JUDGMENT N. PRUSTY, J. — This writ petition has been filed by the defendants for quashing of the impugned order dated 4.8.2005 and 24.1.2006 passed by the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division), Khurda in C.S. No.79 of 2003 whereby the learned Court has re¬jected the petition filed by the defendants to recall P.W. 1 for cross-examination and closed the evidence from the side of the defendants. Heard Mr. Sahoo, learned counsel for the petitioners and Mr. D. K. Das, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the sole oppo¬site party. Mr. Sahoo, learned counsel for the petitioners submits that since the defendants could not appear on the date fixed for their appearance, they have been set ex parte and later on all the defendants appeared and filed an application for setting aside the ex parte order as well as filed their written statement on the very same day along with an application for acceptance of the same. The learned trial Court by its order dated 4.8.2005 was pleased to allow the petition, set aside the ex parte order against the defendants and accepted the written statement filed by them. In the mean time prior to the written statement filed by the defendants, the Plaintiff had filed his affidavit under Order 18 Rule 4 C.P.C. as his evidence and the same was accepted on that date without being cross-examined by the defendants, since by that time the defendants did not appear in the suit and had already been set ex parte. Immediately after their appearance they have filed one application to recall P.W.1 for his cross-examination, which was rejected by the learned trial Court. In the order dated 4.8.2005 it was also made clear that the defend¬ants are to participate in the hearing of the case and are to be satisfied with the action, which has already been done in the trial. As such they are not entitled to recall the witness i.e. P.W.1 for cross-examination. As it appears the defendants did not challenge this order immediately after the same was passed, i.e. even within 90 days from the date of passing of the order. It is well settled that where period of limitation is not provided for challenging an order in a civil proceeding, it is to be treated as 90 days, which is the period of limitation for filing an appeal. It is well settled that where period of limitation is not provided for challenging an order in a civil proceeding, it is to be treated as 90 days, which is the period of limitation for filing an appeal. The order dated 4.8.2005 was passed in a civil proceeding. Even though this writ petition has been filed challenging the order dated 4.8.2005 passed in C.S. No.79 of 2003, the same ought to have been filed within a reasonable period of 90 days, which is the period of limitation for filing appeal or revision against an order passed in the civil proceeding. The petitioners while chal¬lenging the subsequent order dated 24.1.2006 rejecting their self same prayer to recall P.W.1 for cross-examination, have also challenged the earlier order dated 4.8.2005 in this writ peti¬tion. In that view of the matter, I am not inclined to entertain the prayer for quashing order dated 4.8.2005, and the same is accordingly rejected. The impugned orders, as well as the averments made in the writ petition indicates that, later on after closure of evidence of both the sides again the defendants filed an application for recalling P.W.1 for his cross-examination on 4.1.2006, on the ground that it is very much essential for them to cross examine P.W.1 for the ends of justice and proper adjudication of the suit. They have also stated in the petition that if P.W.1 is not recalled for his cross-examination by the defendants then just decision of the suit cannot be arrived at. The learned trial Court considering the submissions made by the learned counsel for both the parties and keeping in view the earlier order dated 4.8.2005, which was not challenged by the defendants, as such is treated to have been accepted by them and/or become binding on the parties, also rejected the later application filed by the defendants, for the self same relief, by his order dated 24.1.2006 and hence this writ petition. Mr. Sahoo, submits that even if the prayer of the petition¬ers to recall P.W.1 has been rejected earlier, there is no bar for the defendants for filing such an application with the self same prayer once again. There was no other alternative for the petitioner except approaching this Court for redressal of their grievance. Mr. Sahoo, submits that even if the prayer of the petition¬ers to recall P.W.1 has been rejected earlier, there is no bar for the defendants for filing such an application with the self same prayer once again. There was no other alternative for the petitioner except approaching this Court for redressal of their grievance. If the order dated 24.1.2006 is not modified/recalled the defendants shall be highly prejudiced and suffer irreparable loss, as they will lose their valuable right of cross-examining P.W.1, which is very much required for the just decision of the case. Mr. Das, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the sole opposite party submits that since the defendants-petitioners have not challenged the order dated 4.8.2005 within time, whereby their earlier application for setting aside the ex parte order and acceptance of W.S. was allowed, but prayer for recalling P.W.1 for cross-examination was rejected with certain observa¬tions/conditions, the present application cannot be entertained for self same relief. Once an application earlier filed by a party has been