner-society has failed to furnish documents to substantiate its bona fides, would warrant interference by the State Government. As the society for whose benefit the land was acquired, is defunct and since the land is being misused by third parties. Even according to the petition averments, it is seen that for over two decades, there was no activity on the part of the society to develop the acquired property and it is only in the year 2003 that there has been a flurry of activity, which had been at the instance of third party developers as aforesaid. And therefore, the action initiated by the Government is only to ascertain the true facts and circumstances, which cannot be held to be illegal or without jurisdiction. The petitioner-society, in any event, cannot claim immunity from making a clean breast of its bona fides. It is only since the true facts and circumstances are capable of being exposed that the petitioner-society has chosen to approach this Court to prevent any such enquiry. This is a blatant abuse of process of Court and the third respondent would therefore challenge the petitioner-society to demonstrate its bona fides. The petitioner has filed a rejoinder to attack the bona fides of the third respondent and to state that it is in fact an agent of the third respondent, who is the mouth-piece of the third respondent and that he is a businessman with vested interest, who has initiated action. The petitioner claims that the third respondent, acting through its power of attorney holder and the fifth respondent-society, which is claiming to be the genuine society, are speaking in the same tone, which would indicate that they are acting in collusion. The petitioner claims that the third respondent, acting through its power of attorney holder and the fifth respondent-society, which is claiming to be the genuine society, are speaking in the same tone, which would indicate that they are acting in collusion. The allegations against the Locandwala Group of Mumbai, are denied as being false, while contending that the Locandwala group has been engaged as a contractor by the petitioner-society and that there is no prohibition against such engagement. Insofar as the contention that the present case would be akin to the case decided by the Supreme Court namely the H.M. T. case, supra, the petitioner seeks to contend that the Supreme Court deemed it fit to interfere in the said H.M. T. case, as middlemen were found involved in the case before the Supreme Court and that there is no such involvement which is established in the present case and therefore the said judgment is not capable of being applied to the facts and circumstances of the present case. The acquisition was in challenge in the said case unlike in the present instance. Further, that the acquisition of land for the petitioner-society was completed even before the formation of the three man committee headed by Sri G.V.K Rao. 5. The third respondent has filed further additional objections as on 16-4-2005 to contend that the first respondent has not applied its mind as required under Section 3(f)(viii)(b) of the L.A. Act and that there was no prior approval obtained under Section 3(f)(vi) of the L.A. Act, which vitiates the whole acquisition proceedings and renders it invalid. The genuineness of the society for the purposes of activity of house building is not examined and recommended by the three man committee and cleared by the State Level Co-ordination Committee constituted as per Government Order dated 30-4-1987 and that the recommendations of the three man committee was pending. Further, that the committee under Sri G.V.K Rao was constituted to enquire into allegations of 98 house building co-operative societies. That the committee was appointed under Section 64 of the Karnataka Co-operative Societies Act, 1959 on 7-11-1988. Notices were given to all societies including the petitioner-society. Since the society was defunct and non-existent, there was no response. And, it is clear from the report of the committee that no records are submitted for verification. That the committee was appointed under Section 64 of the Karnataka Co-operative Societies Act, 1959 on 7-11-1988. Notices were given to all societies including the petitioner-society. Since the society was defunct and non-existent, there was no response. And, it is clear from the report of the committee that no records are submitted for verification. That the third respondent had issued a legal notice to the first respondent as early as 26-11-2002 to initiate action. Since there was no response, the third respondent made a representation to the Chief Minister of Karnataka and this having been forwarded to the Revenue Department and the concerned departments on the basis of material on record available with respect to the petitioner-society, has found that the society was defunct. It is on the basis of such information available, that the first respondent has issued the show-cause notice to the concerned persons. 6. The petitioner, the third respondent and the fifth respondent, have all filed their objections to the impugned notice. The petitioner having participated in the proceedings, has, while suppressing that information, filed the present petition. And, as there are two different entities claiming to be the same society, the proceedings, sought to be initiated by the State Government ought not to be aborted without further examination as to the existence or non-existence of the petitioner-society and whether it is the petitioner-society or the fifth respondent-society which is the original one and it is also sought to be pointed out that there are discrepancies and obvious revelations in the very audit report filed by the petitioner as to its mala fide actions and that the question involved is one of effective governance and the State Government, while discharging its executive functions, is well-within its power to call upon all persons and ask for reasons with respect to any misuse or waste of property obtained through the instrumentality of the State. The society is a person through whom the State intended to achieve a public purpose. If such an entity is suspected to have committed a breach, then the State is right in seeking to ensure that a public purpose is not defeated. The show-cause notice, therefore, cannot be held to be without jurisdiction or unwarranted. The State is not bound to explain its acts at the