Judgment ( 1. ) THE appellant has preferred this appeal under Section 374 (2) of the Criminal Procedure Code being aggrieved by the judgment dated 14. 7. 1990 by the Sessions Judge, Seoni (M. P.) in Sessions Trial No. 14/89 convicting the appellant under Section 306 and 498a of the JPC and sentenced for three years R. I and two years rigorous imprisonment respectively under the aforesaid sections. ( 2. ) ACCORDING to the case of the prosecution. Smt. Purnima wife of appellant was remained subjected to cruelty and ill treatment by the appellant in his family. The appellant has ousted her from his house on dated 3. 7. 1988. On reporting the same to the police it was recorded in the Rojnamcha Sana. Subsequent to it, the matter was subsided and she came back to live with the appellant. On dated 22. 12. 1988 the dead body of said Purnima was found in the well. On information given by Kamal Kishor the inquest report was registered, during its inquiry an offence Under Section 306 of the IPC was registered against the appellant. After holding investigation he was charge-sheeted Under Section 306 and 498a of the IPC. ( 3. ) ON committing the Sessions, the charges Under Section 306 in alternate Under Section 4. 98 A of the IPC were framed against the appellant. The same were denied by him, the trial was held, in which the prosecution has examined as well as seven witnesses in order to prove its case while no one has been examined on behalf of life defence. On appreciation of the evidence the appellant was held guilty under the aforesaid both the sections and sentenced as said above. Hence, this appeal was preferred on behalf of the appellant ( 4. ) SHRI A. S. Jha Senior Advocate assited by Ms Dipika Jha has vehemently submitted that appellant has not committed any offence and he was falsely implicated in the case. According to him, the ingredients of the alleged offence have not been proved by the prosecution. On wrong appreciation of the evidence the appellant has been held guilty. As per his submission not a single instance of the cruelty with the deceased has been proved against him. By referring the entries of the Rojnamcha dated 3. 7. 1988 Ex. According to him, the ingredients of the alleged offence have not been proved by the prosecution. On wrong appreciation of the evidence the appellant has been held guilty. As per his submission not a single instance of the cruelty with the deceased has been proved against him. By referring the entries of the Rojnamcha dated 3. 7. 1988 Ex. P/7, he has submitted that according to it, some dispute had taken place in between the appellant and his wife the deceased, on account of not preparing the food and this being a general domestic dispute is not falling under the head of "cruelty" or abetment to commit the suicide. However, this dispute had come to an end within a short period thereafter no incident was reported by the deceased. Besides this, the deposition of the mother and father and other relatives of the deceased are not establishing the ingredients of the aforesaid offence. He also referred the depositions of Rama Bai (P. W. 1), Kamal Kishor (PW 3) and Radha Bai (PW 4) in this regard. According to him, the appellant has been convicted on wrong appreciation of evidence. The impugned judgment was also assailed on account of the opinion mentioned in the post-mortem report and the deposition of the concerning Doctor. According to him, on taking out the dead body from the well, no injury was found on it, it shows that the incident was happened due to accident and it was not a case of suicide and prayed for allowing his appeal by setting aside the impugned judgment. ( 5. ) WHILE, Shri Kamesh Shukla, learned Dy. Govt. Advocate appearing for the State has vehemently submitted that on proper appreciation of the evidence the appellant has been rightly convicted and sentenced. Accordingly, he justified the impugned judgment of the trial Court. He also submitted that in view of the provisions of presumption under Section 113a of the Evidence Act, the appellant was liable for the consequences of the suicide committed by his wife and prayed for dismissal of the appeal. ( 6. ) HAVING heard the learned Counsels, on perusing the record it appears that the appellant and deceased were residing together since their marriage and till 3. 7. 1988 no dispute had taken place in between them. ( 7. ( 6. ) HAVING heard the learned Counsels, on perusing the record it appears that the appellant and deceased were residing together since their marriage and till 3. 7. 1988 no dispute had taken place in between them. ( 7. ) BEFORE considering any merits of the matter, I would like to refer the material ingredients of the aforesaid sections in which the appellant has been convicted. ( 8. ) THE Section 306 of the IPC reads as under: Abetment of suicide: 306. If any person commits suicide whoever abets the commission of such suicide, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine. ( 9. ) ACCORDING to the aforesaid, "the abetment" of such act is a material part of this section and the same is defined Under Section 107 of the IPC. According to it, out of the following ingredients, any of them is necessary to prove the offence of abetment of a thing. (1) , by instigating a person to commit an offence; or (2) by engaging in a conspiracy to commit it; or (3) by intentionally aiding a person to commit it. ( 10. ) AS per Section 498a of the IPC, the following ingredients are necessary to prove the act of cruelty against the offender: (1) The woman must be married; (2) She must be subjected to cruelty or harassment; and (3) such cruelty or harassment must have been shown either by husband of (he woman or by the relative of her husband. ( 11. ) IN