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2006 DIGILAW 431 (CAL)

JAYANTA KUMAR GUHA v. STATE OF WEST BENGAL

2006-07-18

PARTHA SAKHA DATTA, PRAVENDU NARAYAN SINHA

body2006
PARTHA SAKHA DATTA, J. ( 1 ) THE appeal at the instance of the two accused persons as appellants is directed against the judgment and order stated 22. 6. 1995 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, 4th Court at Howrah in S. T. Case no. XVIII (January) 1991 convicting the appellant Jayanta Guha and his mother santa Guha under Section 498a read with Section 34 I. P. C. and sentencing each of them to suffer rigorous imprisonment for two years and a fine of rs. 10,000/- in default to suffer rigorous imprisonment for six months and further convicting the appellant Jayanta Guha of the charge under Section 304b read with Section 34 I. P. C. and sentencing him to suffer rigorous imprisonment for 10 years. ( 2 ) AT 00. 45 hours on the night between 1. 11. 89 and 2. 11. 89 the father of the victim Nirmalya Ghosh lodged a written complaint with the Jagacha Police station leading thereby registration of Jagacha P. S. Case No. 111/89 dated 2. 11. 89 against the two appellants under Sections 498a/304b read with Section 34 I. P. C. wherein the following facts were alleged: -In January 1987 the victim Monalisa Guha was given in marriage with the appellant Jayanta Guha according to Hindu rites. Sometime after the marriage the son-in-law Jayanta and his mother Smt. Santa Guha started creating pressure upon her at different times for giving a sum of rs. 5,000/- and a tape deck as dowry. For a number of times the demand was placed through the victim. The de facto-complainant was not agreeable to the demand and before the marriage it was clearly communicated to them that no dowry would be given. But, over the demand the two appellants would perpetrate physical and mental torture upon the victim. On a number of occasions the second son of the de facto-complainant, Prabir Ghosh was sent to the matrimonial home of the victim so as to request the appellants to desist from such illegal work. One year two months before the victim had died she had delivered a female child, and she had to undergo various mental tortures owing to that. He had requested his son-in-law and mother to live peacefully keeping in mind the future of his daughter and her baby daughter, yet they had kept on exerting pressure for fulfilling their earlier demand of rs. He had requested his son-in-law and mother to live peacefully keeping in mind the future of his daughter and her baby daughter, yet they had kept on exerting pressure for fulfilling their earlier demand of rs. 5,000/- and a tape deck. In the evening of 30. 10. 89 the appellant jayanta had brought his wife and daughter to his (de facto-complainant's)house on scooter on the occasion of 'bhatridwitia' and returned to his house after having dropped them. The victim was of a subdued nature, yet in course of chatting with her mother over this and that she had expressed about her family trouble, while cautioning at the same time her mother against making any dispute over that. On 1. 11. 89 at about 6 p. m. the appellant Jayanta came to the house of the de facto-complainant by a scooter for the purpose of taking back the victim and her baby. In the house of the de facto-complainant there was hot exchange of words between the victim and the appellant Jayanta over domestic affairs. At that time the de facto-complainant heard Jayanta telling his wife, "i shall not take you on the scooter, I shall make you run behind the scooter". The de facto-complainant's elder daughter had protested against that. However, the de facto-complainant called a rickshaw whereby the victim with her baby proceeded to her matrimonial home, while Jayanta followed the rickshaw by scooter. At about 9. 30 p. m. Gopal Chakraborty, the neighbour of the de facto-complainant had informed his sons in secret that his daughter had strangled herself to death with a rope noose around her neck in her matrimonial home at National Place. Immediately his sons left for the victim's father-in-law's house. Although the matter was kept secret to the de facto-complainant he had anticipated that something ill had taken place and he too had gone to his son-in-law's house almost instantly and found his daughter lying dead on bed in the first floor of her husband's room and a lot of local people had gathered there. On enquiry he came to know that his daughter and her baby daughter had returned to his father-in-law's house at about 7. 30 p. m. and at that time her husband and mother-in-law physically and mentally tortured her over family matter and as a result of that his daughter died. On enquiry he came to know that his daughter and her baby daughter had returned to his father-in-law's house at about 7. 