stage of issuance of notice in order to ascertain further facts and details. The show-cause notice, therefore, cannot be held to be without jurisdiction or unwarranted. The State is not bound to explain its acts at the stage of issuance of notice in order to ascertain further facts and details. Fifth respondent, which has sought to implead itself, had filed an application seeking to vacate the order of stay, wherein it is contended that the petitioner-society is a bogus society. That the fifth respondent is the actual society, which was formed in the year 1965 and that there is a calculated attempt by the petitioner-society composed of unauthorised persons to lay claim to the lands which have been acquired for and on behalf of the fifth respondent-society. The petition allegations are being denied as concocted. It is claimed that after acquisition of the land was completed, there was a difference of opinion amongst the members of the society and therefore there were two factions, but there was no intention of alienating the property or dissolving the society. There was financial paucity and taking advantage, certain persons created a parallel group and involved themselves with Locandwala Builders from Mumbai and have transacted illegally with the said group. It is claimed that after the year 1986, there was not much activity though the members used to meet regularly and record resolutions. The respondent-society was aware of the illegal activities that were being perpetrated by the petitioner-society or the group claiming to be petitioner-society and had complained repeatedly to the Government. Since the Government also did not take serious note of the goings on and taking advantage of this laxity, the parallel group consisting of persons who are claiming as the petitioner-society have engineered a plan to acquire and dispose of the land for their benefit. The several documents that have been generated are of recent origin giving credence to the fact that the group claiming as the petitioner-society are acting at the behest and with the aid of the Locandwala Developers from Mumbai, who are actively financing the machinations of the said group of persons, claiming to be the petitioner-society and therefore, the fifth respondent seeks to distance themselves from the petitioner-society which is claimed as an impostor. 7. 7. Sri Udaya Holla, Senior Advocate for Sri Shashi Kiran Shetty for the petitioner would contend, that in terms of Section 48 of the LA Act, notwithstanding the finding of fact which may be arrived at as to which of the societies is genuine, the fact remains that the subject land has been acquired as narrated hereinabove and it is not disputed by the State Government and no steps having been initiated either to set at naught the procedure that has been followed in acquiring the lands and handing over possession of the same to the society, it is not open either for the State Government or for any other party to claim that the proceedings are invalid or that there was jurisdiction and power to the State Government to withdraw from acquisition as now proposed and to de-notify the lands and seek to restore the same to the original owners. On facts, he would further submit that there is ample material on record to indicate that the petitioner-society is the genuine society and further that is incorrect to hold that there has been no development over the acquired land, as is seen from the several proceedings that have gone on insofar as approvals and sanctions granted by the BDA and other statutory bodies in respect of the proposed development as well as the allotment and sale of house sites to its several members. In this light, he would rely on several judgments in support of his case. 8. He places reliance on the judgment in the case of Ashit Shetty and Others v State of Karnataka and Others1, wherein it is held that when the State Government has taken possession of the land on completion of acquisition proceedings and when an award is passed and the State Government has taken possession of the land on completion of the acquisition proceedings, the Government has no right to withdraw from acquisition. And, on the case of Dr. H.S. Hanumanthappa v State of Karnataka and Another2, wherein it is held that the Government would be at liberty to withdraw from acquisition only when it has not taken possession of the land in question and where the possession of the land has been taken and a layout has been formed, the allottees of the sites have locus standi to oppose the notification issued under Section 48(1) of the LA Act. Next he would rely on the case of Bank Officers' Co-operative Society Limited, Bangalore v State of Karnataka, by its Secretary, Housing and Urban Development Department and Others3, for the proposition that where the Government had taken possession of the land it could not withdraw from acquisition. Similarly, in the case of Venkatagiriyappa v State of Karnataka, Revenue Department1, where lands were granted in the year 1962 and the Revenue Authorities initiated proceedings in the year 1992 on the ground that the lands granted are not brought under cultivation for 15 years from the date of grant and the proceedings were quashed. And, on the case of Mohamad Kavi Mohamad Amin v Fatmabai Ibrahim2, for the proposition that the power available to the Government is to be exercised within a reasonable time, failing which such exercise of power will be interfered with. 9. He also placed reliance on the following.- M/s. Mohan Meakin Limited Simla, Himachal Pradesh and Another v State of Karnataka and Others ; Nirode Baran Bannerjee v Union of India and Another4; Dr. H.S. Hanumanthappa's case; Lt. Governor of Himachal Pradesh v Sri Avinash Sharma5; Calcutta Discount Company Limited v Income Tax Officer, Companies District I, Calcutta andAnother6. 10. Per contra, Sri Srinivasagowda, Government Advocate appearing for the State, would substantiate the several statement of objections filed over a period of time which is strictly speaking, completely opposed to the Writ Proceedings Rules, 1977. 11. It is seen that Rule 21 of the Writ Proceeding Rules, 1977, reads as follows.