( 1 ) THE appellants/plaintiffs have preferred this appeal under Section 100 of C. P. C. being aggrieved by the judgment and decree dated 14-2-1996 passed by 1st additional District Judge, Rewa in Regular civil Appeal No. 9-A/9 5 affirming the judgment and decree dated 15-2-1995 passed by 3rd Civil Judge, Class-II, Rewa in Civil original Suit No. 271 A/94 regarding dismissal of his suit. ( 2 ) THIS appeal was admitted on the following substantial question of law : "whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Courts below were justified in holding that though the plaintiff is in possession of the property but has not perfected his title as the permission was permissive. And whether the findings are contrary to record and pleadings. " ( 3 ) THE suit for declaration and injunction was filed by the appellant against the respondents regarding revenue land bearing Survey No. 348 (Old No. 267), area 0. 76, 787 (Old No. 638), area 0. 80 and 1445 (Old number 1091), area 0. 81 acres situated at village Amilike. ( 4 ) ACCORDING to the case of appellants the aforesaid land was recorded in the name of father of respondent No. 1 namely Ram kishore S/o Shri Suryadeen in record of rights under the settlement held in 1921 to 1927, who died in 1943 while his elder son durga Prasad died in his life time in the year 1940-41, thus he survived by respondent no. 1 the only son and legal representative. Ramkishore was unable to pay land revenue on account of it, he was dispossessed by elakedar. The said outstanding land revenue was paid by Gomti Prasad the elder brother of appellants from the fund of Hindu undivided family. On depositing it the possession of land vide Patta dated 20-5-1942 was given to the Gomti Prasad by Elakedar. In the year 1946 partition had taken place in their family in which after taking some gold and silver Gomti Prasad had left his right in favour of appellant No. 2 and Shri Keshav prasad the predecessor of appellant No. 1a to 1g and their father Shri Parmeshwari dayal, who had died in the year 1961. Accordingly since 1942 they are coming in possession and also became Bhumiswami of it. Accordingly since 1942 they are coming in possession and also became Bhumiswami of it. In the year 1969-70 new records of rights were prepared by the revenue officers mistaken the name of said ramkishore S/o Suryadeen was entered as Bhoomiswami in it, which came in the knowledge of the appellants in the year 1974. The same was challenged in appeal before Collector, Rewa the same was allowed vide order dated 1-8-1975 with a direction to enter the name of appellants in the record of rights as Bhoomiswami. The same was implemented but meanwhile aforesaid order was challenged before the Revenue Commissioner in which by setting aside the order of Collector the case was remitted back to the Collector with a direction that' after impleading to respondent No. 1 the appropriate order be passed. Such order was challenged by the appellants before the Board of Revenue and such proceedings was pending on the date of initiation of suit. It is further pleaded that initially on filing the aforesaid proceedings for correction in the revenue record the respondent No. 1 was not impleaded as party and due to order of Commissioner he has become aggressive and intimidated to the appellants for dispossessing them, thus along with the plea of adverse possession the aforesaid suit was filed. ( 5 ) IN written statement respondent No. 1 has contended that in the aforesaid revenue proceeding filed by appellant initially he was not impleaded as party in obtaining the order by practising the fraud while his father Ramkishore was never dispossessed from the land on account of non-payment of land revenue. It was always remained in possession of the respondent's family and the land revenue was also paid by them. It was never paid by Gomti Prasad as said by the appellant. The possession of said land was never given to said Gomti Prasad by patta dated 20-5-1942 or by any other mode. The receipt of land revenue dated 20-5-1942 filed by appellants is not genuine document but the same is forged one and bogus documents. It is neither a Patta nor a document which conferred any right to the appellants. As per Mall Kanun of Rewa State Gomti prasad, appellants or any member of their family have not acquired any title or possession of the land. Thus, the question of adverse possession or its perfection are also not relevant. It is neither a Patta nor a document which conferred any right to the appellants. As per Mall Kanun of Rewa State Gomti prasad, appellants or any member of their family have not acquired any title or possession of the land. Thus, the