JUDGMENT The appellant in this appeal is the Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation (hereinafter referred to as 'the Corporation'). In this appeal, the appellant has called in question the correctness of the order dated 20th of December, 2001 made in W.P. No. 2548 of 1999 by the learned Single Judge of this Court. 2. The facts in brief may be stated as hereunder: The 1st respondent (hereinafter referred to as 'the workman') was appointed as a Peon in the Chickballapur depot in Kolar Division of the Corporation. The 2nd respondent is the wife of the workman (hereinafter referred to as 'the workman's wife'). During the course of employment of the workman, since the workman was suffering from diabetics, which turned as gangrene, both the legs of the workman came to be amputated above the knee, resulting in the workman not being in a position to discharge the normal duties in the Corporation. Under these circumstances, the workman filed an application before the Corporation on 16th of December, 1996 expressing his inability to discharge his duties on account of his physical disability and requested for appointment of his wife on compassionate grounds. However, the said request, having been turned down by the Corporation by means of an endorsement dated 31st of March, 1997, the workman filed Writ Petition No. 14542 of 1997 before this Court. The said writ petition came to be disposed of by this Court by means of his order dated 18th of February, 1998, with an observation that if the Medical Board gives a report that the workman is suffering from total and permanent disability, then only it was open to the workman and his wife to apply to the Corporation for the employment in terms of Circular dated 9th of October, 1991 relied upon by the workman. In the light of the observations made by this Court in W.P. No. 14542 of 1997, the workman was subjected to medical examination by the Medical Board. The Medical Board submitted its report on 1st of July, 1998 stating that the workman was not able to discharge his duties as a peon. In the light of the report given by the Medical Board, the Corporation made an order dated 3rd of August, 1998 compulsorily retiring the workman from service. The Medical Board submitted its report on 1st of July, 1998 stating that the workman was not able to discharge his duties as a peon. In the light of the report given by the Medical Board, the Corporation made an order dated 3rd of August, 1998 compulsorily retiring the workman from service. Subsequently, the workman and his wife gave a representation on 12th of August, 1998 seeking for appointment of the workman's wife on compassionate ground in terms of the circular dated 9th October, 1991. The Corporation, by means of an endorsement dated 15th of December, 1998, rejected the prayer of the workman and his wife for appointment of the wife of the workman on compassionate ground. Aggrieved by the said endorsement, the petitioner filed a Writ Petition No. 2548 of 1999. In the impugned order, the learned Single Judge allowed the writ petition on the ground that the contentions raised in the writ petition is covered by the earlier judgment of this Court in the case of Smt. Pushpavathi and Others v The Chairman and Managing Director, KSRTC and Others1 and made an order to consider the case of the workman's wife for appointment on compassionate ground in terms of the order made by this Court in Pushpavathi's case. Aggrieved by the said order, as noticed by us earlier, this writ appeal is filed. 3. By means of order dated 3rd of February, 2006, the 3rd respondent-Commissioner for persons with disabilities, was impleaded. 4. Sri D'Sa, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant-employer, submitted that the circular at Annexure-G is not applicable to the case of the workman and his wife. He further submitted that the order made in W.P. No. 3438 of 1997 and W.P. No. 45829 of 1999 following the judgment in Pushpavathi's case, were set aside in W.A. Nos. 3226 of 2001 and 3331 of 1997, respectively, and therefore the impugned order is also liable to be set aside. 5. He further submitted that the order made in W.P. No. 3438 of 1997 and W.P. No. 45829 of 1999 following the judgment in Pushpavathi's case, were set aside in W.A. Nos. 3226 of 2001 and 3331 of 1997, respectively, and therefore the impugned order is also liable to be set aside. 5. On the other hand, the learned Counsel appearing for the workman and his wife submitted that there is no merit in the contention of the learned Counsel for the appellant, in view of the decision in Anand Bihari and Others v Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation, Jaipur and Another2 and Narenda Kumar Chandla v State of Haryana and Others3 and the provisions of the Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act, 1995 (in short, 'the Disabilities Act'). 6. We have perused the judgment in The Managing Director, KSRTC and Another u Mohammed Zakeer1. In the said judgment, at para 4, the Division Bench of this Court has observed as under: ".... the Division Bench of this Court while deciding W.A. No. 3226 of 2001 has set aside the order passed in W.P. No. 45829 of 1999 which order was passed by this Court relying upon the judgment in Smt. Pushpauathi's case. When the said judgment has been set aside by the Division Bench and when two consecutive orders are passed by two Division Benches of this Court, we have to hold that as per the circular or regulations of the KSRTC, there is no provision to appoint a dependent person of an employee who took voluntary retirement on health grounds". 