Judgment ( 1. ) WHAT would have been a factum of computation simpliciter has got itself accentuated to a different situation for the reason that there has been a delay of 1427 days in preferring the appeal. We have through it appropriate and seemly to deal with the application for condonation of delay and the merits of the appeal together, so that a just, proper, adequate and necessitous picture is projected. In addition, learned Counsel for the parties also conceded that both the issues be dealt with in a composite manner, so that a complete picture gets exposited with utmost clarity. Thus, we proceed to delineate the facts from both the spectrums. ( 2. ) THE unfortunate parents alongwith two other sons initiated an action under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for brevity the Act) before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Jabalpur (for short the Tribunal) for grant of compensation of Rs. 19 lakhs on the foundation that on 25-8-1997, Surendra Kumar, son of the appellant Nos. 1 and 2 herein, the deceased, met wit a motor accident, sustained injuries and eventually succumbed to the same. It was put forth before the Tribunal that he was aged about 17 years and earning Rs. 3000/- per month and was contributing to the family. ( 3. ) DESPITE the resistance and refutation by the driver, owner as well as the insurer from many a quarter the Tribunal on the base of material brought on record came to hold that the accident had occurred due to rash and negligent driving of the offending vehicle bearing registration No. UM-RD-1016 (T); that the vehicle was insured with the respondent No. 3, the New India Insurance Co. Ltd. ; that the deceased was earning Rs. 2000/- per month; that the contribution of the deceased to the family was Rs. 12,000/- per year; that the mother, Smt. Premkumari Mishra, was entitled to the compensation in toto; and that the multiplier of 10 would be applicable in the obtaining factual matrix moreso, taking into consideration the age of the mother. As is evincible a sum of Rs. 1,27,000/- was awarded by the Tribunal. ( 4. ) FIRST we shall deal with the issue of limitation inasmuch as the insurer has resisted the prayer by filing an objection in oppugnation and further Mr. As is evincible a sum of Rs. 1,27,000/- was awarded by the Tribunal. ( 4. ) FIRST we shall deal with the issue of limitation inasmuch as the insurer has resisted the prayer by filing an objection in oppugnation and further Mr. Rakesh Jain, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the insurer stood absolutely embedded to the stand taken by the respondent No. 3 and opposed with immense vehemence the application for condonation of delay. Submission of Mr. Jain is that if delay in filing the present appeal is condoned it will set a precedent inasmuch as the claimants would become enthusiastic to file appeals after lapse of so many years ostracising the basic conception that an award which is passed today on the basis of the price index would not have been the same four years back. Pyramiding the aforesaid submission it is urged by Mr. Jain that if the application filed by the appellants is perused nothing is patent to even indicate an iota of sufficient cause inasmuch as in the application no acceptable reason has been preferred. Incriminating the said facet Mr. Jain would contend that though there has to be a liberal approach but when the question of grant of just compensation emerges and the Tribunal has granted just compensation at the relevant point of time, with the efflux of time that cannot be treated to be unjust, for a pound or rupee today is not the same tomorrow. In essentiality the objection of Mr. Jain is that the perception of delay has to have nexus or connectivity with the fiscal index and liberalism cannot have free drive down into the said system. ( 5. ) MR. Sharad Gupta, learned Counsel appearing for the claimant countering the aforesaid submission in support of the application for condonation of delay propounded that the claimant/mother of the deceased was 42 years of age and had lost her young son at the age of 17 years and it was extremely difficult to get out of the said shock. ) MR. Sharad Gupta, learned Counsel appearing for the claimant countering the aforesaid submission in support of the application for condonation of delay propounded that the claimant/mother of the deceased was 42 years of age and had lost her young son at the age of 17 years and it was extremely difficult to get out of the said