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Andhra High Court · body

2006 DIGILAW 43 (AP)

Manda Vikram Dev v. M. Supriya

2006-01-23

M.VENKATESWARA REDDY

body2006
( 1 ) ALL the three criminal petitions are filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1908 (for short "the Code" ). In the first two petitions namely, Criminal Petition Nos. 4219 and 4267 of 2005, the petitioners therein are seeking quashing of proceedings in Crime no. 667 of 2005 on the file of the Central crime Station, Hyderabad, registered for the offences punishable under Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code and Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. In the third petition viz. , 5779 of 2005, the petitioners therein are seeking quashing of the proceedings in F. I. R. No. 224 of 2005 on the file of the Charminar Police Station, hyderabad, registered for the offence punishable under Section 506 read with section 34 of the IPC. ( 2 ) THE three petitioners in Criminal petition No. 4219 of 2005 are A. 1 to A. 3 and the sole petitioner in Criminal Petition no. 4267 of 2005 is A. 4 in Crime No. 667 of 2005 of Central Crime Station, Hyderabad. The three petitioners in Criminal Petition no. 5779 of 2005 and the three petitioners in criminal Petition No. 4219 of 2005 are one and the same. ( 3 ) THE copy of the F. I. R. in Crime no. 224 of 2005 on the file of the Charminar police Station, which is a offshoot of Criminal petition No. 4219 of 2005, does not disclose the names of the accused. On 21-10-2005 when the other two petitions were listed for hearing, and when the Court was engaged in hearing, other matters the respondents in Criminal Petition No. 5779 of 2005 turned up before the Court and complained that when they were in the Verandah of the court, waiting for their turn, two persons came to them and threatened them with dire consequences if they did not come round for compromise in Criminal Petition nos. 4267 and 4219 of 2005. This Court directed the Registrar (Judicial), High Court of Andhra Pradesh to cause recording of their statements and forward the same to the concerned police. Accordingly, the learned Registrar (Judicial) registered the statements and forwarded the same to the police. 4267 and 4219 of 2005. This Court directed the Registrar (Judicial), High Court of Andhra Pradesh to cause recording of their statements and forward the same to the concerned police. Accordingly, the learned Registrar (Judicial) registered the statements and forwarded the same to the police. In their statements, respondents 2 and 3 stated that two persons, one of whom identified himself as Narsing Goud, and another who is also a Goud, came to them and threatened with dire consequences if they did not withdraw the case. The offenders stated before them that the three petitioners in Criminal Petition No. 4219 of 2005 sent them. Therefore, it has to be presumed that the case is Cr No. 224 of 2005 is registered against the three petitioners in Crl. P No. 4219 of 2005. ( 4 ) THE three petitioners in Criminal petition Nos. 4219 and 5779 of 2005 are no other than the husband, father-in-law and mother-in-law of the defacto-complainant, who is the respondent in the first two petitions and the second respondent in Criminal petition No. 5779 of 2005. The 3rd respondent in Criminal Petition No. 5779 of 2005 is no other than the father of the second respondent therein i. e. , defacto-complainant. ( 5 ) FOR convenience of reference, i shall make reference to the parties in these three petitions as the defacto-complainant, the husband (of the defacto-complain) and parents-in-law (of the defacto-complainant ). Whenever the context requires refarme of the husband and all other accused together they will be referred to collectively as accused. ( 6 ) THE sole petitioner in Criminal petition No. 4267 of 2005, who is A. 4 in crime No. 667 of 2005 is the maternal uncle of the husband of the defacto-complainant and he will be referred to as defacto-complainant s husband s maternal uncle. ( 7 ) I have already set out in a nutshell the allegations in Crime No. 224 of 2005 and there is no need for reiteration. ( 8 ) CRIME No. 667 of 2005 arose out of a private complaint filed by the wife, the defacto-complainant, under Section 200 cr. P. C. , the allegations of which, briefly set-forth, are as under : ( 9 ) THE marriage of the defacto-complainant was solemnized on 9-5-2004 at kamma Sangam, Ameerpet, Hyderabad. The defacto-complainant is an M. Sc degree holder in Computers. P. C. , the allegations of which, briefly set-forth, are as under : ( 9 ) THE marriage of the defacto-complainant was solemnized on 9-5-2004 at kamma Sangam, Ameerpet, Hyderabad. The defacto-complainant is an M. Sc degree holder in Computers. It was represented before marriage that the accused was working as Software Engineer in U. S. A. and earning a salary of $ 6000/- per month. It was agreed prior to the marriage that instead of dowry of Rs. 10,00,000/- in cash, the same shall be paid in the form of customary