J. M. PANCHAL J. ( 1 ) THE instant Suo motu proceedings are registered against the respondent in view of the following facts which emerge from the order dated February 17, 2006, passed by the learned Single Judge. When the learned single Judge was hearing Company application No. 239 of 2005. a mobile phone started ringing in the Court. The court saw that keeping mobile phone in hand, the respondent was walking out of the Court. When the Court noticed this the Court called the respondent. According to the learned Single Judge instead of expressing any remorse or regrets, the respondent started saying that he was keeping his mobile phone on vibration mode but as he had to take some medicines, he had set the alarm which went off. The learned Judge noticed that the respondent did not express a word of regret upto that time and when the Court asked him that the Court was likely to issue a notice to him to show cause, he said that it was the choice of the court. Thereupon, the learned Single Judge by an order dated February 17. 2006 directed to issue notice to the respondent calling upon him to show cause as to why he should not be punished under the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 ( the Act for short) for ignoring the directions issued by this Court that nobody should bring his working mobile phone in the Court nor should allow his mobile to ring. After directing to issue notice, as staled above, the learned Judge directed to put up the matter on February 24,2006 and asked the respondent to remain in attendance. It was also directed that the copy of the order be served on the respondent and separate proceedings be registered. Further the Registry was directed to place the matter before the learned Judge himself as according to the learned Judge the contempt was on face of the Judge. Pursuant to the abovenoted order, the Registry registered suo motu contempt proceedings against the respondent as Misc. Civil Application No. 27 of 2006. ( 2 ) ON receipt of the notice dated february 17/20. Pursuant to the abovenoted order, the Registry registered suo motu contempt proceedings against the respondent as Misc. Civil Application No. 27 of 2006. ( 2 ) ON receipt of the notice dated february 17/20. 2006 and the order dated february 17,2006, the respondent filed affidavit-in-reply dated February 23,2006 stating inter alia that there were certain factual mistakes in order dated February 17,2006, which were either not there in the order dictated in the open Court or were not noticed by him. The respondent has mentioned in the reply that the Court had not called him on noticing that keeping mobile in hand he was walking out of the court but according to the respondent, he was surprised and alarmed that the alarm of his mobile phone rung in the court-room and in order to prevent disturbance to the court, he had rushed out of the Courtroom, simultaneously trying to switch off the alarm and before he had stepped out of the Court room, the alarm was switched off. The respondent has stated in the reply that within about three or four minutes his instructing advocate, who is his son, had come out of the Court and informed him that alter he had come out of the Court room. His Lordship had expressed displeasure on the alarm starting to sound in the court-room and though he had apologised on behalf of the respondent. His lordship had called for the respondent. According to the respondent immediately he had returned back in the Court room and on getting opportunity explained apologetically to His Lordship that as he was required to take some medicines at about 12. 30 p. m. he had, while in Chamber, set the alarm. The respondent has explained in the reply that he had received a message at about 12. 00 noon that the matter was likely to reach shortly and, therefore, he had got dressed to come to the Court and that though he had set the mobile on vibration mode he had through oversight failed to switch off the alarm. The respondent has stressed in the reply that after he had switched off the alarm, as slated above, there was no further ringing thereof at any time. According to the respondent he had staled before the Court that he was sorry but His Lordship had remarked that the respondent should have first apologised and then given the explanation. The respondent has stressed in the reply that after he had switched off the alarm, as slated above, there was no further ringing thereof at any time. According to the respondent he had staled before the Court that he was sorry but His Lordship had remarked that the respondent should have first apologised and then given the explanation. The respondent has mentioned in the reply that in spite of his having expressed his regret. His Lordship had told him that it was proposed to issue a show cause notice for contempt of court and as he was helpless, he had told His Lordship that it was upto His Lordship. The respondent has stated that the order dated february 17. 