H. K. RATHOD, J. ( 1 ) HEARD learned Advocate Mr. Pradeep J. Patel for petitioner and Mr. Ashish H. Shah for respondent. Through this petition under art. 227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner-Kheda District Panchayat has challenged the award made by the Labour Court, Nadiad in Reference No. 385 of 1986 dated 21-9-1998 wherein the Labour Court has granted reinstatement with continuity of service with 25 percent of back wages of intervening period with effect from 16-1-1986. ( 2 ) IT is submitted by the learned Advocate Mr. Patel before this Court that the workman has been reinstated in service with effect from 24-12-2004, and presently, he is working with the petitioner. It is submitted by the learned advocate Mr. Shah that this petition was dismissed for default by this Court on 28-6-1999, and thereafter, respondent filed Misc. Civil Application No. 1686 of 2002 wherein order was passed by this Court on 6-5-2003. Thereafter, present petition was restored by this Court on 6-5-2003. ( 3 ) LEARNED Advocate Mr. Patel submits that the workman was not completing 240 days continuous service and it was a case of abandonment of service, according to him, there was delay of about three years in raising of an industrial dispute. He also submits that the respondent was called for work by petitioner through one messenger and that has been accepted by workman in his cross examination and in view of these facts, Labour Court should not have made the award of reinstatement with 25% back wages for intervening period. He also submits that the respondent was working as daily-wager, and therefore, labour Court ought not to have granted relief in his favour. Except these submissions, no other submissions have been made by learned Advocate Mr. Patel before this Court. ( 4 ) IN this petition, rule was issued by this Court on 7-11-2003. While issuing rule, ad-interim relief in terms of Para 7 (c) was granted by this Court subject to compliance of Sec. 17b of the I. D. Act, 1947. ( 5 ) LOOKING to the facts of this case, services of workman were terminated on 9-6-1983. Dispute was referred to for adjudication on 16-1-1986. Contention raised before this Court by the learned Advocate Mr. Patel that there was delay in raising of an industrial dispute was not raised by petitioner before the Labour court. ( 5 ) LOOKING to the facts of this case, services of workman were terminated on 9-6-1983. Dispute was referred to for adjudication on 16-1-1986. Contention raised before this Court by the learned Advocate Mr. Patel that there was delay in raising of an industrial dispute was not raised by petitioner before the Labour court. Not only that but the order of reference was also not challenged by the petitioner before the higher forum and has participated in the adjudication proceedings. However, there is no time-limit prescribed in Sec. 10 (1) of the i. D. Act, 1947 for raising of an industrial dispute. Therefore, delay in raising of an industrial dispute has to be considered by the Labour Court while granting relief but when the dispute remains in existence and due to delay, it is not ceased, then, such dispute can be raised for adjudication even though there may be delay in raising of an industrial dispute. Therefore, this contention of delay raised by Mr. Patel cannot be accepted. Further, looking to the operative portion of the award, it is clear that the Labour Court has granted back wages with effect from 16-1-1986 and not from the date of termination of service, therefore, it is clear that though such contention was not raised by petitioner before Labour court, yet Labour Court has taken in into consideration, while granting relief in favour of the workman. In view of that, contention raised by Mr. Patel about delay in raising of an industrial dispute is rejected. ( 6 ) AS regards the next contention raised by Mr. Patel that the workman has left the job at his own and it is a case of abandonment of service and not a case of termination, from perusal of the record, it appears that the petitioner has not issued any letter of notice to workman intimating him to report for work. Not to remain present for work or not to resume work also amounts to misconduct for which departmental inquiry is required to initiate by employer against employer against employee framing specific charge to that effect. Here, in this case, no such inquiry was held by petitioner against respondent. No such opportunity was given by petitioner to workman before terminating service of workman. Even during the pendency of reference also, no intimation was given by petitioner to workman for reporting for duty. Here, in this case, no such inquiry was held by petitioner against respondent. No such opportunity was given by petitioner to workman before terminating service of workman. Even during the pendency of reference also, no intimation was given by petitioner to workman for reporting for duty. Even according to the Apex court decisions in V. C. Banaras Hindu University and Ors. v. Shrikant, 2006 air SCW 2952 as well as in case of Viveka Nand Sethi v. Chairman J. and K. Bank Ltd. and Ors. , 2005 (5) SCC 337 ; limited inquiry is also necessary to observe the principles of natural justice in such a situation. Witness for the petitioner admitted that part that no notice has been served to workman for remaining absent by the petitioner but he referred to simple post which was sent to workman but there was no proof that such letter has been received by