shock. It is urged by him that it is not a case where by virtue of enhancement of the price index the claimant has become unnecessarily avaricious to knock at the doors of the Court but on the contrary, has approached this Court only to agitate the grievance that what could have been just compensation at the time of grant of the award has not been given to her and such deprivation or denial has taken place since the correct multiplier has not been applied, even if determination of income and contribution are found to be correct and sound. The learned Counsel submitted that the apprehension expressed by the learned Counsel for the insurer is a figment of imagination and does not warrant acceptance because the basic purpose of the Act is a beneficial one and when a beneficial statute is understood in its proper perspective and benefit is to be given, the object and primary and pivotal factors being just compensation, the delay cannot be an obstacle or a remora as the Court has the jurisdiction to strike a balance by condoning the delay in entertaining the appeal but refusing to grant interest. ( 6. ) TO appreciate the aforesaid submissions raised at the bar with regard to the application for condonation of delay we think it appropriate to refer to the decision rendered in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and Anr v. Mst. Katiji and Ors. AIR1987 SC 1353 , 1987 (35 )BLJR465 , 1987 (13 ) ECC27 (SC ), 1988 (19 )ECR565 (NULL ), 1987 (28 )ELT185 (SC ), [1987 ]167 ITR471 (SC ), JT1987 (1 )SC 537 , (1987 )I LLJ500 SC , 1987 (1 )SCALE413 , (1987 )2 SCC107 , [1987 ]2 SCR387 , [1987 ]66 STC228 (SC ), 1987 (2 ) UJ29 (SC ), wherein the Apex Court while conceptualising the concept of liberal approach for condonation of delay stated so, in seriatim in Paras 1 to 6 as under: 1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late. 2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties. 3. every days delay must be explained : Does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hours delay every seconds delay : The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner. 4. When substantial justice and technical considerations arc pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay. 5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of malafides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk. 6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalize injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so. ( 7. ) IN this context, we may usefully refer to a two Judge Bench decision of the Apex Court rendered in the case of G. Ramegowda, Major etc. v. The Special Land Acquisition Officer, Bangalore AIR1988 SC 897 , JT1988 (1 )SC 524 , 1988 (1 )SCALE479 , (1988 )2 SCC142 , [1988 ]3 SCR198 , 1988 (1 ) UJ666 (SC ). We are conscious the said decision was rendered while making a slight distinction with regard to limitation application filed by the State Govt. but Their Lordships epitomized the principles in Paragraph 7 as under: "7. The contours of the area of discretion of the Courts in the matter of condonation of delays in filing appeals are set out in a number of pronouncements of this Court. See Ramlal v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd. AIR1962 SC 361 , [1962 ]2 SCR762 ; Shakuntala Devi v. Kuntal Kumari AIR1969 SC 575 , [1969 ]1 SCR1006 ; Concord of India Insurance Co. See Ramlal v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd. AIR1962 SC 361 , [1962 ]2 SCR762 ; Shakuntala Devi v. Kuntal Kumari AIR1969 SC 575 , [1969 ]1 SCR1006 ; Concord of India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Nirmala Devi AIR1979 SC 1666 , [1979 ]49 Compcas463 (SC ), [1979 ]118 ITR507 (SC ), (1979 )81 PLR546 , (1979 )4 SCC365 , [1979 ]3 SCR694 , 1979 (11 )UJ486 (SC ); Mata Din v. A. Narayanan AIR1970 SC 1953 , (1969 )2 SCC770a , [1970 ]2 SCR90 ; Collector, Land Acquisition v. Katiji AIR1987 SC 1353 , 1987 (35 )BLJR465 , 1987 (13 )ECC27 (SC ), 1988 (19 )ECR565 (NULL ), 1987 (28 )ELT185 (SC ), [1987 ]167 ITR471 (SC ), JT1987 (1 )SC 537 , (1987 )I LLJ500 SC , 1987 (1 )SCALE413 , (1987 )2 SCC107 , [1987 ]2 SCR387 , [1987 ]66 STC228 (SC ), 1987 (2 )UJ29 (SC ) etc. There is, it is true, no general principle saving the party from all mistakes of its Counsel. If there is negligence, deliberate or gross inaction or lack of bonafides on the part of the party or its Counsel there is no reason why the opposite side should be exposed to a time- barred appeal. Each particularities of its own special facts. However, the