ORDER Shri S.R. Nayak, C.J.;- 1. This appeal preferred under Section 30 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 (for short 'the Act') is directed against the award of the Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation (for short 'the Commissioner'), Bilaspur dated 8.4.1992 passed in case No. 13/WCA/911F. The husband of the respondent, late D.K. Paliwal by name, was an employee in the establishment of the appellant -Company and he died on 28th June 1989 in an accident arising out and in the course of his employment. The widow of the deceased, the respondent herein, filed a claim petition under the Act for compensation. The Commissioner passed the award on 8.4.1992 and awarded compensation of Rs.65,000/- with interest at the rate of 12% with penalty quantified at Rs.30,000/- plus costs quantified at Rs.500/-. Hence, this appeal by the aggrieved appellant-Company. 2. We have heard learned counsel for the parties. It was contended by Shri P.S. Koshy, learned counsel for the 'appellant, that in the facts and circumstances of the case, the Commissioner is not justified in awarding interest and imposing penalty. Elaborating his submission, Shri Koshy would submit that immediately after the appellant -Company came to know the death of the husband of the first respondent, it wrote a letter on 14.6.1990 to the Commissioner seeking clarification whether the Company is liable to deposit compensation with regard to the death of D.K. Paliwal expressing its doubt whether it was required to deposit compensation because D.K. Paliwal on the date of the accident was serving as Joint Senior Manager (Production0 (P & A) and he was not a "workman" as defined under clause (n) of Section 2 of the Act. There was no immediate reply from the Commissioner. In the circumstance, the appellant-Company sent a reminder on 19.12.1990. Then came the response from the Office of the Commissioner dated 28.12.1990. Though the same was sent by the Head Clerk in the Office of the Commissioner, the appellant-Company was told that the dependents of late D.K. Paliwal are not entitled to get compensation under the Act because he was Production Manager and the dependents of the deceased had to work out legal remedies in a Civil Suit. Though the same was sent by the Head Clerk in the Office of the Commissioner, the appellant-Company was told that the dependents of late D.K. Paliwal are not entitled to get compensation under the Act because he was Production Manager and the dependents of the deceased had to work out legal remedies in a Civil Suit. In view of this clarification contained in the letter of the Head Clerk, the appellant-Company did not deposit compensation within the specified time, as required under Section 4A of the Act, and therefore, the Commissioner was not justified in awarding interest and imposing penalty. Shri Koshy would maintain that there was justification for the Company in depositing the compensation with delay. Smt. Hamida Siddiqui, learned counsel appearing for the first respondent, per contra, would point out that the clarification sent by the Head Clerk should not enure to the benefit of the appellant .because, the appellant did not contest the claim of the first respondent for compensation on the ground that the deceased was not a "workman" within the meaning of that term, as defined under the Act, and since admittedly there was delay in depositing the compensation, the Commissioner is justified in awarding interest and imposing penalty on delayed payment of compensation. 3. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, we cannot take any exception to the impugned award insofar as it has awarded interest at the rate of 12% per annum. Sub-section (3) of Section 4A of the Act reads as follows: "[(3) Where any employer is in default in paying the compensation due under this Act within one month from the date it fell due, the Commissioner shall- (a) direct that the employer shall, in addition to the amount of the arrears, pay simple interest thereon at the rate of twelve per cent per annum or at such higher rate not exceeding the maximum of the lending rates of any scheduled bank as may be specified by the Central Government, by notification in the Official Gazette, on the amount due; and (b) if, in his opinion, there is no justification for the delay, direct that the employer shall, in addition to the amount of the arrears, and interest thereon pay a further sum not exceeding fifty per cent of such amount by way of penalty. Provided that an order for the payment of penalty shall not be passed under clause (b) without giving a reasonable opportunity to the employer to show cause why it should not be passed. Explanation- For the purposes of this sub-section, "scheduled bank" means a bank for the time being included in the Second Schedule to the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934 (2 ofl934) [(3A) The interest and the penalty payable under subsection (3) shall be paid to the workman or his dependent, as the case' may be.]]" As could be seen from clause (a) of sub-section (3) of the Section 4A of the Act, no discretion is left with the Commissioner and he is duty-bound to award simple interest on the delayed payment at the minimum rate of 12% or at such higher rate not exceeding the maximum of the lending rates of any scheduled bank as may be specified by the Central Government. Since the appellant has committed default in depositing the compensation due under the Act within one month from the date it fell due, the Commissioner's powers to direct payment of simple interest at the rate of 12% cannot be questioned . 