JUDGMENT I.A. Ansari, J. 1. By the impugned judgment and order, dated 27.07.98, passed, in Special Case No. 05/96, the accused-Appellants stand convicted under Sections 7(1)(a)(ii) of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955, (in short, 'the EC Act') for violation of the provisions of Clause 3 of the Assam Trade Articles (Licensing and Control) Order, 1982 (in short, the order of 1982) and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for three years and to pay a fine of Rs. 5,000/- each and in default of payment of fine to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a further period of six months. 2. The case of the prosecution, as unfolded at the trial, may, in brief, be stated as follows: PW1, who is an Inspector of the Food and Civil Supplies, Govt. of Assam, accompanied by PW2, a Deputy Superintendent of Police, engaged in economic offences, visited the business premises of M/s. Laxmi Agencies, situated at Pandu Borbazar and they found there 45 quintals of Tata iodised salt stored for sale. On demand, the accused-Appellant No. 2, Anil Kumar Jain, Manager of the said business concern, who was present there at the time of the said visit, failed to produce any licence for storing and selling of the salt. PW1, then, seized the said salt by Seizure List (Exhibit 3) in the presence of PW2 and another independent witness, namely, PW3 and gave, vide zimmanama (Exhibit 2), the said seized salt into the custody of the accused-Appellant No. 2. PW1 also recorded the statement, in writing, (Exhibit 4) of the accused Appellant No. 2. The contents of the display board, which was displayed at the said business premises with regard to the stored articles for sale there, were extracted on a price of paper, the contents, so extracted, being reflected by Exhibit 5. Thereafter, on obtaining sanction for prosecution (Exhibit 3), PW 1 submitted the offence report (Exhibit 6) against the accused-Appellants, the accused-Appellant No. 1 being the proprietor of M/s. Laxmi Agencies aforementioned. 3. During trial, which was summary in nature, when the learned Court below explained to the accused-Appellant the particulars of offence alleged to have been committed by them, the accused-Appellants pleaded not guilty thereto. 4. In support of their case, prosecution examined all the three witnesses aforementioned. 3. During trial, which was summary in nature, when the learned Court below explained to the accused-Appellant the particulars of offence alleged to have been committed by them, the accused-Appellants pleaded not guilty thereto. 4. In support of their case, prosecution examined all the three witnesses aforementioned. The accused-Appellants were, then, examined under Section 313 Code of Criminal Procedure and in their examination aforementioned, the accused-Appellant No. 1 admitted that he was the proprietor of the said business concern; both the accused-Appellants also admitted the seizure of the said salt from their business premises, but they denied that they had stored the salt for sale without licence. It was also the case of the accused-appellants that the statement of the accused-Appellant No. 2, as reflected from Ext.4, was obtained by PW 1 under threat. In substance, the accused-Appellants denied that they had committed the offence alleged to have been committed by them, the case of the defence being that the said salt was stored for sale with licence. On finding the accused-Appellants guilty, the learned trial Court convicted the accused-Appellants accordingly and passed sentence against them as mentioned hereinabove. Aggrieved by their conviction and the sentence passed against them, the accused-Appellants have preferred the present appeal. 5. I have heard Mr. G.N. Sahewalla, learned Senior Counsel, for the Appellants and Mr. B. Sinha, learned Additional Public Prosecutor, for the Respondents. 6. Because of the nature of the evidence on record, Mr. Sahewalla, learned Senior Counsel, appearing on behalf of the accused-Appellants, has not seriously disputed the fact that the evidence on record proves that the accused-Appellants were found to have stored 45 quintals of iodised salt for sale without licence. What Mr. Sahewalla has submitted is that the two accused-Appellants are victims of circumstances inasmuch as they had already applied for requisite licence, but before the licence was received, they had already stored the salt so as to sell the same as soon as licence is received by them. In the case at hand, according to Mr. Sahewalla, there was no mens rea involved in the acts of the accused-Appellants and, hence, despite having stored the salt, the accused-Appellants had not, contends Mr. Sahewalla, committed any offence. It is also submitted by Mr. In the case at hand, according to Mr. Sahewalla, there was no mens rea involved in the acts of the accused-Appellants and, hence, despite having stored the salt, the accused-Appellants had not, contends Mr. Sahewalla, committed any offence. It is also submitted by Mr. Sahewalla that mens rea is an essential ingredient of the offence under Section 7 of the EC Act in order to establish a charge under Section 7 of the EC Act, prosecution must adduce adequate evidence to show the presence of mens rea in the act of storing of an article of trade by an accused. In support of this contention that mens rea is an essential ingredient of an offence under Section 7 of the EC Act, Mr. Sahewalla has placed reliance on State of Assam v. Monglunia and Co. and Ors., reported in (1991)1 GLR 444. It is further submitted by Mr. Sahewalla that the sentence passed against the accused-appellants is too harsh and that in the facts and circumstances of the present case, the accused-Appellants ought to have been, contends Mr. Sahewalla, given the benefit of the provisions of Probation of Offenders Act, 1958. 