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2006 DIGILAW 413 (KER)

Sanal v. State Bank Of India

2006-07-13

K.BALAKRISHNAN NAIR

body2006
ORDER OF REFERENCE K. Balakrishnan Nair, J. 1.The petitioners have approached this Court, challenging the steps taken by the 1st respondent State Bank of India, proposing to make campus recruitment to the post of Probationary Officer. The brief facts of the case are the following : 2. The first petitioner is a graduate in B. Sc. Physics with 70% marks. He is doing the Post Graduate course in the Cochin University of Science and Technology. The second petitioner is doing B. Tech. in Electronics, in the Model Engineering College, Thrikkakara. They submit, they have cleared all the examinations, scoring very high marks. The second petitioner is a member of the Scheduled Caste. On coming to know that the 1st respondent is going to make campus recruitment to 30% of the vacancies in @page-KLT343# the cadre of Probationary Officers, this Writ Petition is filed by them. They challenge the campus recruitment, mainly on the ground that the same offends their fundamental rights, guaranteed under Arts. 14 and 16(1) of the Constitution of India. 3. The second respondent, who is the Zonal Manager of the 1st respondent Bank, has filed a counter affidavit, resisting the prayers in the Writ Petition and supporting the steps taken for campus recruitment. The said respondent rely on Ext.R2(a) circular, issued by the Government of India to the Chief Executives of all Public Sector Banks, empowering them to recruit up to 30% of the vacancies in the post of Probationary Officer, earmarked for direct recruitment, by way of campus recruitment from recognised management and other professional institutions. On the basis of Ext.R2(a), the Bank has framed a recruitment policy, which is produced as Ext.R2(b), which provides, inter alia, for campus recruitment from reputed management institutions. It is also pointed out that the Ministry of Finance, Government of India, has issued Ext.R2(c) policy, concerning Managerial autonomy of Public Sector Banks. The said policy also enables the Bank to proceed with the campus recruitment. It is further submitted that the executive committee of the Central Board of the 1st respondent has approved Ext.R2(b) policy on campus recruitment. 4. Regarding the challenge to the recruitment policy, on the ground that the same offends Art.16(1) of the Constitution of India, it is submitted by the Bank that classification of the students of reputed colleges in India and the students of other colleges is a valid classification, founded on an intelligible differentia. 4. Regarding the challenge to the recruitment policy, on the ground that the same offends Art.16(1) of the Constitution of India, it is submitted by the Bank that classification of the students of reputed colleges in India and the students of other colleges is a valid classification, founded on an intelligible differentia. From Kerala, three Colleges, namely, Rajagiri College of Social Sciences, Kalamassery, Government Women's College, Thiruvananthapuram and All Saints College, Thiruvananthapuram are identified as the colleges, fit for campus recruitment. It is also submitted that the Rules governing campus recruitment are transparent and there is no possibility of favouritisim or arbitrariness in the selection. So, respondents 1 and 2 pray for dismissing the Writ Petition. 5. In the light of the documents produced by the Bank, the petitioners have amended the Writ Petition, incorporating the challenge against Ext.R2(a), which is produced as Ext.P4. They also challenge the decision of the Executive Committee of the Central Board of the S.B.I., concerning campus recruitment of Probationary Officers, which is produced as Ext.P5. Ext.P4 is the guidelines issued by the Central Government, under S.18 of the State Bank of India Act, 1955. 6. I heard the learned counsel on both sides. The point that arises for decision is whether 30% of the vacancies available for direct recruitment could be filled up by campus recruitment, by the 1st respondent, which is a statutory corporation, without doing violence to the fundamental rights of the petitioners and others under Arts.14 and 16(1) of the Constitution of India. 7. The Preamble to our Constitution proclaims that India is a Sovereign, Socialist, Secular, Democratic Republic. It promises to all its citizens, Justice-social, economic and political and equality of status and opportunity. To carry out the pledge contained in the preamble, the founding fathers, after elaborate discussion in the Constituent Assembly, incorporated Arts.14 and 16 in Part III of the Constitution. Art.14 mandates that "the State shall not deny to any person, equality before Law or the equal protection of Laws within the territory of India". To carry out the pledge contained in the preamble, the founding fathers, after elaborate discussion in the Constituent Assembly, incorporated Arts.14 and 16 in Part III of the Constitution. Art.14 mandates that "the State shall not deny to any person, equality before Law or the equal protection of Laws within the territory of India". Art.16(1) guarantees , "equality of opportunity for all citizens in matters relating to employment or appointment to any office under the State." In the light of the above guarantees, it has to be decided whether 30% of the vacancies in the post of Probationary Officers in a statutory corporation can be set apart exclusively to those who secure admission