workman. Therefore, it is clear that the services of workman were terminated without following due process of law and that part has been rightly dealt with by the Labour Court and in view of that" contention raised by Mr. Patel in that regard cannot be accepted, and same is, therefore, rejected. In V. C. Banaras Hindu University v. Shrikant (supra), after considering the decision in Viveka Nand Sethi (supra), the Apex Court observed as under in Paras 59, 60 and 61 : "59. Referring to the decisions noticed by us hereinbefore, it was held : it is thus in this context, one ought to read the doctrine of natural justice being an in built requirement on the Standing Orders. Significantly, the facts depict that the respondent workman remained absent from duty from 13-10-1990 and it is within a period of four days that a letter was sent to the workman informing him that since he was absenting himself from duty without authorized leave, he was advised to report back within 48 hours and also to render his explanation for his absence, otherwise his disinterestedness would thus be presumed. 60. The well settled principle of law as regards necessity to comply with the principles of natural justice was again reiterated, stating :- arbitrariness is an antithesis to rule of law, equity, fair-play and justice- contract of employment there may be but it cannot be devoid of the basic principles of the concept of justice. 60. The well settled principle of law as regards necessity to comply with the principles of natural justice was again reiterated, stating :- arbitrariness is an antithesis to rule of law, equity, fair-play and justice- contract of employment there may be but it cannot be devoid of the basic principles of the concept of justice. Justice-oriented approach as is the present trend in Indian jurisprudence shall have to be read as an in built requirement of the basic of concept of justice, to wit, the doctrine of natural justice, fairness, equality and rule of law. 61. A provision relating to abandonment of service came up for consideration yet again in Viveka Nand Sethi v. Chairman, J. and K. Bank Ltd. and Ors. ( 2005 (5) SCC 337 ) before a Division Bench of this Court. This Court opined that although in a case of that nature principles of natural justice were required to be complied with, a full-fledged departmental enquiry may not be necessary, holding : a limited enquiry as to whether the employee concerned had sufficient explanation for not reporting to duties after the period of leave had expired or failure on his part on being asked so to do, in our considered view, amounts to sufficient compliance with the requirements of the principles of natural justice. " ( 7 ) NEXT contention raised by Mr. Patel is that the workman has not completed 240 days continuous service, and therefore, award of reinstatement is not sustainable. Bare perusal of the award in question makes it clear that the Labour court has not considered this question is not being set aside by Labour Court on the ground of non-compliance of Sec. 25f of the I. D. Act but it was set aside on the ground of breach of principles of natural justice. Therefore also, this contention has no relevancy and the Labour Court was right in not considering this question while passing the award in question. ( 8 ) NEXT contention raised by Mr. Patel is to the effect that the workman has admitted in his cross-examination that he received one letter from messenger wherein he was called upon to resume duty. No such contention was raised by petitioner before labour Court. ( 8 ) NEXT contention raised by Mr. Patel is to the effect that the workman has admitted in his cross-examination that he received one letter from messenger wherein he was called upon to resume duty. No such contention was raised by petitioner before labour Court. However, even if it is presumed that such letter was written by petitioner to workman and yet workman has not been resuming or reporting for the duty, then, it amounts to misconduct warranting proper departmental inquiry or limited inquiry is necessary according to the principles of natural justice. In view of that, Labour Court has rightly examined the matter and has rightly set aside the order of termination, and therefore that contention raised by Mr. Patel on behalf of the petitioner is rejected and not accepted. ( 9 ) NEXT contention raised by learned Advocate Mr. Patel is to the effect that since the workman was a daily-wager, therefore, he is not entitled for any relief. Right of daily-wager in case of termination of his service is equally covered by the principles of natural justice and in case if there is any termination of casual/daily-wager contrary to the principles of natural justice, then, Labour Court has certainly got jurisdiction to set aside such termination as per the law laid down by the Apex Court in case of Nar Singh Pal v. Union of India and Ors. , reported in 2000 AIR SCW 1141 that even in case of daily-rated casual labour also observance of principles of natural justice is necessary and non-observance thereof would render it bad and illegal. ( 10 ) THE contention of the petitioner that the respondent had abandoned his job by not reporting for job cannot be accepted only on the ground that no notice was sent to the workman before passing the termination order. The petitioner should know the intention of workman (respondent ). There is nothing on record to suggest that the respondent abandoned the job. On the aforesaid