Judgment 1. This second appeal has been preferred against the judgment and decree dated 23.3.1990 passed by Sri Kailash Bihari Verma, 1st Additional District Judge, Saran at Chapra, in title appeal No. 49 of 1983 whereby he had affirmed the judgment and decree dated 7.3.1983 passed by Sri Surendra Kumar Sinha, 3rd Additional Sub-Ordinate Judge, Chapra, in partition suit No. 6 of 1976. 2. The case of the plaintiff-respondent is that one Nakched Singh was the common ancestor. He had three sons; Ramdahin Singh, Padarath Singh and Mukhlal Singh, Ramdahin Singh died unmarried in the state of jointness before the revisional survey. In the year 1921, the two remaining brothers, namely, Pradarath Singh and Mukhlal Singh separated. Thereafter, Padarath Singh died in the year 1943 leaving behind his widow Hikayat Kuer and a daughter Simrekha Kuer. After the death of Padarath Singh, his widow Hikayat Kuer came in possession of the properties left by Padarath Singh. In the year 1945, Most. Hikayat Kuer also died leaving behind her daughter Simrekha, who inherited the properties of her father left by him and after the death of Simrekha Kuer the plaintiff being her only heir inherited the properties. Further case of the plaintiff is that his mother Simrekha Kuer executed a deed of gift on 9.11.1971 in favour of defendant No. 3 through defendant No. 4. In the year 1972, the mother of the plaintiff died leaving behind her, the plaintiff as her only heir who came in possession of the properties left by his mother. Further case of the plaintiff is that about 25-26 years back Mukhlal Singh (another brother of Padarath Singh) died leaving behind him his only son Mukhtar Singh and seven daughters who all inherited the properties left by Mukhlal Singh and, accordingly, they came in possession of the properties left by Mukhlal Singh. Later on, Mukhtar Singh also died and thereafter his two sons, namely, Tarak Nath Singh and Manokamna Singh (defendant Nos. 1 and 2) inherited the properties left by him and came in possession thereof. Further case is that although Mukhlal Singh and Padarath Singh had separated long-long ago but no partition had taken place by metes and bounds and the plaintiff used to pay rent of the lands with regard to her half share through Mukhtar Singh and Mukhlal Singh. 1 and 2) inherited the properties left by him and came in possession thereof. Further case is that although Mukhlal Singh and Padarath Singh had separated long-long ago but no partition had taken place by metes and bounds and the plaintiff used to pay rent of the lands with regard to her half share through Mukhtar Singh and Mukhlal Singh. But, after the death of Mukhtar Singh and Mukhlal Singh, the defendant No. 1 turned to be dishonest and he started obstructing in the joint possession of the plaintiff over the suit land and, hence, the necessity of filing of this suit arose. 3. The case of the defendants-appellants, in short, is that Padarath Singh and, Mukhlal Singh were own brothers. Padarath Singh died unmarried about 50 years back in the state of jointness. Later on, the defendants amended the written statement and said that Padarath Singh died leaving behind his widow Hikayat Kuer but it was denied that Simrekha was her daughter. It has been stated in the written statement that there is no unity of title and unity of possession with respect to the suit land as the plaintiff has got no right, title and interest in the suit property. He has filed this suit with dishonest intention at the instance of one Sushil Kumr Singh, defendant No. 4, who is a rich and influential man of the village and wants to grab the land of the defendants. It has been stated that the defendant No. 4 had approached the defendants to part with the land but when the defendants refused to part with the lands he became annoyed and got this case instituted. It has further been stated in the written statement that the plaintiff is not related to, the family of the defendants and the genealogical table given by the plaintiff is wrong. The plaintiff is not the daughter of Simrekha Kuer. It has also been stated that Simrekha has not executed any deed of gift in favour of the defendant No. 3 through defendant No. 4 and if any such deed of gift was executed it has got no legal effect. On the basis of the above pleadings the defendants-appellants have prayed to dismiss the suit. 4. It has also been stated that Simrekha has not executed any deed of gift in favour of the defendant No. 3 through defendant No. 4 and if any such deed of gift was executed it has got no legal effect. On the basis of the above pleadings the defendants-appellants have prayed to dismiss the suit. 4. From the perusal of the judgment of the trial Court, it appears that on the basis of the pleadings of both the parties, the trial Court framed as many as ten issues and after making discussion on all the issues the trial Court decreed the suit of the plaintiff for partition of his half share in the suit property described in schedule of the plaint. 