Judgment Vinod K.Sharma, J. 1. The tenant petitioner by way of present revision petition has challenged the order dated 20.1.2003 passed by the learned Rent Controller, Amloh, as affirmed by the Appellate Authority, Fatehgarh Sahib, ordering his eviction from the shop situated at ward No. 12, Railway Road, Mandi Gobindgarh. 2. The brief facts of the case are that the respondent-landlord filed an ejectment petition under Section 13 of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act (for short the `Act) on the ground that he had purchased the shop in dispute for a consideration of Rs. 85,000/- from Darshana Khosla vide sale- deed No. 1033 dated 5.11.1996. The said shop was in possession of the petitioner herein as a tenant on payment of Rs. 60/- per month as rent. There was a relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties. The ejectment was sought on the grounds that the petitioner-tenant has not paid the rent from February 1995 till date and that the tenant-petitioner has roughly and negligently used the demised shop resulting into breakage of the floor. 3. The respondent-landlord required the demised premises for his personal use and occupation inasmuch as he is running the business of gun metal in a rented shop of Municipal Committee, Mandi-Gobindgarh. It was alleged that the Municipal Committee, Mandi-Gobindgarh, has threatened to get the same vacated from him and also threatened to increase the rent out of all proportions. It was averred that the respondent-landlord has not vacated any shop nor has any other suitable accommodation for his business in the urban area concerned, nor he has got vacated any other shop. It was also alleged that the tenant- respondent had changed the user of the shop in dispute by starting the business of wood made articles and furniture from karyana shop for which it was originally let out. It was further alleged that the tenant-petitioner had diminished the value and utility of the demised shop. 4. On notice, the tenant-petitioner appeared and filed a detailed reply to the ejectment petition and contested the same. It was further alleged that the tenant-petitioner had diminished the value and utility of the demised shop. 4. On notice, the tenant-petitioner appeared and filed a detailed reply to the ejectment petition and contested the same. By way of preliminary objections, it was pleaded that that the ejectment petition was not maintainable against him and it was barred by principle of res judicata as the ejectment petition of Smt. Darshana Khosla was dismissed as withdrawn on the same ground and that the petition was barred under Order 2 Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 5. On merits, the petitioner-tenant denied that he has been in arrears of rent since February 1995. It was further denied that he had roughly and negligently used the demised premises resulting into breakage of floor. It was also denied that the respondent-landlord required the demised premises for his personal use and occupation. It was denied that the Municipal Committee, Mandi Gobindgarh, has threatened to get the shop in possession of the landlord vacated from him, wherein he is the tenant. According to the petitioner- tenant, the landlord and his father Ajit Singh are in occupation of three shops of Municipal Committee, Gobindgarh, wherein they have been the tenants. The respondent-landlord carries on his business in the godowns and chaubara, wherein the shops are located. That the landlord has no threat of any type from the Municipal Committee. It was also stated that the respondent-landlord and his father are still in occupation of the shops of the Municipal Committee, and godowns and shops in addition to the shop of Municipal Committee in occupation of the landlord as a tenant. It was denied that the tenant-petitioner had changed the user of the demised shop. It was stated that the tenant has never carried on karyana business in the shop in dispute and the father of the tenant carried on the wood and furniture business from the very beginning in the demised shop. The other averments of the respondent- landlord were controverted and it was prayed that the ejectment petition be dismissed. 6. The respondent-landlord filed replication in support of his averments and denied the case put forth by the petitioner-tenant. On the pleadings of the parties, following issues were framed :- "1. Whether the tender in short & valid ? OPA 2. The other averments of the respondent- landlord were controverted and it was prayed that the ejectment petition be dismissed. 