- "21. (1) Answer if any to the rule nisi showing cause against such petition shall be made by filing into Court objections supported by an affidavit within fourteen days after the expiry of the time fixed for appearance or such earlier time as the Court may direct, and reply to the objections supported by an affidavit, may be filed by the petitioner within one week of service of a copy of the objections on him or such earlier time as the Court may direct. The reply shall not raise any new ground in support of the writ petition. (2) Copies of the objections or reply shall be served on the opposite party or parties or their Advocates and the objections of reply shall not be received unless they contain an endorsement of service signed by such party or parties or their Advocates. The reply shall not raise any new ground in support of the writ petition. (2) Copies of the objections or reply shall be served on the opposite party or parties or their Advocates and the objections of reply shall not be received unless they contain an endorsement of service signed by such party or parties or their Advocates. (3) No further statement or affidavit shall be filed by any party except with the leave of the Court". 12. However, the pleadings in the present matter are filed with such frequency and without regard for obtaining the permission or leave of the Court, making the entire record unwieldly and difficult to marshal. In this regard, not only the State Government but even the other parties are at fault and this is a practice which needs to be severely deprecated. In any event, the pleadings have been considered. The contention on behalf of the State, as can be seen is that the State Government has acted on the representations made insofar as the petitioner-society conversely the fifth respondent-society having become defunct and not having proceeded to develop the land even after twenty years of acquisition and since there is serious doubt as to the identity of the society, the show-cause notice which is now impugned, is a preliminary step initiated by the State before making a full-fledged enquiry, and decide the course of action and the provisions of law under which proceedings would be initiated. He would submit that on prima facie examination of the record, the fifth respondent appears to be the genuine society and that it has represented, it would have no objection to surrender the land as the society is defunct and is not capable of developing the lands and that the petitioner-society obviously is motivated with vested interest in seeking to challenge the very showcause notice which is only a pre-cursor to other proceedings that may follow in the usual course. That no prejudice or harm would be caused to the petitioner if it were to place before the State its claim as being a bona (ide society and that it has been carrying on its activities as claimed. He would further contend that a voluntary surrender of land, whereby possession has been handed over to the society by the landowner, is not contemplated under Section 16 of the L.A. Act. He would further contend that a voluntary surrender of land, whereby possession has been handed over to the society by the landowner, is not contemplated under Section 16 of the L.A. Act. There is hence, no indication that possession has been taken by the Government after passing of the award. On the other hand, it is plain on record, that possession had been taken over by the society even before the passing of the award and that there is no indication of the Government having taken possession at any point of time. And, this by itself, would render the acquisition proceedings incomplete and therefore, the exercise of power would certainly be placed under Section 48(1) of the Act. In this regard, he would rely upon the judgment in the case of Muthappa v Malleswaram Co-operative Society 1, to contend that there is no indication as to the petitioners society being represented by an authorised person. He would rely upon the case of H. Muninanjappa, to contend that as sub-section (1) of Section 48 of the L.A. Act provides that the power to withdraw from the acquisition of the land can be exercised by the State Government in respect of a land of which possession has not been taken. It is reasonable to draw an inference that taking possession of land contemplated by sub-section (1) of Section 48 of the L.A. Act, is taking possession either under Section 16 or Section of the L.A. Act. It therefore follows that if possession was taken otherwise than in accordance with Section 16 or 17 of the L.A. Act, taking of such possession does not preclude the State Government from withdrawing from the acquisition under sub-section (1) of Section 48 of the L.A. Act. On the question that show-cause notice would not cause prejudice, especially when the State was of the view that one of the parties concerned was fictitious, in this regard, he would rely' on the judgment of the Supreme Court on the case of Jetmull Bhojraj, supra, which has been followed by this Court in Muninanjappa's case aforementioned. On the question that show-cause notice would not cause prejudice, especially when the State was of the view that one of the parties concerned was fictitious, in this regard, he would rely' on the judgment of the Supreme Court on the case of Jetmull Bhojraj, supra, which has been followed by this Court in Muninanjappa's case aforementioned. He would submit that after the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of H.M.T. House Building Co-operative Society, supra, it would be open for the Government to suo motu exercise its power to question the bona fides of a society for whose benefit the land may have been acquired by the State Government, especially when it is found that persons who cannot be held to be genuine members are involved in acquiring the land, which has been acquired for a public purpose. And therefore, having regard to these circumstances, that the petitioner-society or be it fifth respondent-society, was one among 85 societies which were identified by Sri G.V.K Rao committee and which report disclosed that the petitioner-society had not responded to its notice to provide particulars about the functioning of the society. It would be appropriate that the State Government go through with the proceedings initiated in order to verify the bona fides of the petitioner-society. The jurisdiction or the power of the State Government ought not to be tested in circumstances where the bona fides of the petitioner are suspected and the public interest would necessarily demand that the State Government complete the enquiry contemplated under the impugned notice and therefore submits that the writ petition is premature and is liable to be rejected in limine. 