JUDGMENT H.N. Sarma, J. 1. This second appeal arises out of the judgment and decree passed in Title Appeal No. 24/97 by the learned Civil Judge, Senior Division, Dhubri reversing the judgment and decree passed by the learned Civil Judge, Junior Division, Dhubri passed in Title Suit No. 41/95. The learned trial Court having dismissed the suit in the appeal filed by the Plaintiff, the same was reversed by the learned first appellate Court and the suit of the Plaintiff was decreed as prayed for. 2. I have heard Mr. D.C. Mahanta, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Ms. P. Bhattacherjee, learned Counsel for the Appellant, Mr. T.A. Hassan, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the Respondent No. l and Mr. P.S. Deka, learned Govt. Advocate appearing on behalf of the Respondent Nos. 2 to 7. 3. The brief facts necessary for disposal of the appeal may be summarized as follows: The Plaintiff is a Madrassa School was established on 02.01.1992 without having any permission to open the School and it is being managed by a managing committee, no recognition of the School is also given to the School by the concerned authority. On 08.01.92, the Plaintiff applied to the authority for granting permission to open the Madrassa and on such prayer Defendant No. 5 instructed the Defendant No. 6 to inspect the School and submit an inspection report for that purpose. The Defendant No. 6 accordingly inspected the School on 19.11.93 and submitted his report to the Defendant No. 9. It is further pleaded that the Defendant No. l with the help of the Defendant Nos. 3 and 4 established another Madrassa at a distance of about 200 Kms from the site of the Plaintiff Madrassa in the month of February/March, 1992. It is alleged that although the Defendant No. l established the Madrassa later on in collusion with the department, detailed an inspection report dated 13.05.93 from the Defendant No. 10 and obtained opening permission from Defendant No. 9 vide order No. EED-19/92/478 dated 29.12.92 fraudulently and the said opening permission is pleaded to be not binding upon the Plaintiff Madrassa. It is further pleaded that an earlier suit filed by the Plaintiff being No. 260/92 with Misc. (J) Case No. 170/92 filed against the Defendant Nos. It is further pleaded that an earlier suit filed by the Plaintiff being No. 260/92 with Misc. (J) Case No. 170/92 filed against the Defendant Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8 seeking same relief was dismissed for default on 08.09.94 and after such dismissal, the present suit has been filed. On the pleaded allegations, the following prayer has been made in the suit by the Plaintiff: 1) For declaration that the Plaintiff Madrassa is the original Madrassa, established on 02.01.1992 prior to Defendant No. 1 Madrassa. 2) For that the Plaintiff madrassa is legally instituted to get permission/recognition/ sanction from the Department, i.e. Defendants. 3) Permission obtained vide letter No. EED. 19/92/478 dated 29.12.92 fraudulently from Defendant No. 9 which is liable to be cancelled. 4) A permanent injunction shall be granted restraining the Defendants No. 2 to 9 from taking/giving permission/recognition/sanction to the Defendant No. l Madrassa and also restrain them from running Defendant No. l Madrassa. 5) A Mandatory injunction may be granted by directing the Defendants No. 2-7 not to run the function of Defendant No. 1 4. Summons of the suit having been served upon the Defendant Nos. 1, 2, 3 and 4 they contested the suit by filing written statement. The Defendant Nos. 5, 6, 1, 9 and 10 are govt. officials and Defendant No. 9 is the State of Assam and they have not filed the written statement in the suit but allowed to participate in the proceeding. The Defendants denied the allegations made by the Plaintiff against them and asserted that there was proper inspection by the Department and denied that any false report was submitted by the Inspecting Officer, that on such inspection report it is found that the Madrassa was established on 02.01.92, the said Madrassa is having an area of 3 Bighas of land which was donated and registered vide sale deed dated 17.07.92 and it has got necessary School building and three classes with four teachers were continuing along with the other properties of the School. It is further pleaded that the Plaintiff's Madrassa is yet to get the opening permission from the department concerned but the Defendants Madrassa has been given such permission by the departmental authorities. 5. Upon pleadings of the parties, the learned trial Court framed the following issues: (1) Whether the suit is maintainable in its present form? It is further pleaded that the Plaintiff's Madrassa is yet to get the opening permission from the department concerned but the Defendants Madrassa has been given such permission by the departmental authorities. 