30 p. m. and at that time her husband and mother-in-law physically and mentally tortured her over family matter and as a result of that his daughter died. ( 3 ) BEFORE the learned trial Court 21 witnesses were examined on behalf of the prosecution, while three witnesses were examined by the defence and upon examination of the witnesses learned trial Court recorded the conviction and sentence under Section 498a, I. P. C. against the two appellants and under section 304b, I. P. C. against the appellant, Jayanta Guha in addition to the charge under Section 498a, I. P. C. ( 4 ) OF the 21 witnesses examined for the prosecution, evidence of P. W. 1 nirmalya Ghosh who is the father of the victim, P. W. 3 Sabita Ghosh, mother of the victim, P. W. 8 Prasun Ghosh, elder brother of the victim, P. W. 13 Puspa ghosh, the wife of P. W. 1 s elder brother, P. W. 14 Meenakshi Ray Nandi, elder sister of victim P. W. 16 Pranay Ghosh, another brother of the victim and P. W. 18 Prabir Ghosh, yet another brother of the victim can be classified under one category of the witnesses who as relations of the victim testified to the alleged torture on demand of dowry. Under the second category fall P. W. 4 Dhiraj datta, P. W. 7 Mohan Ghosh, P. W. 12 Ujjwal Kanti Ghosh, P. W. 15 Atanu ranjan Pal, P. W. 17 Paresh Bhattacharjee and P. W. 19 Bishnu Pada De, all being neighbours of the appellants. The rest of the witnesses who include police officers, doctor and others are formal witnesses and their evidence do not touch upon the facts-in-issue. ( 5 ) BEFORE proceeding to the analysis of the evidence of the witnesses we are reminding ourselves of the legal position obtaining in the given situation. Unquestionably, the victim died an unnatural death within two years 10 months from the date of her marriage and in the context of the allegations that the victim was subjected to torture and cruelty on demands of dowry the following questions have to be addressed to: - (A) Whether the accused has committed the dowry death of the victim. ? Unquestionably, the victim died an unnatural death within two years 10 months from the date of her marriage and in the context of the allegations that the victim was subjected to torture and cruelty on demands of dowry the following questions have to be addressed to: - (A) Whether the accused has committed the dowry death of the victim. ? (B) Whether the victim was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or his relative? (C) Whether such cruelty and harassment was for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry? (D) Whether such cruelty or harassment was 'soon before' her death? ( 6 ) AS has been laid down in Kalyyaperumal v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 2003 SC 3828 and also Yashoda v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2004 (3) SCC 98 , there must be existence of a proximate and live-link between the effect of cruelty based on dowry demand and the concerned death. If alleged incident of cruelty is remote in time and has become stale enough not to disturb mental equilibrium of the woman concerned, it would be of no consequences. It has been the law settled therefore that the determination of the period which can come within the term 'soon before' is left to be decided by the Courts depending upon facts and circumstances of each case and the expression 'soon before' would normally imply that the interval should not be much between cruelty or harassment and the death in question. ( 7 ) P. W. 1 who was the F. I. R. maker stated in his evidence that the demand of Rs. 5,000/- for the purpose of defraying the expenses on account of bhoubhat Ceremony and tape-deck was made by the uncle of Jayanta but he made it clear that it would not be possible for him to comply with the demand. A few days after marriage the victim came to his house and lamented for not meeting up the demand of the accused persons. His wife ascertained from his daughter as to the cause behind her unhappy married life and charged him for arranging the marriage in a wealthy family having no minimum courtesy or decorum. He says that her daughter was subjected to physical and mental torture. His wife ascertained from his daughter as to the cause behind her unhappy married life and charged him for arranging the marriage in a wealthy family having no minimum courtesy or decorum. He says that her daughter was subjected to physical and mental torture. The evidence of P. W. 1 does not truly reveal as to when the victim allegedly told him about infliction of torture on demand of dowry. Reading between the lines of the F. I. R. which was lodged with the O. C. Jagacha P. S. on 1. 11. 89 itself it does not appear that before the marriage and when negotiation had been going on the accused persons had demanded a sum of Rs. 5,000/- in order to meet the expenditure on account of Bhoubhat Ceremony and a tape-deck, nor has it been stated there that uncle of Jayanta as his guardian pressed such demand. However, in third paragraph of the Examination-in-Chief of P. W. 1 it has been stated that sometime after marriage when the deceased had come to his house she lamented against not paying the money and tape-deck and his wife ascertained from his daughter as to the cause behind the victim's unhappy married life. Evidence of P. W. 1, if closely read and even if accepted prima facie, does not give rise to any legitimate conclusion that there had been any continuity in the alleged demand of dowry. Whether the victim had really made any disclosure to her parents about