in some reputed educational institutions. The three colleges selected in Kerala, have only very limited seats, when compared to tens of thousands of students in Kerala, who were compelled, because of their place of residence or financial incapacity, to seek admissions elsewhere for Degree and other comparable courses. So, the point to be answered is whether recruitment by a statutory corporation from among the students, who are fortunate to get admission in a few reputed educational institutions, will be denying justice to the large majority of youngsters of India i.e., Bharath, the land of Daridra Narayanas. Bose. J., in State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar ( AIR 1952 SC 75 ), while considering the sweep of Art.14 stated as follows: "I can conceive of cases where there is the utmost good faith and where the classification is scientific and rational and yet which would offend this law. Let us take an imaginary case, in which a State Legislature considers that all accused persons whose skull measurements are below a certain standard or who cannot pass a given series of intelligence tests, shall be tried summarily whatever the offence on the ground that the less complicated the trial, the fairer it is to their sub-standard of intelligence. Here is classification. It is scientific and systematic. The intention and motive are good. There is no question of favouritism and yet I can hardly believe that such a law would be allowed to stand." His Lordship, again, in Bidi Supply Co. v . Here is classification. It is scientific and systematic. The intention and motive are good. There is no question of favouritism and yet I can hardly believe that such a law would be allowed to stand." His Lordship, again, in Bidi Supply Co. v . Union of India ( 1956 SCR 267 ), reiterated the above view in the following manner: "I endeavoured to point out in my judgment in Anwar Ali Sarkar's case at page 361 that one can conceive of classifications that conform to all these rules and yet which are bad : classifications made in the utmost good faith; classifications that are scientific and rational, that will have direct and reasonable relation to the object sought to be achieved and yet which are bad because despite all that the object itself cannot be allowed on the ground that it offends Art.14. In such a case, the object itself must be struck down and not the mere classification which, after all, is only a means of attaining the end desired and that in my judgment, is precisely the point here." His Lordship further added : "After all, for whose benefit was the Constitution enacted ? What was the point of making all this pother about fundamental rights? I am clear that the Constitution is not for the exclusive benefit of Governments and States : it is not only for lawyers and politicians and officials and those highly placed. It also exists for the common man, for the poor and the humble, for those who have businesses at stake, for 'the butcher', 'the baker' and 'the candlestick maker'. It lays down for this land 'a rule of law' as understood in the free democracies of the world. It constitutes India into a Sovereign Democratic Republic and guarantees in every page rights and freedom to the individual side by side and consistent with the overriding power of the State to act for the common good of all." 8. Art.16(1) is the species guaranteeing equality in public employment, which forms part of the genus of equality, guaranteed under Art.14 of the Constitution. It is true, Arts.14 and 16 permit classification, but the same should not be extended to a point where the main guarantee to equality itself is subverted. Art.16(1) is the species guaranteeing equality in public employment, which forms part of the genus of equality, guaranteed under Art.14 of the Constitution. It is true, Arts.14 and 16 permit classification, but the same should not be extended to a point where the main guarantee to equality itself is subverted. The Apex Court in Muhammed Shujat Ali v. Union of India (1975) 1 SCR 449 ), warned against overdoing classifications, in the following words: "The fundamental guarantee is of equal protection of the laws and the doctrine of classification is only a subsidiary rule evolved by courts to give a practical content to that guarantee by accommodating it with the practical needs of the society and it should not be allowed to submerge and drown the precious guarantee of equality. The doctrine of classification should not be carried to a point where instead of being a useful servant, it becomes a dangerous master, for otherwise, as pointed out by Chandrachud, J., in State of Jammu & Kashmir v. Triloki Nath Khosa 'the guarantee of equality will be submerged in class legislation masquerading as laws meant to govern well-marked classes characterised by different and distinct attainments. ... That process would inevitably end in substituting the doctrine of classification for the doctrine of equality : The fundamental right to equality before the law and equal protection of the laws may be replaced by the overworked methodology of classification. Our approach to the equal protection clause must, therefore, be guided by the words of caution uttered by Krishna Iyer, J., in State of Jammu and Kashmir v. Triloki Nath Khosa (at) 'Mini-classifications based on micro-distinctions are false to our egalitarian faith and only substantial and straightforward classification plainly promoting relevant goals can have constitutional validity. To