13. Sri Uday Lalith, Senior Advocate appearing for Sri B.S. Manjunath; for the third respondent would submit that it is evident from the undisputed fact that possession of lands in question was taken and delivered to the society on 8-3-1984, on which date the award was yet to be passed. And since possession was delivered to the society even before 1984, would be contrary to Section 16 of the L.A. Act. It is seen that after passing of the award, the possession of lands may be taken under Section 16 of the L.A. Act, but upon taking such possession, the land vests absolutely with the State, free from all encumbrances. An important requirement is that there should be an award. It is seen that after passing of the award, the possession of lands may be taken under Section 16 of the L.A. Act, but upon taking such possession, the land vests absolutely with the State, free from all encumbrances. An important requirement is that there should be an award. The word "may" used in Section 16 of the L.A. Act is to accommodate Section 48 of the L.A. Act. This is so because, even after passing of the award, if the State wants to withdraw, the State is at liberty to withdraw, but if the State takes possession of the land after passing of the award, then it is only such possession which results in vesting of land in the State, free from all encumbrances. Thus, if possession is not taken under Section 16 of the L.A. Act, then the land does not vest with the State. In the present case, there is no vesting of land in the State as the provision under Section 16 of the L.A. Act is not complied with. It is also not in dispute that possession of the land was not with the State as on 8-3-1984 as it had already been delivered to the society. In the result, it would be a contradiction in terms to contend that possession has been taken in terms of Section 16 of the L.A. Act. The Gazette Notification under Section 16 of the L.A. Act would clearly indicate this paradox, as there is reference to taking possession in the year 1984, before the passing of the award and not by the Government but is said to be by the society. He would further point out that if Section 16(1) of the L.A. Act is complied with and if the same is gazetted, then there is a presumption of having taken possession. Section 16(2) of the L.A. Act which is incorporated by Karnataka State Amendment, cannot be read as substantive law evidencing delivery of possession. The said sub-section, which is incorporated by the State Amendment, is a mere confirmation of a ministerial act and would not override or eclipse the requirement under sub-section (1), which is uniformly applied to all the States in the country, as provided by the Central enactment. The delivery of possession, voluntary or otherwise to the society would not have the effect of vesting the property with the State. The delivery of possession, voluntary or otherwise to the society would not have the effect of vesting the property with the State. The State would acquire title only if such delivery of possession or vesting was in compliance with the provisions of the L.A. Act. As the provisions of the Act required the award to be passed before possession is taken, it would not have the effect of conferring title on the State. Section 17 of the L.A. Act, which is an emergency provision, is an exception. In the present circumstance, there is no reference to Section 17 of L.A. Act. Hence, it can be stated that there is no compliance with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. If this proposition is accepted, then the State Government's power to withdraw from acquisition under Section 48(1) would not be taken away. A mere publication of notification under Section 16(1) of L.A. Act does not have the effect of curing a material defect. In any event, the merits of the case is not the subject-matter of the petition. The long neglect of the lands, which have been acquired by the society and the doubt as to the bona (ides of the society are in question and it cannot be said that the State Government is precluded from initiating an enquiry and to initiate appropriate proceedings under the several laws that it may press into service through the competent authorities. 14. In this regard, he would rely upon several judgments: M / s. Jetmull Bhojraj, wherein it is laid down that the Government becomes the owner of the lands notified for acquisition only when the collector takes possession of those lands either under Section 16 or under Section 17(1). Possession referred to in Section 48 necessarily is the possession taken under Section 16 or under Section 17(1). Ordinarily possession of any land notified for acquisition is taken when the collector has made an award under Section 11 and not before it. But an exception is provided under Section 17(1). In cases of urgency, if the Government so directs, the collector may though no award has been made under Section 11, on the expiration of 15 days from the publication of the notice mentioned in Section 9(1) take possession of any waste or arable land and the land shall there upon vest absolutely with the Government free from all encumbrances. In cases of urgency, if the Government so directs, the collector may though no award has been made under Section 11, on the expiration of 15 days from the publication of the notice mentioned in Section 9(1) take possession of any waste or arable land and the land shall there upon vest absolutely with the Government free from all encumbrances. From this provision, it is plain that the Collector cannot take possession of the land in question unless the Government directs him to do so. Even in case of urgency the Government may not think it necessary to take immediate possession for good reasons. Neither the language of Section 7(1) nor public interest justifies the construction sought to be placed by the learned Counsel for the appellant. Commissioner of Central Excise v V. Madhu alias C. v: Maadhesh1: A joint notice having been issued to two firms, under the Central Excise Act, 1944, a writ petition was filed before the High Court, contending that the two are separate and independent units and that one was not in existence, and that the goods seized related to the other and therefore the initiation of joint proceedings was illegal. The High Court quashed the joint notice. The