rejected by the Court, the aggrieved party is precluded from filing another application again for the self same relief/self same cause of action. In case such an application is filed, the same is liable to be rejected in limine as it merits no consideration and as principle of res judicata shall also be applicable in this case as well as the order on the later appli¬cation has to be passed taking into consideration the former order. Learned counsel further submits that if at this stage the prayer of the petitioner shall be allowed the opposite parties shall be highly prejudiced and suffer irreparable loss and there are good numbers of decisions of this Court as well as of the Apex Court in support of his contentions. Learned counsel relied upon and cited the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar and others, reported in A.I.R. 1964 Su¬preme Court 993 and decision of this Court in the case of Rad¬hashyam Mohanty and another v. Narayan Chandra Nath and others reported in 64 (1987) C.L.T. 102. In the case of Arjun Singh (Supra) it has been held by the Apex Court :- Para-10. “That the scope of the principle of res judicata is not confined to what is contained in S.11 but is of more general application is also not in dispute. In the case of Arjun Singh (Supra) it has been held by the Apex Court :- Para-10. “That the scope of the principle of res judicata is not confined to what is contained in S.11 but is of more general application is also not in dispute. Again, res judicata could be as much applicable to different stages of the same suit as to findings on issues in different suits. xxx xxx.” Para-11 “xxx xxx If the Court which rendered the first decision was competent to entertain the suit or other proceeding, and had therefore competency to decide the issue or matter, the circumstance that it is a tribunal of exclusive jurisdiction or one from whose decision no appeal lay would not by themselves negative the finding on the issue by it being res judicata in later proceedings. Similarly, as stated already, though S.11 of the Civil Procedure Code clearly contemplates the existence of two suits and the findings in the first being res judicata in the later suit, it is well established that the principle underlying it is equally applicable to the case of decisions rendered at successive stages of the same suit or proceeding. But where the principle of res judicata is invoked in the case of the different stages of proceedings in the same suit, the nature of the pro¬ceedings, the scope of the inquiry which the adjectival law provides for the decision being reached, as well as the specific provisions made on matters touching such decision are some of the material and relevant factors to be considered before the princi¬ple is held applicable. xxx xxx.” Para-13 “xxx xxx interlocutory orders are of various kinds; some like orders of stay, injunction or receiver are designed to preserve the status quo pending the litigation and to ensure that the parties might not be prejudiced by the normal delay which the proceedings before the Court usually take. They do not, in that sense, decide in any manner the merits of the controversy in issue in the suit and do not, of course, put an end to it even in part. Such orders are certainly capable of being altered or varied by subsequent applications for the same relief, though normally only on proof of new facts or new situations which subsequently emerge. Such orders are certainly capable of being altered or varied by subsequent applications for the same relief, though normally only on proof of new facts or new situations which subsequently emerge. As they do not impinge upon the legal rights of parties to the litigation the principle of res judicata does not apply to the findings on which these orders are based, though if applications were made for relief on the same basis after the same has once been disposed of, the Court would be justified in rejecting the same as an abuse of the process of Court. There are other orders which are also interlocutory, but would fall into a different category. The difference from the ones just now re¬ferred to lies in the fact that they are not directed to main¬taining the status quo, or to preserve the property pending the final adjudication, but are designed to ensure the just, smooth, orderly and expeditious disposal of the suit. They are interlocu¬tory in the sense that they do not decide any matter in issue arising in the suit, nor put an end to the litigation. The case of an application under O. IX, R.7 would be an illustration of this type. If an application made under the provisions of that rule is dismissed and an appeal were filed against the decree in the suit in which such application were made, there can be no doubt that the propriety of the order rejecting the reopening of the proceeding and the refusal to relegate the party to an earli¬er stage might be canvassed in the appeal and dealt with by the appellate Court. In that sense, the refusal of the Court to permit the defendant to “set the clock back” does not attain finality. But what we are concerned with is slightly different and that is whether the same Court is finally bound by that order at later stages, so as to preclude its being reconsidered. Even if the rule of res judicata does not apply, it would not follow that on every subsequent day on which the suit stands adjourned for further hearing, the petition could be repeated and fresh orders sought on the basis of identical facts. The principle that repeated applications based on the same facts and seeking the same