TAPAN MUKHERJEE, J. ( 1 ) THIS appeal at the instance of the writ petitioners is directed against the judgment and order passed by learned Single Judge on 21. 03. 01 in C. O. No. 12759 (W) of 1991. ( 2 ) THE case of the writ petitioners is that they were engaged as casual employees and selected for the post of Durwan/messenger under the appellant and served several departments of the appellants from the year 1983 to 1987. The Director (E), Ministry of Personnel and Training and Pension (Department of Personnel and Training), Government of India, issued office memorandum to the effect that services of those casual workers may be regularised in group-D post, in various Ministries/departments, etc. , who were recruited through the Employment Exchange as well as those who worked for a number of years. The petitioners fulfilled the conditions of the said order and they were entitled to be regularised in their respective posts. But, the respective department officers gave verbal orders to the petitioners for not resuming their duties. Though they were treated as casual workers by the authorities, they were given incentive, bonus like regular and permanent employees. They were suddenly disengaged from their respective job by the different department officers under DGM (F and A), Central Marketing Organization, sail and the said officer issued order on 16. 12. 86 to all Departmental Chief-in-Officers that casual basis or daily rated basis persons would have no engagement but they may be engaged from 1st january, 1997 only with prior permission of D (C ). The management was recruiting persons from outside on daily rated basis though the writ petitioners were declared the surplus. As there was an order dated 16. 12. 86 for disengagement of the petitioners, so the petitioners moved the Court in writ jurisdiction challenging the said order and for restraining the appellant from filling up the post of Durwan/messenger in the SAIL by any other person or persons other than the writ petitioners and the writ petitioners succeeded. As there was an order dated 16. 12. 86 for disengagement of the petitioners, so the petitioners moved the Court in writ jurisdiction challenging the said order and for restraining the appellant from filling up the post of Durwan/messenger in the SAIL by any other person or persons other than the writ petitioners and the writ petitioners succeeded. ( 3 ) LEARNED Single Judge disposed of the writ petition with a direction upon the authority concerned to formulated a scheme according to the then prevailing statutory rules for the purpose of absorbing the petitioners and in the light of the judgment and order passed by this Court but not on the basis of present rule, if any, within a period of six months from the communication of the order. The petitioners were found to be entitled to payment for the number of days they had worked at the similar rate to the regular employees who have worked for the whole month till the date of their purported engagement. There was direction for payment of arrear. ( 4 ) BEING aggrieved with the said judgment of the learned Single Judge, the respondent No. 1 in the writ petition preferred this appeal. During hearing learned Lawyer for the appellant contended that the writ petitioners being casual labourers, had no right to claim absorption on regular basis or regularisation in service. Learned Lawyer relying on a very recent decision of the Hon'ble Apex court reported in 2006 (4) SCC at page 1 contended that absorption, regularisation or permanent continuance of temporary, contractual, casual, daily waged on ad hoc employees appointed/recruited and continued for long in public employment is against the constitutional scheme of public employment and no such direction for absorption or regularisation of the casual employee can be passed by the Court. ( 5 ) IT appears that the learned Single Judge had observed that when the names were called upon from the Employment Exchange for the purpose of filling up the vacancies on the basis of prevailing Statutory Rules which were followed for the same excepting the regularisation of service and when a scheme was formulated by the order of the Division Bench of this Court for the purpose of regularisation in respect of services and when such scheme was prepared and services were regularised in case of others, the petitioner's case would have to be considered by following the latest observations of the Hon'ble Apex court reported in AIR 1998 SC 1477 :1988 (9) SCC 78 where it was held that the persons who were working as casually or temporarily, they deserved sympathy for consideration even if they would not claim regularisation as a matter of course. This was considered as an equitable Justice since such incumbents were not guilty of fraud or sharp practice and they did not lack any requisite qualification. The case of the petitioner also considered along with others by waiving the age bar, if necessary, learned Single Judge also referred another case reported in AIR 1999 SC 1160 which is related to a contract labour that, the equality clause in the Constitution does not speak of mere formal equality before the law but embodies the concept of real and substantive equality which strikes at the inequalities on account of vast social and economic differentiation and is thus consequently an essential ingredient of social and economic Justice. The security clause in the Constitution has been equated to mean that the people of the country ought to be secured of socio-economic Justice by way of fusion of Fundamental Rights to Directive Principles of State Policy. Socialism ought not to be treated as a mere concept of an ideal but the same ought to be practised in every sphere of life and be treated by the Law Courts as constitutional mandates since the Law Courts exist for the society and required to act as a guardian angel of the society. As a matter, of fact, the socialistic concept of society is very well laid in Part-IIl and Part-IV of the Constitution and the constitution being supreme, it is a bounden duty of the Law Courts to shape and offer reality to such a concept. As a matter, of fact, the socialistic concept of society is very well laid in Part-IIl and Part-IV of the Constitution and the constitution being supreme, it is a