Supreme Court, in appeal, set aside the order of the High Court and held that if the notices raised appropriate objections before the authorities they could examine the same and thereafter if necessary, hold separate proceedings. Such a joint notice did not cause prejudice to either of the parties. Thirumala Tirupati Devasthanams and Another v Thallappaka Anantha Charyulu and Others2 and Union of India v Upendra Singh3. In support of the principle that a writ of prohibition is issued only when patent lack of jurisdiction is made out. 15. A writ of prohibition is normally issued only when the interior Court or Tribunal: (a) proceeds to act without or in excess of jurisdiction; (b) proceeds to act in violation of the rules of natural justice; (c) proceeds to act under law which is itself ultra vires or unconstitutional; or (d) proceeds to act in contravention of fundamental rights. The principles which govern the exercise of such power must be strictly observed. A writ of prohibition must be issued only in the rarest of rare cases. The principles which govern the exercise of such power must be strictly observed. A writ of prohibition must be issued only in the rarest of rare cases. H.M. T. House Building Co-operative Society's case, wherein then Supreme Court has, while considering the challenge to acquisition proceedings, held that there was contravention of Section 3(f)(vi) of the Act inasmuch as there was no prior approval of the State Government as required by the said section before steps for acquisition of the lands were taken. And that, from materials on record, to indicate that the proceedings for acquisition of the lands had not been initiated because the State Government was satisfied about the existence of the public purpose, but at the instance of an agent, who had collected large sums of money for getting the lands acquired by the State Government. While quashing the acquisition proceedings, the possession of the lands were directed to be restored to the respective landowners, irrespective of the fact whether they had challenged the acquisition of their lands or not. In the case of M/s. Mohan Meakin Limited, to contend that though a Division Bench of this court has held that voluntary surrender of possession cannot be held to have been excluded for the purpose of exercise of power under Section 48, the Court was not dealing with a situation wherein even before the Award was passed, possession of the land having been taken by the beneficiary society. It is therefore contended that delivery of possession in any other manner, not according to the provisions of the L.A. Act itself gives jurisdiction to the State to look into the matter. It is also contended that in any event the reasoning in this decision would not stand in the face of the ratio in Jetmull Bhojraj's case, supra. 16. Sri M.V. Narasimhan, Counsel for the respondent 5 contends that his client is the genuine society and that the petitioner has no locus standi to maintain the present petition., This is a seriously disputed question of fact and without resolving the same, the present petition cannot be entertained. The impugned notice is the first step in this direction and hence the petition is pre-mature and is obviously to avoid any further enquiry into the bona fides of the petitioner, amounting to gross abuse of process of the Court. The impugned notice is the first step in this direction and hence the petition is pre-mature and is obviously to avoid any further enquiry into the bona fides of the petitioner, amounting to gross abuse of process of the Court. It is not even denied by the petitioner that it has entered into an agreement with a reputed builder from Mumbai, but has failed to produce the details of that arrangement, which w9uld bring it within the pale bf the law laid down by the Supreme Court in H.M. T. House Building Co-operative Society's case, supra. It is his submission that his client has no objection if the subject lands are resumed by the State Government as the society does not have the wherewithal to complete the process of forming house sites and allotting the same to its members. It has become defunct many years ago. It is his contention that the public purpose would be defeated if the petitioner is permitted to continue to act unhindered. 17. In the light of these rival contentions, the points that arise for consideration in the present case are as follows.- (a) "Whether the show-cause notice issued by the State Government ought to be quashed at the instance of the petitioner?. (b) "Whether a writ of prohibition should be issued against the State from proceeding further pursuant to the impugned notice? 18. The immediate cause for the filing of the present writ petition is the show-cause notice issued by the Under Secretary to Government, Revenue Department. In the notice, it is seen that as a preamble it is stated that the land measuring 20 acres 16 guntas is acquired in favour Shanthinagar House Building Co-operative Society and that a final declaration was issued as on 17-·5-1983 and an award was passed on 27-9-1986 and possession of the land was handed over to the society on 3-11-1988 by issue of a notification under Section 16(2) of the L.A. Act. But, it has come to the notice of the Government that the property has not been utilised for the purpose for which it has been acquired by the Government in favour of the society and that the society has failed to distribute the sites among the genuine members. But, it has come to the notice of the Government that the property has not been utilised for the purpose for which it has been acquired by the Government in favour of the society and that the society has failed to distribute the sites among the genuine members. It has also been reiterated that several survey numbers have been sold by several landowners or the General power of attorney holders as late as March, 2004 to third parties, which indicated that the said society was not functioning properly and that it was not in control of the properties and that the society appears not to be functioning and it was defunct and though the land had been acquired twenty years ago, the lands were not utilised within a reasonable time for the purposes for which it was acquired. Therefore, the society has violated the provisions of the L.A. Act and Rules by misusing the lands by not utilising them, and hence, the society 'was called upon to show cause why