4. However, we are of the considered opinion that the Commissioner, in the peculiar facts and circlffi1stances of the case, is not justified in imposing the penalty under clause (b) of sub-section (3) of Section 4A of the Act. It is quite clear from the provisions of clause (b), the Commissioner could direct payment of penalty only if he is of the opinion than here was no justification for the employer in causing the delay in depositing compensation. In the instant case, it is stated, two persons died in the accident. According to the employer, the other victim was a "workman" whereas the husband of the first respondent was not a "workman". It is not necessary for us to opine whether the above claim of the appellant is justified and correct. Suffice it to state that labouring under the impression that the husband of the first respondent is not a "workman", the appellant -Company vide its letter dated 14.6.90 addressed to the Commissioner sought clarification as to whether it was required to deposit compensation with regard to the death of the husband of the first respondent. Suffice it to state that labouring under the impression that the husband of the first respondent is not a "workman", the appellant -Company vide its letter dated 14.6.90 addressed to the Commissioner sought clarification as to whether it was required to deposit compensation with regard to the death of the husband of the first respondent. As already pointed out, there was no immediate response from the Commissioner for considerable time and that led to the appellant Company sending a reminder on 19.12.90. Then came the reply from the Office of the Commissioner. No doubt, Annexure - C dated 28.12.90 produced before us would show that communication was sent by the Head Clerk in the Office of the Commissioner. When we peruse Annexure-C, it would show that the appellant Company was told in cleartem1s that the dependents of the deceased D.K. Paliwal are not entitled to compensation under the Act because he was not a "workman" for he was Production Manager and his dependents should work out legal remedies in a Civil Suit. It is stated that only after the dependents of the deceased-D.K. Paliwal filed claim petition before the Commissioner and the Company received notice in that proceedings, the Company filed its reply. In the reply, it is stated that if ultimately the Commissioner finds the appellant-Company liable to pay the compensation under the Act, the appellant-Company would pay the compensation. 5. In deciding the question whether the appellant-Company had justification in depositing the compensation money with delay, the matter should be approached not from an absolute standard of necessity but from the point of view of all considerations which would weigh in the mind of a prudent manager. Ordinarily speaking, the word justification" means make out, or establish sufficiency of reasons for one's acts or omissions. In other words, a person who put-forth justification for a commission or omission should show in Court a sufficient reason why he did what the opponent charges him to answer for, but, he cannot excuse himself for not performing a duty or in performing an act which is not in accordance with law without showing any reason whatsoever. In Random House Webster’s College Dictionary meaning of the word justification" stated thus: "Justification: 1. a reason, fact, circumstance, or explanation that justifies. 2. an act of justifying, 3. the state of being justified. 4. In Random House Webster’s College Dictionary meaning of the word justification" stated thus: "Justification: 1. a reason, fact, circumstance, or explanation that justifies. 2. an act of justifying, 3. the state of being justified. 4. the act of God whereby humankind is absolved of guilt or sin. 5. the act or result of justifying a line or lines of type." In Black s Law Dictionary (Eighth Edition) the meaning of the word justification" is given thus : "1. A lawful or sufficient reason for one's acts or omission; any fact that prevents an act from being wrongful. 2. A showing, in court, of a sufficient reason why a defendant did what the prosecution charges the defendant to answer for." As per Stroud s Judicial Dictionary of Words and Phrases (Sixth Edition) Volume 2, the word justification" means 'is an affirming or showing good reason in court why he did such a thing as he is called to answer (Cowel)". In Advanced Law Lexicon by P. Ramanathan Aiyar; 3rd Edition 2005, the meaning of the word justification" is given thus: "Justification. A maintaining or showing good reason in Court why one did such a thing which he is called to answerbook. (Tomlin) The showing in Court of a sufficient lawful reason Why a party charged or accused did that for which he is called to answer.'" 6. The word "justification" occurring in clause (b) of sub-Section (3) of Section 4A of the Act if properly interpreted and understood in the context of this case, it cannot be said that the appellant-Company deliberately and without any justification refused to deposit the compensation within the time specified under Section 4A of the Act nor could it be said that the failure on the part of the appellant-Company was merely an excuse. The correspondence laid before the Court would show that the Company had heavily dependent on the advice of the Commissioner in the matter of discharging its liability to pay compensation and that is why, at the earliest point of time, the appellant-Company wrote a letter to the Commissioner to know from him whether it was liable to pay the compensation. The correspondence laid before the Court would show that the Company had heavily dependent on the advice of the Commissioner in the matter of discharging its liability to pay compensation and that is why, at the earliest point of time, the appellant-Company wrote a letter to the Commissioner to know from him whether it was liable to pay the compensation. Even in the reply filed by it, it was not the contention of the appellant -Company that it was not liable to pay compensation, but it undertook to pay compensation in the event of the Commissioner finding the appellant-Company liable to pay compensation. In between, there was another letter emanating from the Office of the Commissioner informing the appellant that since the deceased was Production Manager, the dependents of the deceased are not entitled to compensation under the Act and they have to work out their legal remedies in a Civil Suit. When we look at the facts of this case as a whole, we are inclined to think that there was justification for the appellant-Company not to deposit compensation within the stipulated time. In that view of the matter, we do not think that the Commissioner is justified in imposing penalty in addition to awarding the interest. 7. In that view of the matter, we allow the appeal in part and set aside the direction of the Commissioner to pay penalty. In all other aspects, the impugned award stands unaltered. No costs. Appeal Partly Allowed.