gifts, gold, jewellery, silver articles and other house-hold items costing worth rs. 6,00,000/- and open plot bearing No. 209 in Survey No. 746 of Ekasilanagar Colony in korremula Village, Gatkeshar Mandal, Ranga reddy District be given as Pasupukumkuma. After marriage the husband was found to be unemployed. Three days before the marriage, the husband, the in-laws and the maternal uncle of the husband of the defacto-complainant asked the parents of the defacto-complainant to purchase a flat in the name of the husband and in-laws of the defacto-complainant or to give a portion of the house in which defacto-complainant s parents are residing or to give money to an extent of Rs. 10,00,000/- as dowry. ( 10 ) UNDER compelling circumstances the father of the defacto-complainant was forced to execute a gift deed agreeing to gift a flat if proposal is made for construction of residential apartments in which the parents of the defacto-complainant were residing by fixing a time-frame for development. After the marriage, the in-laws insisted the parents of the defacto-complainant to sell the open plot bearing no. 209, in survey No. 746, above referred to, and pay in cash to them. The father of the defacto-complainant refused to do so. Therefore, they developed hatred against the defacto-complainant ( 11 ) THE husband left U. S. A. on 20-5-2004 and parents of the accused left on 26-5-2004. No proper VISA arrangements were made by the accused to take the defacto-complainant to U. S. A. Later, the defacto-complainant joined her husband in u. S. A. Accused No. 1 physically assaulted and, demanded the defacto-complainant to ask her parents to send money. He also threatened to divorce and kill her. The other accused supported and instigated him. No proper VISA arrangements were made by the accused to take the defacto-complainant to U. S. A. Later, the defacto-complainant joined her husband in u. S. A. Accused No. 1 physically assaulted and, demanded the defacto-complainant to ask her parents to send money. He also threatened to divorce and kill her. The other accused supported and instigated him. On 11 -6-2005 the husband fell down accidentally from the balacony and the same was informed to the police authorities in u. S. A. The husband was admitted in hospital. He began to harass the defacto-complainant to arrange the money from her parents. The brother of the husband by name Manda Anil Kumar also joined his brother and both of them asked the defacto-complainant to go back to India. Thereafter, both the defacto-complainant and her husband came back to India on 26-6-2005 and stayed in in-law s house. The defacto-complainant was physically tortured and abused by her in-laws for money. She was asked to register the flat and to sell the plot of land which was agreed to be given as Pasupukumkuma. The defacto-complainant thereafter was necked out of the house. The defacto-complainant and her parents approached the in-laws several times, but they were demanded to pay Rs. 10,00,000/ -. (The complaint is not happily drafted with regard to the sequence of events and the harassment ). ( 12 ) ON the other hand, in the quashing petitions filed before this Court, the husband alleges that the defacto-complainant picked up quarrels with the husband and went to the extent of holding his shirt for not securing a job to her and she, in fact, pushed him from behind from the balcony and she did not even take care to take him to hospital; that he spent 27,000 U. S dollars for treatment of his broken hands. The husband also issued notice to the defacto-complainant and there was no response from the latter. Thus, the allegations and counter allegations were made against each other. ( 13 ) WHEN the matters came up for hearing, both the parties were advised by the Court to compromise the matter as it is not desirable for both sides to get hogged down in the quagmire of unending litigation. Both the parties took considerable time and compromised the matter. ( 13 ) WHEN the matters came up for hearing, both the parties were advised by the Court to compromise the matter as it is not desirable for both sides to get hogged down in the quagmire of unending litigation. Both the parties took considerable time and compromised the matter. A joint memo of compromise was filed into Court and both the parties admitted the terms of the compromise to be correct. ( 14 ) AS per the terms of the compromise, it is agreed, inter alia, that the husband shall pay an amount of Rs. 3,00,000/- by way of draft at the time of obtaining divorce in the presence of the judge adjudicating the proceedings of divorce; that both the spouses will not leave the country till the proceedings of divorce are concluded and that the wife and her parents will not institute any criminal or civil cases against the husband and his parents and relatives. Both the parties prayed for quashing of the proceedings. ( 15 ) THE question is whether in view of the compromise arrived at between both the parties, the proceedings in all the three cases can be