7. It must be mentioned that the decisions of the Apex Court in Anand Bihari and Narendra Kumar Chandla's cases, and the provisions of Disabilities Act, which came into force on 1-1-1996 were not brought to the notice of the Division Bench. Hence, this Court is entitled to consider the case of the petitioners on merits, with reference to the provisions of the Disabilities Act and in the light of the judgments of the Hon'ble Apex Court rendered in Anand Bihari and Narendra Kumar Chandla's cases. 8. Now it is necessary to refer to Section 47 of the Disabilities Act, which reads as under: "47. 8. Now it is necessary to refer to Section 47 of the Disabilities Act, which reads as under: "47. Non-discrimination in Government employment.-(1) No establishment shall dispense with, or reduce in rank, an employee who acquires a disability during his service: Provided that, if an employee, after acquiring disability is not suitable for the post he was holding, could be shifted to some other post with the same pay scale and service benefits: Provided further that, if it is not possible to adjust the employee against any post, he may be kept on a supernumerary' post until a suitable post is available or he attains the age of superannuation, whichever is earlier. (2) No promotion shall be denied to a person merely on the ground of his disability: Provided that the appropriate Government may, having regard to the type of work carried on in any establishment, by notification and subject to such conditions, if any, as may be specified in such notification, exempt any establishment from the provisions of this section". 9. It is not in dispute that the State Government has not issued any notification exempting the establishment of the Corporation from the applicability of the Disabilities Act in exercise of the power conferred on it under sub-section (2) of Section 47 of the Disabilities Act. In view of first proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 47 of the Act, the workman should have been shifted to some other post or as per 2nd proviso, if it was not possible to adjust the workman against any post, he should have been kept on a supernumerary post until a suitable post is available or until he attained the age of superannuation. But his services came to be terminated by way of compulsory retirement with effect from 3rd of August, 1998. The Hon'ble Apex Court, in Anand Bihari's case, termination of a Driver of the State Road Transport Corporation, on the ground that his eye sight was below the required standard to drive the bus, was held bad, and issued certain directions. 10. The Hon'ble Apex Court, in Anand Bihari's case, termination of a Driver of the State Road Transport Corporation, on the ground that his eye sight was below the required standard to drive the bus, was held bad, and issued certain directions. 10. The Apex Court, while dealing with the case of Narendra Kumar Chandla, a sub-station attendant in Haryana State Electricity Board, who was discharged from service on· the ground that his right arm was completely amputated due to Sarcoma (Cancer), the Hon'ble Apex Court has held in paragraph 7, of the judgment as under: "Article 21 protects the right to livelihood as an integral facet of right to life. When an employee is afflicted with unfortunate disease due to which, when he is unable to perform the duties of the posts he was holding, the employer must make every endeavour to adjust him in a post in which the employee would be suitable to discharge the duties as a carrier attendant is unjust. Since he is a matriculate, he is eligible for the post of L.D.C. For L.D.C., apart from matriculation, passing in typing test either in Hindi or English at the speed of 15/30 words per minute is necessary. For a Clerk, typing generally is not a must. In view of the facts and circumstances of this case, we direct the respondent-Board to relax his passing of typing test and to appoint him as a L.D.C. Admittedly on the date when he had unfortunate operation, he was drawing the salary in the pay scale of Rs. 1400-2300. Necessarily, therefore, his last drawn pay has to be protected. Since he has been rehabilitated in the post of L.D.C. we direct the respondent to appoint him to the post of L.D.C. protecting his scale of pay of Rs. 1400-2300 and direct to pay all the arrears of salary". 11. Admittedly, as per the regulations and the circular at Annexure-G, in the case of death of a workman while in service or in the event of compulsory retirement of a workman who becomes disabled due to injuries sustained in an accident during the course of employment, the dependent of such a workman is eligible for compassionate appointment. There is no dispute on this question. There is no dispute on this question. However, the question is that in the absence of any regulation or Scheme framed by the Corporation, whether it is permissible for the workman, who has been completely paralyzed and whose serves have been terminated by the Corporation, to insist the Corporation to provide an appointment on compassionate ground, in the Corporation, to one of the members of the family? There cannot be any dispute that the compassionate appointment is done on the death of the bread winner of a family to relieve the family from the hardship. Keeping this principle in mind, the rules and schemes are framed in