1. Heard Mr. Ch. Ngongo Singh, learned counsel for the petitioner and also Md. Jalal Uddin,learned G.A. for the respondents 1,2 and 3 as well as Mr. N. Ibotombi Singh, learned CGSC appearing on behalf of the respondent no.4. 2. The factual panorama of the petitioner's case is that the petitioner was arrested by a team of CDO, Bishnupur on 7.7.2005 and handed over to the O.C., Lamphel by falsely implicating in a Criminal case, i.e. FIR 1107 (2005)LPS U/S 384/12-A IPC and 17/20 UA(P) A.O. Act, 2004. For that case, the petitioner/detenu was produced before the concerned Magistrate and remanded to police custody till 16.7.2005. While the petitioner/detenu was in the police custody in connection with the said criminal case, the District Magistrate, Imphal West issued a detention order being No.CRIL/NSA/NO.82 of 2005, Imphal, the 15th July , 2005 for detaining the petitioner/detenu under the National Security Act, 1980 (for short 'NSA'). The District Magistrate also furnished the grounds of detention in pursuance of section 8 of the NSA 1980 under his letter dated 20.7.2005 to the petitioner/detenu. Para-5, i.e. ground no.5, furnished by the District Magistrate, Imphal West under his letter dated 20.7.2005 clearly indicates that the District Magistrate was very much in his knowledge that the petitioner/ detenu was in custody in respect of the criminal case and after taking into consideration of all the materials and his activities in the proximate past, the District Magistrate was satisfied that after having availed of bail facilities and becoming a free person the petitioner would continue to indulge in the same activities which are prejudicial to the security of the State and maintenance of the public order for which an alternative preventive measure was required immediately. Accordingly, the District Magistrate issued the said detention order. For easy reference, para-5 of the ground no.5 of the detention order is quoted hereunder: “5. Accordingly, the District Magistrate issued the said detention order. For easy reference, para-5 of the ground no.5 of the detention order is quoted hereunder: “5. That, in view of your tendencies and inclinations reflected in the offences committed by you in the proximate past as a hard core member of the banned organization namely Kangleipak Communist Party (KCP in short) which aim of establishing a sovereign independent state of Manipur by waging war against the lawfully established Government of India and Manipur holding fire arms, I am satisfied that after having availed of bail facilities and becoming a free person, you being a hard core member of the said organization would continue to indulge in the same activities which are prejudicial to the security of the state and maintenance of the public order. Hence, the application of normal criminal law against you will not at all be effective to prevent you from the commission of further prejudicial activities. An alternative preventive measure is, therefore, immediately called for. From the above grounds, I am satisfied that with a view to prevent you from acting in any manner prejudicial to the security of the state and maintenance of public order, I have made this order directing that you be detained under NSA, 1980.” 3. The state government, i.e. the Government of Manipur, by an order dated 15.7.2005 in exercise of the powers conferred U/S 3(4) of the NSA approved the said detention order passed by the District Magistrate dated 15.7.2005. Further, by an order of the Government of Manipur being No.17(1)/916/2004-H, Imphal, the 19th August, 2005 confirmed the said detention order dated 15.7.2005 and fixed the period of detention for 12 months from the date of detention. 4. By this writ petition, the petitioner is assailing the detention order on the, inter alia, grounds that (1) there is non-application of mind by the detaining authority in issuing the detention order dated 15.7.2005 inasmuch as the detaining authority has failed to consider the fact that the petitioner was already in the custody and also the availability of bail facilities and also the materials for detaining the petitioner/detenu under the NSA; and(2) the detaining authority also failed to comply with the provisions of sub-section (4) of section 3 of the NSA inasmuch as the detaining authority had failed to report forthwith the fact of detention together with the grounds to the State Govt. 5. 5. The respondent no.1, i.e. the District Magistrate, filed his affidavit-in-opposition stating that the detention order was issued after considering all the materials. The District Magistrate also reiterated that he was satisfied that the detenu is required to be detained under the NSA with a view to prevent him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the security of the state and maintenance of the public order and also that all the procedural requirements under the NSA were fulfilled in detaining the petitioner/detenu under the NSA. The respondents 2 and 3 also filed their affidavit-in-opposition denying the grounds for assailing the detention order in the present writ petition. 