7. Resisting the submissions made on behalf of the accused-Appellants, Mr. B. Sinha, learned Additional Public Prosecutor, has submitted that there was ample evidence on record to show that the accused-Appellants had, knowing full well that the storage of salt for sale without licence was an offence, stored the same for sale. In fact, according to the evidence on record, submits learned Additional Public Prosecutor, the accused-Appellants had been selling salt without obtaining licence. Merely because of the fact that a licence had been applied for, the accused-Appellants, contends the learned Addl. Public Prosecutor, could not have gone ahead with the sale of salt and since they had knowingly violated the provisions of the Order of 1982, they had requisite mens rea and were rightly convicted by the learned trial Court. In the facts and circumstances of the present case, submits learned Addl. Public Prosecutor, the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, was rightly not extended to the accused-Appellants by the learned trial Court. 8. Before entering into the correctness or otherwise of the rival submission made before me, let me point out the penal provisions, which are relevant to the facts of the present case. Public Prosecutor, the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, was rightly not extended to the accused-Appellants by the learned trial Court. 8. Before entering into the correctness or otherwise of the rival submission made before me, let me point out the penal provisions, which are relevant to the facts of the present case. For this purpose, let me, now, refer to Clause 3 of the Order of 1982. The relevant provisions of the Order of 1982 read as follows: 3. Licensing of dealers, (1) No dealer shall, after the commencement of this Order, carry on business of purchase, sale or storage for sale of any of the trade articles mentioned in Schedule 1 except under and in accordance with the terms and conditions of a licence issued in this behalf by the Licensing Authority under the provisions of this Order. * * * (2) For the purpose of this clause, any person, firm, association of persons or a co-operative society, who stores any trade article at any one time in quantities exceeding the limits prescribed in Sub-clause (1) shall, unless the contrary is proved by him, be deemed to be carrying on business as dealer and to store the same for the purpose of sale. 9. From a careful reading of what is contained in Sub-clause (1) of Clause 3, what becomes transparent is that no dealer shall carry on business of purchase, sale or storage for sale of any of the trade articles mentioned in Schedule 1 except under and in accordance with the terms and conditions of the licence issued to him by the Licensing Authority under the provisions of the Order of 1982. Sub-clause (2) of Clause 3 makes it also clear that if any person is found to have stored any trade article in quantities exceeding the limits prescribed by Sub-clause (1) of Clause 3, he shall be, ordinarily, deemed to carry on business as a dealer and to have stored the trade article, in question, for the purpose of sale unless the person concerned proves to the contrary. 10. In the light of what has been pointed out above, when one comes to the Schedules of the Order of 1982, what becomes glaringly noticeable is that a person, without having licence, can store salt upto the maximum limit of 3.75 quintals. 10. In the light of what has been pointed out above, when one comes to the Schedules of the Order of 1982, what becomes glaringly noticeable is that a person, without having licence, can store salt upto the maximum limit of 3.75 quintals. As a corollary thereto, it also becomes transparent that if a person is found to have stored salt exceeding 3.75 quintals, he shall be deemed to be a dealer in salt and he shall also be deemed to have stored the salt for the purpose of sale unless the contrary is proved by him. In short, thus, when a person is found to have stored 45 quintals of salt, he shall, unless the contrary is proved by him, be deemed to have been carrying business as a dealer of salt and shall also be deemed to have stored the salt, so found stored, for the purpose of sale. 11. In the backdrop of the positions of law as discussed above, let me, now, turn to the factual matrix of the present case. While considering the evidence on record, what attracts the eyes, most prominently, is that the fact that the accused-Appellants were found to have stored 45 quintals of salt was not disputed at the trial. Since the quantity of salt, so stored, was in excess of the permissible limit of 3.75 quintals, as indicated hereinabove, it is clear that unless the contrary was proved by the accused-Appellants, they could have been safely deemed to have been dealer of salt and they could have also been deemed to have stored the salt, in question, for the purpose of sale. This apart and curiously enough, the accused-Appellants did not really deny, at the trial, that they had kept the salt, in question, for sale. What they asserted was that their storage of salt for sale was not without any licence therefor. However, towards the end of the trial, it was submitted, on behalf of the