not complying with the demand of dowry is a different question to which we will presently come to in the sequel. But, having read the evidence of P. W. 1 it could only be argued at best that once soon after marriage when the victim came to her father's house she complained of dowry demand and torture but it cannot be argued that at any time the victim repeated her lament to her parents during her subsequent visits to her father's home. The fourth paragraph of the Examination-in-Chief of p. W. 1 relates to a different story, namely birth of female child which made the accused persons unhappy and to which P. W. 1 consoled the in-laws of the victim saying that the matter was the same whether a male or a female child was born. The fourth paragraph of the Examination-in-Chief of p. W. 1 relates to a different story, namely birth of female child which made the accused persons unhappy and to which P. W. 1 consoled the in-laws of the victim saying that the matter was the same whether a male or a female child was born. This event can at best be taken as a piece of evidence in connection with charge under Section 498a I. PC. but not under Section 304b I. P. C. thereof. Therefore, the essential requirement 'soon before' her death is distinctly absent from the evidence of P. W. 1. P. W. 1 allegedly made it clear at the time of marriage that it was against his principle to comply with any demand of dowry and in the circumstance it is inconceivable that knowing the State of mind of p. W. 1 the appellants would continue to place the demand fruitlessly. Again, the demand of a sum of Rs. 5,000/- was allegedly placed in connection with defraying the expenditure of 'boubhat' Ceremony, and it was well-nigh impossible that the same demand would continue to persist till the death of the victim even when the purpose had been over long ago and the appellants were made unmistakably clear that it was against the principle of P. W. 1 to oblige with dowry demand. The events of 30. 10. 89 and 1. 11. 89 are purely unconnected with the demand of dowry. In connection with the 'bhatridwitia' function the accused Jayanta brought his wife and her baby by scooter to the house of P. W. 1 and he alone returned, and again came on the next day to take them back. The quarrel that took place between the accused and the victim in the hearing of the P. W. 1 was not at all connected with dowry demand. It was a quarrel over family matter as stated in the F. I. R. itself. The accused Jayanta refused to take p. W. 1 and her daughter by scooter which is why P. W. 1 arranged a rickshaw whereby the victim and her daughter proceeded to her matrimonial home and the accused followed the rickshaw with his scooter. It was a quarrel over family matter as stated in the F. I. R. itself. The accused Jayanta refused to take p. W. 1 and her daughter by scooter which is why P. W. 1 arranged a rickshaw whereby the victim and her daughter proceeded to her matrimonial home and the accused followed the rickshaw with his scooter. In cross-examination of P. W. 1 it has appeared that he visited the house of the accused a number of times but does not say that in course of any of such visits the accused persons directly placed any demand of dowry to him. Similarly, accused Jayanta also visited the house of P. W. 1 on a number of occasions but P. W. 1 does not claim this on any such occasion the accused allegedly repeated and renewed his demand. It comes from cross-examination of P. W. 1 that the accused Jayanta purchased national saving certificate worth Rs. 50,000/- in the joint names of himself and the deceased. Further, in the name of the deceased a savings bank account was opened by the accused Jayanta with the United Commercial-Bank and a sum of Rs. 16,000/-was found lying in the credit of the deceased. The accused Jayanta purchased out of his own fund a refrigerator and a Colour t. V. before the death of his wife. During the short span of two years and half the accused Jayanta had taken the victim on pleasure trips to Digha, Puri, Madras and Kashmir and the question naturally arises whether such pleasure trips to different places of India can occur during any family turmoil. The matter of the fact is that P. W. 1 was a retired Government employee having six sons and two daughters, the deceased being the youngest, while the family of the accused was well off having two-storied building in Buxarah in the District of Howrah. In this background it is worthwhile to consider whether the demand of Rs. 5,000/-and a tape-deck was really made by the accused persons or whether the death of the victim was on account of some other factors than the alleged demand of dowry. In the evening of 30. 10. In this background it is worthwhile to consider whether the demand of Rs. 5,000/-and a tape-deck was really made by the accused persons or whether the death of the victim was on account of some other factors than the alleged demand of dowry. In the evening of 30. 10. 