question of adverse possession or its perfection are also not relevant. Although in the year 1942 respondent has gone in service since then his sister-in-law (widow of brother) was looking after all the affairs of it. The appellant No. 1 keshav Prasad being educated person had a good position in the village, by taking advantage of it their possession was recorded in the record while such entries are not true. The respondent No. 1 has come back to the village on his superannuation from his service and started to cultivate the same. Thus, trie question of adverse possession of appellant does not arise. The fraud was committed by appellant by initiating the proceedings before the Collector without impleading to respondent No. 1 and also by impleading a wrong person as respondent No. 2 while his father had died in the year 1940-41. It is also pleaded that the father of respondent No. 1 and said Parmeshwari Dayal being good friends had family relations with each other. Therefore if his sister-in-law (the widow of deceased brother) who was looking after the land has sent some amount for depositing the land revenue through Shri parmeshwari Dayal and/or by his family member, it does not mean that the appellant has taken over the possession of the land or/and became the Bhumiswami. ( 6 ) ON framing the issues, evidence was recorded by the trial Court, on appreciation of it, the suit was dismissed by holding that the appellants have neither in possession of the land nor acquired Bhumiswami right and their name was also illegally mutated. On appeal the same was dismissed by affirming the decree of the trial Court. Hence, this appeal, the same was admitted on abovementioned question of law. ( 7 ) LEARNED counsel for the appellants has vehemently submitted that in the year 1942 recorded Bhumi Swami Ramkishore father of respondent No. 1 had left the land as he was not in a position to pay the land revenue the same was deposited by their elder brother Gomti Prasad from the fund of hindu undivided family and the land was acquired. In support of his contention he has submitted that as per Annexure-P-1, dakhila Malgujari dated 20-5-1942, the land revenue was deposited by Gomti Prasad and by Annexure-P-2, Elakedar Jaswant Singh has given an order (Mukhtarnama) to Gomti prasad regarding payment of land revenue. Subsequent to it land was remained in their family and in the year 1946 by Ex. P. 3 it was partitioned and Gomti Prasad had relinquished his right in favour of appellant and other coparceners of the family and his father and on demise of Parmeshwari Dayal in 1961, the appellants have become bhumiwami of it. He also referred the receipts regarding land revenue from Ex. P. 10 to Ex. P. 21. In addition to it he has referred the Khasra entries for the year 1956-57 to 1960-61 Ex. P. 5 in which the name of parmeshwar Dayal the father of the appellants have been mentioned as Kabjedar in column Nos. 8, 17, 26, 35 and 44, beside this in Exs. P. 8 and P. 9, the Khasra from 1979-80 to 1983-84, 1984-85 to 1987-88 the name of deceased appellant No. 1 Keshav prasad is mentioned as Bhoomiswami while in Ex. P. 7, the name of respondent No. 2 has been mentioned and submitted that in view of these documentary evidence the title was acquired by them and their mutation was rightly ordered but due to order of commissioner, respondent No. 1 has become aggressive and tried to dispossess the appellant from the land. He also referred some provisions of Rewa Land Revenue Tenancy code 1935. It was also said that both the courts below have held their possession as permissive possession which was not the case of either of the parties. Lastly he has submitted that in any case they have perfected the rights of adverse possession as per Articles 64 and 65 of the Limitation Act and by placing his reliance on some decided cases prayed for setting aside the impugned decree by allowing his appeal. He has also submitted the written synopsis of his argument. ( 8 ) NO one has appeared to respondent the aforesaid argument on behalf of respondent No. 1. ( 9 ) HAVING heard the learned counsel for considering his submission, I have gone through the record of the Courts below and judgments impugned. He has also submitted the written synopsis of his argument. ( 8 ) NO one has appeared to respondent the aforesaid argument on behalf of respondent No. 1. ( 9 ) HAVING heard the learned counsel for considering his submission, I have gone through the record of the Courts below and judgments impugned. It appears that earlier in the resume of erstwhile State of Rewa the aforesaid land was recorded in the name of Ramkishore, the father of respondent No. 1. The