accused-Appellants, that the accused-Appellants had applied for requisite licence, but the licence had not, till then, been, admittedly, granted to them. In fact, at the time of hearing of this appeal also, it has not been denied that the accused-Appellants were found to have stored for sale 45 quintals of salt. In fact, at the time of hearing of this appeal also, it has not been denied that the accused-Appellants were found to have stored for sale 45 quintals of salt. What is really contended, on behalf of the accused-Appellants, is that since they had already applied for licence, they had no mens rea and the offence was technical in nature and that in the absence of mens rea, the accused-Appellant could not have been held guilty of the offence under Section 7of the EC Act. 12. While considering the above aspect of the case, what may be noted is that the decision of the Division Bench, in Monglunia and Co. (supra), is, primarily, based on the Apex Court's decision in NathUlal v. State of Madhya Pradesh ( AIR 1966 SC 43 ), wherein the Apex Court has held to the effect that mens rea was an essential ingredient of an offence under Section 7of the EC Act. Whether the law laid down in Nathulal (supra) still governs the field, in its entirety, is a question, which calls for a microscopic and careful analysis of the subsequent changes, which Section 7 of the EC Act has undergone and the subsequent pronouncements of the Apex Court in this regard. 13. For the above purpose, it needs to be noted that Section 7 of the EC Act, originally, read (as the same reads now) thus, "7. Penalties-(1) If any person contravenes any order made under Section 3,... " While interpreting, in Nathulal (supra), Section 7 of the EC Act, as it stood then, the Apex Court held that an offence under Section 7 would be committed only if a person intentionally contravened any Order made under Section 3 of the EC Act as mens rea was an essential ingredient of the criminal offence referred to in Section 7. The language of Section 7, which had resulted into the decision in Nathulal (supra), was changed by promulgating the Ordinance 6 of 1967, which was subsequently replaced by the Act 36 of 1967. With the amendment, so introduced, Sub-section (1) of Section 7, read thus, "If any person contravenes, whether knowingly, intentionally or otherwise, any Order as made under Section 3". With the amendment, so introduced, Sub-section (1) of Section 7, read thus, "If any person contravenes, whether knowingly, intentionally or otherwise, any Order as made under Section 3". The effect of introduction of the words "whether knowingly, intentionally or otherwise", occurring between the word "contravenes" and the words "any Order made under Section 3", was that existence of mens rea became immaterial for attracting an offence under Section 7. In other words, with the amendment, made by the Act 36 of 1967, the legislative intent expressed was irrespective of the fact whether culpable mental state existed, on the part of an accused, or not, he would be held to have committed an offence under Section 7 if he had contravened any Order made under Section 3. 14. What is, now, interesting, to note is that following the recommendations of the Law Commission, in their 47th report, Section 7 of the EC Act was amended, whereby the words "whether knowingly, intentionally or otherwise", which were introduced by Amending Act 36 of 1967, were deleted and while restoring the material part of Section 7(1) to its original form, a new provision in the form of Section 10 was added to the EC Act. This Section [i.e. Section 10(C)] reads as under: 10. C (1) In any prosecution for any offence under this Act which requires a culpable mental state on the part of the accused, the Court shall presume the existence of such mental state but it shall be a defence for the accused to prove the fact that he had no such mental state with respect to the act charged as an offence in that prosecution. Explanation: In this Section, "culpable mental state" includes intention, motive, knowledge of a fact and the belief in, or reason to believe, a fact. (2) For the purposes of this Section, a fact is said to be proved only when the Court believes it to exist beyond reasonable doubt and not merely when its existence is established by a preponderance of probability. 15. The changes introduced into Section 7 by the amendment Act 30 of 1974 as well as the contents of Section IOC have remained unchanged till now. 15. The changes introduced into Section 7 by the amendment Act 30 of 1974 as well as the contents of Section IOC have remained unchanged till now. The effect of these changes is that when an accused is found to have contravened the provisions of any order made under Section 3, a presumption of guilty mind, on the part of the accused in respect of offence under the EC Act, including Section 7, would arise; but it would be open to the accused to rebut the same by proving that he had no culpable mind, while contravening the provisions of the order and committing the alleged offence. Thus, in any prosecution under the EC Act, which requires a culpable mental state of mind on the part of the accused, the same must, as the law now stands, be presumed to have been existing unless the accused proves that he had no such mental state with respect to the offence for which he is tried. What is also extremely important to note is that according to the Explanation to Section 10(C), culpable mental state includes intention, motive, knowledge of a fact and belief in or reason to believe a fact. The degree of proof expected to rebut the presumption has been indicated by Sub-section (2) thereof, which states that a fact will be said to be proved only if it exists beyond reasonable doubt and it will not be sufficient to prove its existence by preponderance of probability. Thus, if an accused has to rebut the statutory presumption, which arises under the EC Act, the burden of proof is very heavy on the accused and the degree of proof shall be same as is required for proving existence of a fact by the prosecution. There can, therefore, be no doubt that the legislative changes, discussed hereinbefore, have materially affected the thrust of the decision of the Apex Court in Nathu Lal's case (supra). 