ORDER S.K. Gangele, J. The petitioners have filed this petition with regard to grant of pay scale of Rs. 800-1200/- applicable to Shiksha Karmi Class-III. As per the petitioner, he is a power of attorney holder on behalf of 8 Shiksha Karmis and he filed the present petition on behalf of the Shiksha Karmis who had given him the power of attorney. Unfortunately, those 8 Shiksha Karmis have not been added as a party or petitioners in the petition initially, but they have been added as party by an amendment which has been allowed by this Court vide order dated 8-11-2001. Brief facts of the case are that the Municipal Council Jawara issued a notification dated 28-5-1998 with regard to appointments of Teachers including Shiksha Karmis Class-III (Madarsa) in the pay scale of Rs. 800-1200. There were total 14 posts mentioned in the advertisement as Shiksha Karmis Class-III (Madarsa). In pursuance to the aforesaid advertisement, the petitioners and other persons applied for the post and after facing the selection process as per the advertisement the petitioners and other 8 persons were appointed as Shiksha Karmi Class-III in the pay scale of Rs. 800-1200 vide order dated 18-8-1998 on a probation for a period of 3 years. In pursuance to the aforesaid appointment order the petitioners and other 8 persons were joined as Shiksha Karmis however, vide order dated 12-1-1999 issued by the Block Education Officer the post of the petitioners as Shiksha Karmis has been changed and it is ordered that now they would be designated as Ustad and they will be entitled to get an honorarium of Rs. 1000/- per month. It has further been mentioned in the order that the aforesaid order has been passed in pursuance to the order of scheme co-ordinator Rajiv Gandhi Primary Education Mission Ratlam dated 24-12-1997. The petitioners have challenged the aforesaid order of the Block Education Officer Annexure P-10 and also changing the pay scale and designation of the petitioners and other persons. The petitioners have also filed an appeal before the Collector Ratlam, that appeal was registered as No. 8/C-144-2000-01. The Additional Collector dismissed the appeal under Rule 9 of the M.P. Municipal Council Shiksha Karmi Recruitment and Conditions of Service Rules, 1998 as not maintainable. The petitioners have also filed an appeal before the Collector Ratlam, that appeal was registered as No. 8/C-144-2000-01. The Additional Collector dismissed the appeal under Rule 9 of the M.P. Municipal Council Shiksha Karmi Recruitment and Conditions of Service Rules, 1998 as not maintainable. The respondent No. 2 Nagar Palika Parishad in its return submitted that the petitioners do not come within the purview of Shiksha Karmi in the advertisement. It was clearly mentioned in the advertisement that, the aforesaid 14 posts were for Madarsa and the appointment was temporary in nature. The Shiksha Karmis are under the control of Rajiv Gandhi Shiksha Mission and they are entitled honorarium of Rs. 1000/-. The respondent No. 3 Project Officer Rajiv Gandhi Shiksha Mission in her reply has submitted that the petitioners are under the control of respondent No. 2 and as per the Staffing Pattern the post of Ustad is provided for teaching the students at Madarsa and as per the budget and the policy of the answering respondent No. 3 Mission, the pay of Ustad was initially fixed of Rs. 500/- per month, which was subsequently enhanced to Rs. 1000/- per month vide order dated 12-1-1999 and the petitioners were appointed on the post of Ustad and thereafter, they worked on the aforesaid post upto 2000. The petitioners were never appointed as Shiksha Karmi hence, they are not entitled the pay scale of Rs. 800-1200/-. The respondent No. 4 Block Education Officer in his return has stated the same facts as stated by the respondent No. 3. He further submitted that, earlier there was no difference between the Shiksha Karmis of Madarsa and the Shiksha Karmis appointed by the State Government. He further admitted the fact that, the petitioners were appointed on the pay scale applicable for Shiksha Karmis and the Shiksha Karmis appointed by the Municipal Council were given the pay scale of Rs. 800-1200/- However, the petitioners were given an honorarium of Rs. 1000/- because the petitioners were posted as Ustad in Madarsa hence, they are not entitled the pay scale of Shiksha Karmis. Learned counsel for the petitioners has submitted that, initially the petitioners were appointed as Shiksha Karmis on a pay scale of Rs. 800-1200/-hence, they are entitled the same pay scale, designation and pay scale cannot be changed unilaterally. It is violative of Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India. Learned counsel for the petitioners has submitted that, initially the petitioners were appointed as Shiksha Karmis on a pay scale of Rs. 800-1200/-hence, they are entitled the same pay scale, designation and pay scale cannot be changed unilaterally. It is violative of Article 311(2) of the Constitution of India. Contrary to this, the learned counsel for the State has submitted that petitioners were appointed as Ustad for Madarsa and they are entitled to get fixed honorarium of Rs. 1000 per month. From the facts stated above, it is clear that earlier in the year of 1996 the petitioners were engaged as Shiksha Karmis on a fixed pay of Rs. 500 per month. Thereafter, the Municipal Council issued an advertisement dated 28-5-1995 with regard to appointments of Shiksha Karmis. In the aforesaid advertisement 14 posts of Shiksha Karmis Class-III have been mentioned along with a description (Madarsa). The pay scale has also been mentioned Rs. 800-1200/-. The petitioners applied for the post and thereafter vide order dated 18-8-1998 issued by the Chief Municipal Officer, Municipal Council, Jawra they have appointed on the post of Shiksha Karmis Class-III on the pay scale of Rs. 800-20-1200/-and subsequently vide order dated 12-1-1999 issued by the Block Education Officer Jawra their designation