2006 needs to be recalled because summary trial of the charge of contempt of Court said to have been committed in presence or hearing of the supreme Court or High Court by the Judge concerned is an exceplion to the general rule that a person should not appear to he both the prosecutor and the Judge. What is maintained by the respondent in his reply is that normally a Judge ought not to take action for in facie curiae contempt unless the Judge is impelled to do so. According to the respondent a Judge would be justified to act of his own motion only if (a) the coniempt is clear, (b) the contempt affects a trial in progress or about to start. (c) it is urgent and imperative to acl immediately in order to prevent justice being obstructed and undermined and to preserve the integrity of the trial, and (d) no other procedure will do if the ends of justice are to be met. After emphasising that the facts of the case do not justify resorting to suo motu proceedings under Section 14 of the act, it is mentioned by the respondent in the reply that the direction contained in the order dated February 17,2006 that the matter must be placed before the very Court runs counter to the decision of this Court in ajit D. Padiwal v. State of Gujarat and others, 39 (2) GLR 1182. What is relevant to notice is that regretting and expressing his sorrow and regrets for the ringing albeit without his intention and through his oversight, of alarm of his mobile phone in the court-room, the respondent has staled that the same does not amount to any coniempt of Court. What is mentioned by the respondent in his reply is that the alarm going off in the court-room was not an intentional, willful or deliberate act of his or any wilful, intentional or deliberate disobedience on his part of any direction of the court. By filing the reply, the respondent has claimed that the notice issued to him should be discharged. ( 3 ) MR. PERCY Kavina, a practising lawyer of this Court, has filed affidavit on february 23,2006 staling inter alia that he was present in the court-room of the learned single Judge on February 17. 2006 and at or about 12. 30 p. m. he had noticed that while the matter at item No. 12 was being argued, the cell phone of the respondent seemed to ring. According to Mr. Kavina, the respondent immediately rose from his seat and walked towards the exit, in the meanwhile taking out the cellphone and trying to silence it. Mr. Kavina has mentioned in the affidavit that after the respondent had left the court-room, the learned Single Judge had commented upon the fact that it was shocking and inappropriate that the phone of such a senior member of the Bar should have sounded in the midst of a hearing in court. What is mentioned by Mr. Kavina is that the son of the respondent, with whom the respondent was to appear in the matter in that Court, had immediately risen to his feel and apologised profusely to the learned single Judge for the disturbance, but the learned Judge had made a comment to the effect that the apology of son of the respondent was not necessary nor sufficient. It is further stated by Mr. Kavina in his affidavit that the son of the respondent had inquired of the learned judge whether he should call the respondent back inside the Court and thereupon learned judge had observed that "if you don t call him. I will". Mr. It is further stated by Mr. Kavina in his affidavit that the son of the respondent had inquired of the learned judge whether he should call the respondent back inside the Court and thereupon learned judge had observed that "if you don t call him. I will". Mr. Kavina has further stated that the respondent was, thereafter, called inside the court-room and he had come in at once and gone up to the front row of the court-room and on the learned Judge looking to him had addressed the Court. What is mentioned by Mr. Kavina is that during the entire period of exchange between the learned Judge and the respondent till the conclusion of the dictation of the order by the learned Single judge, the respondent had regretfully and respectfully explained in what circumstances the ring of the phone had gone off. Mr. Kavina has mentioned that the respondent had said that as a matter of course, his phone was always on vibration mode in a court-room but in the present instance he had put a reminder alarm for 12. 30 p. m. to remind him to take medicine. Mr. Kavina has further stated that the respondent had regrelted the circumstances which had led to the alarm going off and that the explanation and manner of delivery of the same had shown the genuine regret and contrition on the part of the respondent. According to Mr. Kavina when the respondent was about to complete his explanation, which was in the nature of an apology, the learned Judge had asked the respondent as to why he had not apologised at the very beginning of his address and stated that it was proposed to issue notice to him for contempt of court. It is maintained by Mr. Kavina in his affidavit that the respondent had thereupon replied that it was upto His Lordship. ( 4 ) ON the same day. i. e. on February 23,2006 the respondent filed Misc. Civil application No. 47/06 wherein one of the prayers made was to place Misc. Civil application No. 27/06 before the Hon ble the Chief Justice for appropriate direction to place the matter before the appropriate court. Misc. Civil Application No. 47/06 was placed for hearing before the learned judge on February 24,2006. However, the learned Judge did not pass any order on misc. Civil application No. 27/06 before the Hon ble the Chief Justice for appropriate direction to place the matter before the appropriate court. Misc. Civil Application No. 47/06 was placed for hearing before the learned judge on February 24,2006. However, the learned Judge did not pass any order on misc. Civil Application No. 47/06 and adjourned its hearing to March 16. 