quashed. ( 16 ) THE scope and ambit of the powers under Section 482 of the Code were examined by the Supreme Court in a number of decisions. However, the powers under Section 482 in relation to matrimonial disputes came to be considered in B. S. Joshi and others v. State of Haryana and another, 2003 (1) ALD (Crl.) 842 (SC) = (2003) 4 SCC 675 . The Court observed that the matrimonial disputes, particularly under Sections 498-A IPC and 406 IPC have registered considerable increase in the recent years and complaints were filed not only against the husband, but also other family members. The question considered by their Lordships in their own words is as under :". . . . The Court observed that the matrimonial disputes, particularly under Sections 498-A IPC and 406 IPC have registered considerable increase in the recent years and complaints were filed not only against the husband, but also other family members. The question considered by their Lordships in their own words is as under :". . . . When such matters are resolved either by the wife agreeing to rejoin the matrimonial home or mutual separation of husband and wife and also mutual settlement of other pending disputes as a result whereof both sides approach the High court and jointly pray for quashing of the criminal proceedings or the first information report or complaint filed by the wife under sections 498-A and 406 IPC, can the prayer he declined on the ground that since the offences are non-compoundable under section 320 of the Code, therefore, it is not permissible for the Court to quash the criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint. " ( 17 ) IN the case before their Lordships, affidavits were filed stating that the disputes have been finally settled and both parties agreed for mutual divorce. The High court of Punjab and Haryana in dismissing the quashing petitions on the ground that offences under Sections 498-A and 406 IPC are non-compoundable and inherent powers under Section 482 Cr. P. C. cannot be invoked to bypass the mandatory provision of Section 320 of the Code, relied upon the decisions of Supreme Court in State of haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp. (1) scc 335 = 1992 SCC (Cri.) 426; Madhu li/nave v. State of Maharashtra, (1977) 4 scc 551 = 1978 SCC (Cri.) 10 and surendra Nath Mohanty v. State of Orissa, 1999 (1) ALD (Crl.) 874 (SC) = (1999) 5 scc 238 = 1999 SCC (Cri) 988 = AIR 1999 SC 2181 . ( 18 ) WHILE appreciating the reasoning given by the High Court of Punjab and haryana, the Division Bench of the Supreme court held that the High Court has lost sight of the earlier part of para 102 in Bhajan lal case, (supra) which made it abundantly clear that the categories of cases given in the said case were only by way of illustration and neither the categories of cases so given were exhaustive nor could it be so. ( 19 ) IT may be pointed out that in bhajan Lal case (supra), the Supreme Court pointed out that it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised. ( 20 ) IN Pepsi Foods Ltd. v. Special judicial Magistrate, 1997 (2) ALD (Crl.) 840 (SC) = (1998) 5 SCC 749 = 1998 SCC (Crl) 1400, the Supreme Court held with reference to Bhajan Lal case (supra) that the guidelines laid down in Bhajan Lal case could not be inflexible. ( 21 ) AFTER making reference to the pepsi Foods Ltd. case (supra), the Supreme court held that it is well settled that these powers have no limits. Of course, where there is more power, it becomes necessary to exercise utmost care and caution while invoking such powers. ( 22 ) IN coming to the conclusion that it would be impermissible to quash the FIR on the ground that there has been a settlement between the parties since the offences complained are not compoundable, the Punjab and Haryana High Court relied upon Madhu limaye case (supra), the Hon ble Supreme court commented on the said conclusion of the High Court as follows :"the decision in Madhu Limaye case has been misread and misapplied by the High court. The question considered in that case was when there was a bar on the power of revision in relation to any interlocutory order passed in an appeal, enquiry, trial or other proceedings, what would be its effect on exercise of power under Section 482 of the code. Sub-section (2) of Section 397 CRPC providing that the power of revision conferred by sub-section (1) shall not be exercised in relation to any interlocutory order passed in any appeal, inquiry, trial or other proceedings was noticed and it was held that on a plain reading of Section 482, it would follow that nothing in the Code, which would include sub-section (2) of section 397 also, "shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High court". The Court said that if we were to say that the said bar is not to operate in the exercise of the inherent power at all, it will be setting at naught one of the limitations imposed upon the exercise of the revisional powers but adopting a harmonious approach held that the bar provided in sub-section (2) of Section 397 operates