6. From the bare perusal of the detention order dated 15.7.2005 and the grounds of detention furnished by the District Magistrate under his letter dated 20.7.2005 to the petitioner/detenu, it is clear that the District Magistrate has taken into consideration of the fact that the petitioner/detenu was already in the custody and also availability of bail facilities and also the activities of the petitioner/detenu in the proximate past. Further, it is also appeared that the District Magistrate applying his mind had come to his satisfaction that application of normal criminal law against the petitioner/detenu will not at all be effective to prevent him from the commission for further prejudicial activities and alternative measure was, therefore, required immediately. It is now fairly well settled that the satisfaction of the detaining authority for placing a person under the NSA is only subjective satisfaction. For this point, it is not required to burden ourselves by referring to various decisions of the Apex Court. It would be suffice to refer to: (1) Pushkar Mukherjee & 29 Ors -vrs - State of West Bengal: (1969) 1 SCC 10 ; (2) Choudarpu Raghunandan -vrs - State of T.M.: (2003) 3 SCC 754; (3) A.P. Saravanam -vrs - State of Tamil Nadu: (2001) 10 SCC 212; (4) Union of India -vrs - Paul Manickam: (2003) 8 SCC 342 ; (5) Alijan Mian -vrs - District Magistrate, Dhanbad & Ors: AIR 1983 SC 1130 ; 7. The learned counsel appearing for the State-respondents by referring to the ratio laid down by the Apex Curt in the above cases submits that subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority arrived at while considering the material and record was the cumulative result of all the grounds of detention. The learned counsel appearing for the State-respondents by referring to the ratio laid down by the Apex Curt in the above cases submits that subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority arrived at while considering the material and record was the cumulative result of all the grounds of detention. Further, according to the learned counsel for the state respondents, no set standard had been laid down by the NSA for arriving a subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority for detaining a detenu under the NSA. In the present case, the detaining authority had come to his subjective satisfaction on the basis of all the materials placed before him by the Superintendent of Police. It cannot be said that there is non-application of mind of the District Magistrate in issuing the detention order. Therefore, the detention order cannot be said to be illegal. It is also fairly well settled that the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority should be reasonable and it is always open to the court exercising the power of judicial review to see whether there has been due and proper application of mind to the relevant and vital materials and also that this court in exercising the powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is not sitting as an appellate authority of the detention order. This court in exercising the writ jurisdiction is not re-appreciating the evidence available on the record for coming to a finding different to that of the detaining authority but this court is considering as to whether the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority was not at all based on any material or not. With this limited scope, this court is considering as to whether there was non application of mind of the detaining authority in issuing the impugned detention order. The learned G.A. also placed the relevant file of the Govt. of Manipur for perusal before this court. From perusal of the record as well as the detention order itself, the grounds of detention, this court is of the considered view that the detention order cannot be said to be illegal on the ground of non-application of mind of the detaining authority. 8. It is no doubt true to that procedural safeguards mentioned in the NSA should be strictly followed in issuing the detention order for detaining a citizen of India. 8. It is no doubt true to that procedural safeguards mentioned in the NSA should be strictly followed in issuing the detention order for detaining a citizen of India. Under sub-section (4) of section 3, the detaining authority shall forthwith report the fact of detention along with the grounds of detention to the state Government. From the material available on the record, the District Magistrate submitted the grounds of detention on 20.7.2005 to the State Government. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner/detenu submits that according to sub-section (4) of section 3 the fact about the detention along with the grounds of detention should be submitted “forthwith”. In other words, the learned counsel for the petitioner/detenu contended that the grounds of detention should be immediately submitted to the State Government. The Apex Court (C/B) had discussed the meaning of the word “forthwith” in Keshav Nilkanth Jaglekar -vrs - The Commissioner of Police, Greater Bombay & Ors: 1957 SC 28 [(S) AIR V 44 C 6 Jan.]. Keshav Nilkanth Jaglekar(supra) is a case considering the detention order under the Preventive Detention Act, 1950 and the facts spelt out in para-2 of the judgment is that the Commissioner of Police, Greater Bombay issued the detention order on 13.1.1956 and he communicated the ground of detention to the State Government only on 21.1.1956. The detenu had challenged the detention order on the ground that since the ground of detention had not been communicated to the State Govt. forthwith there was procedural lapses and as a result detention order is illegal. The Apex Court (C/B) after considering the meaning of the word “forthwith” mentioned in section 3(3) of the Preventive Detention Act 1950 held that an act which is to be done forthwith must be held to have been so done. When it is done with all reasonable dispatch and without avoidable delay. Para-7 of the judgment in Keshav Nilkanth Jaglekar (supra) reads as follows: “(7) The meaning of