2006. While adjourning the matter on February 24,2006, the learned Judge also issued notices to the Printers, Publishers and editors of Rajasthan Pathrika, Gujarat vaibhav. Divya Bhaskar, Gujarat samachar and Dainik Bhaskar. Indore. The order dated February 24,2006 rendered in misc. Civil Application No. 47/06 was challenged by the respondent by way of filing O. J. Appeal No. 16 of 2006 before the division Bench. The appeal was placed for admission haring before the Division Bench comprising A. R. Dave and K. A. Puj, JJ on march 6,2006 and after hearing the learned senior advocate appearing for the respondent, the appeal was ordered to be admitted. It may be mentioned that Civil application No. 55/06 was also moved by the respondent in O. J. Appeal No. 16 of 2006 for stay of proceedings pending before the learned Single Judge. In the said application, rule was issued making it returnable on March 16,2006 and it was directed that the proceedings initiated against the respondent in Misc. Civil application No. 27/06 should not be proceeded further by the Court taking up the said application. A clarification was also made that it was open to the learned single Judge to continue the proceedings against the Press and others under separate contempt proceedings. The appeal was thereafter taken up for final disposal. The division Bench has allowed the appeal by judgment dated March 31,2006, which is now reported in 2006 (2) GLH 163 . While allowing the appeal, the Division Bench gave following directions, which are to be found in the operative part of the judgment:"though we are pronouncing separate concurring judgments, we come to the following conclusion: the appeal is allowed. Notices issued to persons other than the appellant in: misc. Civil Application No. 47 of 2006 in misc. Civil Application No. 27 of 2006 as well as the order dated 16. 3. 2006 passed therein, are hereby quashed. All proceedings pertaining lo Misc. Notices issued to persons other than the appellant in: misc. Civil Application No. 47 of 2006 in misc. Civil Application No. 27 of 2006 as well as the order dated 16. 3. 2006 passed therein, are hereby quashed. All proceedings pertaining lo Misc. Civil: application No. 27 of 2006 and other proceedings arising therefrom shall not be heard by the learned single Judge. We further direct that the proceedings initiated against persons other than the appellant shall be registered separately and both the proceedings shall be placed before the hon ble Chief Justice so as lo enable him lo pass appropriate order as per provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 and contempt of Courts (Gujarat High Court) Rules, 1984. A. R. Dave. J. and K. A. Puj, J" ( 5 ) IN view of above referred to directions, the papers of Misc. Civil Application no. 27/06 were placed by the Registry before the Hon ble Chief Justice and pursuant to the direction given by the hon ble Chief Justice, the matter has been listed for hearing before this Bench. ( 6 ) MR. MIHIR J. Thakore, learned counsel for the respondent, contended that summary procedure contemplated by Section 14 (1)of the Act should not have been resorted to by the learned Judge as there was no urgent necessity to take action against the respondent, more particularly when the ringing cell phone was switched off by the respondent and the respondent had offered explanation as lo under which circumstances the cell phone had started ringing. It was argued that normally procedure contemplated under Section 14 (1) of the Act should never be invoked unless the ends of juslice really required such a drastic measure because it appears to be rough justice and is contrary to natural justice and can only be justified if nothing else will do. It was argued that normally procedure contemplated under Section 14 (1) of the Act should never be invoked unless the ends of juslice really required such a drastic measure because it appears to be rough justice and is contrary to natural justice and can only be justified if nothing else will do. The learned counsel asserted lhal exercise of power under section 14 (1) of the Act was not justified at all and as provided by Rules 4 (b) and 11 of the Contempt of Court (Gujarat High court) Rules, 1984 ( the Rules for short), after noting the event of ringing of cell phone of the respondent, the mailer should have been ordered lo be placed before the hon ble Chief Justice for placing it before appropriate Division Bench, which could have decided the question whether notice should be issued to the respondent or not and, therefore, notice under Section 14 (1)of the Act issued by the learned Judge should be set aside. In support of this submission, the learned counsel placed reliance on the decision in Balogh v. Crown court at St Albans in (1974) 3 All ER 283. In the alternative the learned counsel for the respondent pleaded that from the order dated February 17, 2006 as well as notice issued to the respondent pursuant to the said order, it is evident that the notice has been issued calling upon the respondent to show cause as to why he should not be punished for having committed civil contempt as defined in Section 2 (h) of the act and as there is no judgment, decree, direction, order or writ or other process of court, requiring the respondent that he shall not bring his working mobile phone in the court nor shall allow his mobile to ring, the notice issued to the respondent should be discharged. After referring to the judgment of Division Bench in Suo Motu v. P. C. Pandya, 2005 (3) GLR 2485 it was argued that no general directions have been given by the Division Bench that nobody should bring his working mobile in the court-room nor should allow his mobile to ring and, therefore, the respondent cannot be proceeded with on the footing that he has committed civil contempt within the meaning of the Act. It was argued that even if the Court comes to the conclusion that ringing of cell phone of the respondent amounted to civil contempt within the meaning of the Act, there was nothing on the record of the case to show that in wilful disobedience of any judgment, decree, direction, order, writ or other process of the court, the respondent had allowed his cell phone to ring and, therefore, also the notice issued to the respondent should be discharged. The learned counsel in the alternative