overdo classification is to undo equality." (emphasis supplied) In the above decision, the Apex Court recognised the power of the State to classify. The relevant portion of it reads as follows : "This doctrine recognises that the Legislature may classify for the purpose of legislation but requires that the classification must be reasonable. It should ensure that persons or things similarly situated are all similarly treated. The measure of reasonableness of a classification is the degree of its success in treating similarly those similarly situated. But the question is: what does this ambiguous and crucial phrase 'similarly situated' mean? It should ensure that persons or things similarly situated are all similarly treated. The measure of reasonableness of a classification is the degree of its success in treating similarly those similarly situated. But the question is: what does this ambiguous and crucial phrase 'similarly situated' mean? Where are we to look for the test of similarity of situation which determines the reasonableness of a classification ? The inescapable answer is that we must look beyond the classification to the purpose of the law. A reasonable classification is one which includes all persons or things similarly situated with respect to the purpose of the law." Mathew, J., in State of Gujarat v. Shri Ambica Mills Ltd. (1974) 3 SCR 760 ) has held as follows : "The equal protection of the laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws. But laws may classify............. A reasonable classification is one which includes all who are similarly situated and none who are not. The question is what does the phrase 'similarly situated' mean ? The answer to the question is that we must look beyond the classification to the purpose of the law. The purpose of a law may be either the elimination of a public mischief or the achievement of some positive public good. A classification is under-inclusive when all who are included in the class are tainted with the mischief but there are others also tainted whom the classification does not include. In other words, a classification is bad as under-inclusive when a State benefits or burdens persons in a manner that furthers a legitimate purpose but does not confer the same benefit or place the same burden on others who are similarly situated. A classification is over-inclusive when it includes not only those who are similarly situated with respect to the purpose but others who are not so situated as well." Going by the principles laid down in the above decisions, I feel that the classification attempted by the respondents in this case, cannot be sustained. It does not pass the twin tests enunciated by the courts, to sustain discriminatory treatments. The persons covered by the classification must have an intelligible differentia, when compared to the persons, not so classified. Further, the classification should have a rational nexus with the object of the law. In this case, the job seekers have been divided into two groups. It does not pass the twin tests enunciated by the courts, to sustain discriminatory treatments. The persons covered by the classification must have an intelligible differentia, when compared to the persons, not so classified. Further, the classification should have a rational nexus with the object of the law. In this case, the job seekers have been divided into two groups. One group belongs to the students of certain reputed educational institutions and the other group belongs to students of other educational institutions, throughout the length and breadth of the country and also includes, those who have already passed out from the colleges including reputed institutions. Once they go out from those reputed institutions, they cannot claim the benefit of campus recruitment. The differentia between the two groups is not really intelligible. Further, the classification has no connection, whatsoever, with the object of the law. The object is to select the best among the applicants. The assumption that the best is available only in certain educational institutions, is plainly irrational and does not appeal to common sense. There may be hundreds of others, studying in other educational institutions or those who have passed out from those institutions, who are far more superior than the students found in the campuses of certain colleges. Further, the overdoing of the classification in this case is undoing the equality clause. 9. The landmark decision of the Apex Court in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India ( AIR 1978 SC 597 ), has given a new dimension to the concept of Art.14 of the Constitution. In the said decision, it was held as follows : "Now, the question immediately arises as to what is the requirement of Art.14 : what is the content and reach of the great equalising principle enunciated in this article? There can be no doubt that it is a founding faith of the Constitution. It is indeed the pillar on which rests securely the foundation of our democratic republic. And, therefore, it must not be, subjected to a narrow, pedantic or lexicographic approach. No attempt should be made to truncate its allembracing scope and meaning, for to do so would be to violate its activist magnitude. Equality is a dynamic concept with many aspects and dimensions and it cannot be imprisoned within traditional and doctrinaire limits. And, therefore, it must not be, subjected to a narrow, pedantic or lexicographic approach. No attempt should be made to truncate its allembracing scope and meaning, for to do so would be to violate its activist magnitude. Equality is a dynamic concept with many aspects and dimensions and it cannot be imprisoned within traditional and doctrinaire limits. We must reiterate here what was pointed out by the majority in E.P.Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu (1974) 2 SCR 348 ) : ( AIR 1974 SC 555 ) namely, that 'from a positivistic point of view, equality is antithetic to arbitrariness. In fact, equality and arbitrariness are sworn enemies ; one belongs to the rule of law in a republic, while the other, to the whim and caprice of an absolute monarch. Where an act is arbitrary, it is implicit in it that it is unequal both according to political logic and constitutional law and is therefore, violative of Art.14'. Art.14 strikes at arbitrariness in State action and ensures fairness and equality of treatment. The principle of reasonableness which legally as well as philosophically, is an essential element of equality or non-arbitrariness pervades Art.14 like a brooding omnipresence." Going by the above principles laid down by the Apex Court also, the attempt of the respondents to deny equality to the petitioners and others cannot be sustained. In Indra Sawhney v. Union of India ( AIR 1993 SC 477 ), the Apex Court adumbrated on the equality clauses in the Constitution, in the following words: "Liberty, equality and fraternity was the cry of the French Revolution. It is also the motto of our Constitution with the concept of 'Justice - Social, Economic and Political' - the sum total of modern political thought super-added to it. Equality has been and is the single greatest craving of all human beings at all points of time. It has inspired many a great thinker and philosopher. All religious and political schools of thought swear by it, including the Hindu religious thought, if one looks to it ignoring the later crudities and distortions. Liberty of thought, expression, belief, faith and worship has equally been an abiding faith with all human beings, and at all times in this country in particular. Fraternity assuring the dignity of the individual has a special relevance in the Indian context, as this Judgment will illustrate in due course. Liberty of thought, expression, belief, faith and worship has equally been an abiding faith with all human beings, and at all times in this country in particular. Fraternity assuring the dignity of the individual has a special relevance in the Indian context, as this Judgment will illustrate in due course. The doctrine of equality has many facets. It is a dynamic and an evolving concept. Its main facets, relevant to Indian Society, have been referred to in the preamble and the articles under the sub-heading 'Right to equality' (Arts.14 to 18). In short, the goal is 'equality of status and of opportunity'. Arts.14 to 18 must be understood not merely with reference to what they say, but also in the light of the several articles in Part IV (Directive Principles of State Policy). 'Justice, Social, Economic and Political', is the sum total of the aspirations incorporated in Part IV. Art.14 enjoins upon the State not to deny to any person 'equality before the law' or the equal protection of the laws' within the territory of India. Most Constitutions speak of either 'equality before the law' or 'the equal protection of the laws' but very few of both. S.1 of the XIV Amendment to the U.S. Constitution uses only the latter expression while the Austrian Constitution (1920), the Irish Constitution (1937) and the West German Constitution (1949) use the expression 'equal before the law' (Art.7 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948, of course, declares that 'all are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to equal protection of the law). The content and sweep of these two concepts is not the same though, there may be much in common. The content of the expression 'equality before the law' is illustrated in several articles in Part IV, in particular, Arts.38, 39, 39A, 41, 46. Among others, the concept of equality before the law contemplates minimising the inequalities in income and eliminating the inequalities in status, facilities and opportunities not only amongst individuals, but also amongst groups of people, securing adequate means of livelihood to its citizens and to promote with special care the educational and economic interests of the weaker sections of the people, including in particular, the scheduled castes and scheduled tribes and to protect them from social injustice and all forms of exploitation. Indeed, in a society, where equality of status and opportunity do not obtain and where there are glaring inequalities in incomes, there is no room for equality - either equality before law or equality in any other respect. The significance attached by the founding fathers to the right to equality is evident not only from the fact that they employed both the expressions 'equality before the law' and 'equal protection of the laws' in Art.14 but proceeded further to state the same rule in positive and affirmative terms in Arts.15 to 18. Through Art.15, they declared in positive terms that the State shall not discriminate against any citizen on the grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them. With a view to eradicate certain prevalent undesirable practices, it was declared in cl.