reliefs might be disallowed by the Court does not however necessarily rest on the principle of res judicata. The principle that repeated applications based on the same facts and seeking the same reliefs might be disallowed by the Court does not however necessarily rest on the principle of res judicata. Thus if an application for the adjournment of a suit is rejected, a subse¬quent application for the same purpose even if based on the same facts, is not barred on the application of any rule of res judica¬ta, but would be rejected for the same grounds on which the original application was refused. The principle underlying the distinction between the rule of res judicata and a rejection on the ground that no new facts have been adduced to justify a different order is vital. If the principle of res judicata is applicable to the decision on a particular issue of fact, even if fresh facts were placed before the Court, the bar would continue to operate and preclude a fresh investigation of the issues, where as in the other case, on proof of fresh facts, the Court would be competent, may would be bound to take those into account and make an order conformably to the facts freshly brought before the Court.” The Apex Court in the decision in the case of Sangram Singh v. Election Tribunal, Kotah and another, reported in A.I.R. 1955 S.C. 425 observed that : “16. Now a code of procedure must be regarded as such. It is ‘procedure’, something designed to facilitate justice and further its ends: not a penal enactment for punishment and penalties; not a thing designed to trip people up. Too technical a construction of Sections that leaves no room for reasonable elasticity of interpretation should therefore be guarded against (provided always that justice is done to ‘both’ sides) lest the very means designed for the furtherance of justice be used to frustrate it.” “17. Next, there must be ever present to the mind the fact that our laws of procedure are grounded on a principle of natural justice which requires that men should not be condemned unheard, that decisions should not be reached behind their backs, that proceedings that affect their lives and property should not continue in their absence and that they should not be precluded from participating in them. Of course, there must be exceptions and where they are clearly defined they must be given effect to. Of course, there must be exceptions and where they are clearly defined they must be given effect to. But taken by and large, and subject to that proviso, our laws of procedure should be construed, wherever that is reasonably possi¬ble, in the light of that principle.” And in paragraphs 30 and 31, it has been held that :- “30. xxx xxx xxx. It is not a mortgaging of the future but only applies to the particular hearing at which a party was afforded the chance to appear and did not avail himself of it. Therefore, if a party does not appear on “the day to which the hearing of the suit is adjourned’, he cannot be stopped from participating in the pro¬ceedings simply because he did not appear on the first or some other hearing.” “31. But though he has the right to appear at an adjourned hearing, he has no right to set back the hands of the clock. Order 9, R. 7 makes that clear. Therefore, unless he can show good cause, he must accept all that has gone before and be con¬tent to proceed from the stage at which he comes in. xxx xxx xxx.” Finally the Hon’ble Apex Court in paragraph 40 of the judg¬ment observed that :- “In the present case, we are satisfied that the Tribunal did not exercise its discretion because it considered that it had none and thought that until the ‘ex parte’ order was set aside the defendant could not appear either personally or through counsel. We agree with the Tribunal, and with the High Court, that no good cause was shown and so the defendant had no right to be relegated to the position that he could have occupied if he had appeared on 17.3.53, but that he had a right to appear through counsel on 20.3.53 and take part in the proceedings from the stage at which they had then reached, ‘subject to such terms and conditions as the Tribunal might think fit to impose’, is, we think, undoubted. Whether he should have been allowed to cross-examine the three witnesses who were examined after the appearance of his counsel, or whether he should have been allowed to adduce evi¬dence, is a matter on which we express no opinion, for that has to depend on whatever view the Tribunal in a sound exercise of judicial discretion will choose to take of the circumstances of this particular case, but we can find no justification for not at least allowing counsel to argue.” In the case of Satyadhyan Goshal and others v. Smt. Deorajin Debi and another reported in AIR 1960 S.C. 941 the Apex Court has observed :- “7. The principle of res judicata is based on the need of giving a finality to judicial decisions. What it says is that once a res judicata, it shall not be adjudged again. Primarily it applies as between past litigation and future litigation. When a matter-whether on a question of fact or a question of law- has been decided between two parties in one suit or proceeding and the decision is final, either because no appeal was taken to a higher Court or because the appeal was dismissed, or no appeal lies, neither party will be allowed in a future suit or proceed¬ing between the same parties to canvass the matter again. This principle of res judicata is embodied in relation to suits in S.11 of the Code of Civil Procedure; but even where S.11 does not apply, the principle of res