the word 'immediately' came up for consideration in Thompson v. Gibson (1841) 8 M & W 282:151 E R 1045 at p.1047 (C). When it is done with all reasonable dispatch and without avoidable delay. Para-7 of the judgment in Keshav Nilkanth Jaglekar (supra) reads as follows: “(7) The meaning of the word 'immediately' came up for consideration in Thompson v. Gibson (1841) 8 M & W 282:151 E R 1045 at p.1047 (C). Holding that it was not to be construed literally, Lord A binger C. B. observed: “If they” (acts of Parliament) “could be construed literally, consistently with common sense and justice, undoubtedly they ought; and if I could see, upon this act of Parliament, that it was the intention of the legislature that not a single moment's interval should take place before the granting of the certificate, I should think myself bound to defer to that declared intention. But it is admitted that this cannot be its interpretation; we are therefore to see how, consistently with common sense and the principles of justice, the words immediately afterwards' are to be construed. If they do not mean that it is to be done the very instant afterwards, do they mean within ten minutes, or a quarter of an hour, afterwards? I think we should interpret them to mean, within such reasonable time as will exclude the danger of intervening facts operating upon the mind of the Judge, so as to disturb the impression made upon it by the evidence in the cause”. In agreeing with this opinion, Alderson. B. expressly approved of the decision of Lord Hardwicke in Rex V. Francis (A). This construction of the word 'immediately' was adopted in Page v. Pearce (1841) 8 M. & W 677 at p.678: 151 E R 1211 at p. 1212 (D), Lord Abinger C.B observing: “It has already been decided, and necessarily so, that the words 'immediately afterwards' in the statute, cannot be construed literally; and if you abandon the literal construction of the words, what can you substitute but 'within' a reasonable time?...” In The Queen v. The Justices of Berkshire (1879) 4 Q.B.D. 469 at p. 471 (E), where the point was as to the meaning of “forthwith” in S 52 of 35 & 36 Vict, Chapter 94, Cockburn C.J. observed: “ The question is substantially one of fact. It is impossible to lay down any hard and fast rules as to what is the meaning of the word 'immediately' in all cases. It is impossible to lay down any hard and fast rules as to what is the meaning of the word 'immediately' in all cases. The words 'forthwith' and 'immediately' have the same meaning. They are stronger than the expression 'within a reasonable time', and imply prompt, vigorous action, without any delay, and whether there has been such action is a question of fact, having regard to the circumstances of the particular case”. The same construction has been put on the word “forthwith” occurring in contracts. In Hudson v. Hill, (1874) 43 LJCP 273 at p. 280(F) which was a case of charterparty, it was observed at page 280: “Forthwith” means without unreasonable delay. The difference between undertaking to do something 'forthwith' and within a specified time is familiar to everyone conversant with law. To do a thing 'forthwith' is to do it as soon as is reasonably convenient.” In Reg. V. Price, (1853-54) 8 Moo PC 203: 14 E R 78(G), it was held by the Privy Council that the word “forthwith” in a bail bond meant within a reasonable time from the service of notice. On these authorities, it may be taken, an act which is to be done forthwith must be held to have been so done, when it is done with all reasonable dispatch and without avoidable delay.” 9. From the material available on the record in the present case, we are of the considered view that the District Magistrate with all reasonable dispatch and without avoidable delay communicated the ground of detention to the State Government. Accordingly the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner/detenu is not sustainable. 10. In the course of hearing of the present writ petition, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner also faintly mentioned that there is violation of the procedures prescribed in sub-section (5) of section 3 of the NSA in the present case but such plea of the learned counsel for the petitioner has not been taken in the writ petition. In the absence of the plea in the writ petition, the question as to whether or not the procedure prescribed in sub-section (5) of section 3 had not been taken into consideration at the time of final hearing inasmuch the respondents cannot be denied the opportunity of filing their affidavit-in-opposition in this regard. In the absence of the plea in the writ petition, the question as to whether or not the procedure prescribed in sub-section (5) of section 3 had not been taken into consideration at the time of final hearing inasmuch the respondents cannot be denied the opportunity of filing their affidavit-in-opposition in this regard. Over and above, it is a question of fact which could only be decided after giving opportunity to the respondent to say the fact by producing the record. Such being the situation, this court is of the considered view that the plea of the learned counsel for the petitioner/detenu in this regard cannot be decided at this stage. Accordingly, this court is not considering the said plea of the learned counsel for the petitioner. 11. In view of the above discussions and observations, we are of the considered view that the present writ petition is devoid of merit and no interference to the detention order is called for. Accordingly, the present writ petition is dismissed. No costs.