background, the view taken by the Allahabad High Court in case of Ashok Kumar pandey v. State of U. P. and Ors. , reported in 1999 (83) FLR 1118 is relevant. Therefore, Paragraphs 6 and 7 of said judgment are reproduced as under : "6. The word abandonment has not been defined in the rules. The General manager in his order has drawn an inference from the facts. , reported in 1999 (83) FLR 1118 is relevant. Therefore, Paragraphs 6 and 7 of said judgment are reproduced as under : "6. The word abandonment has not been defined in the rules. The General manager in his order has drawn an inference from the facts. Abandonment is a concept of law. What would amount to abandonment or when abandonment can be said to be established is not easy to state. The meaning of the word abandonment was considered by the Apex Court in G. T. Lad and Ors. v. Chemicals and Fibres india Ltd. , 1979 (38) FLR 95. The Apex Court while considering the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, held as under : in the Act, we do not find any definition of the expression, abandonment of service . In the absence of any clue as to the meaning of the said expression, we have to depend on meaning assigned to it in the dictionary of English language. In the unabridged edition of the Random House Dictionary, the word abandon has been explained as meaning to leave completely and finally; forsake utterly, to relinquish, renounce, to give up all concern in something . According to the dictionary of English Law by Ear Jowitt (1959 edition) abandonment means relinquishment of an interest or claim . According to the Black s Law Dictionary, abandonment when used in relation to an office means voluntary relinquishment . It must be total and under such circumstances as clearly to indicate an absolute relinquishment. The failure to perform the duties pertaining to the office must be with actual or imputed intention, on the part of the officer to abandon and relinquish the office. The intention may be inferred from the acts and conduct of the party, and is a question of fact. Temporary absence is not ordinarily sufficient to constitute as abandonment of office. " "7. Abandonment of service, thus, means voluntary relinquishment of office by employee. To constitute abandonment, there must be clear intention of the employee to give up his duties. It must be total so as to give rise to one and only one inference that the employee has abandoned. The inference that an employee has abandoned or relinquished his service cannot be presumed unless it is clear from the facts that the employee intended to abandon service. It must be total so as to give rise to one and only one inference that the employee has abandoned. The inference that an employee has abandoned or relinquished his service cannot be presumed unless it is clear from the facts that the employee intended to abandon service. Abandonment or relinquishment of service is always a question of intention cannot be attributed to an employee without adequate evidence in this behalf. Absence from duty can be temporary or for reasons, beyond control of the employee remains absent from his duty after giving an application for leave, supported by medical certificate, which may not be sanctioned but that alone may not be sufficient to give rise to an inference that the employee had abandoned the service. The law requires something more to make such absence as voluntary relinquishment. What are such circumstances cannot be laid down as pointed out by the Apex Court in G. R. Lad case (supra) but shall depend on facts and circumstances of each case. The petitioner fell ill on 6-1-1989. He sent an application for leave accompanied by a medical certificate. He went on making applications till August, 1989. Whether the medical certificate was from a doctor on which reliance could be placed or whether petitioner was from a doctor on which reliance could be placed or whether petitioner was ill or he was making application after application because he did not want to go to hills may be believd or not but they cannot give rise to an inference in law that the petitioner abandoned his service from 6-1-1989. " In M/s. Nicks (India) Tools v. Ram Sarat and Anr. , reported in 2004 AIR scw 5095, the Apex Court observed as under in Paragraphs 17, 18, 19 and 20 : "17. We are unable to accept this argument because if we look into the overall proceedings before the Labour Court, we notice that though the management did take the stand that the workman had left the services of the appellant-management, voluntarily by receiving his total dues in full and final settlement it did not at the stage of filing of its written statement, contend that the workman has executed a receipt which is now sought to be produced as Exh. M/x (M3 ). M/x (M3 ). This coupled with the fact that the said document was not confronted to the respondent-workman, in our opinion, is sufficient to hold this document cannot be relied upon for establishing the fact that the management has proved its case that the workman had voluntarily left his services. The trial Court has further buttressed this finding by noticing the difference in the ink in the receipt as well as the bonus register as also the absence of revenue stamp in the receipt from it drew an inference that the receipt in question may have been signed previously, but was filled up subsequently. This finding of the Labour Court has been accepted by the High court and this being a finding of fact and which cannot be said to be perverse, we are not inclined to interfere with the same in this appeal. 