document Ex. P. 1 is only Dakhila malguzari which also shows the name of said ramkishore as Malguzar but the name of the Gomti Prasad is mentioned as a person who brought the money to the office of malgujari (Ilakedar) it is also mentioned in it that brought money was returned to Gomti prasad as the same was counterfeit coin, it shows that no land revenue was deposited by him. Beside this it is not a document of transfer of the land. On the contrary it shows that the right of Ramkishore as Malgujar. In order to prove the payment of land revenue regarding disputed land a receipt Ex. P2 is placed on record. It says that in consider-I ation of outstanding arrears the aforesaid land is named from the Ramkishore to Gomti prasad. It does not bear any official seal or the signature of the Ilakedar. The same is also not bearing any provision of law or the chronological number. Thus, merely on the basis of the seal of Yashwant Singh Ilakedar in the lack of his signature this document cannot be relied on for any purpose. Moreover, it is not in accordance with the law and in formate, which was in existence during that period. Therefore, the same is not supporting to appellant in any manner. ( 10 ) THE other documents Ex. P. 10 to P. 21 the receipts regarding payment of land revenue on which the appellant is claiming the right and possession over the properjty. But i have not found a single receipt which shows that the same was issued in respect of disputed land. The evidence speaks that appellants had some other land in his family so possibility regarding payment of land revenue of such other land cannot be ruled out. But i have not found a single receipt which shows that the same was issued in respect of disputed land. The evidence speaks that appellants had some other land in his family so possibility regarding payment of land revenue of such other land cannot be ruled out. Beside this mere payment of land revenue or rent itself does not give any right or possession in the property unless such rights are not proved by admissible or reliable evidence. My aforesaid view is supported by a decided case in the matter of Dr. H. S. Rikhy v. New Delhi Municipality, reported in AIR 1962 SC 554 , in which it was held as under: "6. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Hence, the use of the term 'rent' cannot preclude the landlord from pleading that there was no relationship of landlord and tenant. The question must, therefore, depend upon whether or not there was a relationship of landlord and tenant in the sense that there was a transfer of interest by the landlord in favour of the tenant. 7. In our opinion, the Act applies only to that species of 'letting' by which the relationship of landlord and tenant is created, that is to say, by which an interest in the property, however limited in duration, is created. " ( 11 ) THE same was followed by this Court in the matter of Madhusudan Khandelwal v. Municipal Council, reported in 1995 (II)MPWN 176 in which it was held as under : "all these contentions have been considered in detail in Civil Second Appeal No. 191 of 1983 (Jagannath Prasad v. Municipal council, Morena), decided on 4-7-1994. In the above case, it was pointed out that merely receipt indicating payment of rent would not bring into existence relationship of landlord and tenant. Reliance was placed on a decision given by the Supreme Court in the case of Dr. H. R. Rikhy v. New Delhi municipalities, AIR 1962 SC 554 . Thus, aforesaid receipts are also not helping to the appellant. " ( 12 ) APPELLANT has also emphasised on ex. P. 3, the inter se document in between principal plaintiffs (the appellants) and their family members, thus, the same is not binding against respondent No. 1. H. R. Rikhy v. New Delhi municipalities, AIR 1962 SC 554 . Thus, aforesaid receipts are also not helping to the appellant. " ( 12 ) APPELLANT has also emphasised on ex. P. 3, the inter se document in between principal plaintiffs (the appellants) and their family members, thus, the same is not binding against respondent No. 1. Although on necessity the admissions made in it can be used against them in view of provision of sections 17 and 21 of the Evidence Act, but it cannot be used against the respondents for any purpose. ( 13 ) SO far revenue record is concerned in Khasra of 1956-57, 1960-61 Ex. P-5 the name of Parmeshwari Dayal, the father of the appellants has been mentioned as Sikmi in Column Nos. 8, 17, 26, 35 and 44 but the name of the Ramkishore is shown as owner and agriculturist. The Khasra Ex. P-6 for the year 1962-63 shows only the name of said Ramkishore as Bhoomiswami while possession of appellant has not be