action should not be initiated against it under the Act and Rules and that if no reply was received within seven days, action would be taken to de-notify the above lands and to restore its possession to its original owners. This notice is claimed as being addressed to both the petitioner-society and the fifth respondent. The notice itself does not disclose the address to which the said notice was issued. The State Government, however, appears to recognise the fifth respondent as the actual society and has questioned the bona fides of the petitioner. This is apparent from its pleadings. However, there is no enquiry or other proceedings where the parties have been heard in arriving at a finding that either the petitioner-society or the fifth respondent is the actual society. Though it is placed on record that on account of the jurisdictional Police having made enquiries with the Registrar of Co-operative Societies as to the identity of the society and whether it should recognise the petitioner-society as the actual society or the fifth respondent, an inspection report appears to have been generated wherein it is disclosed that the concerned Deputy Registrar of Co-operative Societies has formed an opinion that the fifth respondent is the actual society. Beyond this, there is no finding of fact arrived at by any authority at a full fledged enquiry to conclude that either the petitioner or the fifth respondent is the actual society, for whose benefit the land was acquired. Insofar as the notice itself is concerned, the fifth respondent does not have any objection if the land reverts back to the original Owner. It is the petitioner-society which seeks to challenge the said notice. 19. In addressing the first question, it is necessary to proceed on the undisputed facts, without reference to the controversies raised by the parties in their prolix pleadings both on facts and the finer points of interpretation of the law. That a co-operative society was incorporated in the year 1965, bearing the name of the petitioner is not in dispute. An agreement dated 15-10-1975 by the society with respondent 3 for purchase of the subject lands to the extent of 60 acres 20 guntas is also not disputed. The· issuance of a preliminary notification under Section 4(1) of the L.A. Act as on 12-1-1983, is not denied. A declaration under Section 6(1) of the L.A. Act as on 22-5-1983 is not denied. A further agreement dated 10-9-1986 as between respondent 3 and the State Government in the prescribed Form D, conteplated under Section 11(2) of the L.A. Act and prescribed under Rule O-B of the Karnataka Land Acquisition Rules, 1965 ('KLA Rules' for short) is also not denied. 20. An award having been passed on 12-9-1986 and a notification under Section 16(2) of the L.A Act having been issued as on 3-11-1988 notifying post facto, the delivery of possession of the lands is also not denied. 21. The subsequent events as narrated by the petitioner-society from the year 1988 onwards is not evidenced by material documents. 22. Proceeding on the admitted circumstances as it stood culminated by the issuance of a notification under Section 16(2) of the L.A. Act dated 3-11-1988, it is to be examined whether the proposed action is tenable in law. 23. The tenor of the impugned notice would indicate that the acquired lands have not been utilized for the purpose for which it has been acquired. The society has failed to form a layout and distribute the house sites amongst its members. 23. The tenor of the impugned notice would indicate that the acquired lands have not been utilized for the purpose for which it has been acquired. The society has failed to form a layout and distribute the house sites amongst its members. That there are sale transactions by the erstwhile landowner on a possible claim that he continues to exercise ownership, leading to a presumption that the lands are left unprotected by the society. In short, that there has been a failure in the purpose for which the lands were acquired and hence, why action ought not to be initiated under the Act and Rules. The notice however, carries a rider that if no reply is received from the society within seven days, unilateral action would be taken to denotify the lands and to restore its possession to its original owner. 24. As stated above, the possession of the lands have been taken over by the State Government and this has been notified under Section 16 of the Act. The validity or otherwise of the said acquisition proceedings is not the subject-matter of this petition. Notwithstanding the contentions as regards the infirmity in possession having been taken contrary to the provisions of the Act, the lands having vested absolutely in the State free from all encumbrances, it would be an anomaly to suggest that the State could "denotify" the lands or seek to withdraw from acquisition. The acquisition proceedings are completed. The question of the State "withdrawing" from the acquisition is therefore not possible. Especially since the State has handed over the lands to the society and its members for whose benefit it was acquired. To this extent the show-cause notice indicating a possible denotification is inexplicable and superfluous. 25. The notice is silent as to the provision of law under which it is issued. There is no explanation forthcoming in the prolix pleadings of the State. Nor was any argument canvassed in this regard, except to contend it is irrelevant at the nascent stage of a preliminary enquiry into the bona (ides of the petitioner-society and its activities. The obvious has, however, been ignored. A co-operative society within the meaning of the Co-operative Societies Act, 1912, or any law corresponding to that Act and a Company registered under the Companies Act, 1956, are treated synonymously under the L.A. Act. The Karnataka Land Acquisition (Companies) Rules, 1973 are therefore applicable. The obvious has, however, been ignored. A co-operative society within the meaning of the Co-operative Societies Act, 1912, or any law corresponding to that Act and a Company registered under the Companies Act, 1956, are treated synonymously under the L.A. Act. The Karnataka Land Acquisition (Companies) Rules, 1973 are therefore applicable. 