1989 the victim who had long hair had gone to a beauty parlour and cut her hair in such a measure that according to the defence it was not to the liking of P. W. 1 and over this incident there was a commotion in the family of the P. W. 1 and the victim was chastised and rebuked. ( 8 ) EVIDENCE of P. W. 3 does not elicit anything new. She, the mother of the victim, visited the house of the accused for 5/6 times but never does she say that on any occasion the accused persons demanded or renewed the alleged demand of dowry. Evidence of P. W. 3 goes to the effect that sometime after marriage she found her daughter morossed and on enquiry the daughter disclosed that she was being criticized for non-payment of a sum of Rs. 5,000/-and non-presentation of a tape-deck. Her evidence does not go to show that the victim narrated her woes to her mother oh each occasion when she came. In Examination-in-Chief of P. W. 3 we find that P. W. 3 was pained as the victim was not allegedly allowed to move with her husband and their conjugal privacy was interfered with even during their trips to different places by the victim's mother-in-law and aunt of the accused. This alleged event is purely unconnected with the charge under Section 304b I. P. C. In her evidence-in-chief P. W. 3 has stated that the victim who was well known for her long hair cut down her hair so short for which she was criticized by the accused Jayanta on 1. 11. 1989 in the victim's father's house by saying that she would be given a lesson by his mother after she would return to her matrimonial home. 11. 1989 in the victim's father's house by saying that she would be given a lesson by his mother after she would return to her matrimonial home. This may be an instance of humiliation or rebuke but is unconnected with the charge under 304b I. P. C. The I. O. who is P. W. 21 has stated in his evidence that P. W. 3 did not state before him that the deceased had divulged to her that she was subjected to criticism and harassment for non-payment of the money and she was hard pressed by the accused who renewed their demand to them. ( 9 ) P. W. 8 Prasun Ghosh, the elder brother of the victim said that during her casual visit to his house the victim had ventilated her grievances against the accused persons and reported about torture for non-presentation of dowry. P. W. 8 said in his cross-examination that the victim reported about torture in 1987 and 1988. If his evidence is taken to be true at face value it does not come out that the deceased complained of torture to him at any point of time during the year 1989. Even on 2. 11. 89 he did not tell the I. O. that the deceased was tortured for non-payment of the dowry. The I. O. says that P. W. 8 did not at all tell him that his sister was subjected to torture for non-payment of cash about rs. 5,000/- and non-presentation of tape-deck. ( 10 ) EVIDENCE of P. W. 13, Puspa Ghosh, the wife of P. W. 1's elder brother says in her evidence-in-chief that two months after marriage the victim told her about torture on the ground of dowry demand. The I. 0. says that P. W. 13 did not at all State to him that the victim had reported her (P. W. 13) that she was subjected to torture because of non-fulfillment of the dowry demand. ( 11 ) EVIDENCE of P. W. 14 Meenakshi Ray Nandi is mere repetition in essence of what P. W. 1 and P. W. 3 have stated in their respective Examination-in-Chief. This witness was examined by the I. O. 20/25 days after the incident. ( 11 ) EVIDENCE of P. W. 14 Meenakshi Ray Nandi is mere repetition in essence of what P. W. 1 and P. W. 3 have stated in their respective Examination-in-Chief. This witness was examined by the I. O. 20/25 days after the incident. Her statement that Monalisa (victim) told her that either she would commit suicide or be killed by the accused persons is to be taken with a pinch of salt when compared with the evidence of the I. O. I. O. says that P. W. 14 did not State to him that the accused persons renewed their demand. This witness has introduced a story. It is that on the occasion of the Kali Puja which is performed in the house of the uncle of the Jayanta the victim was asked to attend the function by wearing a particular ear-ring but that ear-ring was misplaced by the victim for which victim wrote a letter to P. W. 14 requesting her to supply another ear-ring which P. W. 14 complied with. Now this episode has hardly any bearing with the charges levelled against the accused persons. ( 12 ) EVIDENCE of P. W. 16 Pranay Ghosh one of the sons of P. W. 1 relates to seizure of a letter written by the deceased to P. W. 14. Importantly, this witness does not say anything about the alleged torture upon the victim by the accused, persons on alleged demand of dowry. ( 13 ) ACCORDING to the evidence of P. W. 1 because of marital trouble in the matrimonial family of the deceased P. W. 18, Prabir Ghosh who is the son of p. W. 1 was sent to the house of the accused to persuade them not to cause torture upon the victim but this witness (P. W. 18) does not at all say that his sister was subjected to torture, that she was pressed with the demand of dowry of Rs. 5,0007- and tape-deck and , that he had gone to the house of the accused persons with request not to cause marital trouble upon his sister. Thus, P. W. 16 and P. W. 18 who are the brothers of the victim do not appear to have said a single sentence to substantiate any