16. Noticing the above changes, which have been introduced by the Act 30 of 1974, the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in Swastik Oil Industries v. State of Madhya Pradesh, reported in (1978) 19 Guj. 16. Noticing the above changes, which have been introduced by the Act 30 of 1974, the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in Swastik Oil Industries v. State of Madhya Pradesh, reported in (1978) 19 Guj. LR 1117, held: But again in the year 1974, pursuant to the recommendations of the Law Commission in their 47th Report and the experience gained in the working of the Act, by an Ordinance, Section 7 of the Act was amended whereby the words "whether knowingly, intentionally or otherwise" which were introduced by Amending Act 36 of 1967 were deleted and the material part of Section 7(1) restored to its original frame and a new provision in Section 10 of the Act was added which reads as under: 10. C (1) In any prosecution for any offence under this Act which requires a culpable mental state on the part of the accused, the Court shall presume the existence of such mental state but it shall be a defence for the accused to prove the fact that he had no such mental state with respect to the act charged as an offence in that prosecution. Explanation: In this Section, "Culpable mental state" includes intention, motive, knowledge of a fact and the belief in, or reason to believe, a fact. (2) For the purpose of this Section, a fact is said to be proved only when the Court believes it to exist beyond reasonable doubt and not merely when its existence is established by a preponderance of probability. This Ordinance was replaced by Amending Act 30 of 1974. The effect of this subsequent change in the statute is that a presumption of guilty mind on the part of the accused in respect of offences under the Act, including Section 7, would arise and it would be open to the accused to rebut the same. As the law now stands in any prosecution under the Act which requires a culpable mental state on the part of the accused, the same must be presumed unless the accused proves that he had no such mental state with respect to the offence for which he is tried. Now according to the explanation to Section 10(C) culpable mental state includes intention, motive, knowledge of a fact and belief in or reason to believe a fact. Now according to the explanation to Section 10(C) culpable mental state includes intention, motive, knowledge of a fact and belief in or reason to believe a fact. The degree of proof expected to rebut the presumption has been indicated by Sub-section (2) thereof which says that a fact will be said to be proved only if it exists beyond reasonable doubt and it will not be sufficient to prove its existence by preponderance of probability. Thus the burden of proof lies heavily on the accused to rebut the statutory presumption and the degree of proof expected that is required for the proof of a fact by the prosecution. There can therefore be no doubt that the aforesaid legislative changes have reversed the thrust of the decision of the Supreme Court in Nathu Lal's case, AIR 1966 SC 43 (supra) and the same no longer holds the field. 17. The Apex Court, it may be noted, in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Narayan Singh and Ors. AIR 1989 SC 1789 has expressed its complete agreement with the enunciation of the position of law, as regards Section 7 of the EC Act, in Swastik Oil Industries (supra). 18. In substance, therefore, with the pronouncement of the decision in Narayan Singh (supra), the law with regard to Section 7 is that when an accused is proved to have contravened the provisions of any Order made under Section 3 of the EC Act, he would be presumed to have culpable mental state, while contravening such provisions. However, the accused would remain free to prove that he had no such mental state with respect to the offence for which he has been tried. In short, thus, while mens rea is, indeed, an essential ingredient of an offence under Section 7 of the EC Act, the fact remains that when an accused is proved to have contravened the provisions of any Order made under Section 3, such as, Order of 1982 (as is the case at hand), he must be presumed to have so contravened the provisions of the Order with requisite culpable mental state or mens rea unless the accused discharges this statutory presumption by proving, beyond reasonable doubt and not by mere preponderance of probability, that there was no culpable mental state or mens rea on his part, when he had contravened the provisions of the Order, in question. It is in this light, now, that the decision in Monglunia and Co. (supra) needs to be read. What may also be pointed out is that though Narayan Singh (supra) was decided, on 25.07.89, this decision was not, unfortunately, brought to the notice of the Division Bench in Monglunia and Co. (supra). While reading, therefore, the decision in Monglunia and Co. (supra), the position of law pronounced in Narayan Singh (supra) needs to be borne in mind. 19. In the backdrop of what has been pointed out above, when I revert to the evidence on record, I find that the evidence of PW1 and PW2 is to the effect that they had visited the business premises of the accused-Appellant No. 1, where the accused-Appellant No. 2 was found working as a manager, and, in the process of inspection carried out there by PW1 and PW2, they (P Ws 1 and 2) found there 45 quintals of salt kept stored for sale. The evidence, so given, has remained unshaken. 