5. Against the judgment of trial Court, the defendants- appellants preferred title appeal which was numbered as title appeal No. 49 of 1983. The said appeal was finally disposed of on 23.3.1990 by the 1st Additional District Judge, Saran at Chapra who dismissed the appeal filed by the defendants-appellants and affirmed the judgment of the trial Court. 6. Against the said judgment and decree passed in title appeal No. 49 of 1983 by the 1st Additional District Judge, Saran at Chapra, this second appeal has been preferred. 7. From the perusal of the record of this second appeal it appears that on 5.9.1990, this appeal was admitted for hearing and on the same day following substantial questions of law were framed :- I. Whether the judgment of the learned Courts below are vitiated due to non-consideration of evidence on the question of adverse possession before recording a finding regarding the same ? II. Whether the judgments of learned Courts below are vitiated due to the finding in favour of the plaintiff on the question of time of death of Padarath which are based on surmises and conjecture and not on the evidence on record ? III. Whether the learned Courts below have committed a serious error of law in not properly incorporating Ext. F series and non-consideration of other documents of defendants ? 8. During the course of hearing, the learned Advocate of the respondents raised some legal issues. He referred sec. III. Whether the learned Courts below have committed a serious error of law in not properly incorporating Ext. F series and non-consideration of other documents of defendants ? 8. During the course of hearing, the learned Advocate of the respondents raised some legal issues. He referred sec. 100 of the Code of the Civil Procedure and submitted that against the concurrent finding of the Courts below the second appeal can only be entertained when the Court is satisfied that the case involves substantial question of law. He submitted that if it is found that in the case no substantial question of law is involved then in second appeal this Court can not reverse the judgment of the first appellate Court even if the same is erroneous. In support of his argument, he relied upon the following decisions : (i) AIR 1959 SC 57 Deity Pattabhiramaswamy V/s. S. Hanymayya and Ors. (ii) - Kondiba Dagadu Kadam V/s. Savitribai Sopan Gujar and Ors. (iii) - V. Ramachandra Ayyar and Anr. V/s. Ramalingam Chettiar and Anr. 9. I would like to quote some paragraphs from the decisions referred to above. In the case of Deity Pattabhiramaswamy V/s. S. Hanymayya and Ors. AIR 1959 SC 57 following observation has been made by the Apex Court regarding the provision of Sec. 100, CPC. The provisions of sec. 100 are clear and unambiguous. There is no jurisdiction to entertain a second appeal on the ground of erroneous finding of fact, however gross the error may seem to be. Nor does the fact that the finding of the first appellate Court is based upon some documentary evidence make it any the less a finding of fact. A Judge of the High Court has, therefore, no jurisdiction to interfere in second appeal with the findings of fact given by the first appellate Court based upon an appreciation of the relevant evidence. (The practice of some Judges of the High Court disposing second appeals as if they were first appeal deprecated). 10. In the case of V. Ramachandra Ayyar and Anr. V/s. Ramalingam Chettiar and Anr. - , following observation has been made by the Apex Court on the provision of sec. 100, CPC. (The practice of some Judges of the High Court disposing second appeals as if they were first appeal deprecated). 10. In the case of V. Ramachandra Ayyar and Anr. V/s. Ramalingam Chettiar and Anr. - , following observation has been made by the Apex Court on the provision of sec. 100, CPC. If a finding of fact has been recorded by the first appellate Court without any evidence, that finding can be successfully challenged in second appeal, because a finding of fact which is not supported by any evidence can be questioned u/s. 100 and in that connection it may be said that the decree proceeding on such a finding discloses a substantial defect or error in procedure. This, however, does not mean that wherever the High Court thinks that the evidence accepted by the lower appellate Court could not have been reasonably accepted, the High Court would be justified in interfering with the decision of the lower appellate Court. All that it means is that it should be a case where the evidence, which is accepted by the lower appellate Court, no reasonable person could have accepted and that really amounts to saying that there is no evidence at all.... The High Court was not justified in interfering with the finding of fact recorded by the lower appellate Court merely because the judgment of the lower appellate Court was not as elaborate as that of the trial Judge, or because some of the reasons given by the trial Judge had not been expressly reversed by the lower appellate Court. The finding of the lower appellate Court could not be said to be perverse or not supported by any evidence. 