26. A Division Bench of this Court, in the case of Narayana Reddy and Another v State of Karnataka and Others 1 has held that under Section 3(f)(vi) insofar as it relates to societies other than those falling under the expression "Corporation owned or controlled by the State" the acquisition of land would be for a public purpose only if it is for purposes specified in Section 3(f)(vi) of the Act. If it is for any purpose other than those specified in Section 3(f)(vi) then certainly Part VII of the Act would be attracted and have to be complied with. It cannot however, be said that the mere acquisition by a co-operative society that it requires the lands for a housing scheme would meet the requirements of Section 3(f)(vi). It is for the Government before granting previous sanction to ascertain it is so. This position of law has been affirmed by the Supreme Court in the case of H.M. T. House Building Co-operative Society Limited. And it is held that the prior approval required by Section 3(f)(vi) of the appropriate Government is not just a formality, it is a condition precedent to the exercise of power of acquisition by the Government for a housing scheme of a Housing Co-operative Society. Further, in the case of M. Subramani v Union of India; S. Vasudeva v State of Karnataka2, it is held by a Division Bench of this Court that a housing scheme sponsored by a co-operative society is "public purpose" only if it has received the prior approval of the Government. Such approval is a condition precedent for acquisition. In any other case the procedure laid down in Part VII of the Act would be attracted. 27. The Act does not specify the material on which either the tentative conclusion to Section 4(1) or approval under Section 3(f)(vi) are to be based. Such approval is a condition precedent for acquisition. In any other case the procedure laid down in Part VII of the Act would be attracted. 27. The Act does not specify the material on which either the tentative conclusion to Section 4(1) or approval under Section 3(f)(vi) are to be based. In M/s. Fomento Resorts and Hotels Limited v Gustavo Ranato Da Cruz Pinto and Others3, it was held that the view of the Government that the land is needed either for a public purpose or for a company may be based either on independent enquiry or from reports and information received by the Government or even from an application by the company concerned. The prior approval however, is a must. 28. In the instant case, the admitted reason for acquisition through the medium of the State was on account of the prohibition under the Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961. It is nobody's case that there was a prior approval of any housing scheme of the society. Even as on date, there is no sanctioned plan in respect of the entire extent of the lands. Part VII of the Act therefore stood attracted. 29. Section 39 of the L.A. Act provides as follows.- "39. Previous consent of appropriate Government and execution of agreement necessary.-The provisions of Sections 6 to 16 (both inclusive) and Sections 18 to 37 (both inclusive) shall not be put in force in order to acquire land for any Company, under this Part, unless with the previous consent of the appropriate Government, nor unless the Company shall have executed the agreement hereinafter mentioned". 30. Section 41 of the L.A Act prescribes the need for entering into an agreement by the company (read "Society") with the Government in cases where the acquisition is for the purpose of erecting dwelling houses or the provision of amenities connected therewith. The time within which, the conditioIT8 on which and the manner in which the same shall be carried out. 31. Rule 5 of the Karnataka Land Acquisition (Companies) Rules, 1973 provides as follows.- "5. The time within which, the conditioIT8 on which and the manner in which the same shall be carried out. 31. Rule 5 of the Karnataka Land Acquisition (Companies) Rules, 1973 provides as follows.- "5. Matters to be provided in the agreement under Section 41.-(1) The terms of the agreement referred to in Section 41 of the Act shall include the following matters namely.- (i) that the company shall not except with the previous sanction of the State Government, use the land for any purpose other than that for which it is acquired; (ii) that the time within which the dwelling-houses or amenities directly connected therewith shall be erected or provided or the building or work shall be constructed or executed shall not exceed three years from the date of transfer of the land to the company; (iii) that where the State Government is satisfied after such enquiry as it may deem necessary that the company was prevented by reasons beyond its control from erecting, providing, constructing or executing or dwelling-houses or amenities or any building or work within the time specified in the agreement, the State Government may extend the time for that purpose by a period not exceeding one year at a time so however that the total period of extension shall not exceed three years; (iv) that if the company commits a breach of any of the conditions provided for in the agreement, the appropriate Government may make an order declaring the transfer of the land to the company as null and void whereupon the land shall revert back to the State Government and directing that an amount not exceeding one-fouth of the amount paid by the company to the State Government as the cost of acquisition under clause (1) of Section 41 of the Act shall be forfeited to the State Government as damages and the balance shall be refunded to the company, and the order so made shall be final and binding; (v) that if the company utilises only a portion of the land for the purpose for which it was acquired and the appropriate Government is satisfied that the company can continue to utilise the portion of the land used by it even if utilities part thereof is resumed, the State Government may make an order declaring the transfer of the land with respect to the unutilised portion thereof as null and void whereupon such unutilised portion shall revert back to the State Government and directing that an amount not exceeding one-fourth of such portion of the amount paid by the company as cost of the acquisition under clause (1) of Section 41 of the Act as is relatable to the unutilised portion shall be forfeited to the State Government as damages and that balance of that portion shall be refunded to the company and the order so made shall, subject to the provisions of clause (vi), be final and binding; (vi) that where there is any dispute with regard to the amount relatable to the unutilised portion of the land, such dispute shall be referred to the Court within whose jurisdiction the land or any part thereof is situated and the decision of that Court thereon shall be final. (2) Where the company commits a breach of any of the terms of the agreement, the State Government shall not make an order under clause (vi) or clause (v) of sub-rule (1) unless the company has been given an opportunity of being heard in the matter. (3) The State Government shall consult the committee before according any sanction under clause (i) of the sub-rule (1) or extending the time under clause (iii) or making any order under clause (iv) or clause (v) of that sub-rule". Rule 7 further provides as follows.