6. The respondent-landlord filed replication in support of his averments and denied the case put forth by the petitioner-tenant. On the pleadings of the parties, following issues were framed :- "1. Whether the tender in short & valid ? OPA 2. Whether the petitioner requires the demised premises for its own use & occupation ? OPA 3. Whether the respondent had changed the user of the demised premises ? OPA 4. Whether the respondent has diminished the value and utility of the demised premises by his acts and omissions as claimed in the petition ? OPA 5. Whether the application is not maintainable ? OPR 6. Whether the application is hit by principle of res judicata and Order 2 Rule 2 CPC ? OPR 7. Relief." 7. The learned Rent Controller decided issue No. 2 in favour of respondent- landlord and ordered ejectment of the petitioner-tenant from the shop in dispute and the said order was confirmed by the Appellate Authority. 8. In order to prove his case, the landlord-respondent examined AW-1 Surjit Singh, Rent Clerk, Municipal Committee, Mandi Gobindgarh and he himself appeared as AW-2 and, thereafter closed his evidence, whereas the petitioner- tenant examined RW-1 Gurjit Singh, RW-2 Nirbhai Singh and he himself appeared as RW-3 and thereafter closed his evidence after tendering documents Exhibits R-1 to R-9. The landlord also closed the evidence in rebuttal. 9. The learned Courts below on appreciation of evidence on record came to the conclusion that it was proved on record that the respondent-landlord was a tenant in shop No. 35 under Municipal Committee, Mandi Gobindgarh, whereas his brother Baljinder Singh and his father Jeet Singh were tenants in Shop Nos. 17 and 22 of the Municipal Committee, Mandi Gobindgarh. It was also held that the landlord had no concern with Shop Nos. 17 and 22 which were on rent with his brother and father. The other contention of the petitioner-tenant that the landlord also owned another shop in front of Civil Hospital, Mandi Gobindgarh, was rejected on the plea that the alleged shop in front of the Civil Hospital was a part of residential building and, therefore, could not be said to be a non-residential property. The other contention of the petitioner-tenant that the landlord also owned another shop in front of Civil Hospital, Mandi Gobindgarh, was rejected on the plea that the alleged shop in front of the Civil Hospital was a part of residential building and, therefore, could not be said to be a non-residential property. It was also held that Section 11 of the Act puts a bar on converting a residential building into non-residential building without written permission of the Rent Controller. Thus without admitting the factum of ownership of the respondent-landlord on the alleged shop, the learned Courts below came to the conclusion that the said residential building could not be converted into non-residential building without the written permission of the Rent Controller under Section 11 of the Act. 10. The learned Courts below also came to the conclusion that the respondent- landlord was paying higher rent to the Municipal Committee, Mandi Gobindgarh, whereas the demised shop in occupation of the petitioner-tenant was on rent @ Rs. 60/- per month since 5.11.1996. The learned Courts below also took note of the fact that in the rejoinder the respondent-landlord had pleaded that the tenanted shop was insufficient for his need and the plea of the petitioner that since the pleading in the replication could not be taken account, was rejected. 11. The learned Courts below also took note of the fact that besides making averments in the replication, the landlord in his statement had deposed that the shop of Municipal Committee measured 9 ft x 16 ft., whereas the demised shop in this case was larger in size of 126" x 296" and the rent of the shop of the Municipal Committee was Rs. 400/- per month with a stipulation of increase of 20% after every 3 years as per terms of agreement of rent note Exhibit A-1 on record. Thus, it was held that requirement of the demised shop by the landlord Harvinder Singh was bona fide and reasonable. 12. The contention of the petitioner-tenant was that the landlord has purchased the property from Darshana Khosla vide Exhibit A-3 and the earlier eviction petition was filed against him by the attorney of Darshana Khosla, wherein it was not pleaded that Darshana Khosla required the demised premises for her personal use and occupation. 13. 12. The contention of the petitioner-tenant was that the landlord has purchased the property from Darshana Khosla vide Exhibit A-3 and the earlier eviction petition was filed against him by the attorney of Darshana Khosla, wherein it was not pleaded that Darshana Khosla required the demised premises for her personal use and occupation. 13. The learned Courts below came to the conclusion that though in the previous petition the plea of personal necessity was not taken, but it was held that it was not open to the tenant-petitioner to challenge the sale-deed Exhibit A-3 in favour of respondent-landlord. 