judicata has been applied by Courts for the purpose of achieving finality in litigation. The result of this is that the original Court as well as any higher Court must in any future litigation proceed on the basis that the previous decision was correct.” “8. The principle of res judicata applies also as between two stages in the same litigation to this extent that a Court, whether the trial Court or a higher Court having at an earlier stage decided a matter in one way will not allow the parties to re-agitate the matter again at a subsequent stage of the same proceedings.” The other observation made by the Apex Court in the present case is as to whether this matter can be re-agitated again at a later stage of the same litigation/at the stage of an appeal challenging the final order/decree passed in the suit or not. In the case of Radhashyam Mohanty and others (Supra), it has been held by this Court :- “A defendant against whom an ex parte order has been passed under Order 9, Rule 6 of the Civil Procedure Code is not debarred from participating in the further proceeding of the suit, what- ever remains when he makes his appearance in the suit. But he would not be entitled to be relegated to the position he was occupying on the date when he was set ex parte and consequently he cannot enjoy the rights and privileges to which he was enti¬tled to, before the ex parte order was passed against him.” Considering the submissions made by learned counsel for both the parties and after going through the decisions cited by the learned counsel for the opposite parties as well as keeping in view the ratio decided by the Apex Court in other similar matters and the facts and circumstances of the case, I am of the consid¬ered view that there is no bar for an aggrieved party in moving an application like, setting aside ex parte order, acceptance of written statement, recalling witnesses and deputation of pleader commissioner etc. again on a subsequent stage of proceeding with some new facts, even if such an application was rejected earlier by the Court. As such if an application is filed for the self same relief, which was rejected earlier by a Court, the later application cannot be rejected only on the ground that the same is barred by res judicata. The later application has to be con¬sidered on its own merit, but taking into account the con¬tents/conditions of the earlier orders passed by the Court. It is the duty of the Court to see that substantial justice should be done to the aggrieved party in all matters at different stages of the proceedings, but the face of the other person, who is sitting at a distance and waiting for justice should also be kept within the range of the vision simultaneously. Once an earlier order has been passed with certain direction/certain conditions, the same cannot be ignored by the Court while considering the subsequent application for the self same relief. In the matters/disputes of this nature, substantial justice is to be done to both the side. Justice is not meant for the aggrieved petitioner alone. Once an earlier order has been passed with certain direction/certain conditions, the same cannot be ignored by the Court while considering the subsequent application for the self same relief. In the matters/disputes of this nature, substantial justice is to be done to both the side. Justice is not meant for the aggrieved petitioner alone. As such no order need be passed in favour of one ignoring the injury which may be caused to the other side. In the case at hand, by order dated 4.8.2005 when the application filed by the defendants for setting aside the ex parte order under Order 9, Rule 7 C.P.C. was allowed as well as the written statement filed by them was accepted, it was with the condition that the defendants were only relegated to the position they were occupying on the date of their appearance/filing of the petition for setting aside ex parte order as well as acceptance of the written statement. In the said order it was specifically observed, “Since the law is well settled that at a later stage the defendants can also be allowed to participate in the hearing I allow the petition of the defendants and accept the W.S. But they are to participate in the hearing from the date and is to be satisfied with the action has already been done in the trial. In other words, they are not entitled to recall the witness, i.e, P.W. for his cross-examination”. It means that the defendants shall not be entitled for recall of the witness already examined (i.e. P.W.1) prior to the date of order (4.8.2005) for his cross-examination. The order dated 4.8.2005 having not been challenged by the defendants earlier within a reasonable time, the same is binding on all the parties in all respect. Even though the de¬fendants have also prayed to quash/set aside order dated 4.8.2005 in this writ petition, while challenging the subsequent order dated 24.1.2006 for the self same cause of action on the self same facts, the said prayer for quashing the order dated 4.8.2005 cannot be entertained at this stage and as such keeping in view the contents/conditions of order dated 4.8.2005, the order dated 24.1.2006 also cannot be set aside. In view of the above, I am not inclined to entertain the prayer made by the petitioners to quash order dated 24.1.2006 passed by the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division), Khurda in C.S. No. 79 of 2003 in rejecting the prayer of the petitioners to recall P.W.1 for cross-examination. Writ application accordingly dismissed as the same is devoid of any merit. Application dismissed.