20. Coupled with the above, it is also not in dispute that the evidence on record clearly reveals that the accused-Appellants had kept displayed, at the display board, at their business premises, to the effect that they had kept stored 45 quintals of salt as an item of trade article for sale. When the clear evidence was, thus, available on record that the accused-Appellants had kept stored the said 45 quintals of salt as an item of trade article for sale at their business premises, the learned trial Court need not, and correctly did not, enter into the question of drawing presumption against the accused-Appellants as dealer. When there was direct evidence on record convincingly proving that the said 45 quintals of salt had been kept stored for sale and accordingly displayed at the display board at the said shop, the learned trial Court was wholly correct in holding that the accused-Appellants had kept the salt stored for sale. This impression gets further strengthened from the fact that the cash-memo books, exhibiting various transactions of sale of salt carried out by the accused-Appellants, on different dates, were, admittedly, seized by Ext. 1. In fact, the cash memo books leave no room for doubt that the accused-Appellants had been, indeed, selling salt from the said business premises. This impression gets further strengthened from the fact that the cash-memo books, exhibiting various transactions of sale of salt carried out by the accused-Appellants, on different dates, were, admittedly, seized by Ext. 1. In fact, the cash memo books leave no room for doubt that the accused-Appellants had been, indeed, selling salt from the said business premises. Thus, the oral evidence on record coupled with the contents of the display board and also the seizure of the cash memo books were more than adequate to hold that the accused-Appellants were dealers of salt and had kept 45 quintals of salt stored for sale. 21. The learned trial Court has placed reliance on the statement of the accused- Appellant No. 2 recorded by PW1 and proved as Ext. 4, wherein the accused-appellant No. 2 has admitted that they had applied for licence, but they had not been granted the licence till then and yet they had been selling the salt to the retailers of West Guwahati area. What needs to be carefully noted, now, is that even if the contents of Ext.4 were kept excluded from the purview of consideration and not taken note of, the remaining evidence on record, as already discussed above, independent of what Ext. 4 contains, convincingly prove beyond all reasonable doubt that the accused-Appellants were dealers of salt and had kept, if I may reiterate, the said salt stored for sale. 22. When the accused-Appellants were fully aware of the fact that it was impermissible under the law to either sell salt or store for sale salt without licence and yet they had been selling salt with impunity and had, unabashedly and without any respect for the law, kept stored the said salt for sale, it is impossible to hold that there was no mens rea, on the part of the accused-Appellants, when they had stored for sale the said seized salt. 23. 23. Coupled with the above, it is also imperative to note that apart from the fact that the accused-Appellants, as already indicated hereinabove, have been proved, beyond all reasonable doubt, to have committed the offence under Section 7 of the EC Act, the fact remains that when the accused-Appellants have been found to have been selling, and had kept stored for sale, iodized salt, in question, without any licence, the necessary culpable mental state shall be presumed to have been existing with them and it was for the accused-Appellants to discharge this statutory presumption by convincingly proving that their act of storage of iodized salt for sale or sale thereof were without mens rea. In this regard, suffice it to mention here that the accused-Appellants have adduced no evidence and nothing exists on record to rule out the existence of mens rea in the accused-Appellants' act of storage of iodized f air or sale thereof. In such circumstances, in the light of the law laid down in Narayan Singh (supra), the accused-Appellants could not have but been held guilty of the offence under Section 7(1)(a)(ii) of the EC Act. 24. Because of what have been discussed and pointed out above, I find no infirmity in the conviction of the accused-Appellants. However, the question, which still remains to be answered is as to whether the present Appellants could have been or ought to have been given the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958? 