Judgment :- (Prayer: Criminal Appeal against the judgment of conviction and sentence dated 19.3.1998 in S.C. No. 33 of 1996 on the file of Principal Sessions Judge, Dharmapuri District at Krishnagiri.) The appellants are A-1 and A-2 in S.C. No. 33 of 1996 on the file of Principal Sessions Judge, Dharmapuri District at Krishnagiri. The present appeal is directed against the conviction and sentence imposed on the appellants by judgment dated 19.3.98. Before the Trial Court, the first appellant/A-1 was charged under Sections 448 and 323 I.P.C. and another charge was also framed against the appellants as well as the acquitted accused/A-3 under Section 3(1)(x) of SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities)Act, 1989 (hereinafter referred to as the "Act"). The learned Trial Judge, on the materials placed on record, while acquitting A-3, found A-1 guilty under Sections 448 and 355 as well as under Section 3(1)(x) of the Act and found A-2 also guilty under Section 3(1)(x) of the Act. For each of the offence under Sections 448 and 355 I.P.C., A-1 was imposed with a fine of Rs.100 carrying a default sentence of one week simple imprisonment and for the offence under Section 3(1)(x) of the Act, A-1 and A-2 were each sentenced to undergo 6 months RI together with a fine of Rs.100/- carrying a default sentence of one week simple imprisonment. As already stated, the said conviction and sentence is under challenge in this appeal. 2. The case of the prosecution is that A-1 trespassed into the house of P.W.1 Chinnasamy along with A-2 and caused simple injuries to his son P.W.2 by attacking him with hands and that A-1 to A-3 intentionally insulted by calling them in the name of their community. In order to prove their case, the prosecution examined P.W.s 1 to 10, marked Exs-P1 to P10 and M.O.1. 3. When the accused were questioned under Section 313 Cr.P.C.as to the incriminating evidence against them, they denied as false and stated that a false complaint had come to be given due to jealousy. Neither oral nor documentary evidence was brought before Court at their instance. 4. Heard both sides 5. Learned counsel for the appellants mainly contended that no proper investigation was done by the investigating agency and both P.W.8, the Sub-Inspector of Police, who initially conducted investigation and P.W.10, the Inspector of Police, who filed the final report, had no authority to investigate at all. 4. Heard both sides 5. Learned counsel for the appellants mainly contended that no proper investigation was done by the investigating agency and both P.W.8, the Sub-Inspector of Police, who initially conducted investigation and P.W.10, the Inspector of Police, who filed the final report, had no authority to investigate at all. Further, the learned counsel submitted that though the occurrence took place at 12 noon on 20.12.94, the complaint came to be registered only on the next day, ie., on 21.12.94. On the basis of the complaint, Ex-P1, P.W.8, the Sub-Inspector of Police, registered a case in Crime No. 25/94 for offences under Sections 438 and 323 I.P.C. and 3(1)(x) of the Act and prepared Ex-P9, the printed First Information Report. Thereafter, considering the nature of offence involved, he forwarded the material records to Thoppur Police Station. P.W.9, the Sub-Inspector of Police at Thoppur Police Station, on receipt of material records from P.W.8, took up investigation on 22.12.94. He went to the scene of occurrence, inspected the same and prepared an Observation Mahazar, Ex-P7 and drew a rough sketch, Ex-P11 and recovered M.O.1-shirt from P.W.2 under mahazar Ex-P8. He recorded statements of P.W.s 1 to 5 on the same day. He arrested A-1 on 30.8.95. A-2 and A-3 were arrested by him on 9.10.95. He gave a requisition to the Tahsildar to issue community certificates relating to P.W.s 1 and 2 and the accused. Thereafter, since he was transferred, investigation was taken up by P.W.10, the Inspector of Police, on 22.1.96. He received the community certificates Exs-P2 to P6 and after completing the investigation, he filed the final report in Court against the accused on 22.1.96. According to the learned counsel, the entire investigation done by P.W.s 8 to 10, had not been done in a proper manner and the officials, who conducted investigation, had no authority to do so, after the framing of SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Rules, 1995 which came into effect on 31.3.95. According to the learned counsel, the entire investigation done by P.W.s 8 to 10, had not been done in a proper manner and the officials, who conducted investigation, had no authority to do so, after the framing of SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Rules, 1995 which came into effect on 31.3.95. The learned counsel also relied on the decision of the Supreme Court in State of M.P. V. Mubarak Ali ( AIR 1959 SC 707 ) wherein the Supreme Court has held that, after investigation, formation of the opinion, as to whether on the material collected, there is a case to place the accused before a Magistrate for trial and if so taking the necessary steps for the same by the filing of a charge-sheet under S.173, also forms part of the investigation, which starts on receipt of the information with regard to the offence. The other decision relied on by the learned counsel is the judgment of this Court in Chinnasamy V. State reported in 2000 (2) MWN (Cr.) 280, wherein this Court held as, "These rules have been framed by the Central Government in exercise of rule-making power conferred under Section 23 of the Act. The Central Government has been authorised under Section 23(1) of the Act to make rules for carrying out the purposes of the Act. Since the purpose and objective sought to be attained by the Act is to minimise the offences against the S.C. and S.T. Act. Therefore, in order to ensure any misuse of the Act, Rule 7 of the Rules lays down not only that the investigation should be done by an Officer not below the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police but also lays down that such officer should be specifically appointed by the State Government for investigating the offences under the Act. It further lays down that, while appointing such officers, the Government should take into consideration his past experience, sense of ability and justice to perceive the implications of the case. Under these circumstances, I am of the view that the investigation done by the Inspector of Police goes to the root of the matter and it vitiates the entire proceedings." The learned counsel also relied on the judgment of this Court in K.P.S. Sathyamoorthy V. State of Tamil Nadu ( 2003 (2) CTC 666 ), wherein the principles laid down in the above said judgment were followed. 6. 6. Learned Government Advocate submitted that inasmuch as SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Rules, 1995 came into effect on 31.3.95 and major part of the investigation had been completed by then, the investigation done in this case cannot be said to be improper. 7. There is no force in the submission of the learned Government Advocate since Rule 7(1) of the Rules contemplates that, "an offence committed under the Act shall be investigated by a Police Officer not below the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police. The Investigating Officer shall be appointed by the State Government/Director General of Police/Superintendent of Police after taking into account his past experience, sense of ability and justice to perceive the implications of the case and investigate it along with right lines within the shortest possible time." Therefore, in view of the fact that the said rules had come into force with effect from 31.3.95, which contemplates that an offence committed under the Act shall be investigated by a police officer, not below the rank of Deputy Superintendent of Police and that such officer shall be appointed either by the State Government/Director General of Police/Superintendent of Police, the entire investigation after 31.3.95 has to be termed as improper as P.W.s 9 and 10 are incompetent to proceed further in the matter. Hence, it is clear, as rightly contended by the learned counsel for the appellants, the investigation conducted in this case is vitiated. 8. Accordingly, the conviction and sentence imposed on the appellants are set aside. Inasmuch as the first appellant/A-1 had died, the appeal as regards A-1 is dismissed as abated. The appeal stands allowed in respect of the second appellant/A-2.