11. In the case of Kondiba Dagadu Kadam V/s. Savitribai Sopan Gujar and Ors. - following observation has been made by the Apex Court. "The right of appeal is neither a natural or an inherent right attached to the litigation. Being a substantive statutory right, it has to be regulated in accordance with law in force at the relevant time. The conditions mentioned in the section must be strictly fulfilled before a second appeal can be maintained and no Court has the power to add or to enlarge those grounds. The second appeal can not be decided on merely equitable grounds. The conditions mentioned in the section must be strictly fulfilled before a second appeal can be maintained and no Court has the power to add or to enlarge those grounds. The second appeal can not be decided on merely equitable grounds. The concurrent findings of facts howsoever erroneous can not be disturbed by the High Court in exercise of the powers under this section. The substantial question of law has to be distinguished from a substantial question of fact. 12. Besides the abovementioned decisions referred above the following decisions are also relevant in this appeal. In 1989 PLJR (SC) 76 the Hon ble Supreme Court has held that "where there are concurrent findings of fact the Court should not interfere if finding is based on reasonable appreciation of evidence on record and is in no way perverse or unreasonable. In 2005 (2) BBCJ - IV - 420 while making discussion on the scope of Section 100, CPC the Apex Court made following observations :- In second appeal existence of substantial question of law is sine quo non for exercise of jurisdiction and the High Court cannot proceed to hear a second appeal without formulating the substantial questions of law. Para - 17 of the decision runs as follows :- This judgment was followed by this Court in civil appeal No. 2292 of 1999 Govindaraju V/s. Marriamman -. In Govindrajus case (supra) it has been held that the High Court while exercising the power u/s. 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure on re-appreciation of the evidence cannot set aside the findings of the fact recorded by the first appellate Court unless the High Court comes to the conclusion that the findings recorded by the first appellate Court were perverse i.e. based on misreading of evidence or based on no evidence. 13 Having been armed with the above decisions the learned Advocate of the respondents submitted that this Court has got no jurisdiction to interfere with the concurrent findings of facts even if the findings appear to be erroneous. I am also of the view that u/s. 100, CPC in second appeal this Court has no jurisdiction to interfere with the concurrent findings of fact given by the trial Court as well as by the first appellate Court. I am also of the view that u/s. 100, CPC in second appeal this Court has no jurisdiction to interfere with the concurrent findings of fact given by the trial Court as well as by the first appellate Court. This goes to show that in second appeal the concurrent findings of the Courts below on certain facts cannot be disturbed after re-appreciation of the evidence available on record unless the Court finds that the findings are perverse. 14. During the course of argument, a point has been raised by the learned Advocate of the respondents that all the three substantial questions of law formulated in this second appeal are actually substantial questions of fact and not substantial questions of law and these substantial questions cannot be decided without re-appreciation of the evidence available on record which is not permissible u/s. 100 of the CPC. I fully agree that all the three substantial questions of law formulated at the time of admission of this appeal are actually the substantial questions of fact and without re-appreciating the evidence of both the parties these substantial questions cannot be decided which is not permissible u/s. 100 of the CPC. Accordingly, I hold that all the three substantial questions of law as formulated in this second appeal are actually the substantial questions of fact and since the judgments of the trial Court as well as the first appellate Court show that both the judgments are based upon correct appreciation of the evidence available on record and do not appear to be perverse as such this Court has no jurisdiction to reverse the concurrent findings of the Courts below after formulating substantial questions of fact in the garb of substantial questions of law. 15. In the result, I do not find any merit in this second appeal and as such, the same is hereby dismissed with cost. The judgment and decree passed by the Courts below are hereby confirmed.