emphasised that from the contents of the affidavit-in-reply filed by the respondent and affidavit filed by learned advocate Mr. Percy Kavina on February 23, 2006 it is evident that the respondent had expressed his regrets for ringing of his cell phone in the court-room before the learned Single Judge and has also expressed sincere regrets while explaining that alarm on his mobile phone had started ringing as he had, through oversight, failed to switch off the alarm though he had set the mobile phone on vibration mode and, therefore, also the notice issued by the learned Judge under Section 14 (1) of the Act should be set aside. ( 7 ) THIS Court has heard Mr. Mihir j. Thakore, learned senior advocate for the respondent at length and in great detail. This Court has also considered the documents forming part of the application. ( 8 ) BEFORE considering the points urged at the Bar, it would be relevant to ascertain the nature of contempt alleged to have been committed by the respondent. From order dated February 17,2006, it is evident that the learned Judge had decided to issue notice to the respondent to show cause as to why he should not be punished under the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 because the learned Single Judge was of the opinion that the respondent had ignored the directions issued by the court that nobody should bring his working mobile in the court nor should allow his mobile to ring. A reasonable reading of the order quoted above would indicate that it was decided to issue notice to the respondent because according to the learned judge the respondent had flouted the directions issued by the Court that nobody should bring his working mobile phone in the court nor should allow his mobile to ring. A reasonable reading of the order quoted above would indicate that it was decided to issue notice to the respondent because according to the learned judge the respondent had flouted the directions issued by the Court that nobody should bring his working mobile phone in the court nor should allow his mobile to ring. The tenor of the order mentioned above makes it very clear that action was proposed to be taken against the respondent for civil contempt as defined in the Act. It is nobody s case that the respondent published by words spoken or written or by signs or by visible representations or otherwise of any matter or did any other act whatsoever which was scandalous or tended to scandalise or lowered or tended to lower the authority of the learned single Judge nor it is the case of anyone that the respondent had prejudiced or interfered or tended to interfere with the due course of any judicial proceedings, or interfered or tended to interfere with or obstructed or tended to obstruct the administration of justice in any other manner. The learned counsel for the respondent has produced before this Court notice received by the respondent pursuant to order passed by learned Single Judge on february 17,2006. This Court has perused the said notice. The notice received by the respondent also makes it clear that the proceedings have been registered as misc. Civil Application and not as Misc. Criminal Application, which normally would have been registered if the respondent had been charged with having committed criminal contempt within the meaning of the Act. Moreover, reference to "directions" in order dated February 17, 2006 makes it further clear that action was sought to be initiated against the respondent for breach of the directions which means the respondent is alleged to have committed civil contempt, as defined in the Act. Thus, the nature of proceedings indicate that notice has been issued to the respondent for civil contempt within the meaning of Section 2 (b) of the Act. Having ascertained the true nature of the proceedings initiated against the respondent, this court proposes to consider the arguments advanced at the Bar on behalf of the respondent. Thus, the nature of proceedings indicate that notice has been issued to the respondent for civil contempt within the meaning of Section 2 (b) of the Act. Having ascertained the true nature of the proceedings initiated against the respondent, this court proposes to consider the arguments advanced at the Bar on behalf of the respondent. ( 9 ) THE first question which falls for consideration of this Bench is whether the learned Judge was justified in invoking summary powers under Section 14 (1) of the Act and issuing notice to the respondent calling upon him to show cause as to why he should not be punished under the provisions of the Act for ignoring the directions issued by the Court that nobody should bring his working mobile phone in the court nor should allow his mobile to ring. Section 14 of the Act reads as under:"14. Proccdurc where contempt is in the face of the Supreme Court or a High court. (1) When it is alleged, or appears to the supreme Court or the High Court upon its own view, that a person has been guilty of contempt committed in its presence or hearing, the Court may cause such person to be detained in custody, and, at any time before the rising of the Court, on the same day, or as early as possible thereafter, shall- (a) cause him to be informed in writing of the contempt with which he is charged : (b) afford him an opportunity to make his defence to the charge; (c) after taking such evidence as may be necessary or as may be offered by such person and after hearing him, proceed, either forthwith or after adjournment, to determine the matter of the charge ; and (d) make such order for the punishment or discharge of such person as may be just. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), where a person charged with contempt under that sub-section applies, whether orally or in writing, to have the charge against him tried by some judge other than the Judge or Judges in whose presence or hearing the offence is alleged to have been committed, and the court is of opinion that it is practicable to do so and that in the interests of proper administration of justice the application should be allowed, it shall cause the matter to be placed, together with a statement of the facts of the case, before the Chief justice for such directions as he may think fit to issue as respects the trial thereof. (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law, in any trial of a person charged with contempt under sub-section (1) which is held, in pursuance of a direction given under sub-section (2), by a judge other than the Judge or Judges in whose presence or hearing the offence is alleged to have been committed, it shall not be necessary for the Judge or Judges in whose presence or hearing the offence is alleged to have been committed to appear as a witness and the statement placed before the Chief Justice under sub-section (2) shall be treated as evidence in the case. (4) Pending the determination of the charge, the Court may direct that a person charged with contempt under this section shall he detained in such custody as it may specify: provided that he shall he released on bail, if a bond for such sum of money as the Court thinks sufficient is executed with or without sureties conditioned that the person charged shall attend at the time and place mentioned in the bond and shall continue to so attend until otherwise directed by the Court : provided further that the Court may, if it thinks fit, instead of taking bail from such person, discharge him on his executing a bond without sureties for his attendance as aforesaid. " ( 10 ) A bare perusal of the abovequoted ; provisions of Section 14 makes it clear that powers conferred by Section 14 are summary in nature. Section 14 of the Act empowers the High Court to take immediate and emergent action when the contempt is on the face oi" the Court, whether civil or criminal. " ( 10 ) A bare perusal of the abovequoted ; provisions of Section 14 makes it clear that powers conferred by Section 14 are summary in nature. Section 14 of the Act empowers the High Court to take immediate and emergent action when the contempt is on the face oi" the Court, whether civil or criminal. This power of the Court is a summary power and, therefore, should be exercised by the Court only when no other procedure will do if the ends of justice are. to be met, for when this power is exercised by the Judge he appears to be prosecutor acting in his own cause. A reasonable reading of the provisions of Section 14 of the Act indicates that summary power under Section 14 of the Act can be exercised in rare cases and when there is urgent necessity to take action against the person concerned for preventing him from disturbing the proceedings of the Court. When and under what circumstances should such summary power be exercised has been succinctly summarised by Woolf LJ in director of Public Prosecutions v. Channel Four Television Company Ltd. , (1993) 2 All E r 517, after considering the judgment of Court of Appeal in Balogh v. Crown Court at St Albans (supra) and in weston v. Courts Administrators of the central Criminal Court (1976) 2 All ER 875 in the following words:"mr. Munby QC, who appeared for the respondent in the second application, in his helpful submissions, also referred us to weston v. Courts Administrator of the central Criminal Court (1976) 2 All ER 875. (1977) QB 32 and the persuasive decision of the High Court in Australia in keeley v. Mr. Justice Brooking (1979) 143 clr 162. There is considerable force in mr. Munby s submission that a judge should only act of his own motion in a matter of contempt if (a) the contempt is clear, (b)the contempt affects a trial in progress or about to start, (c) it is urgent and imperative to act immediately in order to prevent justice being obstructed and undermined and to preserve the integrity of the trial and (d) no other procedure will do if the ends of justice are to be met. However, it is possible within the Crown court to make arrangements to ensure a fair procedure. However, it is possible within the Crown court to make arrangements to ensure a fair procedure. First of all a judge need not appear in the position of persecutor. Mr collins, having at the request of the court taken the instructions of the Director, indicated that, where a contempt occurred in the Crown Court, then, although the court may have to draw the situation to the attention of the Director, the Director though the Crown Prosecution Service would accept responsibility for deciding whether there should be an applicant and, if so, lor making the application to the court and conducting the proceedings in the same way as it would if there were to be a trial on indictment. In a case involving issues which would not be appropriate for the trial judge to determine, another judge of the crown Court could hear the application. " ( 11 ) IN a leading decision of the Court of appeal in Balogh v. Crown Court at St albans (supra), Lord Denning expressed as under:"as I have said, a judge should act of his own motion only when it is urgent and imperative to Act immediately. In all other cases he should not take it on himself to move. He should leave it to the Attorney general or to the party aggrieved to make a motion in accordance with the rules in rsc Ord 52. The reason is so that he should not appear to be both prosecutor and judge; for that is a role which does not become him well. " ( 12 ) IN Balogh v. Crown Court at St albans (supra), following pertinent observations have