shown in it. The Khasra of 1974-75 to 1978-79 Ex. P. 7 also showing the name of Ramkishore as Bhoomiswami but in column Nos. 16, 18 and 20 the name of deceased appellant-Keshav prasad was mentioned under the order of Collector to endorse such entries while the same has been set aside by the commissioner as it was passed without impleading to respondent No. 1. In view of this the subsequent entries in Khasra Ex. P-8 and P-9 in which the name of Keshav Prasad is mentioned are also hit by order of Commissioner( 14 ) NOW the question arises whether in view of the aforesaid documents the possession or the adverse possession of the appellants on the land could be inferred for answering the question in his favour. ( 15 ) AS per pleadings of the parties as mentioned above the appellant is claiming his possession since 20-5-1942 by alleging that Ramkishore has left the land and dispossessed by the Ilakedar and possession was handed over to Gomti Prasad the brother of appellant. In foregoing para it has been held that the Exs. P-1 and P-2 are not admissible and cannot be considered for any purpose. Even otherwise for the sake of argument if these documents are taken up in consideration then in view of the then enforced tenancy laws the said documents are not admissible. In foregoing para it has been held that the Exs. P-1 and P-2 are not admissible and cannot be considered for any purpose. Even otherwise for the sake of argument if these documents are taken up in consideration then in view of the then enforced tenancy laws the said documents are not admissible. ( 16 ) THE concerning/relevant provisions, the Rewa Land Revenue and Tenancy Code, 1935 (in short "the Code") read as under : Section 129 : Ejectment : (1) No tenant shall be ejected from his holding otherwise than by formal proceedings under this Act. Section 130 : Grounds of ejectment of a pachpan-paintalis or pattedar tenant. A pachpan-paintalis or pattedar tenant shall be liable to ejectment from his holding on one or more of the following grounds namely (a) to (b) (c) On the ground that his rent or any portion thereof has remained unpaid for a period of one year. Section 134 : Procedure in ejectment : (1) When it is proposed to eject a Kothar tenant, or when a pawaidar or sub-pawaidar applies for the ejectment of his tenant, the tahsildar shall issue a notice in his name specifying the grounds of the ejectment and calling on him to vacate the land or to appear and contest the notice within thirty days of its receipt. If the tenant does not contest such notice within the prescribed period, the Tahsildar shall order the ejectment of the tenant and if the tenant contests the notice or claims compensation for any improvement, the Tahsildar shall forthwith forward the record of the case to the deputy Commissioner for decision. If the tenant does not contest such notice within the prescribed period, the Tahsildar shall order the ejectment of the tenant and if the tenant contests the notice or claims compensation for any improvement, the Tahsildar shall forthwith forward the record of the case to the deputy Commissioner for decision. (2) to (3)Section 144 (1) : The interest of a tenant shall be extinguished : (a) to (d) (e) where the tenant has been deprived of possession and his right to recover possession is barred by limitation; section 178 : Disputes regarding entry in Annual Village Papers : (1) When a dispute arises regarding an entry in the Annual Village Papers, the tahsildar shall make a full enquiry into the respective claims of the parties to the dispute, and : (a) if the dispute relates to the amount of rent or revenue or jama or to an entry In the khewat, he shall submit the record with his report to the Deputy Commissioner for disposal, who shall, after making such further inquiry as may be necessary, decided the dispute; (b) if the dispute relates to any other matter, he shall decide it in accordance with the provisions of this Act. (2) Dispute under sub-section (1) shall not be decided without due notice to all the parties concerned. (3) If the dispute relates to the possession of any land, the Tahsildar shall, before proceeding to make the full enquiry prescribed by sub-section (1), pass, after summary enquiry, an ad interim order in favour of the party having actual possession, whose name shall be entered in the Khasra : provided that, if the Tahsildar cannot satisfy himself as to which party is in actual possession, or has reason to believe that actual possession has been obtained, within six months prior to the commencement of his summary enquiry, by wrongful dispossession of the party entitled to it, he shall pass an ad interim order