14. The plea of the tenant-petitioner that the landlord owned other properties at Mandi Gobindgarh as per copies of jamabandis Exhibits R-3 to R-5 and Exhibits R-8 and R-9 was rejected by holding that the said properties were residential and, therefore, could not be converted into non-residential buildings without prior permission in writing from the Rent Controller. Therefore, the finding of the learned Rent Controller that the demised shop was required by the landlord for his bona fide requirement was affirmed by the Appellate Authority. 15. The contention of the petitioner-tenant that M/s. Sethi Gun Metal Store was a partnership firm and that Harvinder Singh was its partner and hence was not liable to maintain the ejectment petition was rejected in view of the statement made by him while appearing as RW-3 in which he was unable to disclose if M/s. Sethi Gun Metal store was a partnership firm or not. 16. The application moved by the tenant-petitioner for amendment of the written statement was also rejected by holding that it was an attempt to delay the proceedings. 17. Mr. M.L. Sarin, learned senior counsel, appearing for the petitioner in support of his claim argued that the Courts below have mis-constructed the word "require" and, therefore, the findings recorded by the learned Courts below stood vitiated by an error of law. His contention, therefore, was that it was open to the revisional Court to interfere with such findings. 17. Mr. M.L. Sarin, learned senior counsel, appearing for the petitioner in support of his claim argued that the Courts below have mis-constructed the word "require" and, therefore, the findings recorded by the learned Courts below stood vitiated by an error of law. His contention, therefore, was that it was open to the revisional Court to interfere with such findings. In support of his contention, the learned senior counsel placed reliance on the judgments of the Honble Supreme Court in the case of Phiroze Bamanji Desai v. Chandrakant M. Patel and others, AIR 1974 SC 1050 and Deena Nath v. Pooran Lal, 2001(2) RCR 130, wherein it was held that if the Courts below do not apply the statutory provisions to the evidence on record in its proper perspective, then resultant findings regarding bona fide requirement would cease to be a mere finding of fact and the High Court would be justified in interfering in such findings. 18. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner vehemently argued that the evidence brought on record in the present case did not show the need of the respondent-landlord. The contention of the learned senior counsel was that in the instant case the respondent-landlord has miserably failed to prove that the demised premises was required bona fide and a mere desire of the landlord could not be a substitute for bona fide need. In support of this contention, the reliance was placed by the learned counsel on the judgments of the Honble Supreme Court in the case of Atma S. Berar v. Mukhtiar Singh, 2003(1) RCR(Rent) 42 (SC) : 2003(1) PLR 371 and Kempaiah v. Lingaiah and others, 2002(1) RCR(Rent) 532 (SC) : 2001(8) SCC 718. 19. The case of the petitioner was that once it was proved that the respondent-landlord was in possession of the Municipal Shop No. 35, it could not be said that he required the demised premises for his personal use especially when the plea of insufficiency of Municipal Committee shop was first time brought in the rejoinder and that too without giving the dimensions of the shop or placing on record the plan thereof. 20. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner, therefore, argued that in the absence of plan it was not open to hold by the learned Courts below that the premises was required bona fide. 20. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner, therefore, argued that in the absence of plan it was not open to hold by the learned Courts below that the premises was required bona fide. In support of this contention, learned senior counsel placed reliance on the judgments of this Court in Mohan Lal Jain v. Mohan Lal and another, 1973 RCR(Rent) 380 (P&H) : 1973 PLR 350 and Karnail Singh v. Vidya Devi alias Bedo, 1980(1) RCR(Rent) 592 (DB) (P&H) : 1980(2) PLJ 188. 21. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner vehemently argued that once it was established that the landlord was in possession of another building in the same urban area whether as owner, landlord, tenant or mortgagee with possesion or in any other recognised mode having right in the property, he could not claim eviction of his tenant from other premises in the same urban area without alleging and proving anything more. In support of this contention, reliance has been placed by the learned senior counsel for the petitioner on a Division Bench of this Court in Karnail Singh v. Vidya Devi alias Bedo, 1980(2) RCJ 188 and a Full Bench judgment of this Court reported in Romesh Kumar v. Atma Devi and others, 1986(1) RCR(Rent) 240 (P&H) : 1985(2) RCJ 566. 