(2) of Art.15 that no citizen shall on the grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth or any of them be subject to any disability, liability, restriction or condition with regard to shops, public restaurants, hotels and place of public entertainment or to the use of well, tanks, bathing ghats, roads and place of public resort maintained wholly or partly out of state funds or dedicated to the use of general public. At the same time, with a view to ameliorate the conditions of women and children a provision was made in cl.(3) that nothing in the said Article shall prevent the State from making any special provision for women and children. Inasmuch as public employment always gave a certain status and power - it has always been the repository of State power - besides the means of livelihood, special care was taken to declare equality of opportunity in the matter of public employment by Art.16. Cl.(i) expressly declares that in the matter of public employment or appointment to any office under the State, citizens of this country shall have equal opportunity while cl.(2) declares that no citizen shall be discriminated in the said matter on the grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, descent, place of birth, residence or any of them. Cl.(i) expressly declares that in the matter of public employment or appointment to any office under the State, citizens of this country shall have equal opportunity while cl.(2) declares that no citizen shall be discriminated in the said matter on the grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, descent, place of birth, residence or any of them. At the same time, care was taken to declare in cl.(4) that nothing in the said Article shall prevent the State from making any provision for reservation of appointments or posts in favour of any backward class of citizen which in the opinion of the State is not adequately represented in the services under the State. Art.17 abolishes the untouchability, while Art.18 prohibits conferring of any titles (not representing military or academic distinction). It also prohibits the citizens of his country from accepting any title from a foreign State." Recently, the Constitution Bench of the Apex Court in Secretary, State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (2006 (2) KLT SN 55 (C.No.70) SC = JT 2006(4) SC 420) held as follows : "In addition to the equality clause represented by Art.14 of the Constitution, Art.16 has specifically provided for equality of opportunity in matters of public employment. Buttressing these fundamental rights, Art.309 provides that subject to the provisions of the Constitution, Acts of the legislature may regulate the recruitment and conditions of service of persons appointed to public services and posts in connection with the affairs of the Union or of a State. In view of the interpretation placed on Art.12 of the Constitution by this Court, obviously, these principles also govern the instrumentalities that come within the purview of Art.12 of the Constitution. .......................................................................................... At this stage, it is relevant to notice two aspects. In Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973 Suppl. SCR 1), this Court held that Art.14 and Art.16, which was described as a facet of Art.14, is part of the basic structure of the Constitution of India. The position emerging from Kesavananda Bharati (supra) was summed up by Jagannatha Rao,J., speaking for a Bench of three Judges in Indira Sawhney v. Union of India (1997 (1) KLT 45 (SC) = JT 1996 (10) SC 331). That decision also reiterated how neither the Parliament nor the Legislature could transgress the basic feature of the Constitution, namely, the principle of equality enshrined in Art.14 of which Art.16(1) is a facet. That decision also reiterated how neither the Parliament nor the Legislature could transgress the basic feature of the Constitution, namely, the principle of equality enshrined in Art.14 of which Art.16(1) is a facet. This Court stated : ' The preamble to the Constitution of India emphasizes the principles of equality as basic to our Constitution. In Kesavandanda Bharati v. State of Kerala, it was ruled that even constitutional amendments which offended the basic structure of the Constitution would be ultra vires the basic structure. Sikri, C.J. laid stress on the basic features enumerated in the preamble to the Constitution and said that there were other basic features too which could be gathered from the Constitutional scheme (paras. 520 and 535A). Equality was one of the basic features referred to in the Preamble to our Constitution. Shelat and Grover JJ. Also referred to the basic rights referred to in the Preamble. They specifically referred to equality. Hegde & Shelat JJ. also referred to the Preamble (paras 648, 642). Ray J (as he then was) also did so (para 886) Jaganmohan Reddy, J. too referred to the Preamble and the equality doctrine (para. 1159). Khanna. J. accepted this position (para 1471). Mathew J, referred to quality as a basic feature (para. 1621) Dwivedi J (paras. 