- "7. Submission of Periodical Reports.-For the purpose of ensuring that the conditions provided for in the agreement executed by tile company are complied with, the State Government may direct the Deputy Commissioner or such other Officer as the State Government may appoint for the purpose, to submit to it and to the committee a periodical report, at such intervals of time as it may specify, indicating the conditions which have been or have not been complied with as well as the steps taken by the company towards their compliance". In the absence of an enquiry as contemplated under Section 40 and prior sanction of any housing scheme of the petitioner, the mandate of Section 39 and Section 41 has not been followed by the State. 32. This explains the reason that there has been no follow up under Rules 5 and 7 of the Karnataka Land Acquisition (Companies) Rules, 1973. In any event, these rules provide for a mechanism of resumption of the lands by the State where there has been a breach of the terms of agreement on the basis of which the transfer of the land is made in favour of a company or society. The power to enquire into the reasons for not having satisfied the object of acquisition of the lands is not absent. The absence of an agreement as contemplated under Section 41 of the Act - notwithstanding the spirit and purpose of the acquisition, must at all times be seen to be complied with. The lapse of time from the date of transfer of the lands in favour of the society has not resulted in any substantial change in the acquired land. It is not the case of any of the parties that the lands are completely developed and built up. The lapse of time from the date of transfer of the lands in favour of the society has not resulted in any substantial change in the acquired land. It is not the case of any of the parties that the lands are completely developed and built up. Even according to the petitioner there remain sites which are yet to be conveyed to its members. 33. Further, from the pleadings in the present petition, it is clear that the course of events are not entirely transparent and tangible. Disputed questions of fact need to be addressed, some of which, if answered against the petitioner, would certainly warrant resumption of the land by the State Government. 34. Having regard to the time frame prescribed under the Rules and in the light of the fact that no such agreement as contemplated therein was executed, it may be argued that even if there was a breach on the part of the society, any action by the State ought to have been taken by the State in that regard within a reasonable time and hence, could not be initiated at this point of time. It is settled that in a statute where for exercise of power no time-limit is fixed, it has to be exercised within a time which can be held to be reasonable. It is also settled that such exercise of power would depend on the facts and circumstances of the cases. (See State of G'1arat v Patil Raghav Natha and Othersl; Mansaram v S.P. Pathak ; Ram Chand v Union of India3; Kerala State Housing Board v Ramapriya Hotels (Private) Limited4; State of Orissa v Brundaban Sharma5 and Hindustan Times Limited v Union of India6). In the case of Brundaban Sharma, supra, it is held, absence of limitation is an assurance to exercise the power with caution or circumspection to effectuate the purpose of the Act, or to prevent miscarriage of justice or violation of the provisions of the Act or misuse or abuse of the power by the lower authorities or fraud or suppression. Length of time depends on the factual scenario in a given case. In the circumstances of the present case, therefore, there is no impediment as would cause prejudice to any third party by the State Government initiating an enquiry. 35. Length of time depends on the factual scenario in a given case. In the circumstances of the present case, therefore, there is no impediment as would cause prejudice to any third party by the State Government initiating an enquiry. 35. In my opinion, therefore, the show-cause notice issued by the State Government cannot be said to be in colourable exercise of power. The language and form may be found wanting in precision, but the State is not precluded from enquiring into a possible breach or failure of the object of acquisition. The first question is hence answered in the negative. 36. In view of the above, the second question would not survive for consideration. On the other hand, the State Government is directed to proceed in accordance with law to maintain the status quo in respect of the vast extent of lands in question pending enquiry and further action. The proposed precipitative action of the State Government under the impugned notice is, however, to be restrained. 37. In the result, the writ petition is allowed in part. The State is restrained from proceeding to resume the lands without holding or causing such enquiry and such further enquiry as may be warranted or deemed fit under relevant statutory provisions to justify its action. 38. Incidentally, an application numbered as I.A. No.6 is filed. Sri A.G. Shivanna, Counsel for the applicants submits that the applicants are the legal heirs of a re-grantee in respect of a portion of the land which is the subject-matter of acquisition and raises the very legal contentions urged by respondent 3. And contends, that the applicants are necessary parties to the petition. The petitioners have filed objections to the application. Having regard to the limited scope of the writ petition, no ground is made out in the application. The same is rejected.

SHANTHINAGAR HOUSE BUILDING CO-OPERATIVE SOCIETY LIMITED, BANGALORE v. STATE OF KARNATAKA, BANGALORE