in favour of the party prima facie best entitled to possession, whose name shall be entered in the Khasra. Section 179 : Presumption as to entries in Annual Village Papers : all entries made under this Chapter in the Annual Village Papers shall be presumed to be correct until the contrary is proved. Section 179 : Presumption as to entries in Annual Village Papers : all entries made under this Chapter in the Annual Village Papers shall be presumed to be correct until the contrary is proved. Section 180 : Procedure in regard to mutation of names : (1) When a holder of land, other than a pawaidar or sub-pawaidar, loses his rights in any land in a village by death, or by surrender or abandonment of the land or transfer of his rights to any other person, or by dispossess or otherwise, the patwari of the village in which the land is situated shall forthwith report the fact to the Tahsildar, intimating the name of the new holder, if any, and the grounds on which latter claims to succeed to the title of the former holder. (2) The Tahsildar, on receipt of the patwari's report, shall make enquiry; and, if there appears to be no doubt or dispute in the matter, shall direct the necessary changes to be made in the Annual Village papers. If there appears to be a dispute in the matter, the Tahsildar shall proceed under Section 178. ( 17 ) IN view of the aforesaid provision appellant has not produced any proceedings or document regarding dispossessing or evicting to Ramkishore on account of nonpayment of land revenue from the aforesaid land under Sections 129 (1), 130 and 134 (1)of the Code. In the absence of any evidence in respect of such proceedings or orders as per prescribed procedure of law, no inference could be drawn mere on the basis of exs. P. 1 and P-2. As per aforesaid provision the Pawaidar was not the authority to evict and handover the possession of the land to appellants or any other person. Beside this as per Sec. 134 (1) of the Code, the Tahsildar was the only authority to evict the ramkishore and it is apparent fact on record that no such order of Tahsildar has been produced or proved by the appellant. Therefore, the story put forth by the appellant appears to be false and fabricated. ( 18 ) IF the possession was taken by said gomti Prasad then the same should have been endorsed or recorded in the revenue record in view of Section 178 or 180 of the code, the evidence in this regard has also not been led. Therefore, by keeping in view the Ex. ( 18 ) IF the possession was taken by said gomti Prasad then the same should have been endorsed or recorded in the revenue record in view of Section 178 or 180 of the code, the evidence in this regard has also not been led. Therefore, by keeping in view the Ex. P. 1 in which the name of Ramkishore is mentioned as Malgujar, gives sufficient circumstances to draw the presumption u/s. 178 of the Code that he was remained in possession of the land as pattedar tenant defined u/s. 43 (l) (a) of the Code. ( 19 ) ON coming to the Khasra entries, this Court has to consider that the title or the possession of a party could be decided on its endorsements or not. The Khasra are prepared by the revenue department only for the fiscal purpose which do not give any right or title over the property beside this any entry made in it without order of the competent revenue officer does not extend any right or title to such party, in view of the law laid down by the Apex Court in the matter of Balwant Singh v. Daulat Singh, reported in 1997 AIR SCW 2690 : ( AIR 1997 sc 2719 ), in which it was held as under (Para 27) : "we have already noticed that mutation entries do not convey or extinguish any title and those entries are relevant only for the purpose of collection of land revenue. That being the position. Mutation No. 1311 cannot be construed as conveying title in favour of Balwant Singh and Kartar Singh or extinguishing the title of Durga Devi in the suit property. Consequently, the title to the suit property always vested with the widow notwithstanding the Mutation No. 1311 viewed in this manner. The decision in the earlier proceedings namely, decree in Suit No. 194/55 even assuming operates as res judicata will not be of any avail to the contesting respondents, (plaintiffs) in the present suit because the reliefs sought in the prior proceeding was for a simple declaration that the mutation gift of 1954 would not affect reversionary rights of reversioners. As noticed already mutation entries will not convey or extinguish title in the property. Therefore, under Mutation No. 1311 neither balwant Singh and Kartar Singh acquired title nor Durga Devi's title in the property got