1882, 1883) and Chandrachud, J (as he then was) see para. 2086) accepted this position. What we mean to say is that Parliament and the legislatures in this Country cannot transgress the basic feature of the Constitution, namely, the principle of equality, enshrined in Art.14 of which Art.16(1) is a facet." The principles laid down in the above decisions also render the campus recruitment ultra vires and unauthorised. In this context, I think, it will be apposite to quote the speech of Dr.B.R. Ambedkar in the Constituent Assembly when Draft Art.10 (presently, Art.16), was taken up for consideration : "..............there are three points of view which it is necessary for us to reconcile, if we are to produce a workable proposition which will be accepted by all. Of the three points of view, the first is that there shall be equality of opportunity for all citizens. Of the three points of view, the first is that there shall be equality of opportunity for all citizens. It is the desire of many Members of this House that every individual who is qualified for a particular post should be free to apply for that post, to sit for examinations and to have his qualifications tested so as to determine whether he is fit for the post or not and that there ought to be no limitations, there ought to be no hindrance in the operation of this principle of equality or opportunity. Another view mostly shared by a section of the House is that, if this principle is to be operative - and it ought to be operative in their judgment to its fullest extent - there ought to be no reservations of any sort for any doss or community at all, that all citizens, if they are qualified, should be placed on the same footing of equality so far as the public services are concerned. That is the second point of view we have. Then we have quite a massive opinion which insists that although, theoretically, it is good to have the principle that there shall be equality of opportunity, there must at the same time, be a provision made for the entry of certain communities which have so far been outside the administration. As I said, the Drafting Committee had to produce a formula which would reconcile these three points of view, firstly, that there shall be equality of opportunity, secondly that there shall be reservations in favour of certain communities which have not so far had a proper look-in so to say into the administration. If honourable Members will bear these facts in mind - the three principles we had to reconcile - they will see that no better formula could be produced than the one that is embodied in sub-cl.(3) of Art.10 of the Constitution. It is a generic principle. At the same time, as I said, we had to reconcile this formula with the demand made by certain communities that the administration which has now -for historical reasons- been controlled by one community or a few communities, that situation should disappear and that the others also must have an opportunity of getting into the public services." 10. At the same time, as I said, we had to reconcile this formula with the demand made by certain communities that the administration which has now -for historical reasons- been controlled by one community or a few communities, that situation should disappear and that the others also must have an opportunity of getting into the public services." 10. Going by the above and the decisions of the Apex Court, I find it difficult to sustain the steps taken by respondents 1 and 2 for campus recruitment. The children of the butcher', 'the baker' and the candlestick maker' will be permanently kept away from the 30% of the vacancies in the cadre of Probationary Officers in the State Bank of India, if the impugned measures are sustained. Those posts will exclusively remain reserved to the fortunate students who get admissions in a few elite educational institutions. Such a reservation will be flying in the face of Art.16(4) of the Constitution, which permits reservation only in favour of backward classes of citizens. The concept of classification cannot be pressed into service to camouflage a reservation in favour of persons not covered by Art.16(4). 11. The learned counsel for the Bank, relying on the decision of the Apex Court in Balco Employees Union v. Union of India (2002 (1) KLT SN 34 (C.No.41) SC (F.B.) = 2002) 2 SCC 333) and also State of Punjab v. Ram. Lubhaya Bagga (1998) 4 SCC 117 ) submitted that it is for the Executive to lay down policies regarding the administration of the country and this Court should not sit in appeal over those policies. But, when those policies are translated into Acts and Rules and if they offend any of the fundamental rights of the citizens, it is the constitutional duty of this Court to step in and strike down them. 12. But in this case, the respondents have produced a decision of this Court dated 20.07.2005 in Writ Petition (C) No.17789/05 (Ed. Note:- Reported in 2006 (3) KLT 9 .), wherein this Court upheld the campus recruitment resorted to by the Kochi Refineries Ltd. The said decision squarely covers the point raised by the petitioners, it is submitted by the respondents. The learned counsel for the petitioners pointed out that an SLP seeking to challenge the said Judgment, has been admitted by the Honourable Supreme Court. The learned counsel for the petitioners pointed out that an SLP seeking to challenge the said Judgment, has been admitted by the Honourable Supreme Court. Going by the said decision, I find that it is a case argued by the petitioner, who appeared in person. Many of the relevant decisions on the point have not been brought to the notice of this Court. In view of the said Division Bench decision, I feel that this Writ Petition should also be heard by a Division Bench. Accordingly, I adjourn the case for the same. Place the papers before the Honourable Chief Justice for appropriate orders. (Ed. Note:- Reference was not answered based on the submission that campus recruitment is not being resorted to any longer.)