22. The next contention of the learned senior counsel for the petitioner was that the learned Appelalte Authority wrongly relied on Section 11 of the Act to ignore the occupation of the respondent-landlord on another shop and godown opposite Civil Hospital. The contention of the learned senior counsel was that the permission of the Rent Controller is required if there exists a scheme under Section 192 of the Punjab Municipal Act, and for this purpose he placed reliance on the judgment of the Honble Supreme Court in Dev Brat Sharma v. Dr. Jagjit Mehta, 1990(2) RCJ 431 and judgment of this Court in Gopi Ram v. Jagan Nath, 2003(1) RCR 664. The contention of the learned senior counsel was that since there was no existing scheme of the Municipal Committee in the concerned urban area, therefore, the finding recorded regarding this issue cannot be sustained. 23. Jagjit Mehta, 1990(2) RCJ 431 and judgment of this Court in Gopi Ram v. Jagan Nath, 2003(1) RCR 664. The contention of the learned senior counsel was that since there was no existing scheme of the Municipal Committee in the concerned urban area, therefore, the finding recorded regarding this issue cannot be sustained. 23. Learned senior counsel for the petitioner thereafter argued that merely because the landlord had purchased a building did not entitle him that he can automatically be taken to be requiring the property for his bona fide need and for this purpose reliance was placed on a judgment of this Court reported in Salim Ahmed v. Surjit Kumar Sahai, 1998(2) RCR(Rent) 391 (P&H) : 1998(3) PLR 182. 24. Learned senior counsel for the petitioner also argued that the learned Courts below erred in law in not taking note of subsequent events and wrongly rejected the application for amendment of the written statement filed by the petitioner. The contention of the learned senior counsel, therefore, was that it was open to this Court to take note of the subsequent events in view of the law laid down by this Court in Smt. Kalawati and another v. Vinod Kumar, 1989(2) RCR(Rent) 115 (P&H) : 1989(2) PLR 289 and the judgment of the Honble Supreme Court in Rajesh Kumar Aggarwal and others, 2006(4) SCC 385. 25. The next contention of the learned senior counsel for the petitioner was that during the pendency of the case before the Appellate Authority the respondent-landlord had sold the property with his mother and though the petitioner by way of amendment was seeking to produce on record the sale-deed to show that the landlord was actually a property dealer, but the plea was (not) adjudicated upon. Therefore, the contention of the learned senior counsel for the petitioner was that the finding regarding rejection of application for amendment of the written statement could not be sustained in view of the settled law that the Courts should take note of subsequent events disabling the landlords from seeking eviction of the tenants. Learned senior counsel placed reliance on the judgments of the Honble Supreme Court reported in Gulabbai v. Nalin Narsi Vohra and others, 1991 HRR 427 and Adil Jamshed Frenchman (D) by LRs. v. Sardar Dastur Schools Trust and others, 2005(1) RCR 284. 26. Learned senior counsel placed reliance on the judgments of the Honble Supreme Court reported in Gulabbai v. Nalin Narsi Vohra and others, 1991 HRR 427 and Adil Jamshed Frenchman (D) by LRs. v. Sardar Dastur Schools Trust and others, 2005(1) RCR 284. 26. Learned senior counsel for the petitioner thereafter contended that the petitioner-tenant had filed CM No. 775-CII of 2006 for bringing on record all the relevant subsequent events showing that the respondent-landlord has purchased has purchased more properties after passing of the impugned order by the Appellate Authority and he wished to produce on record that evidence which is annexed with the said application. In support of this contention, he placed reliance on the judgment of the Honble Supreme Court in the case of Maqboolunisa v. Mohd. Saleha Quaraishi, JT 1989(9) SC 40 to contend that an adjoining shop fell vacant and the landlord failed to amend his ejectment petition to incorporate this fact and to show as to why the said adjacent shop did not fulfil his alleged move. The ejectment petition was dismissed by the Honble Supreme Court. 