has been changed as Ustad and it is mentioned that they would be entitled an honorarium of Rs. 1000 per month. The service conditions of the Shiksha Karmis appointed in the Municipal Council have been governed by the Rules named as M.P. Municipal Council Shiksha Karmis (Recruitment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 1998. These Rules have a statutory force of law because the aforesaid Rules have been framed u/s 58 of the Municipal Council Act, 1956 and section 433 of Municipal Council Act, 1961 and section 95 read with section 355. Section 2 of the aforesaid Rule defines the Shiksha Karmi which is as under :- Shiksha Karmis means as it is persons appointed by the Municipal Corporation Municipal Council or Nagar Panchayat for the purpose of teaching to the school under their control." (Translated from Hindi context). From the aforesaid definition and facts it is clear that, the petitioners come within the purview of Shiksha Karmi because they were appointed by the Municipal Council and they are also teaching in Madarsa under the control of Municipal Council Jawra, the respondent No. 2. The aforesaid fact has been admitted by the respondent Nos. From the aforesaid definition and facts it is clear that, the petitioners come within the purview of Shiksha Karmi because they were appointed by the Municipal Council and they are also teaching in Madarsa under the control of Municipal Council Jawra, the respondent No. 2. The aforesaid fact has been admitted by the respondent Nos. 3 and 4 in their reply. From their appointment order and the notification with regard to appointments it is further clear that they have appointed on the post of Shiksha Karmi both in the appointments orders and notification with regard to selection issued by the Municipal Council it has specifically mentioned that Shiksha Karmi Class-III (Madarsa) would be appointed on the pay scale of Rs. 800-1200 other similarly situated persons who were appointed along with petitioners in the Municipal Council are getting the same pay scale. However, the designation of the petitioners has been changed unilaterally by the respondent No. 3 vide letter dated 12-1-1999 mentioning the fact that petitioners would be designated as Ustad and they would get an honorarium of Rs. 1000 per month. The respondent Nos. 2, 3 and 4 did not assign any cogent reasons with regard to giving Rs. 1000/- per month as honorarium to the petitioners, except the fact that as per the budget of the respondent No. 3 Rajiv Gandhi Shiksha Karmi Project Ustad who were teaching in Madarsa would be given an honorarium of Rs. 1000 per month. The respondent No. 3 in his return has also stated that working plan with regard to appointment of Shiksha Karmi was prepared in the year of 1998-99 and upto that time there was no difference between the Shiksha Karmi of Madarsa and other Shiksha Karmi appointed by the respondent No. 2 after the preparation of the plan in the year of 1998-99 the difference has been made between the Shiksha Karmis who were working under the Mission and the petitioners who were teaching in Madarsa they were given the name as Shiksha Karmi and they were also given the pay scale of Rs. 800-20-1200/-. However, the petitioners who were appointed as Shiksha Karmi Madarsa their designation was changed as Ustad and they were given an honorarium of Rs. 1000/- per month except this no other reasons have been assigned by the respondents with regard to change of pay scale and designation of the petitioners. 800-20-1200/-. However, the petitioners who were appointed as Shiksha Karmi Madarsa their designation was changed as Ustad and they were given an honorarium of Rs. 1000/- per month except this no other reasons have been assigned by the respondents with regard to change of pay scale and designation of the petitioners. No opportunity of hearing has been given to the petitioners in changing their designation and also the pay scale of Rs. 800-20-1200/- and it is penal in nature. Apart from this, the respondents have not purforth any valid reasons treating petitioners differently with other similarly situated persons. It is well settled principle of law that Article 14 prohibits class legislation but it permits valid classification. A Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Mysore and Another Vs. P. Narasing Rao, has held as under: It is well settled that though Article 14 forbids class legislation, it does not forbid reasonable classification for the purposes of legislation. When any impugned rule or statutory provision is assailed on the ground that it contravenes Article 14, its validity can be sustained if two tests are satisfied. The first test is that the classification on which it is founded must be based on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or things grouped together from others left out of the group, and the second test is that the differentia in question must have a reasonable relation to the object sought to be achieved by the rule or statutory provision in question. In other words, there must be some rational nexus between the basis of classification and the object intended to be achieved by the statute or the rule. As we have already stated, Articles 14 and 16 form part of the same constitutional code of guarantees and supplement each other. In other words, Art. 16 is only an instance of the application of general rule of equality laid down in Art. 14 and it should be construed as such. Hence, there is no denial of equality of opportunity unless the person who complains of discrimination is equally situated with the person or persons who are alleged to have been favoured; Article 16(1) does not bar a reasonable classification of employees or reasonable tests for their selection. Hence, there is no denial of equality of opportunity unless the person who complains of discrimination is equally situated with the person or persons who are alleged to have been favoured; Article 16(1) does not bar a reasonable classification