expression sufficient cause in Section 5 must receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice and generally delays in preferring appeals are required to be condoned in the interest of justice where no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or lack of bonafides is imputable to the party seeking condonation of the delay. In Katijis case (supra), this Court said: When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of non-deliberate delay. " It must be grasped that judiciary is respect not on account of its power to legalise injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so. ( 8. ) WE have referred to the aforesaid decisions only to show that approach has to be liberal. In a case of the present nature, the mother was the awardee and she was in her mid 40s. The mandate of the Act requires that just compensation has to be awarded. ( 8. ) WE have referred to the aforesaid decisions only to show that approach has to be liberal. In a case of the present nature, the mother was the awardee and she was in her mid 40s. The mandate of the Act requires that just compensation has to be awarded. In the case of State of Haryana and Anr. v. Jasbir Kaur and Ors. 2003 ACJ1800 , AIR2003 SC 3696 , 2003 (4 )AWC3421 (SC ), [2003 (4 )JCR196 (SC )], JT2003 (Suppl1 )SC601 , (2003 )135 PLR414 , 2003 (6 )SCALE113 , (2003 )7 SCC484 , 2003 (2 )UJ1527 (SC ), it has been held that the compensation has to be just and reasonable. It should neither be a bonanza nor a source of profit nor a pittance. Their Lordships proceeded further to state that the term just denotes equitability, fairness and reasonableness. If just compensation has not been awarded the question that falls for consideration is whether the Appellate Court can condone the delay to rectify the defect by doing a balancing act by denying the grant of interest. In our considered view, if the tenet liberal approach in the backdrop of beneficial statute is seemly understood, the purposive import would be to condone the delay by applying the doctrine of striking of balance. As we perceive from the award, there is manifest error. Be it placed on record, the objections raised by Mr. Rakesh Jain, learned Counsel for the insurer may have due impact and assured validity in a case where a claimant with the efflux of time prefers and appeal because the amount awarded in praesenti is more, but so is not the case here. Hence we have no hesitation in repelling the aforesaid submission of Mr. Jain as far as the present case is concerned, as we are convinced that a demonstrable error should not have allowed to remain and a technical fetter should not be taken aid of by the insurance company to obliterate the issue of just compensation allowable to an unfortunate mother. Thus, the delay in filing the appeal stands condoned. ( 9. ) PRESENTLY we shall proceed to deal with the quantum of compensation. Mr. Sharad Gupta, learned Counsel for the appellants has fairly stated that he does not intend to assail the finding of the Tribunal with regard to the multiplicant and the dependency being accepted at Rs. Thus, the delay in filing the appeal stands condoned. ( 9. ) PRESENTLY we shall proceed to deal with the quantum of compensation. Mr. Sharad Gupta, learned Counsel for the appellants has fairly stated that he does not intend to assail the finding of the Tribunal with regard to the multiplicant and the dependency being accepted at Rs. 12,000/per month. The question that arises for consideration is what should have been the appropriate multiplier. ( 10. ) MR. Rakesh Jain, learned Senior Counsel for the insurer also does not desire to leave it in the arena of simple computation by enhancing the multiplier but on the contrary, would contend that mother was admittedly 46 years and, therefore, the application of multiplier of 10 is absolutely just and does not warrant to be interfered with by this Court. The learned Counsel has commended us to the decision rendered in the case of Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay v. Laxman Iyer and Anr. 2004 ACJ53 , AIR2003 SC 4182 , 2004 (1 )AWC176 (SC ), 2003 (3 )BLJR2325 , JT2003 (8 )SC 108 , 2004 (2 ) Mhlj668 , (2004 )1 MLJ82 (SC ), (2004 )136 PLR446 , 2003 (9 )SCALE2 , (2003 )8 SCC731 , 2004 (1 )UJ350 (SC ). Mr. Jain has drawn our attention to Paragraph Nos. 10 to 12 of the aforesaid decision. He has laid immense emphasis on Paragraph 12 which we reproduce: 12. Keeping in view the observations made by this Court in various cases, several other factors need to be taken note of. The deceased was unmarried. The contribution to the parents who had their separate earning being employed and educated has relevance. The possibility of reduction in contribution once a person gets married is a reality. The compensation is relatable to the loss of contribution or the pecuniary benefits. The multiplier adopted by the Tribunal and confirmed by the High Court is certainly on the higher side. Considering the age of the claimants, it can never exceed 10 even by the most liberal standards. Worked out on that basis the amount comes to Rs. 3. 6 lakhs at the monthly expected income fixed by the Tribunal and confirmed by the High Court. Considering the age of the claimants, it can never exceed 10 even by the most liberal standards. Worked out on that basis the amount comes to Rs. 3. 6 lakhs at the monthly expected income fixed by the Tribunal and confirmed by the High Court. Looking into the nature of the contributory negligence of the deceased after making an appropriate deduction which can reasonably be fixed at 25%, the compensation amount payable by the Corporation can be vised at rupees three lakhs including the amount awarded by the Tribunal and confirmed by the High Court for loss of expectation of life. Interest at the rate as awarded by the High Court is maintained from the date of application for compensation. ( 11. ) RELYING on the same it is urged by Mr. Jain that the multiplier cannot exceed 10. In this context, we may profitably refer to the decision rendered in the case of H. S. Ahammed Hussain and Anr. v. Irfan Ahammed and Anr. 2002 ACJ1559 , AIR2002 SC 2483 , 2002 (50 )BLJR1854 , [2002 ]111 Compcas747 (SC ), (2002 )2 GLR897 , JT2002 (5 )SC 118 , 2002 (5 )SCALE99 , (2002 )6 SCC52 , [2002 ]supp1 SCR78 , 2002 (2 )UJ991 (SC ). In the aforesaid case a two Judge Bench of the Apex Court in Para 6 has expressed the view as under: 6. Learned Counsel then submitted that under the Second Schedule to the Act providing compensation based on a formula, the multiplier which was applicable was 15 and not 13 as the age of the mother of the victim Vazeer was 45 years in which case the correct multiplier should have been 15 and not 13 whereas in the case of the victim Rafeeq, as the age of his mother being 40 years, the correct multiplier should have been 16 and not 14. On the other hand, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents submitted that compensation has been awarded in accordance with the Second Schedule. It is well settled that life expectancy of the deceased or the beneficiary, whichever is shorter, is an important factor. Reference in this connection may be made to the decision of this Court in the case of C. K Subramania Iyer v. T. Kunhikuttan Nair. In the case of National Insurance Co. It is well settled that life expectancy of the deceased or the beneficiary, whichever is shorter, is an important factor. Reference in this connection may be made to the decision of this Court in the case of C. K Subramania Iyer v. T. Kunhikuttan Nair. In the case of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Swaralata Das, it was observed that: (SCC P. 745, Para 8): The appropriate method of assessment of compensation is the method of capitalization of net income choosing a multiplier appropriate to the age of the deceased or the age of the defendants whichever multiplier is lower. According to the Second Schedule, if the age is above 40 years but not exceeding 45 years the multiplier applicable is 15 and if the age is above 35 years but not exceeding 40 years, the multiplier would be 16 but the High Court that taken the multiplier as 13 and 14 instead of 15 and 16 respectively. In the case of compensation to the parents of Vazeer, the multiplier 15 should have been adopted instead of 13 and the compensation should not have been reduced from Rs. 3,13,000 to Rs. 1,71,000 but the same should have been reduced to Rs. 1,95,000. In the case of compensation to the parents of Rafeeq, the correct multiplier should have been 16 and not 14 and the High Court was not justified in reducing the compensation from Rs. 3,49,000 to Rs. 1,83,000 which should have been reduced to Rs. 2,07,000. Thus, we hold that the parents of Vazeer are entitled to total compensation to the tune of Rs. 1,95,000 and that of Rafeeq to the tune of Rs. 2,07,000. ( 12. ) IN this regard we may also refer with profit to another two Judge Bench decision rendered in the case of Abati Bezbarurah v. Dy. Director General, Geological