18. This leaves us to consider the next limb of the argument of Shri U. U. Lalit, learned Senior Counsel who contended that the Labour Court having come to the conclusion that in Ludhiana where the appellant s factory is situated, there are large number of other industries, hence it was always possible for the respondent-workman to have obtained a gainful employment on that basis, was justified in confining the back wages to only 25% of the full back wages, and the high Court in this regard erred in reversing that finding by not taking into consideration the additional material produced by the management in regard to this aspect of the case i. e. of the respondent being gainfully employed during the relevant period. He also relied on two judgments of this Court in the case of P. G. I, of Medical Education and Research, Chandigarh v. Raj Kumar, 2001 (2) SCC 54 and M. P. State Electricity Board v. Jarina Bee (Smt.), 2003 (6) SCC 141 . 19. In this regard, we notice that the Labour Court awarded only 25 % of the back wages primarily relying on a judgment of the Punjab and Haryana High court in the case of M. K. Kohli v. Afadeal Chemicals, Faridabad and Anr. 19. In this regard, we notice that the Labour Court awarded only 25 % of the back wages primarily relying on a judgment of the Punjab and Haryana High court in the case of M. K. Kohli v. Afadeal Chemicals, Faridabad and Anr. , 1997 (2) LLN 299, the High Court in its judgment has noticed the fact that the said judgment was reversed by a Division Bench of the very same Court in a subsequent judgment delivered in Civil Writ Petition No. 8665 of 2000 in the matter of state of Haryana v. Ram Kumar and Anr. , hence it found that the reliance placed by the labour Court on the abovesaid judgment of M. K. Kohli v. Afadeal chemicals, Faridabad and Anr. , was not sustainable. 20. Reliance placed by the learned Counsel for the appellant in the case of p. G. I, of Medical Education and Research, Chandigarh (supra) in our opinion does not take the case of the appellant any further. In that case, this Court held that the Labour Court being the final Court of facts the superior Courts dp not normally interfere with such finding of facts unless the said finding of fact is perverse or erroneous or not in accordance with law. In the instant case, we have already noticed the basic ground on which the Labour Court reduced the back wages was based on a judgment of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana which as further noticed by us, was overruled by a subsequent judgment of a Division bench. Therefore, the very foundation of the conclusion of the Labour Court having been destroyed, the appellant could not derive any support from the above cited judgments of that Court. Similarly, in the case of M. P. State Electricity Board (supra) this Court only said that it is not an inevitable conclusion that every time a reinstatement is ordered, full back wages was the only consequence. This court, in our opinion, did not preclude that even in cases where full back wages are legally due, the superior Courts are precluded from doing so merely because the Labour Court has on an erroneous ground has reduced such back wages. This court, in our opinion, did not preclude that even in cases where full back wages are legally due, the superior Courts are precluded from doing so merely because the Labour Court has on an erroneous ground has reduced such back wages. In the instant case, we have noticed that the trial Court apart from generally observing that in Ludhiana, there must have been job opportunities available, on facts, it did not rely upon any particular material to hold either such job was in fact available to the respondent and he refused to accept the same or he was otherwise gainfully employed during the period he was kept out of work. On the contrary, it is for the first time before the writ Court the appellant tried to produce additional evidence which was rightly not considered by the High Court because the same was not brought on record in a manner known to law. Be that as it may, in the instant case, we are satisfied that the High Court was justified in coming to the conclusion that the appellant is entitled to full back wages. " ( 11 ) THUS, I have considered each and every contentions raised by learned advocate Mr. Patel before this Court. According to my opinion, Labour Court has rightly not granted back wages for initial three years period taking into consideration the delay in raising of an industrial dispute. Labour Court, after taking into consideration the delay in raising of an industrial dispute and also considering the fact that the establishment is a Government body, and therefore, it cannot be made to suffer more financial burden, and therefore, considering all these aspects, Labour Court granted back wages only with effect from 16-1-1986, the date on which dispute was raised and that too only at the rate of 25 % alone also, by taking into consideration the relevant factors, length of service, pendency of reference and status of employee and employer, and therefore, it can be said that the period of delay in raising of an industrial dispute has also been taken into account by Labour Court while considering the matter for back wages. ( 12 ) THEREFORE, considering all these aspects of the matter, according to my opinion, Labour Court has not committed any