JUDGMENT A. S. NAIDU, J. — On the basis of an FIR filed on 5.10.2005 by opposite party No.2 Smt. Sunita Agarwal alleging commission of offences under Sections 498A/325/307/506/34 IPC read with Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, Bargarh P.S. