Judgment H.R. Panwar, J.-By the instant criminal revision under Section 397/401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, “the Code” hereinafter), the petitioners have challenged the order dated 30.04.2005 passed by the Additional Sessions Judge (Fast Track), Jalore (for short, “the trial Court” hereinafter) in Sessions Case No. 94/2004, whereby the trial Court framed charges against the petitioner for the offences under Sections 307, 326, 324, 323 and 341, IPC. Aggrieved by the order impugned the petitioners have filed the instant criminal revision. 2. I have heard learned Counsel for the petitioners and the Public Prosecutor for the State. Perused the order impugned. I have also gone through the challan papers, more particularly the statement of injured Hema Ram, as also his injury report. 3. It is contended by the learned Counsel for the petitioners that the offence under Section 307, IPC is not made out from the material placed on record as none of the injuries suffered by the injured are dangerous to life. It has been contended that no injury has been caused to injured which is capable of causing death and, therefore, according to the learned Counsel, the trial Court fell in error in framing the charge for the offence under Section 307, IPC against the petitioner. Learned Counsel further submits that though the injury on patella bone was found to be grievous in nature as it resulted in a fracture of patelia bone, but still none of the injuries was dangerous to life. 4. Learned Public Prosecutor supports the order impugned and contended that the intention of the author of the injury has to be seen at the time of framing the charge and not the result. 5. I have given my thoughtful consideration to the rival submissions made by the learned Counsel for the parties. 6. From the perusal of the statement of the injured, it appear that in order to cause his death, repeated injuries have been caused to the injured by the petitioners. As many as nine injuries, including incised wound, have been caused to injured Hema Ram by the petitioners. One of the injuries is on the right occipital region and one of the injuries, on being examined by the Radiologist, it was found grievous in nature. 7.
As many as nine injuries, including incised wound, have been caused to injured Hema Ram by the petitioners. One of the injuries is on the right occipital region and one of the injuries, on being examined by the Radiologist, it was found grievous in nature. 7. It is settled law that to constitute an offence under Section 307, IPC, it is not essential that bodily injury capable of causing death should have been inflicted. What is required is that there should be some overt act with such intention or knowledge and under such circumstances that if he by that act caused death, he would be guilty of murder. 8. In Girja Shankar vs. State of U.P., 2004 (2) JT 140 SC, the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that for constituting an offence under Section 307, IPC, it is not essential that bodily injury capable of causing death should have been inflicted. The Apex Court further held as under:- “It is not essential that bodily injury capable of causing death should have been inflicted. Although the nature of injury actually caused may often give considerable assistance in coming to a finding as to the intention of the accused, such intention may also be deduced from other circumstances, and may even, in some cases, be ascertained without any reference at all to actual wounds. The section makes a distinction between an act of the accused and its result, if any. Such an act may not be attended by any result so far as the person assaulted is concerned. It is not necessary that the injury actually caused to the victim of the assault should be sufficient under ordinary circumstances to cause the death of the person assaulted. What the Court has to see is whether the act, irrespective of its result, was done with the intention or knowledge and under circumstances mentioned in the section.” 9. In Sarju Prasad vs. State of Bihar, AIR 1965 SC 843 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the injury actually inflicted by the accused did not cut any vital organ of the victim, is not itself sufficient to take the act out of the purview of Section 307, IPC.
In Sarju Prasad vs. State of Bihar, AIR 1965 SC 843 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the injury actually inflicted by the accused did not cut any vital organ of the victim, is not itself sufficient to take the act out of the purview of Section 307, IPC. The same view has been reiterated by the Hon’ ble Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra vs. Balram Bama Patil & Ors., 1983 (2) SCC 28 , wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court held as under:- “It is sufficient to justify a conviction under Section 307 if there is present an intent coupled with some overt act in execution thereof . It is not essential that bodily injury capable of causing death should have been inflicted. Although the nature of injury actually caused may often give considerable assistance in coming to a finding as to the intention of the accused, such intention may also be deduced from other circumstances, and may even, in some cases, be ascertained without any reference at all to actual wounds. The section makes a distinction between the act of the accused and its result, if any. The Court has to see whether the act, irrespective of its result, was done with the intention or knowledge and under circumstances mentioned in the section. Therefore, it is not correct to acquit an accused of the charge under Section 307 merely because the injuries inflicted on the victim were in the nature of a simple hurt.” 10. In Bappa alias Bapu vs. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2004 SC 4119 , the Apex Court held that it is sufficient to justify a conviction under Section 307, IPC if there is present an intent couple with some overt act in execution thereof . It is not essential that bodily injury capable of causing death should have been inflicted. Although the nature of injury actually caused may often givens considerable assistance in coming to a finding as to the intention of the accused, such intention may also be deduced from other circumstances, and may even, in some cases, be ascertained without any reference at all to actual wounds. The section makes a distinction between the act of the accused and its result, if any. The Court has to see whether the act, irrespective of its result, was done with the intention or knowledge and under circumstances mentioned in the section.
The section makes a distinction between the act of the accused and its result, if any. The Court has to see whether the act, irrespective of its result, was done with the intention or knowledge and under circumstances mentioned in the section. An attempt in order to be criminal need not be the penultimate act. It is sufficient in law, if there is present an intent coupled with some overt act in execution thereof . 11 Same view has been reiterated by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Vasant Vithu Jadhav vs. State of Maharashtra, 2004 (9) SCC 31 ; and R. Prakash vs. State of Karnataka, 2004 (9) SCC 2; 12. Thus, in view of the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, for constituting an offence under Section 307, IPC, it is not essential that bodily injury capable of causing death should have been inflicted and it is sufficient to justify a conviction under Section 307, IPC if there is present an intent coupled with some overt act in execution thereon. 13. In the instant case, there are repetition of injuries by the petitioners on the occipital region of scalp, right eye brow, left knee, right throat lumber region, right scapular throat region, right throacic region and both the thighs. Therefore, it cannot be said at this stage that the petitioners had no intention or knowledge that by their act if death of the injured is caused, he will be guilty of murder. In these circumstances, keeping in view the catena of decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court referred here-in-above, in my view, the trial Court was justified in framing charges against the petitioners for the offences under Section 307, IPC apart from other offences. However, it is made clear that the observations made here-in-above are prima facie and shall not be relevant so far as merit of the case is concerned. 14. Consequently, I do not find any merit in the revision and it is dismissed accordingly. Ad interim stay order dated 19.05.2005 is vacated and stay petition stands dismissed.