27. The contention of the learned counsel was that once the landlord has built another shop on the land purchased on 7.9.2005 in the name of his sister, but the said sale-deed was signed by him, then this fact was sufficient to non- suit the respondent-landlord. It was also contended by the learned counsel for the petitioner that additional documents placed on record along with photographs show that the shop has been let out to a liquor vend and that the workshop was being used by the landlord for his Hammer Press business. However, it is not in dispute that the plot was purchased by the sister of the respondent-landlord. On the basis of the additional evidence sought to be produced on record by way of subsequent events, the learned senior counsel wanted to highlight the fact that the respondent-landlord is a property dealer and deals in sale and purchase of the properties and, therefore, it could not be said that the premises was required bona fide for his requirement. 28. 28. Learned senior counsel for the petitioner theafter contended that the reasoning given by the learned courts below holding that the requirement of the respondent-landlord to be bona fide merely on the ground that he was paying higher rent though the rent he was receiving was less from his tenant, was not reasonable and could not be relied upon for want of pleadings. 29. Learned senior counsel for the petitioner sought to distinguish the judgment of this Court reported in Sham Lal v. Sant Ram, 1984(2) RCR 597 on the ground that in the said case it was proved that the landlord required a bigger plot than the one holding in his occupation and not on the ground that the landlord was paying higher rent for the demised premises. He further sought to distinguish the judgment reported in Lekh Ram v. Kulwant Rai and another, 1985(2) RCR 176 on the plea that there was no allegation of ulterior motive of the landlord, whereas in the case in hand, there was ample evidence to prove the mala fide of the landlord. Similarly, the learned senior counsel for the petitioner argued that the judgment of the Honble Karnataka High Court reported in S. Narahari v. Smt. S. Pankaja, 2001(2) RCR 422 was not applicable to the facts of the present case. 30. Mr. S.N. Chopra, learned counsel appearing of the respondent controverted the arguments raised by the learned senior counsel for the petitioner primarily on the ground that the learned Courts below have rightly come to the conclusion that the respondent-landlord required the shop in dispute for his personal use and occupation. The respondent-landlord was running the business of gun metal in the rented shop belonging to the Municipal Committee and the landlord committee threatened to get the possession of the said shop and under the threats he increases the rent from time to time. The contention of the learned counsel for the respondent was that as per note, there is a clear provision for increase of 20% rent after every three years. Learned counsel, therefore, contended that the landlord was entitled to get the premises vacated for his personal use and occupation as the provisions of the Rent Restriction Act were not applicable to the rented premises in his possession. Learned counsel, therefore, contended that the landlord was entitled to get the premises vacated for his personal use and occupation as the provisions of the Rent Restriction Act were not applicable to the rented premises in his possession. The learned counsel further contended that the accommodation in possession of the respondent-landlord was insufficient and he had purchased the shop in dispute for his own occupation and, therefore, he was entitled to evict the tenant from the said shop. In support of his contention, he placed reliance on the judgment in the case of Kartar Kaur v. V.K. Chhabra, 1986(1) RCR 576. 31. Learned counsel for the respondent further contended there was certainly an element of need when the landlord was occupying a smaller plot as tenant and he was seeking eviction of the tenant occupying the higger shop and in support of this contention he placed reliance on the judgment of this Court reported in Sham Lal v. Sant Ram, 1984(2) RCR 597 (supra). 32. Learned counsel for the respondent vehemently argued that there is an element of need if the landlord is paying more rent for the rented accommodation and fetching less rent of the accommodation of which he is the landlord. The contention of the learned counsel was that it has been proved on record that the landlord was paying Rs. 400/- per month as rent and there was 20% increase in rent after every three years, where he was getting Rs. 60/- per month as rent from the demised shop. In support of this contention, the learned counsel placed reliance on the judgments of this Court in Bhagwati Parshad v. Parkash Chand, 1987(1) RCR 360; Ram Rakha v. Bal Mukand, 1986(1) RCR 208 and Hukam Rai v. Chhail Bihari Lal, 1978(1) RCR 591. 