bounden duty of the Law Courts to shape and offer reality to such a concept. ( 6 ) IT has been held in the case referred by the learned Lawyer for the appellant, reported in 2006 (4) SCC at page 1 that, merely because a temporary employee or a casual wage worker is continued for a time beyond the term of his appointment, he would not be entitled to be absorbed in regular service or made permanent, merely on the strength of such continuance, if the original appointment was not made by following a due process of selection as envisaged by the relevant rules. It is not open to the Court to prevent regular recruitment at the instance of temporary employees whose period of employment has come to an end or of ad hoc employees who by the very nature of their appointment, do not acquire any right. It is not as if the person who accepts an engagement either temporary or casual in nature, is not aware of the nature of his employment. He accepts the employment with open eyes. It may be true that he is not in a position to bargain-not at arm's length-since he might have been searching for some employment so as to eke out his livelihood and accepts whatever he gets. But on that ground alone it would not be appropriate to jettison the constitutional scheme of appointment, perpetuate illegalities and to take the view that a person who has temporarily or casually got employed should be directed to be continued permanently. By doing so it will be creating another mode of public appointment which is not permissible. If the Court were to void a contractual employment of this nature on the ground that the parties were not having equal bargaining power, that too would not enable the Court to grant any relief to that employee. A total embargo on such casual or temporary employment is not possible, given the exigencies of administration and if imposed, would only mean that some people who at least get employment temporarily, contractually or casually, would not be getting even that employment when securing of such employment brings at least some succour to them. A total embargo on such casual or temporary employment is not possible, given the exigencies of administration and if imposed, would only mean that some people who at least get employment temporarily, contractually or casually, would not be getting even that employment when securing of such employment brings at least some succour to them. After all, innumerable citizens of our vast courtly are in search of employment if one is not compelled to accept a casual or temporary employment if one is not inclined to go in for such an employment. It is in that context that one has to proceed on the basis that the employment was accepted fully knowing the nature of it and the consequences flowing from it. ( 7 ) IT has further been laid down in that ruling that when the Court is approached for relief by way of a writ, the Court has necessarily to ask itself whether the person before it had any legal right to be enforced. Considered in the light of the very clear constitutional scheme, it cannot be said that the temporary, contractual, casual or daily-wage employees have been able to establish a legal right to be made permanent even though they have never been appointed in terms of the relevant rules or in adherence of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. It is, therefore, not possible to accept the argument that the State action in not regularising the employees was not fair within the framework of the rule of law. ( 8 ) ORDERS for absorption, regularisation or permanent continuance of such employees are passed apparently in exercise of the wide powers under Article 226 of the Constitution. The wide powers under Article 226 are not intended to be used for a purpose certain to defeat the concept of social Justice and equal opportunity for all, subject to affirmative action in the matter of public employment as recognized by our Constitution. It is time that the Courts desist from issuing orders preventing regular selection or recruitment are the instance of such persons and from issuing directions for continuance of those who have not secured regular appointments as per procedure established. The passing of orders for continuance tends to defeat the very constitutional scheme of public employment. It is time that the Courts desist from issuing orders preventing regular selection or recruitment are the instance of such persons and from issuing directions for continuance of those who have not secured regular appointments as per procedure established. The passing of orders for continuance tends to defeat the very constitutional scheme of public employment. It has to be emphasized that this is not the role envisaged for the high Courts in the scheme of things and their wide powers under Article 226 are not intended to be used for the purpose of perpetuating illegalities, irregularities or improprieties or for scuttling the whole scheme of public employment. Its role as the sentinel and as the guardian of equal rights protection should not be forgotten. ( 9 ) FOLLOWING the principles laid down in the said ruling, it can be said that the writ petitioners have no legal right to be enforced. They being the casual employees cannot challenge the order of discontinuance. The writ petitioners/ respondents are not entitled to reap the benefit of the decision of the Division bench in F. M. A. No. 860/91 and to claim framing of scheme for the purpose of regularisation in respect of their services and also other benefits. As the writ petitioners/respondents have no legal right to be enforced and to be absorbed or regularised and no locus standi to challenge the order dated 16. 12. 86, the said order disengaging the writ petitioners from service cannot be interfered and the question of issuing writ of mandamus commanding the respondents to forbear for filling up the post of Durwan and Messenger in the Steel Authority by any other person or persons other than the writ petitioners cannot arise. The order of the learned Single Judge is not sustainable and the same must be set aside. The appeal, therefore, succeeds. The impugned order of the learned single Judge dated 21. 03. 01 passed in C. O. No. 12759 (W) of 2001 is set aside. The writ petition stands dismissed with no order as to costs.