Survey of India and Anr. 2003 ACJ680 , AIR2003 SC 1817 , 2003 (51 )BLJR1004 , 2003 (1 )CTC570 , JT2003 (5 )SC 205 , 2003 (2 ) SCALE120 , (2003 )3 SCC148 , [2003 ]1 SCR1229 , 2003 (1 )UJ486 (SC ). In the aforesaid case in Paragraphs 11 to 14 Their Lordships ruled thus: 11. It is now a well-settled principle of law that the payment of compensation on the basis of structured formula as provided for under the Second Schedule should not ordinarily be deviated from. In the aforesaid case in Paragraphs 11 to 14 Their Lordships ruled thus: 11. It is now a well-settled principle of law that the payment of compensation on the basis of structured formula as provided for under the Second Schedule should not ordinarily be deviated from. Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act lays down the guidelines for determination of the amount of compensation in terms of Section 166 thereof. Deviation from the structured formula, however, as has been held by this Court, may be resorted to in exceptional case. Furthermore, the amount of compensation should be just and fair in the facts and circumstances of each case. 12. The victim as the relevant time was 40 years of age. The Tribunal and the High Court, therefore, cannot be said to have committed and error in applying the multiplier of 15. the only question which is required to be considered now is as to how the multiplicant be arrived at. 13. The deceases at the time of accident was a young man. He had a stable job. A reasonably liberal view of this future prospects should have, therefore been taken into consideration by the High Court as well as by the Tribunal. 14. Having regard to the prospects and advancement of the future career, a higher estimate of the yearly income at Rs. 45,000 would not be out of place. From the said amount, one-third of the gross income towards personal living expenses should be deducted. The amount of Rs. 30,000/- should thus be determined as the loss of dependency. The said sum should be capitalized by applying the multiplier of 15, which comes to Rs. 4,50,000. ( 13. ) AS is evincible from the aforesaid judgments the structured formula was laid emphasis upon. Their Lordships have taken into consideration certain factors while applying the structured formula. In the case of H. S, Ahammad Hussain (supra), it was held that age of the deceased or the beneficiary whichever is shorter is an important factor. In the case of Laxman Iyer (supra ). Their Lordships have taken note of the fact that parents were employed and educated. From the aforesaid facts, it is clear as day that while applying the structured formula certain relevant factors may be taken note of. In the case of Laxman Iyer (supra ). Their Lordships have taken note of the fact that parents were employed and educated. From the aforesaid facts, it is clear as day that while applying the structured formula certain relevant factors may be taken note of. We need not delve into the same as in the case at hand, it is not disputed before us that awardee, Smt. Prem Kumari Mishra, is a house wife, she was not employed and she has no resources. In view of the aforesaid, we are inclined to think that structured formula should be adhered to. There is no dispute with regard to age as a finding has been recorded by the Tribunal that she was 46 years at the time of the accident. If she was 46 at the time of the accident as per the Second Schedule to the Act, multiplier of 13 would be applicable. Thus, the compensation would come to Rs. 12,000/- x 13 : Rs. 1,56,000/ -. To the aforesaid sum, we shall add Rs. 4,500/- towards loss of estate and funeral expenses. Hence, total sum would come to Rs. 1,60,500/- (Rupees one lakh sixty thousand five hundred) only. To strike the balance it is directed that no interest shall be payable on the aforesaid sum, if it is deposited within a period of three months from the date of receipt of the order passed today. We have not allowed the interest as we have already indicated hereinbefore, we have applied the doctrine of striking of balance while condoning the delay in filing the appeal. No fault can be found with the insurer, therefore, it should not be saddled with the liability of interest. Accordingly, there is no grant of interest. But, if the amount is not deposited within the stipulated period, it shall carry interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of expiration of the time allowed. ( 14. ) CONSEQUENTLY, the appeal stands allowed. There shall be no order as to costs.