33. Learned counsel for the respondent thereafter placed reliance on the judgment of the Honble Supreme Court in the case of G. Kaushalya Devi v. Ghanshyamdas, 2000(1) RCR(Rent) 155 (SC) : 2000(1) PLR 252 to contend that the expression "possession" is to be read as owner only and not otherwise. The learned counsel for the respondent further placed reliance on the judgment of the Honble Allahabad High Court in the case reported as Pradeep Kumar Rastogi v. XVI Addl. The learned counsel for the respondent further placed reliance on the judgment of the Honble Allahabad High Court in the case reported as Pradeep Kumar Rastogi v. XVI Addl. District Judge, Meerut, 2001(2) RCR(Rent) 50 to contend that it was open to the landlord to seek eviction of a tenant even if he was a tenant of another building especially he did not have the protection of Rent Act and the rent of the shop in his possession was exorbitant. 34. Learned counsel for the respondent thereafter placed reliance on the Honble Karnataka High Court in the case of S. Narahari v. Smt. S. Pankaja, 2001(1) RCR 422 (supra) to contend that even if there was no threat of eviction of the landlord from the property in his possession of which he is a tenant, still he can get his property vacated from the tenant. 35. Learned counsel for the respondent thereafter placed reliance on the judgments of this Court in Chander Bhan, Postman v. Jai Parkash and another, 1992(2) RCR 620; Harbans Singh v. Smt. Baljit Kaur and others, 1995(2) RCR 564 and the judgment of the Honble Supreme Court in the case reported as Ramesh Chand and others v. Raj Kumar, 2002(2) RCR 284 to contend that bona fide of the landlord cannot be disputed regarding the purchase of the property and it is not open to a tenant to question the validity of the sale-deed to be a sham transaction. 36. Learned counsel for the respondent thereafter placed reliance on the judgment of this Court in the case of Mrs. Ranbir Kaur v. Sital Parkash, 1986(1) RCR 266, and the judgments of the Honble Supreme Court in the cases reported as R.C. Tamrakar and another v. Nidi Lekha, 2001(2) RCR 511 and Meenal Eknath Kshirsagar v. M/s. Traders & Agencies, 1996(2) RCR 233 to contend that the landlord is the best judge of his need. 37. Ranbir Kaur v. Sital Parkash, 1986(1) RCR 266, and the judgments of the Honble Supreme Court in the cases reported as R.C. Tamrakar and another v. Nidi Lekha, 2001(2) RCR 511 and Meenal Eknath Kshirsagar v. M/s. Traders & Agencies, 1996(2) RCR 233 to contend that the landlord is the best judge of his need. 37. Learned counsel for the respondent also placed reliance on the judgments of this Court in Om Parkash v. Smt. Rattan Kaur, 1975 RCR 331; Master Bhisham Partap v. Balwant Singh (died) and others, 1990(1) RCR 389 and Sarup Singh v. Shri Narinder Nath, 1980(2) RCR 164 to contend that when there is no dispute about the area of the demised building and the one in possession of the respondent-landlord as a tenant of Municipal Committee, there was no need to place on record the site plans. The contention of the learned counsel for the respondent was that dimensions of the property in question and the shop of the Municipal Committee in possession of the respondent-landlord as a tenant having been admitted by the petitioner in his cross-examination to the effect that the godown existed earlier has been converted into residential building. According to the counsel, the petitioner could not draw any benefit of his assertion that the respondent was in possession of godown and shop. The learned Counsel further argued that the petition was to be decided as per the facts existing on the date of filing of the ejectment petition and the subsequent events could not be taken note of. In support of this contention, learned counsel for the respondent-landlord placed reliance on a judgment of the Honble Supreme Court in Gaya Prasad v. Pradeep Srviastava, 2001(1) RCR(Rent) 221, judgment of the Honble Rajasthan High Court in Kirorilal v. Smt. Kishori Devi and others, 2005(1) RCR(Rent) 178, judgment of the Honble Supreme Court reported in Shakuntala Bai and others v. Narayan Dass and others, 2004(1) RCR 580 and the judgment of the Honble Rajasthan High Court in the case of Ashok Gupta v. Ghisi Lal Baraya, 2004(1) RCR 688. 38. Learned counsel for the respondent regarding the Town Planning Scheme submitted as under :- "(i) So far as the question of Town Planning Scheme is concerned the same would not be applicable in the present case because there is no dispute as to the nature of the property on lease with the petitioner-tenant. 