25. While considering the above aspect of the matter, what needs to be, first, determined is as to whether the provisions of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, are available to a person found guilty of an offence under Section 7 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955, when Section 7 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955, prescribes minimum sentence of imprisonment for commission of such an offence. 26. While considering the question of sentence in the present appeal, what needs to be carefully noted is that though the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, prescribes minimum period of imprisonment for an offence committed under the said Act, yet in Isher Das v. State of Punjab AIR 1972 SC 1259 the Apex Court held that to a person convicted under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, the provisions of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, were applicable. The reasons for the conclusion so reached by the Apex Court, in Isher Das (supra), were, in brief, thus: Both Prevention of Corruption Act as well as Prevention of Food Adulteration Act prescribes minimum period of sentence of imprisonment for the offenders under the said two penal enactments. However, while the Probation of Offenders Act specifically mentioned that it would not be applicable to an offender under the Prevention of Corruption Act, no such bar was imposed with regard to an offender under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act. Since the Probation of Offenders Act was enacted in the year 1958 and was subsequent to the enactment of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 and yet the provisions of the Probation of Offenders Act had not been made inapplicable by the legislature to an offender under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, the legislative intent could not have been to exclude the provisions of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 from the ambit and applicability of the Probation of offenders Act, 1958. To put it differently, what the Apex Court laid down, in Isher Das (supra), was that had the legislative intent been not to make available the benefits of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, to an offender under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, it would have barred the application of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, to an offender under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, in the same manner as the legislature had done in connection with the Prevention of Corruption Act by specifically providing that the provisions of Probation of Offenders Act shall not apply to the Prevention of Corruption Act. 27. From what have been pointed out above, it is clear that unless the legislative intent is expressed by debarring application of the benevolent reformative provisions contained in the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, to an offender under the Essential Commodities Act, 1955, the provisions of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, would be available to an offender under the Essential Commodities Act, 1955. 28. 28. Following the decision in Isher Das (supra), it was observed by the Apex Court, in P.K. Tejani v. M.R. Dange AIR 1974 SC 228 that the decision in Isher Das (supra) is an authority for the proposition that rehabilitatory purpose of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, is pervasive enough to technically take under its wings an offence punishable under Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954. 29. Subsequent to the decision in P.K. Tejani (supra), Section 20AA was inserted in the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, by way of Section 18 of the Act 34 of 1976, declaring thereby that offenders, under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, are no longer covered by the provisions of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958. 30. What emerges from the above discussion is that notwithstanding the fact that an offender, under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, was liable to minimum prescribed period of imprisonment, the law in this country, in the light of the authorities cited above, was that the provisions of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, were available to such an offender and it was only after the amendments were made, in the year 1976, by bringing in Section 20AA in the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, that an offender, under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, has been taken out of the purview of the Probation of Offenders Act. To put it differently, had the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, not made specific provisions debarring application of the provisions of the Probation of Offenders Act to an offender under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, the provisions of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, would have remained applicable to such an offender, notwithstanding the fact that he was, otherwise, liable to undergo minimum prescribed period of imprisonment. 