been made by Lawton LJ:"the fact that Judges whether of the high Court or the Crown Court, have this summary jurisdiction does not mean that they should use it whenever opportunity offers. It is an unusual jurisdiction which has come into being to protect the due administration of justice. In Blackstone s words, it applies to any conduct which demonstrates a gross want of that regard and respect, which when once courts of justice are deprived of, their authority (so necessary for the good order of the kingdom) is entirely lost among the pepple. In Blackstone s words, it applies to any conduct which demonstrates a gross want of that regard and respect, which when once courts of justice are deprived of, their authority (so necessary for the good order of the kingdom) is entirely lost among the pepple. in my judgment this summary and draconian jurisdiction should only be used for the purpose of ensuring that a trial in progress or about to start can be brought to a proper and dignified end without disturbance and with a fair chance of a just verdict or judgment. Contempts which are not likely to disturb the trial or affect the verdict or judgment can be dealt with by a motion to commit under RSC Ord. 52, or even by indictment. " ( 13 ) THE abovementioned principles will have to be borne in mind, while construing section 14 of the Act. The Scheme of section 14 of the Act is such that it empowers the Court to take action against the person who has been guilty of contempt committed in its presence or hearing. Taking of action under Section 14 would be justified only if the court comes to the conclusion that the judicial proceedings would continue to be disrupted and not otherwise. At this stage it would be relevant to notice certain provisions of the Contempt of Courts (Gujarat High Court) Rules, 1983. Rule 4 deals with proceedings in civil Contempt and provides that proceedings in connection with a Civil contempt may be initiated (a) by a petition presented by a party or parties aggrieved. or (b) by the High Court on its own motion, or (c ) on a reference made to the High court by the subordinate Courts as in the case of Criminal Contempt. Rule 11 of the rules inter alia provides that every proceedings under the Act should be heard and determined by a Bench of not less than two Judges as the Chief Justice may, from time to time, appoint, whereas the proviso appended to the said Rule stipulates that when a contempt proceeding is covered by section 14 and the Court does not cause the matter to be placed before the Chief Justice under sub-section (2) of Section 14, the proceedings so arising, shall be determined and disposed of by the Judge or Judges of the same Court. A conjoint and meaningful reading of the provision of Section 14 (1) of the Act and Rules 4 and 11 of the Rules makes it very clear that normally contempt proceedings under Section 14 (1) can be initiated only when (a) the contempt is clear, (b) the contempt affects a trial in progress or about to start, (c) it is urgent and imperative to act immediately in order to prevent justice being obstructed and undermined and to preserve the integrity of the trial and, (d) no other procedure can be resorted to. to meet the ends of justice. ( 14 ) WHEN the High Court decides to take action for civil contempt on its own motion, normally the matter would be heard by a division Bench of the High Court. In the facts of the case, it is evident from the order of the Hon ble Court dated February 17,2006, that immediately after the mobile started ringing, the respondent keeping the mobile phone in hand went out of the Court to switch it off. This clearly shows that immediate action was taken by the respondent that the ringing does not continue in the Court. The order does not show that ongoing proceeding were disturbed by the respondent in any manner or that the respondent had continued or likely to continue to disturb other proceedings going on in the court and, therefore, there was urgent need to take immediate action against the respondent nor does the order show that other procedure could not have been resorted to, to meet the ends of justice. In the circumstances, none of the conditions for exercising powers under Section 14 of the act were fulfilled and, therefore, the hon ble Court ought not to have exercised powers under Section 14 of the Act and after noting the event of ringing of cell phone of the respondent, the matter should have been referred to the Division Bench for appropriate action. The Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court in Suo Motu v. P. C. Pandya (supra) exercised summary powers under Section 14 of the Act but the said decision is not an authority as to when and under what circumstances such powers can be exercised. The Division Bench of the Gujarat High Court in Suo Motu v. P. C. Pandya (supra) exercised summary powers under Section 14 of the Act but the said decision is not an authority as to when and under what circumstances such powers can be exercised. The said decision cannot be read as a precedent in respect of the circumstances under which summary power under Section 14 of the Act ought to be exercised by the High Court because that was not an issue raised before the Court nor determined by the Court. The principles as to how the observations made in a decision of the Court should be construed are well settled. In catena of reported decisions, the Supreme Court has ruled courts should not place reliance on decisions without discussing as to how the factual situation fits in with the fact situation of the decision on which reliance is placed. According to Supreme Court observations of courts are neither to be read as Euclid s theorems nor as the provision of the