extinguished. As noticed already mutation entries will not convey or extinguish title in the property. Therefore, under Mutation No. 1311 neither balwant Singh and Kartar Singh acquired title nor Durga Devi's title in the property got extinguished. " ( 20 ) IN view of the foregoing discussion the entries made or endorsed in the khasra either in the name of Permeshwaridayal or name of Keshav Prasad the deceased appellant No. 1 in the absence of any bi-party order by the competent revenue authority are not legal, admissible or fruitful for the appellants, beside this the findings given by the courts below on appreciation of the khasra and other evidence are only the findings of the fact and the same cannot be interfered in second appeal, as laid down by the Apex Court in the matter of Corporation of the City of Bangalore v. M. Papaiah and anr. reported in AIR 1989 SC 1809 , in which it was held as under (Para 5) : "we do agree that the suit cannot be dismissed on the ground that the relief of declaration of title and possession has not been specifically mentioned in the plaint. But the observations on the question whether the issue of title is involved in the suit or not are clearly discrepant. In some other part of the judgment the High Court has mentioned a portion of the relevant evidence on the question of title and possession and made adverse comments against the findings of fact recorded by the first appellate Court without giving any valid reason therefor. So far the revenue records are concerned, the appellate Court considered the same and held that they did not support the plaint. The High Court has reversed the finding saying that the interpretation of the first appellate Court was erroneous. It is firmly established that the revenue records are not documents of title, and the question of interpretation of a document not being a document of title is not a question of law. These errors have seriously vitiated the impugned judgment of the High Court which must be set aside. It is firmly established that the revenue records are not documents of title, and the question of interpretation of a document not being a document of title is not a question of law. These errors have seriously vitiated the impugned judgment of the High Court which must be set aside. " ( 21 ) THE appellants have also alleged some patta issued by the Pawaidar but the same was neither produced nor proved, thus in the absence of it in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in the matter of Gopal krishnaji Ketkar v. Mohamed Haji Latif and others, Reported in AIR 1968 SC 1413 , there is sufficient circumstance to draw an inference against the appellants that no such patta had been issued in their favour. ( 22 ) IN view of aforesaid when appellants or Gomti Prasad had not come or put in possession of the land, therefore in the absence of material ingredients of Art. 64 or 65 of the Limitation Act question of their adverse possession do not arise and the same is not found to be proved. ( 23 ) IN view of the aforesaid principles as laid down by the Apex Court the cases cited by the appellant are not applicable to the case at hand. Although this Court has no dispute regarding principles laid down by the Apex Court in such cases. The case in the matter of Balkrishan v. Satyaprakash and Ors. reported in AIR 2001 SC 700 , speaks about the principle of adverse possession but in this case when the prima facie ingredients of adverse possession has not been found to be proved thus it is not helpful to the appellant. The case Bondar Singh and others v. Nihal Singh and others, reported in 2003 AIR SCW 1383 : ( AIR 2003 sc 1905 ), speaks about interference in the finding, if it is contrary to law or record and case in the matter of Deva v. Sajjan Kumar reported in AIR 2003 SC 3907 are also based on adverse possession, in the absence of material ingredients of adverse possession and in the facts and circumstances these cases are also not helping to the appellants. ( 24 ) THEREFORE, it is held that the findings of Courts below are not perverse or illegal or contrary to records or pleadings. ( 24 ) THEREFORE, it is held that the findings of Courts below are not perverse or illegal or contrary to records or pleadings. The same are with the consonance of law and based on proper appreciation of the evidence. The Courts below have also not held the possession of the appellant. Thus, the aforesaid question is answered against the appellant accordingly. ( 25 ) THEREFORE by affirming the judgment and decree of the Courts below this appeal is hereby dismissed with no order as to costs. ( 26 ) DECREE be drawn up accordingly. Appeal dismissed. .