of the charges which the accused persons have been levelled with. Thus, P. W. 16 and P. W. 18 who are the brothers of the victim do not appear to have said a single sentence to substantiate any of the charges which the accused persons have been levelled with. ( 14 ) ABOUT the neighbours of the accused persons we first come to the evidence of P. W. Dhiraj Datta. This witness initially stated that he had learnt from his wife that the accused person subjected the victim to torture. Subsequently, he developed his evidence to say that the victim narrated her woes within his hearing. In his cross-examination this witness has said that he has not told the I. O. that the victim was in visiting term to his house and that she had disclosed about her sorrows to his wife. Therefore, evidence of this witness has hardly any legal value. The learned Advocate for the appellant argued that this witness is a partisan witness because concerning the death of the deceased a meeting was held in the house of this witness by a certain political party and he was present in his house when the meeting was held. ( 15 ) P. W. 7 Mohan Guha, the alleged matchmaker mentions about alleged incident of torture on the victim which even the parents of the victim did not refer to. This witness says that the negotiation of marriage broke down on the demand of dowry but subsequently the side of the groom came forward and marriage was solemnised without any payment of dowry. Even P. W. 1 and p. W. 3 have not said so. Evidence of P. W. 7 that the victim reported to him from time to time about her unhappy married life and lamented him that she would commit suicide can hardly be accepted inasmuch as P. W. 1 and P. W. 3 did not say in their evidence that the victim told them that she would commit suicide. ( 16 ) P. W. 12 Ujjal Kanti Ghatak, a neighbour of the accused says that victim used to visit his house and tell him that she was subjected to torture because of dowry demand. He claims that he was eye-witness to such torture but does not elaborate when he witnessed the alleged incidents of torture or what was exactly the incident of torture. He claims that he was eye-witness to such torture but does not elaborate when he witnessed the alleged incidents of torture or what was exactly the incident of torture. P. W. 1 and P. W. 3 do not say that p. W. 12 told them anything about the alleged incident of torture, nor does P. W. 12 say that he reported any incident of torture of P. W. 1 and P. W. 3. Learned advocate for the appellants with reference to cross-examination of P. W. 12 submits that the witness has enmity with the accused Jayanta because the accused Jayanta had protested against the illicit connection of P. W. 12 with a maid servant and P. W. 12 appears to be overjealous and it is highly improbable that the victim being a house wife would be frequent visitor to the house of P. W. 12 with whom the accused persons do not appear to have comfortable terms. ( 17 ) EVIDENCE of P. W. 15 Atanu Rajan Pal is not reliable because his statement that the victim was subjected to torture on demand of dowry was not told to the I. O. Secondly, this witness says that on one occasion the mother-in-law of the victim rebuked the victim in filthy words and the husband attempted to assault her by means of iron rod. This alleged incident of attempt to assault or abuse does not appear have any bearing with alleged torture on account of dowry. Moreover, alarmingly this event was not known to P. W. 1 and P. W. 13 and to the I. O. ( 18 ) EVIDENCE of P. W. 17 Paresh Bhattacharjee is interesting in this that he claims to have seen the victim beaten and heard her weeping while he was coaching students on tabla in a house contiguous to the house of the accused. Evidence of this witness can hardly be accepted for more than one reason. Firstly, it is not clear from his evidence as to in whose house this witness used to coach students. If it were the house of a different person then instead of p. W. 17 the house owner of that house would have been a natural witness as being a neighbour of the accused to testify to the alleged torture upon the victim by the accused. If it were the house of a different person then instead of p. W. 17 the house owner of that house would have been a natural witness as being a neighbour of the accused to testify to the alleged torture upon the victim by the accused. Secondly, if it was his own house where he had been giving coaching to his students then it was well-nigh impossible for him to witness any alleged incident of assault or torture in view of his house having been at a distance of three to four minutes walk from the house of the accused. Thirdly, if it is his claim that he has not any visiting term either to the house of the accused or to the house of the de facto-complainant then it is highly doubtful what necessitated him to be a witness. It is important to note here that the victim died on 1. 11. 1989 while this witness was examined by the I. O. on 7. 1. 