5. Upon pleadings of the parties, the learned trial Court framed the following issues: (1) Whether the suit is maintainable in its present form? (2) Whether the suit is barred by law of limitation? (3) Whether the suit is barred Under Section 4 of Code of Civil Procedure? (4) Whether there is any cause of action? (5) Whether there was any Plaintiff M.E. Madrassa at village Kutirghat established on 02.01.92? (6) Whether the letter No. EED-19/92/478 dt. 29.12.92 was obtained fraudulently by Defendants? (7) Whether the Plaintiff is entitled to get any relief, as prayed for? (8) To what relief(s) the parties are entitled to? 6. During the course of trial, Plaintiff examined two witnesses whereas the Defendants examined three. Both the parties exhibited some documents in support of their respective case. The learned trial Court, at the conclusion of the trial, decided the issue Nos. 5 and 6 against the Plaintiff and dismissed the suit vide judgment and order dated 26.08.97. The Plaintiff/Respondent challenge the decree passed by the learned trial Court in Title Appeal No. 24/97 in the Court of the learned Civil Judge, Senior Division, Dhubri. The learned Civil Judge, Senior Division, Dhubri after hearing the parties reversed the decision of issue Nos. 5 and 6 and decreed the suit of the Plaintiff vide judgment dated 02.02.99 which is the subject matter of challenge in the present second appeal. 7. The following substantial question of law has been framed for deciding the appeal as agreed to by the learned Counsel for the parties: 1. Whether the suit filed by the Plaintiff is maintainable and the Govt. order regarding permission obtained to open the School violates the civil right of the Plaintiff? 8. I have considered the rival submissions made by the learned Counsel for the parties and also perused the relevant records. On perusal of the relevant records, it is seen that there are certain noticeable features of the case. The suit was filed by the Plaintiff Madrassa, which was not granted even the opening permission by the authority. One Abdul Anwal as Secretary of the Madrassa represents the Plaintiff Madrassa. On perusal of the relevant records, it is seen that there are certain noticeable features of the case. The suit was filed by the Plaintiff Madrassa, which was not granted even the opening permission by the authority. One Abdul Anwal as Secretary of the Madrassa represents the Plaintiff Madrassa. There is no averments in the pleadings that there is any managing committee or governing body of the School either constituted by some persons of the locality or by some other authorities. The suit of the Plaintiff is for declaration and cancellation and for injunction. It is submitted that this declaratory suit is filed in terms of the Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act but then it is not disclosed as to how and what manner the Plaintiff is entitled such declaration and basis for legal character or any right recognized under Section 34 of the Act. Admittedly, it is not a suit for right to any property. The document, which is challenged in the suit is the letter No. EED-19/92/478 dated 19.12.92, was issued for a period of two years from 29.12.92. The suit was filed on 14.02.95, there is nothing on record whether at the time of filing of the suit, the said period mentioned therein is extended or not, which is exhibited as at Ext. "D". There is neither any averment nor any amendment of the plaint to that effect. The other noticeable feature is that the Defendant Nos. 5, 6, 7, 9 and 10 are the Govt. Officials and Defendant No. 8 is the State of Assam. It is peremtory under Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure that before filing of a suit against the State or against the Govt. or its officials, a notice in terms of the Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure is to be served. No order under Section 80(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure dispensing with the notice for granting urgent relief has also been passed. The Plaintiffs have alleged fraud in obtaining the permission for opening the ME Madrassa vide letter EED-19/92/478 dated 29.12.92. Although, in all cases, in which a party alleges any misrepresentation, fraud, breach of trust, the material particulars thereof are required to be pleaded as per Order 6 Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure. No such particulars of fraud which are alleged in the suit have been provided. Although, in all cases, in which a party alleges any misrepresentation, fraud, breach of trust, the material particulars thereof are required to be pleaded as per Order 6 Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure. No such particulars of fraud which are alleged in the suit have been provided. The necessity for providing such particular relies on the principle that allegation of fraud must be proved beyond reasonable doubt. Turning to the right of the Plaintiff to seek declaration under Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, neither the allegation made in the plaint nor evidence adduced by the Plaintiff discloses such right or legal character for which an actionable proceeding can be stated to be maintainable. 9. Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, confers a discretion upon the competent Court to grant such declaration of status or right of the Plaintiff when the Plaintiff is entitled to get a declaration on any legal character or right is to any property against any person denying or interested to deny, his title to such character or right. From the pleadings of the parties, it is seen and also it is submitted by Mr. Mahanta that the Plaintiffs have not denied the right of the Plaintiff emanating from factual assertion. That apart, the Plaintiff is not stated to be a registered body. It is not on record, rather the Plaintiff has not disclosed or proved as to how the Secretary of the said Madrassa was selected and on what authority, who are the other members of the body, if any. No right to property is alleged to have been violated in the plaint and on the date of filing of the suit. In fact, there is no semblance of such violation, inasmuch as, the very basis of the Plaintiff right to claim such right is the letter dated 29.12.92 which spent its force even on the date of filing of the suit. For consideration as to whether the discretion for declaration under Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act is to be exercised or not the existence of the right on the date of filing of the suit is very much material. The Plaintiff has obviously failed to show and establish such right. Section 34 postulates that the declaration of the legal character and right of the property should belong to the Plaintiff himself. The Plaintiff has obviously failed to show and establish such right. Section 34 postulates that the declaration of the legal character and right of the property should belong to the Plaintiff himself. The suit not being a suit filed on representative character, it is all the more necessary. 10. Proved facts of the case disclosed that the Plaintiff Madrassa is a self-style School, which has not even got permission to open, and none of the person interested in establishing the School has come forward alleging the entitlement to get declaration for such right. Consequently, it is difficult to accept the proposition that by issuing the letter dated 29.12.92 granting permission to start the Defendants Madrassa, as indicated herein above any right, actionable in law is violated. Although the learned Counsel for the Plaintiff strenuously assailed the action on the part of the Government in granting permission to the Defendant's Madrassa, is not acceptable on two counts, firstly the suit against the Defendants is not maintainable for want of the service of notice under Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which is a statutory requirement. Even a suit filed before expiry order of two months of the service of notice is not maintainable (Ref: AIR 1984 SC 1043 ). Secondly, no particulars of fraud or collusion has been pleaded adequately as required under Order 6 Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as noted above. 11. The learned trial Court while discussing the core issues that arose for decision in the suit i.e., the issue Nos. 5 and 6 duly considered the materials available on record and upon such consideration dismissed the suit of the Plaintiff. The learned first appellate Court though by an elaborate judgment, in fact, substituted the view based on re-appreciation of evidence. In exercise of such power under Order 41 Rule 33" it has not properly and duly exercised the said power, as judicially interpreted, a few of which are reported in (1) AIR 1998 SC 3118 (2) 1998 (7) SCC 387 and (3) 2001 (3) SCC 179 . Although, by the learned first appellate Court made an elaborate discussions on the matter, the basic principle in deciding the case under Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, has been ignored and wrongly assumed the jurisdiction to exercise the power and grant the discretionary relief of declaration. 12. Although, by the learned first appellate Court made an elaborate discussions on the matter, the basic principle in deciding the case under Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, has been ignored and wrongly assumed the jurisdiction to exercise the power and grant the discretionary relief of declaration. 12. The learned Court failed to take notice of the deep rooted infirmity in the suit of the Plaintiff that the suit itself was not maintainable. Granting or not granting of permission to open the School mostly an administrative function/decision taken by the departmental authority on the basis of need for opening such School and such decision is taken in exercise of the statutory duty and obligation of the concerned Respondents as provided under Section 12 of the Assam Elementary Schools (Provincialization) Act, 1974. In exercise of such power, the Govt. may take necessary action, on the recommendation of the concerned Deputy Inspector of School concerned. As per the terms and conditions issued by the Govt. from time to time, assuming the suit to be maintainable the suit maintainable even then also the Plaintiffs have not disclosed as to how and on what grounds the terms and conditions laid down by the Government for such recognition is bad and how and what manner the same has been violated. 13. Considering what has been discussed above, I hold that the Plaintiff has not been able to justify issuance of declaration in its favour Code of Civil Procedure our on the basis of pleaded facts and to establish that the suit was maintainable under Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act and the substantial question of law framed in the suit is answered accordingly against the Plaintiff. 14. The learned appellate Court in passing the impugned judgment and decree reversing that of the trial Court assumed jurisdiction to grant the declaratory decree in absence of any material for granting such declaration and hence the judgment and decree passed by the learned appellate Court stands set aside and quashed and the Plaintiff's suit stands dismissed. 15. No order as to costs.