view of the aforesaid the evidence of the present case was examined. But I have not found any material circumstance in which it can be said that the deceased was abetted to commit suicide by appellant or she was subjected to cruelty by any act of the appellant. As per evidence on record, Rum Bai (PW 1) has categorically stated in her deposition that after marriage her daughter was residing with her husband. They visited her house together. It is also stated that the deceased had not said anything regarding the conduct of the appellant with her. She narrated only one incident in para 4 of the deposition that her daughter was given two slaps by appellant in her presence. On her intervention the appellant was refrained from it. They visited her house together. It is also stated that the deceased had not said anything regarding the conduct of the appellant with her. She narrated only one incident in para 4 of the deposition that her daughter was given two slaps by appellant in her presence. On her intervention the appellant was refrained from it. At once her daughter was ousted by the appellant from his house then she came to her family but the parents of the appellant had taken her again and after seven months she was found dead in the well. On examining her entire deposition, I have not found any circumstance showing the cruelty or instigation or involvement of the appellant in any conspiracy with the deceased for committing the suicide. Thus in the absence of such ingredients appellant can not be held guilty for the alleged offences. ( 12. ) THE other witnesses Kamal Kishor Chourasiya (PW 3) is not a witness of any incident. Whatever has been stated by him that is only the hearsay evidence. The same is hit by Section 60 of the Evidence Act. He has stated some facts against the appellant about beating to deceased on the information given by his wife Radha Bai (PW 4), but said Radha Bai has not supported this version of the deposition of her husband that he was informed by her. Although, both the witnesses have said that the deceased had taken some poisonous substance long back prior to the incident but the case of the prosecution is not based on such back ground. Thus, on the basis of the testimony of these witnesses no ingredients of the said offences are made out against the appellant. Except these witnesses all other examined witnesses of the prosecution are related with the official procedure of the investigation and preparation of the papers. ( 13. ) DR. Ajay Kumar Jain (PW 2) who performed the autopsy of the corpus of deceased Purnima has not found any injury on the dead body. As per postmortem report Ex. P/1, he has given his opinion that the mode of aforesaid death was asphyxia due to drowning. ( 14. ) NOW the question arises whether the death of Purnima was accidental or suicidal ? If the death was accidental then in such circumstance the appellant could not be held guilty for any of the alleged offences. P/1, he has given his opinion that the mode of aforesaid death was asphyxia due to drowning. ( 14. ) NOW the question arises whether the death of Purnima was accidental or suicidal ? If the death was accidental then in such circumstance the appellant could not be held guilty for any of the alleged offences. On examining this question I have read the concerning part of the medical jurisprudence and Toxicology edited by Mody on page No. 173 in Twentieth-edition 1977 in which it was said as under: Females may fall accidentally into a well while drawing water from it. It must be remembered that before jumping into water with a view to committing suicide an Indian woman generally tucks up the lower ends of her garments and passing them between her legs fastens them at the loins so that the garments may not be dishevelled and expose nakedness after death, when the body comes up to the surface. In view of the aforesaid when the present case is examined then I have not found any said circumstance either in dead body panchanama Ex. P/6 or in post mortem report Ex. P/1 showing that her sari or cloths were found in aforesaid condition as the Modi has said regarding suicide by the female. Therefore it can be said safely that Purnima Bai had died because of the accidental death not the suicidal. ( 15. ) ON examining the other record of the case I have not found any circumstance showing any of the ingredients of the aforesaid offences as mentioned in the former part of this judgment. ( 16. ) I would like to say something more that in Indian culture where members of family are residing together then some time on some altercations regarding meals, clothes also in respect of other necessities of the family in the heat of passion if some small or trifle dispute takes place in between them then it does not mean that the cruelty has been committed by one member of the family against the other. In the case at hand, if some incident regarding non-preparation of the rice had taken place in the month of July and thereafter the matter was subsided and deceased started to reside with appellant and the impugned incident was happened it does not mean that appellant had committed the cruelty with the deceased Smt. Purnima or gave any abetment or inducement for committing suicide. Hence in the absence of cogent and reliable evidence against the appellant in this regard, the incident mentioned in Ex. P/7 Rojnamcha could not be connected with the death of Purnima. Besides this, I have not been shown any circumstance by the counsel for the State showing any act of the appellant against the deceased showing the abetment to commit suicide or committing cruelty. Hence there is sufficient circumstance to hold that the appellant was not the cause for the aforesaid death of his