31. It logically follows, in the light of the authorities discussed above, though Section 7 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1954, prescribes minimum period of imprisonment, the provisions of Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, would be available to an offender under the Essential Commodities Act, 1955. The question as to whether the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, can be extended or not to an offender under the Essential Commodities Act, 1955, would, however, depend on the facts of the given case. 32. The question as to whether the benefit of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958, can be extended or not to an offender under the Essential Commodities Act, 1955, would, however, depend on the facts of the given case. 32. In the case at hand, when the accused-Appellants were conscious of the fact that their acts of selling salt without licence and/or storage of salt without licence was an offence and yet they had indulged freely in the act of storing of salt for sale by merely making an application for licence, the accused-Appellants cannot said to have committed only technically an offence. Their acts aforementioned were wholly in contravention of the law and the accused-Appellants were conscious of the violation, which they had been committing. In such circumstances, the very purpose of prescribing minimum period of imprisonment under the Essential Commodities Act, 1955, would stand defeated if persons, such as the accused-Appellants, are accorded the benefit of the provisions of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958. 33. Having held that the conviction of the accused-Appellants under Section 7(l)(a)(ii) of the EC Act is well-founded and having also held that in a case of present nature, the accused-Appellants cannot be accorded the benefit of the provisions of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958,1 am, now, required to determine if the sentence passed against the accused-Appellants needs any modification. 34. While considering the above question, what deserves to be noted is that an offence under Section 7(l)(a)(ii) of the EC Act is punishable with imprisonment for a term, which shall not be less than three months, but may extend to seven years and shall also be liable to fine. However, the proviso to Section 7(1)(a) makes it clear that for adequate and special reasons to be mentioned in the judgment, the Court may impose a sentence of imprisonment for a term of less than three months. When the provisions of Section 7 are read as a whole, it clearly transpires that ordinarily, the sentence for an offence under Section 7(1)(a)(ii) shall not be less than three months and the same may extend to seven years with fine; but the Court does have the power to sentence a person, for adequate and special reasons to be mentioned in the judgment, to a term of less than three months. 35. 35. Thus, while it is possible for the Court to sentence a person, found guilty of an offence under Section 7(l)(a)(ii), with imprisonment as much as seven years and as little as three months, the passing of the sentence is not an arbitrary or routine exercise of power, but must be a well-thought one. Though for awarding a sentence of more than three months, no reasons are required to be assigned, the fact remains that for imposition of sentence of more than three months, there must be some reasons discernible from the materials on record or else, there would be no impediment, on the part of a Court, to impose sentence of imprisonment of seven years in each and every case punishable under Section 7(1)(a)(ii). 36. Bearing in mind what have indicated above, when I turn to the case at hand, what attracts the eyes is that the learned trial Court has sentenced the accused-appellants to imprisonment for a period, which is as long as three years. For imposing such a sentence, however, no reason is discernible from the materials on record. The present one is a case in which the accused-Appellants indulged in sale and storage of salt for sale without requisite licence having been issued to them in this regard. We have to bear in mind that a distinction exists between a case, wherein a person, having the knowledge that licence is required, does not even apply for licence and freely indulges in the sale of an essential commodity and a person, who applies for such a licence, but before the licence is granted, indulges in the sale of an essential commodity or stores for sale an essential commodity. The two cases cannot be treated at one and the same footing; Viewed from this angle, the case of the accused-Appellants ought to have been dealt with leniently and, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, the accused-Appellants ought not to have been sentenced to imprisonment for a period of more than one year. 37. Considering, therefore, the matter in its entirely, I am of the view that in the case at hand, the ends of justice would be met if the accused-Appellants are sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for one year and pay a fine of Rs. 1,000/- and, in default of payment of fine, to suffer further imprisonment for a period of one month. 38. 1,000/- and, in default of payment of fine, to suffer further imprisonment for a period of one month. 38. What crystallizes from the above discussion is that the conviction of the accused-Appellants cannot be interfered with, but the sentence passed against them needs modification as indicated hereinabove. 39. In the result and for the reasons discussed above, this appeal partly succeeds. While conviction of the accused-Appellants is not interfered with, each of the two accused-Appellants is sentenced to suffer simple imprisonment for a period of one year and pay fine of Rs. 1,000/- and, in default of payment of fine, suffer simple imprisonment for a period of one month. 40. With the above observations and directions modifying the sentence passed against the accused-Appellants, this appeal shall stand disposed of. 41. Let the LCRs be sent back.