error in making the award in question and the award of Labour Court does not warrant any interference of this Court in exercise of the powers under Art. 227 of the Constitution of India. ( 13 ) LABOUR Court has rightly made the award in question. Unless the findings recorded by the Labour Court are proved to be perverse or contrary to the evidence on record, this Court cannot disturb the same being the finding of fact. Here, since it has not been proved by the petitioner that the findings of labour Court are perverse or contrary to evidence on record, these findings of fact cannot be disturbed by this Court. ( 14 ) THIS aspect has been considered by the Apex Court in Laxmikant revchand Bhojwani and Anr. v. Pratapsing Mohansingh Pardeshi, reported in 1995 (6) SCC 576 . Relevant observations made by the Apex Court in Para 9 of the said judgment, are therefore, reproduced as under : "the High Court under Art. 227 cannot assume unlimited prerogative to correct all species of hardship or wrong decisions. It must be restricted to cases of grave dereliction of duty and flagrant abuse of fundamental principles of law or justice, where grave injustice would be done unless the High Court interferes. " In Ouseph Mathai and Ors. v. M. Abdul Khadir, reported in 2002 (1) SCC 319 , the Apex Court observed as under in Paras 4 and 5 : "it is not denied that the powers conferred upon the High Court under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution are extraordinary and discretionary powers as distinguished from ordinary statutory powers. No doubt Art. 227 confers a right of superintendence over all Courts and Tribunals throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises the jurisdiction but no corresponding right is conferred upon a litigant to invoke the jurisdiction under the said Article as a matter of right. In fact power under this Article cast a duty upon the High Court to keep the inferior Courts and Tribunals within the limits of their authority and that they do not cross the limits, ensuring the performance of duties by such Courts and Tribunals in accordance with law conferring powers within the ambit of the enactments creating such Courts and Tribunals. Only wrong decisions may not be ground for the exercise of jurisdiction under this Article unless the wrong is referable to grave dereliction of duty and flagrant abuse of power by the subordinate Courts and Tribunals resulting in grave injustice to any party. 5. In Waryam Singh v. Amarnath, 1954 SCR 565 this Court held that power of superintendence conferred by Art. 227 is to be exercised more sparingly and only in appropriate cases in order to keep the subordinate Courts within the bounds of their authority and not for correcting mere errors. This position of law was reiterated in Nagendra Nath Base v. Commr. of Hills Division, 1958 SCR 1240 . In Bhahutmal Raichand Oswal v. Laxmibai R. Tarta, AIR 1975 SC 1297 this Court held that the High Court could not, in the guise of exercising its jurisdiction under art. 227 convert itself into a Court of appeal when the Legislature has not conferred a right of appeal. After referring to the judgment of Lord Denning in R. v. Northumber Compensation Appeal Tribunal, Exparte Shaw, 1952 (1) All ER 122-128 this Court in Chandavarkar Sita Ratna Rao v. Ashalata S. Gurnam held : "20. It is true that in exercise of jurisdiction under Art. 227 of the Constitution the High Court could go into the question of facts or look into the evidence if justice so requires it, if there is any misdirection in law or a view of fact taken in the teeth of preponderance of evidence. But the High Court should decline to , exercise its jurisdiction under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution to look into the fact in the absence of clear and cut down reasons where the question depends upon the appreciation of evidence. The High Court also should not interfere with a finding within the jurisdiction of the inferior Tribunal except where the findings are perverse and not based on any material evidence or it resulted in manifest injustice (See : Trimbak Gangadhar Teland, 1977 (2) SCC 437 ). Except to the limited extent indicated above, the High Court has no jurisdiction. The High Court also should not interfere with a finding within the jurisdiction of the inferior Tribunal except where the findings are perverse and not based on any material evidence or it resulted in manifest injustice (See : Trimbak Gangadhar Teland, 1977 (2) SCC 437 ). Except to the limited extent indicated above, the High Court has no jurisdiction. In our opinion, therefore, in the facts and circumstances of this case on the question that the High court has sought to interfere, it is manifest that the High Court has gone into questions which depended upon appreciation of evidence and indeed the very fact that the learned trial Judge came to one conclusion and the Appellate Bench came to another conclusion is indication of the position that two views were possible in this case. In preferring one view to another of factual appreciation of evidence, the High Court transgressed its limits of jurisdiction under Art. 227 of the constitution. On the first point, therefore, the High Court was in error. " Therefore, there is no substance in this petition and same is required to be dismissed. Accordingly, this petition is dismissed. Rule is discharged. Interim relief if any shall stand vacated. There shall be not order as to costs. (RJS) Petition dismissed.