1990. It was suggested by the defence that this witness is friendly to P. W. 18 Prabir Ghosh (brother of the victim) as both P. W. 18 and the witness are primary school teachers. Further, this witness has stated in his cross-examination that he did not tell the I. O. that in course of coaching students on tabla he came to know all about mental and physical tortures perpetrated on the deceased by the accused person and that he heard weeping voice of the deceased while she was being beaten. Ommission to make this important piece of evidence relating to beating the victim by the accused is vital and such a statement on oath coming for the first time four years after the death of the victim can hardly be accepted. Finally, there is a suggestion by the defence to the witness that the witness introduced one female school inspector to the accused Jayanta Guha for the purpose of inducting her as a tenant in the ground floor of the house of Jayanta, which the witness has admitted; but what has not been admitted by the witness is the further suggestion of the defence to the effect that this witness used to visit the female inspector during evenings against which the accused persons raised protest. Upon all these considerations there is no reason to accept the evidence of P. W. 17 at face value and it is important to note that the evidence of P. W. 17 is not at all connected to the charge of dowry demand. It is not in evidence that the victim had any conversation with him or he had any conversation with p. W. 1 or his sons with respect to alleged demand of dowry and causing torture over that. ( 19 ) EVIDENCE of P. W. 19 Bishnu Pada De is not on the better footing either. He claims that the deceased was occasionally subjected to physical torture by the accused persons and there were quarrels in the family and he heard Monalisa's weep. The I. O. says that P. W. 19 has not stated to him that he did notice any quarrel in the house of the accused or heard Monalisa's weep or saw the accused torturing the victim physically. Therefore, statement of P. W. 19 made before the learned trial Court four years after the death of the victim cannot be made the basis of conviction either on account of the charge under section 498a or under Section 304b of the I. P. C. Moreover, this witness has not stated anything at all with regard to the alleged demand of dowry or alleged torture on account of dowry. Again it is not clear from evidence of this witness as to where his house was situated at the material point of time. In his examination-in-Chief he claims that his house is to the contiguous west to the house of the accused. At one place of cross-examination he has said that on and from June 1992 he had not been in occupation as a contiguous neighbour of the accused but again says that in June 1992 he has constructed his own house. Again, it appears from his cross-examination that he was a tenant in the room of the accused and his wife was in the tenanted room on the very evening when the victim committed suicide. We are at a loss how to believe this witness. Again, it appears from his cross-examination that he was a tenant in the room of the accused and his wife was in the tenanted room on the very evening when the victim committed suicide. We are at a loss how to believe this witness. Once he claimed to be a neighbour of the accused, then shifted his position to say that since June 1992 he had not been the neighbour but again said on the fateful day his wife was in the tenanted room of the accused when the victim committed suicide. For all these reasons, this evidence cannot be accepted and it is more so as he is a colleague of P. W. 18. ( 20 ) IN the third category of the witnesses there is P. W. 2, Dr. Pranab kumar Roy who had been to the house of the accused at 9 p. m. on 1. 11. 1989 to find the victim hanging with a saree attached to her neck from the ceiling. At his request the body was brought down. He found no other marks of external injury except a mark around the neck but he was not of the definite opinion as to whether it was a case of suicide or homicide. From the above mark he formed an opinion that it was the outcome of tieing with a cord around her neck but found no trace of that cord inside the room. The learned Additional Public prosecutor lays a great stress upon this piece of evidence to suggest that the death was otherwise than suicidal. The argument of the learned Additional Public prosecutor appears to be misplaced because in cross-examination of this witness the witness has made it clear that he mentioned about the piece of cloth and not of any cord. At any rate evidence of this witness has hardly any legal force because he did not hold any post mortem examination of the victim nor did he make any report after his ocular examination. ( 21 ) IT is P. W. 5 Dr. S. K. Lahiri who on 2. 11. 1989 upon post-morterm examination of the victim came to the opinion that the death was due to the effect of hanging, ante mortem and suicidal. He ruled out it to be the case of homicide. ( 21 ) IT is P. W. 5 Dr. S. K. Lahiri who on 2. 11. 