Government service and in the service of statutory bodies, providing for appointment on compassionate ground on the death of a bread winner of the family. In the instant case, the Corporation, has framed a scheme providing for appointment on compassionate ground on the death of a bread winner of a family, but there is no scheme or provision made, for appointment of a member of a family of a workman in the employment of the Corporation, when the services are terminated on account of permanent total disability. The undisputed facts disclose that the services of the workman came to be terminated on account of amputation of his two legs and as such he has become totally unsuitable to carry on the job to which he was appointed. The second proviso to Section 47(1) of the Disabilities Act provides that if it is not possible to adjust the workman, who suffers from a disability in any post, he is required to be kept on a supernumerary post until a suitable post is available or he attains the age of superannuation. The Disabilities Act, is a welfare legislation meant to protect the interest of the people, who suffers from the disability set down in the Disabilities Act. Therefore, the provisions of Section 47(1) of the Disabilities Act is mandatory in nature. The words "no establishment shall dispense with or reduce in rank, an employee, who acquires disability" is in the nature of an injunction given to the employer not to terminate the services of an employee, who acquires disability during the services subject to the conditions set out in the provisos given to the said section. The words "no establishment shall dispense with or reduce in rank, an employee, who acquires disability" is in the nature of an injunction given to the employer not to terminate the services of an employee, who acquires disability during the services subject to the conditions set out in the provisos given to the said section. Therefore, it appears to us that it was not permissible for the Corporation to terminate the services of the workman. The Corporation was under a statutory obligation to continue the workman till the age of superannuation. However, instead of giving effect to the mandate of the second proviso given to sub-section (1) of Section 47 of the Disabilities Act, the employer, who is an instrumentality of the State has in total disregard of the said provision, has terminated the services of the workman, a peon, who has put in service more than 20 years. Therefore, the termination of the workman from service by the Corporation is ab initio void in law. But the workman has not challenged his termination from service. Therefore, the workman's wife, who has passed SSLC and has done her Teacher's Training Course and Hindi Rathna, who is competent to discharge the duties of a peon, is required to be employed in place of the workman. It would be in the public interest, instead of directing the Corporation to keep the workman in the supernumerary post, and pay some emoluments without extracting any work, to direct the Corporation to give compassionate appointment to the workman's wife. It is claimed by her that she has an obligation to manage the entire family consisting of workman and five other members. Under these circumstances, when the scheme framed by the Corporation provides for employment to the members of the family of a workman, who dies while in service, on compassionate ground, we are unable to appreciate the rationale behind in not formulating a scheme for appointment on compassionate ground, on account of total permanent disability of a workman. No doubt, it is for the Corporation to frame a scheme for providing for appointment on compassionate ground. Any scheme framed by the Corporation for the benefit of a workman must be fair and reasonable. No doubt, it is for the Corporation to frame a scheme for providing for appointment on compassionate ground. Any scheme framed by the Corporation for the benefit of a workman must be fair and reasonable. While the members of a family of a deceased workman are entitled for appointment on compassionate ground by virtue of the circular dated 9th of October, 1991, as noticed by us earlier, we are unable to conceive one good ground to deny a similar benefit to the members of the family of a workman, who is totally paralised or permanently disabled to do any work. Under these circumstances, we are of the view that this Court, exercises its extraordinary power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to bring about equality for law to these sections of the workman, who are fairly identically situated. We are of the considered view that when injustice committed by an instrumentality of the State is apparent, and the said injustice seriously affects the right to livelihood of workman guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, it would not be appropriate for this Court to be a silent spectator of such injustice done. Therefore, we are of the view that the order passed by the learned Single Judge does not call for interference in this appeal. In our view, there is no merit in this appeal. 12. In the result, this appeal is liable to be rejected. Accordingly, it is rejected. The appellant-Corporation is directed to consider the case of the workman's wife for appointment in any suitable post on compassionate ground, as early as possible, at any rate not later than three months from the date of receipt of the copy of this order. However, no order is made as to costs.