38. Learned counsel for the respondent regarding the Town Planning Scheme submitted as under :- "(i) So far as the question of Town Planning Scheme is concerned the same would not be applicable in the present case because there is no dispute as to the nature of the property on lease with the petitioner-tenant. The property in question is a shop & was leased out to the father of the respondent as shop. No such question is involved as to whether the property in question is or is not part of residential building. All the judgments cited by the counsel for the petitioner are in the cases where the nature of the demised property is involved. In all the judgments cited by the counsel for the petitioner- tenant the main question involved was that as to whether the demised property is part of residential property or is independently a commercial property. In the present case there is no such dispute. (ii) Inspite of the fact that existence or non-existence of town planning scheme in a particular city is a question of fact yet the petitioner-tenant never pleaded in the written statement about the existence of any Town Planning Scheme at Mandi Gobindgarh for determining the nature of the building of mother of the respondent-landlord. Moreover the petitioner-tenant did not summon any witness from the Municipal Committee to prove any such scheme. In this regard cross-examination of Sukhdev Singh petitioner-tenant just in the middle of page No. 3 of his statement which reads as under :- "I have not summoned any record of Municipal Council for the above said purpose and has also mentioned in my examination-in-chief. It is wrong to suggest that I intentionally did not summon the record of Municipal Council as I knew that length and breadth of the said shop 9 x 16 or that I also knew that there is no shop of Harvinder Singh as mentioned by me in RW-3/A. It is wrong to suggest that I did not intentionally summon the record as I knew that Harvinder Singh does not own and possess any other non-residential building in the Municipal Limit of building and now he ever vacated the same. It is wrong to suggest that I intentionally did not summon the said record and I knew that if the said records are produced the same will not favourable to me as per my above mentioned statement." 39 In support of this contention, learned counsel for the respondent placed reliance on the judgment of this Court in the case of Nirmal Singh v. Kuldip Raj, 1992(2) RCR(Rent) 483 (P&H) : 1992(2) PLR 693. The contention of the learned counsel was that in the present case it was not even suggested to the landlord-respondent when he appeared as a witness in respect of the alleged existence of town planning scheme and even the petitioner-tenant did not lead any evidence as his own witness. 40. Learned counsel for the respondent thereafter contended that the documents sought to be produced by the petitioner-tenant by way of miscellaneous application to allege subsequent events cannot be of any benefit to the petitioner as Annexure-A is a partnership-deed, whereas Annexure-B is Power of Attorney dated 24.1.1994 by Darshana Khosla in favour of Harvinder Singh landlord. Annexure-C is a sale-deed dated 21.2.1989 executed by Gobind Kaur, mother of the respondent-landlord in favour of respondent-landlord. Annexure-D is sale-deed dated 23.5.1990 regarding 3 biswas of land in favour of the respondent-landlord. Annexure-F is sale-deed dated 11.4.2005 of 2 biswas of land in favour of respondent-landlord while Annexure-G is sale-deed dated 11.4.2005 of 2 biswas of land in favour Rajinder Kaur, wife of the respondent-landlord, Annexure-H is a photograph of the garage and Annexure-I is sale-deed dated 7.9.2005 in favour of Gurvinder Kaur sister of the respondent-landlord, whereas Annexure-J is a photograph. The contention of the learned counsel for the respondent was that the petitioner-tenant cannot draw any benefit of the sale-deeds in favour of his mother Gobind Kaur, wife Rajinder Kaur and sister Gurvarinder Kaur. Learned counsel for the respondent further submitted that the sale-deed Annexure-F of two biswas of land and photograph Annexure-H indicates that it was having roof of cement shop and was merely constructed for garage. 41. Learned counsel for the respondent also argued that the respondent- landlord does not own any property except the residential building which was constructed in the property purchased on 23.5.1990. 42. 41. Learned counsel for the respondent also argued that the respondent- landlord does not own any property except the residential building which was constructed in the property purchased on 23.5.1990. 42. Learned counsel for the respondent also argued that the shop which is said to be made available to the petitioner in fact belongs to the mother of the respondent and is a part of residential building. Therefore, he was not entitled to occupy the same as of his own right. 