1989 upon post-morterm examination of the victim came to the opinion that the death was due to the effect of hanging, ante mortem and suicidal. He ruled out it to be the case of homicide. ( 22 ) P. W. 6, Gopal Chandra Chatterjee is a witness to a seizure list in respect of seizure of one tea table, one sunmica table and one synthetic saree, printed bed-sheet, ladies handkerchief, conch bungles and ladies wrist watch (Ext. 6/1) and he was also a witness to inquest (Ext. 4/1 ). ( 23 ) EVIDENCE of P. W. 9 Rabindra Nath Das, S. I. of police relates to receipt of a written complaint from P. W. 1 and endorsing it to the Duty Officer of jagacha P. S. for starting a specific case under Sections 304b/34/498a of I. P. C. through a homeguard. This witness says that upon receipt of an information regarding public commotion over the incident of suicide by hanging he had rushed to the Buxarah National Place. P. W. 10, Tapan Kumar Seal, an Assistant sub-Inspector of Police carried the deadbody of the deceased to Howrah General hospital and he identified the deadbody to the doctor who held post-mortem examination. P. W. 11, Dhiren Samaddar, who was a constable at the material point of time was a witness to the inquest. P. W. 20 Mrinal Kanti Majhi, S. I. of police received the FIR (Ext. 2) and registered Jagacha P. S. Case No. 111 of 1989 dated 2. 11. 1989 under Sections 304b/498a/34 of the I. P. C. by drawing up a formal FIR (Ext. 7 ). ( 24 ) TO summarize evidence of the witnesses with respect to the charge under Section 304b of the I. P. C. , it can be said that save an except the unnatural death of the victim within three years of her marriage the other essential ingredients necessary to bring home the charge thereunder have not been proved. Leaving aside the question whether the claim of P. W. 1 that the victim was put to pressure to fetch a sum of Rs. 5,000/- and tape deck there is practically absence of evidence as to exactly when during the married life of three years the deceased was asked to fetch the dowry. Leaving aside the question whether the claim of P. W. 1 that the victim was put to pressure to fetch a sum of Rs. 5,000/- and tape deck there is practically absence of evidence as to exactly when during the married life of three years the deceased was asked to fetch the dowry. The demand for dowry has to be persisted. Evidence of P. W. 1 does not at all show when for the last time the victim told P. W. 1 about the dowry demand. The family of the victim and the family of the de facto-complaihant have visited each others' house on a number of occasions but it is not the evidence of P. W. 1 that at any point of time P. W. 1 was asked by the accused persons to give Rs. 5,000/- and a tape deck. The alleged demand of the uncle at the time of negotiation of marriage was not persistent in so far as the uncle is concerned. Admittedly, the accused persons themselves did not place any demand at the time of negotiation of marriage as there is no evidence to that effect. The events of 30. 10. 1989 and 1. 11. 1989, as we have earlier observed are purely unconnected with the alleged dowry demand. In the case of Kans Raj v. State of Punjab as reported in 2000 SCC (Cri) 935 it has been held that the words 'soon before' is pregnant with the idea of proximity test and the expression is not synonymous with the term 'immediately before' and is opposite of the expression 'soon after' as used and understood in Section 114, Illustration (a) of the Evidence Act. In our case there is practically no evidence that the victim was subjected to torture soon before her death by the husband or the in-laws. In Tirath Kumari and Anr. v. State of Haryana, AIR 2005 SC 4429 the same decision was reached that when there is no evidence to show that 'soon before' her death the victim was subjected to cruelty conviction under section 304b of the I. P. C. was not justified. The deposit of Rs. 50,000/- under n. S. C in the joint names of the accused Jayanta and the victim, opening of savings Bank Account in the name of the victim at the instance of the accused jayanta and balance of Rs. The deposit of Rs. 50,000/- under n. S. C in the joint names of the accused Jayanta and the victim, opening of savings Bank Account in the name of the victim at the instance of the accused jayanta and balance of Rs. 16,000/- in that account, purchase of scooter and colour T. V. by Jayanta out of his own fund some time before death of the victim, visit of the parties to each other's house, pleasure trip of the victim and the accused to the different places within India-all taking place within a span of three years do not appear to be consistent with the alleged demand of dowry and alleged torture on account thereof. Evidence of P. W. 3, the mother of the victim is also insufficient and falls short of the requirements prescribed under the law. The evidence of the P. W. 3 to the effect that during visit of the victim to the house she used to cry and say that it was impossible for her to bear torture does not appear to be consistent with her statement in cross-examination that at the interval of two/three months both the accused Jayanta and victim used to visit the house of P. W. 1 and P. W. 3. P. W. 3 herself had been to the house of the accused three to four times in a year and it is not her allegation that in course of any such visit the accused put any demand of dowry to her or that she would find her daughter in her matrimonial home in unhappy