statute and that too taken out of their context. It is explained that the judgments of Courts are not to be construed as statutes and judges interpret statutes but not judgment. According to the Supreme court, there is always peril in treating the words of a judgment as though they are words in a legislative enactment because each case depends upon its own facts and a close similarity between one case and another is not enough because even a single significant detail may alter the entire aspect. Applying these principles to the instant case, this Court finds that the judgment in suo Motu v. P. C. Pandya (Ssupra) is not an authority on the point as to when can powers be exercised by the Court summarily under Section 14 of the Act. Applying these principles to the instant case, this Court finds that the judgment in suo Motu v. P. C. Pandya (Ssupra) is not an authority on the point as to when can powers be exercised by the Court summarily under Section 14 of the Act. ( 15 ) ON the facts and in the circumstances of the case, this court is of the view that the notice issued to the respondent under section 14 (1) of the Act is liable to be discharged because the matter ought to have been referred to the Division Bench, more particularly when the order dated february 17,2006 does not indicate that (a)the contempt was clear, (b) the contempt affected a trial in progress or about to start, (c) it was urgent and imperative to act immediately in order to prevent justice being obstructed and undermined and to preserve the integrity of the trial, and (d) no other procedure could have been resorted to, to meet the ends of justice. ( 16 ) THE alternative submission made by mr. Mihir J. Thakore learned counsel for the respondent that no civil contempt is committed by respondent and. therefore, also the notice should be discharged, deserves consideration. Section 2 (b) of the act defines civil contempt and reads as under: "civil contempt" means wilful disobedience to any judgment, decree, direction, order, writ or other precess of a court or wilful breach of any undertaking given to a court" ( 17 ) IT is evident from the order dated february 17,2006 that the learned Single judge has, in the facts of the case treated the ringing of the mobile as civil contempt. This is quite evident from the following words of the order:"issue notice to Mr. S. B. Vakil to show cause that why he should not be punished under the provisions of the Contempt of courts Act. 1971 for ignoring the directions issued by this Court that nobody should bring his working mobile phone in the court nor should allow his mobile to ring. Put up on 24th February 2006. Mr. S. B. Vakil shall remain in attendance. " ( 18 ) AS observed earlier, the notice issued to the respondent also clearly indicates that the respondent is alleged to have committed civil contempt. This is evident from the following words of the notice: "whereas upon reading the aforesaid"suo MOTU" Misc. Put up on 24th February 2006. Mr. S. B. Vakil shall remain in attendance. " ( 18 ) AS observed earlier, the notice issued to the respondent also clearly indicates that the respondent is alleged to have committed civil contempt. This is evident from the following words of the notice: "whereas upon reading the aforesaid"suo MOTU" Misc. Civil Application by this High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad that you have been guilty of the contempt of Court for having disobeyed the directions given by this Court that nobody should bring his working mobile phone in the court nor should allow his mobile to ring. "in the case of Suo Molu v. P. C. Pandya (supra), the Division Bench of this Court in the facts of that case had treated ringing of the phone as criminal contempt: as is evident from the following paragraphs:"6. A criminal contempt would mean publication (whether by words, spoken or written, or by signs, or by visible representations or otherwise) of any matter. It would also include in its sweep the doing of any act whatsoever which is scandalous or lends lo scandalise or lowers or tends to lower the authority of any court, where it prejudices, or interferes or tends to interfere with, the due course of any judicial proceeding; or interferes or lends to interfere with or obstructs or tends to obstruct, the administration of justice in any other manner. 7. It cannot be gainsaid that when any untoward thing takes place in the Court, then, attention of the Judges, so also of the arguing counsel is distracted. When a mobile phone starts ringing in the Court and it goes on ringing continuously, then, person having the phone cannot be exempted, because, his act is causing interference in the hearing of the judicial proceedings and is obstructing the administration of justice. When the Judges and the lawyers are involved and engrossed in the arguments and the legal niceties, then any disturbance would not be tolerated, because, such interference would be disturbing the smooth process and progress of the judicial proceedings. 11. In view of our findings that ringing of the mobile phone in the Courts amounts to contempt of lawful authority of this court, we must hold that the noticee has committed contempt of lawful authority of this Court. 