43. On the these contentions, learned counsel for the respondent argued that there is no merit in the present revision petition and the same deserves to be dismissed. 44. I have considered the arguments raised by the learned counsel for the parties and do not find force in the contentions raised by the learned senior counsel for the petitioner. 45. The first contention of the learned senior counsel for the petitioner that there is no element of need in the present case cannot be accepted. It is not in dispute that the respondent is running a metal store in the tenanted premises belonging to the Municipal Committee, Gobindgarh for which he was paying higher rent and the shop in dispute was purchased for carrying on his business from the demised shop. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the ground of personal necessity on which the eviction of the tenant was sought does not prove the element of need as he failed to give dimensions of the shop of the Municipal Committee in his possession as tenant and no evidence was brought on record to show that he has been receiving constant threats to vacate the same, is without any force. The learned Courts below have recorded a concurrent finding of fact that the premises are bona fide required by the landlord. There are sufficient safeguards provided in the Act in case the landlord does not occupy the demised premises after ejectment and, therefore, it cannot be said that the learned Counsel below have erred in coming to the conclusion that the demised premises was required by the landlord for his own use and occupation. 46. There are sufficient safeguards provided in the Act in case the landlord does not occupy the demised premises after ejectment and, therefore, it cannot be said that the learned Counsel below have erred in coming to the conclusion that the demised premises was required by the landlord for his own use and occupation. 46. The other contention of the learned senior counsel for the petitioner that the respondent-landlord was in possession of shop No. 35 and that there was no pleading of insufficiency in the ejectment petition cannot be a ground to order ejectment of the petitioner. This contention of the learned senior counsel for the petitioner also does not find favour. Firstly, by way of rejoinder the respondent-landlord had pleaded insufficiency. Secondly, it may be noticed that even in the rent petition the landlord had mentioned that he was in occupation of shop No. 35 belonging to the Municipal Committee, where he is under constant threats to increase of 20% rent after every three years. Be that as it may, once it is proved that the tenant is paying higher rent for the tenanted premises of smaller size than the one belonging to him, it was always open to him to seek ejectment for his own premises. The evidence on record clearly goes to show that the premises in possession of the respondent-landlord was smaller in size than the one in occupation of the tenant. The contention of the landlord counsel that the respondent was in occupation of another shop is without any substance as he failed to prove the same on record, rather it has been proved by the landlord that the said shop was a residential area belonging to his mother. Even otherwise, if the respondent-landlord has not mentioned the dimensions and failed to file the site plan of the said shop, it does not in any way advance the case of the petitioner as there was no dispute about the area of the demised building. Even if the said shop is available to the landlord, it can be no ground to deny eviction as it is for the landlord to decide and choose the premises required by him for running his business as he is the best judge of his need. 47. Even if the said shop is available to the landlord, it can be no ground to deny eviction as it is for the landlord to decide and choose the premises required by him for running his business as he is the best judge of his need. 47. It may be noticed that subsequent events sought to be pleaded by the petitioner-tenant do not, in any way, advance the case of the petitioner- tenant, as nothing has been brought on record to show whether the respondent- landlord has vacated any shop of larger area in the urban area concerned nor there is any evidence to prove that the respondent-landlord was a property dealer. Mere purchase of some land and sale of land by the mother of the respondent-landlord belonging to her cannot be said to be a ground to reverse the findings of fact recorded by the learned Courts below holding that the premises in dispute was required bona fide by the landlord for his own use and occupation. 48. In view of what has been stated and discussed above, there is no merit in the present revision petition, which is accordingly, dismissed with no order as to costs.