state of mind. We have already observed that evidence of P. W. 4, P. W. 12, p. W. 15, P. W. 16, P. W. 17, P. W. 18 and P. W. 19 have got no evidentiary value with respect to the charge under Section 304b of the I. P. C. Evidence of P. W. 7, P. W. 8 and P. W. 13 relate to reproduction of the version of the P. W. 1 and nothing more. Evidence of P. W. 8 to the effect that the victim told him that she was subjected to the torture on demand of dowry was not mentioned before the i. O. From his evidence it does not appear as to when exactly the victim would tell him about her sorrows. P. W. 13 was examined by the I. 0. Evidence of P. W. 8 to the effect that the victim told him that she was subjected to the torture on demand of dowry was not mentioned before the i. O. From his evidence it does not appear as to when exactly the victim would tell him about her sorrows. P. W. 13 was examined by the I. 0. 22 days after the investigation had started. She did not mention the essential features of the prosecution case to the I. O. Above all, the events of 30. 10. 1989 and 1. 11. 1989 in respect of which there is lot of evidence are having no nexus with the alleged torture over demand of dowry. In the circumstances, charge under Section 304b of the I. P. C. does not appear to have been substantiated. ( 25 ) WITH respect to the charge under Section 498a of I. P. C. it can be said that the case of the prosecution essentially centres round torture on account of demand of dowry. When the alleged torture or harassment on account of demand of dowry does not stand to reason, the other charge under Section 498a I. P. C. fails to have any objective foundation of facts. Throughout the length and breadth of evidence of witnesses we fail to find that the accused jayanta can be said to have exhibited any wilful conduct of such a nature as was likely to drive the victim to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to live, limb or health of the deceased. The alleged unpleasant attitude of the parents of Jayanta on account of a birth of a female child cannot be attributed to jayanta inasmuch as there is no evidence that the accused Jayanta expressed his displeasure and consequently caused torture upon the victim for birth of the female child. There is no evidence at all that the victim was subjected to assault or mental torture by the accused on any count other than the alleged demand of dowry which has miserably failed. The victim's cutting her long hair at a beauty parlour on 30. 10. 1989, while in her father's house and Jayanta having quarrel with the victim just before their departure to the house of Jayanta in the evening of 1. 11. The victim's cutting her long hair at a beauty parlour on 30. 10. 1989, while in her father's house and Jayanta having quarrel with the victim just before their departure to the house of Jayanta in the evening of 1. 11. 1989 over that matter and the victim's commission of suicide in the evening itself in her matrimonial house cannot be a piece of evidence with respect of the charge under Section 498a, I. P. C. It bears recall that the alleged statement of the victim before her death with respect to the alleged demand of dowry and torture on account thereof cannot form the basis of conviction under section 498a of I. P. C. Reference in this connection may be had to the decision in Gananath Pattanayak v. State of Orissa as reported in JT 2002 (1) SCC 608. ( 26 ) MR. Kazi Safiullah, learned Public Prosecutor has referred to the decision in Yashoda and Anr. v. State of M. P. , 2004 SCC (Cri.) 671 to submit that since the victim died an unnatural death and that too within seven years of her marriage the onus is on the defence to rebut the presumption arising out of section 113 (b) of the Evidence Act. That is a case where it was successfully established by the prosecution that the victim was subjected to torture and harassment on account of demand of dowry and the demand was renewed only 15 days prior to the unnatural death of the victim and in that context the hon'ble Supreme Court held that the defence failed to rebut the presumption. The decision of the case reported cannot have any application to our case. As was observed in Ambica Quarry Works v. State of Gujarat and Ors. reported in 1987 (1) SCC 213 , the ratio of any decision must be understood in the background of the facts of that case and a case is only an authority for what it actually decides, and not what logically follows from it. ( 27 ) THEREFORE, in our considered opinion the charge under Section 304b of the I. P. C. against both the appellants and the charge under Section 498a, i. P. C. against the appellant Jayanta Guha are unsustainable. ( 28 ) ACCORDINGLY, we allow the appeal, set aside the judgment and order of the learned Additional Sessions Judge, 4th Court, Howrah dated 22. 06. ( 28 ) ACCORDINGLY, we allow the appeal, set aside the judgment and order of the learned Additional Sessions Judge, 4th Court, Howrah dated 22. 06. 1995 and acquit the appellants of the charge under Section 304b I. P. C. and the appellant Jayanta Guha of the charge under Section 498a I. P. C. The appellants shall be discharged from the bail bonds. .