11. In view of our findings that ringing of the mobile phone in the Courts amounts to contempt of lawful authority of this court, we must hold that the noticee has committed contempt of lawful authority of this Court. " ( 19 ) THE above judgment cannot be at all treated as a precedent of civil contempt. The word "direction" in Section 2 (b) has to be construed in the context of the words judgment, decree, order, writ or process. The rule of construction noscitur a sociis clearly would apply and the word "direction" has to be judged by the company it keeps. This is so in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in m. K. Ranganathan v. Government of madras, AIR 1955 SC 604 . Therefore, "direction" in the circumstances would only mean a judicial direction issued against a party. A person is said to commit civil contempt if and only if he wilfully disobeys a judgment, decree, order, direction, writ or process directed against him. Disobedience of any administrative direction will never amount to civil contempt. Disobedience of a judgment in which the alleged contemnor is not a party would not amount to contempt for that may only be non-compliance of law declared by the Court. Therefore, the judgment of Division Bench in Suo Motu v. P. C. Pandya (supra) is not a judgment directed against the respondent and the consequential ringing of the bell of his cell phone cannot be considered disobedience, much less wilful, of a judgment, decree, direction, order, writ or other process of the Court. The facts of the instant case do not disclose alleged commission of civil contempt by the respondent and, therefore, also the notice deserves to be discharged. ( 20 ) EVEN if it is construed that disobedience of direction issued in Suo motu v. P. C. Pandya (supra) amounts to civil contempt, as defined in Section 2 (b) of the Act, the question which needs to be considered is whether bringing of his working mobile phone in the court-room and allowing his mobile to ring was a wilful act amounting to contempt of the court. The respondent in his affidavit has explained that as he was required to take some medicine at about 12. 30 p. m. he had while in his Chamber set the alarm and that on receipt of message at about 12. The respondent in his affidavit has explained that as he was required to take some medicine at about 12. 30 p. m. he had while in his Chamber set the alarm and that on receipt of message at about 12. 0 noon that his matter was likely to reach shortly for hearing, he had got dressed to come to the Court. What is highlighted by the respondent in his reply is that though he had set the mobile on vibration mode he had through oversight failed to switch off the alarm and he himself was surprised and alarmed when alarm on his mobile phone had rung in the court-room. It is further stated by the respondent in his reply affidavit that to prevent disturbance to the court, the respondent had rushed out of the court-room, simultaneously trying to switch off the alarm and before he had stepped out of the court-room, the alarm was in fact switched off. The averments made by the respondent in his affidavit-in-reply get support from the affidavit filed by Mr. Percy Kavina, learned advocate, who is practising in this Court. The above circumstances would indicate that neither bringing of working mobile phone in the court nor allowing the mobile to ring was wilful disobedience to the direction given by this court in Suo Motu v. P. C. Pandya (Supra ). The fact that the respondent is a very senior advocate of this court cannot be ignored. In fact, it would not be justified to attribute motive to him that he had gone in the court-room of the learned single Judge with an intention of disrupting judicial proceedings going on in the Court. The ringing of the alarm on the mobile phone took place inadvertently and this incident distressed the respondent, who immediately rushed out of the Court. Therefore, it is very difficult to conclude that there was wilful disobedience to directions issued by the Court. On this ground also the notice issued deserves to be discharged. ( 21 ) EVEN if one comes to the conclusion that the respondent has committed civil contempt, as defined in Section 2 (b) of the act, there is no manner of doubt that the respondent had tendered apology before the learned single Judge and has also expressed regrets and remorse by filing the affidavit. ( 21 ) EVEN if one comes to the conclusion that the respondent has committed civil contempt, as defined in Section 2 (b) of the act, there is no manner of doubt that the respondent had tendered apology before the learned single Judge and has also expressed regrets and remorse by filing the affidavit. From the contents of order dated February 17, 2006 it is evident that after explaining that he had kept his mobile phone on vibration mode, he had set the alarm as he had to take some medicine, the respondent had expressed regrets for ringing of cell phone in the court-room. What is emphasised by the learned Judge in the said order is that the respondent should have expressed remorse or regrets at the very outset before offering explanation and. therefore, he was required to be punished under the provisions of the Act. A reasonable reading of order dated February 17, 2006 makes it very clear that remorse and regrets were expressed by the respondent, may be after giving the explanation, What is material to consider under the provisions of the Act is whether remorse or regrets expressed were genuine and sincere and not the time at which it is expressed. On the facts and in the circumstances of the case, it cannot be said that the respondent had not tendered sincere apology before the learned single Judge or has not tendered genuine apology before this Court. As the respondent has expressed sincere regrets and remorse, this Court is of the opinion that even otherwise the notice issued under Section 14 (1) of the Act deserves to be discharged. ( 22 ) FOR the foregoing reasons, the notice issued to the respondent pursuant to order dated February 17,2006 is hereby discharged and contempt proceedings initiated against him are dropped. The present proceedings stand accordingly disposed of. Application disposed off.