wife. ( 17. ) MY aforesaid view is fortified by the earlier decision of this Court in the matter of Aman Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh reported in 2005 (2) Madhya Pradesh High Court Today 32 in which it was held as under: 17. Thus, considering the aforesaid law laid down by the Supreme Court and the scope of Section 107 of IPC, it is necessary that a reasonable certainty to incite the consequence must be capable of being spelt out. In this case there is no allegation available on record against the appellant for abetting the deceased to commit suicide. Merely practising cruelty or beating 15 days before her death does not constitute ;offence of abetment. Moreso, in this case the accused had not by his acts or omission or by a continued course of conduct created such circumstances that the deceased was left with no other option except to commit suicide in which as an instigation may have been inferred. Even by the Apex Court in case of Swamy Prahaladdas (supra) the mere words uttered by the accused to the deceased "to go and die" have not been considered enough to instigate the deceased. Therefore, the conviction of the appellant under Section 306, IPC is not liable to be maintained. Therefore, it is set aside. But, looking to the evidence available on record the conviction under Section 498a, IPC against the appellant is affirmed. ( 18. Therefore, the conviction of the appellant under Section 306, IPC is not liable to be maintained. Therefore, it is set aside. But, looking to the evidence available on record the conviction under Section 498a, IPC against the appellant is affirmed. ( 18. ) IN the matter of Smt. Padmabai v. State of M. P. 1987 Cr. L. j. 1573 in which some principle was laid down about altercation in between the mother- in-law and daughter-in-law or husband the same was followed by this Court at the subsequent stage in the matter of Shanti Bai v. State of Madhya Pradesh reported in 2005 Vol. 2 M. P H. T. 281, in which it was mentioned as under: 5. In Smt. Padmabai v. State of M. P. 1987 Cr. L. J. 1573, it has been held: It is of the essence of the crime of abetment of suicide that the abettor should be proved to have substantially assisted in the commission of the offence of suicide. Investigation, incitement, provocation, encouragement, insinuation, solicitation, which words connote different meanings are, no doubt, some of the acts, which may constitute an abetment for commission of suicide. But all such acts or any of them have to be positive or potent in nature, of such as degree, that the direct result of such acts may be none other, but the commission of suicide. Stray domestic quarrels, perfunctory abuses by mother-in-law to her daughter-in-law in the Indian society, crude and uncultured behaviour by the in-laws or the husband towards his wife being mundane matters of normal occurrence in the traditional joint Hindu families, will not go to form and constitute abetment unless these acts or conduct singally or cumulatively, are found to be of such formidable and compelling nature as may lead to the commission of suicide or may facilitate in a singular and prime manner, the commission of the same. ( 19. ) IN the matter of Raghunath v. State of Madhya Pradesh reported in 2004 (1) M. P. Vidhi Bhasvar 172 this Court has considered the situation of altercation regarding non-preparation of the food and held as under: 7. The case of the prosecution for proving the alleged offence is based on the solitary statement of Champabai (PW1 ). ( 19. ) IN the matter of Raghunath v. State of Madhya Pradesh reported in 2004 (1) M. P. Vidhi Bhasvar 172 this Court has considered the situation of altercation regarding non-preparation of the food and held as under: 7. The case of the prosecution for proving the alleged offence is based on the solitary statement of Champabai (PW1 ). The other witnesses Ganga Bai (PW2) mother of deceased and Moti Ram (PW3) brother of deceased have not supported the prosecution story and turned hostile, on the other hand, they stated that the relationship between appellant and deceased was cordial and the appellant was treating his wife (deceased) properly. In the statement of Champabai (PW1), the only allegation against the appellant is that because of non preparation of food in time, the appellant slapped his wife, and in anger, told her that he will marry another woman and keep deceased as servant. 10. From the definition of Section 306 it is clear that the liability of committing the offence therein is Dependant upon the act of abetment, and abetment must be for commission of the suicide. The statement of Champabai (Pw1) has to be considered in the light of the definition of offence of abetment of suicide as for making the appellant liable, for the offence under Section 306 of the IPC it has to be seen whether the prosecution has established that the appellant has abeted the commission of suicide. After considering the entire statement of Champabai (PW 1), in my considered opinion, no case is made out to convict the appellant for commission of offence of abetment of suicide. The Sessions Court has not correctly appreciated the l;evidence on record and has erred in convicting the appellant on the basis of statement of Champabai (PW1 ). ( 20. ) IN view of the aforesaid earlier dictum of this Court I find apparent error, inconsistency and perversity in the judgment of the trial Court , therefore the same is not sustainable under the law. ( 21. ) HENCE, the appeal is allowed. The impugned judgment as well as the conviction and sentence of the appellant are hereby set aside by acquitting the appellant from the alleged charges. His bail bonds and surety bonds are hereby cancelled. Appeal is allowed.