only in exercise of the revisional power of the High Court meaning thereby that the High Court will have no power of revision in relation to any interlocutory order. It was further held that, then, in accordance with one of the other principles enunciated above, the inherent power will come into play, there being no other provision in the Code for the redressal of the grievance of the aggrieved party. In madhu Limaye case it was, inter alia, said that if for the purpose of securing the ends of justice interference by the High court is absolutely necessary, then nothing contained in Section 397 (2) can limit or affect the exercise of the inherent power by the high Court. By way of an illustration, an example was given that where without jurisdiction the Court takes cognizance or issues process and assumes it to be an interlocutory order, would it stand to reason to say that the inherent power of the High Court cannot be exercised for stopping the criminal proceedings as early as possible, since being an interlocutory order, it was not revisable and resultantly the accused had to be harassed upto the end, though the order taking cognizance or issuing process was without jurisdiction. It was held that the bar will not operate to prevent the abuse of the process of the court and/or to secure the ends of justice. 8. It is, thus, clear that Madhu Limaye case does not lay down any general proposition limiting power of quashing the criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint as vested in Section 482 of the Code or extraordinary power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. We are, therefore, of the view that if for the purpose of securing the ends of justice, quashing of fir becomes necessary, Section 320 would not be a bar to the exercise of power of quashing. It is, however, a different matter depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case whether to exercise or not such a power". We are, therefore, of the view that if for the purpose of securing the ends of justice, quashing of fir becomes necessary, Section 320 would not be a bar to the exercise of power of quashing. It is, however, a different matter depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case whether to exercise or not such a power". ( 23 ) COMING to Surendra Nath mohanty case (supra), the Supreme Court held :"in Mohanty case the appellants were convicted by the trial Court for offence under section 307. The High Court altered the conviction of the appellants and convicted them for offence under Section 326 and imposed sentence of six months. The trial court had sentenced the appellants for a period of five years rigorous imprisonment. The application for compounding was, however, dismissed by the High Court. This Court holding that the offence for which the appellants had been convicted was non-compoundable and, therefore, it could not be permitted to be compounded but considering that the parties had settled their dispute outside the Court, the sentence was reduced to the period already undergone. It is, however, to be borne in mind that in the present case the appellants had not sought compounding of the offences. They had approached the Court seeking quashing of FIR under the circumstances abovestated. " ( 24 ) THEREAFTER, making reference to state of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy, air 1977 SC 1489 , the Supreme Court held : "10. In State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy, (supra) considering the scope of inherent power of quashing under Section 482, this court held that in the exercise of this wholesome power, the High Court is entitled to quash proceedings if it comes to the conclusion that the ends of justice so require. It was observed that in a criminal case, the veiled object behind a lame prosecution, the very nature of the material on which the structure of the prosecution rests and the like would justify the High court in quashing the proceeding in the interest of justice and that the ends of justice are higher than the ends of mere law though justice had got to be administered according to laws made by the Legislature. This Court said that the compelling necessity for making these observations is that without a proper realization of the object and purpose of the provision which seeks to save the inherent powers of the High court to do justice between the State and its subjects, it would be impossible to appreciate the width and contours of that salient jurisdiction. On facts, it was also noticed that there was no reasonable likelihood of the accused being convicted of the offence. What would happen to the trial of the case where the wife does not support the imputations made in the FIR of the type in question. As earlier noticed, now she has filed an affidavit that the fir was registered at her instance due to temperamental differences and implied imputations there may be many reasons for not supporting the imputations. It may be either for the reason that she has resolved disputes with her husband