of employees or reasonable tests for their selection. It is true that the selective test adopted by the Government for making two different classes will be violative of Articles 14 and 16 if there is no relevant connection between the test prescribed and the interest of public service. In other words, there must be a reasonable relation of the prescribed test to the suitability of the candidate for the post or for employment to public service as such. The provisions of Article 14 or Article 16 do not exclude the laying down of selective tests, nor do they preclude the Government from laying down qualifications for the post in question. Such qualifications need not be only technical but they can also be general qualifications relating to the suitability of the candidate for public service as such. The same principle was adopted by the Hon'ble Supreme Court further in Saurabh Choudhary vs. Union of India reported in 2003 Volume 11 Page 146. The Hon'ble Supreme Court further in Mew Ram Kanojia Vs. All India Institute of Medical Sciences and Others, has held as under with regard to 'equal pay for equal work'. In judging the equality of work for the purposes of equal pay, regard must be had not only to the duties and functions but also to the educational qualifications, qualitative difference and the measures of responsibility prescribed for the respective posts. Even if the duties and functions are of similar nature but if the educational qualifications prescribed for the two posts are different and there is difference in measure of responsibilities the principle of 'Equal pay for equal work' would not apply. If the classification has reasonable nexus with the objective sought to be achieved, efficiency in the administration, the State would be justified in prescribing different pay scale but if the classification does not stand the test of reasonable nexus and the classification is founded on unreal, the unreasonable basis it would be violative of Articles 14 and 16. Equality must be among the equals, unequals cannot claim equality. The above principle has further been explained by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in V. Markendeya and Others Vs. Equality must be among the equals, unequals cannot claim equality. The above principle has further been explained by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in V. Markendeya and Others Vs. State of Andhra Pradesh and Others, . The purpose of Article 39(d) is to fix certain social and economic goals for avoiding any discrimination amongst the citizens doing similar work in matters relating to pay. The principle of 'equal pay for equal work' is not an abstract one; it is open to the State to prescribe different scales of pay for different cadres having regard to nature of duties, responsibilities and educational qualifications. Where two classes of employees perform identical or similar duties and carrying out the same functions with the same measure of responsibility having same academic qualifications, they would be entitled to equal pay. If the State denies them equality in pay, its action would be violative of Articles 14 and 16, and the Court will strike down the discrimination and grant relief to the aggrieved employees. But before such relief is granted the Court must consider and analyse the rationale behind the State action in prescribing two different scales of pay. If on an analysis of the relevant rules, orders, nature of duties, functions, measure of responsibility, and educational qualifications required for the relevant posts, the Court finds that the classification made by the State in giving different treatment to the two classes of employees is founded on rational basis having nexus with the objects sought to be achieved, the classification must be upheld. Principle of equal pay for equal work is applicable among equals, it cannot be applied to unequals. Relief to an aggrieved person seeking to enforce the principles of equal pay for equal work can be granted only after it is demonstrated before the Court that individious discrimination is practiced by the State in prescribing two different scales for the two classes of employees without there being any reasonable classification for the same. On the basis of the above principles of law laid down by the Hon'ble Court and the facts of the present case the respondent Nos. 2, 3 and 4 have failed to discharge their burden in showing before the Court the reasons with regard to grant of honorarium of Rs. 1000 per month to the petitioners. On the basis of the above principles of law laid down by the Hon'ble Court and the facts of the present case the respondent Nos. 2, 3 and 4 have failed to discharge their burden in showing before the Court the reasons with regard to grant of honorarium of Rs. 1000 per month to the petitioners. It is the fact that the petitioners were appointed as Shiksha Karmi Class-III Madarsa on the pay scale of Rs. 800-1200/-. The advertisement have been issued on the same post with regard to other Shiksha Karmis employed by the respondent No. 2 are getting the same pay scale. The petitioners have the same qualifications and the procedure of appointment has been adopted in the case of petitioners and other persons is the same. Hence, in my opinion the grant of Rs. 1000/- as honorarium to the petitioners is illegal and arbitrary. Consequently, the petition of the petitioner is allowed. The order of respondent No. 4 dated 12-1-1999 Annexure A-10 is hereby quashed. The respondents are directed to grant pay scale to the petitioners of Rs. 800-1200/- on which they were appointed initially vide order dated 18-8-1998 and fix the salary accordingly, and if there was any subsequent change in the pay scale, the petitioner be also given the same benefit and the arrears of salary also. The respondents are directed to comply the aforesaid directions within a period of 3 months from the date of receipt of the order. No order as to cost. Final Result : Allowed