and his other family members and as a result thereof she has again started living with her husband with whom she earlier had differences or she was willingly parted company and is living happily on her own or has married someone else on the earlier marriage having been dissolved by divorce on consent of parties or fails to support the prosecution on some other similar grounds. In such eventuality, there would almost be no chance of conviction. Would it then be proper to decline to exercise power of quashing on the ground that it would be permitting the parties to compound non-compoundable offences ? The answer clearly has to be in the "negative". It would, however, be a different matter if the High Court on facts declines the prayer for quashing for any valid reasons including lack of bona fides. ( 25 ) THEN, the Hon ble Supreme Court made a reference to Madhavarao jiwajirao Scindia v. Sambhajirao chandrojirao Angre, (1988) 1 SCC 692 = 1988 SCC (Cri.) 234, wherein it was held that while exercising powers under Section 482 cr. ( 25 ) THEN, the Hon ble Supreme Court made a reference to Madhavarao jiwajirao Scindia v. Sambhajirao chandrojirao Angre, (1988) 1 SCC 692 = 1988 SCC (Cri.) 234, wherein it was held that while exercising powers under Section 482 cr. P. C. it is for the High Court to take into consideration any special features which appear in a particular case to consider whether it is expedient and in the interest of justice to permit a prosecution to continue and where, in the opinion of the Court, chances of an ultimate conviction are bleak and, therefore, no useful purposes is likely to be served by allowing a criminal prosecution to continue, the Court may, while taking into consideration the special facts of a case, also quash the case, and observed that it becomes the duty of the court to encourage genuine settlement of matrimonial disputes. ( 26 ) REFERENCE is also made to G. V. Rao v. L. H. V. Prasad, 2000 (1) ALD (Crl.) 702 (SC) = (2000) 3 SCC 693 = 2000 SCC (Cri.) 733, by the Supreme Court, wherein it is held that the young couple shall be allowed to settle down in life and live peacefully. The Supreme Court opined that the parties shall be allowed to ponder over their defaults and terminate their disputes amicably by mutual agreement instead of fighting it out in a Court of law where it takes years and years to conclude and in that process the parties lose their "young" days in cashing their "cases" in different courts and concluded as under :"14. There is no doubt that the object of introducing Chapter XX-A containing section 498-A in the Indian Penal Code was to prevent torture to a woman by her husband or by relatives of her husband. Section 498-A was added with a view to punishing a husband and his relatives who harass or torture the wife to coerce her or her relatives to satisfy unlawful demands of dowry. The hypertechnical view would be counterproductive and would act against interests of women and against the object for which this provision was added. There is every likelihood that non-exercise of inherent power to quash the proceedings to meet the ends of justice would prevent women from settling earlier. That is not the object of Chapter XX-A of the Indian penal Code. 15. There is every likelihood that non-exercise of inherent power to quash the proceedings to meet the ends of justice would prevent women from settling earlier. That is not the object of Chapter XX-A of the Indian penal Code. 15. In view of the above discussion, we hold that the High Court in exercise of inherent powers can quash criminal proceedings or FIR or complaint and seetion 320 of the Code does not limit or affect the powers under Section 482 of the Code. " ( 27 ) IN the instant case also both the spouses are young and highly qualified. If they have to fight like cocks in a Court of law lor years together they would certainly lose their valuable years of life particularly youth-hood. They have reached a stage where they cannot live together. Allegations and counter allegations are being made. They decided to take divorce. If more valuable part of life is lost it is difficult for them to get remarried. Denying to quash the proceedings would not serve any purpose when the criminal proceedings launched against the husband are going to end in acquittal in view of the compromise. To allow the police to file charge-sheet in crime No. 224 of 2005 and to allow the proceedings in the above said crimes to go on, would ultimately result in futile exercise, wasting the valuable time of the police, the Court and the parties as well. Therefore, in the aforesaid circumstances, i feel it is expedient in the interest of justice to quash the proceeding in all the three cases. ( 28 ) ACCORDINGLY, relying upon the above case, the Criminal Petition Nos. 4219, 4267 and 5779 of 2005 allowed and the proceedings in Crime No. 667 of 2005 on the file of the Central Crime Station, hyderabad and FIR Crime No. 224 of 2005 on the file of the Charminar Police Station, hyderabad are hereby quashed.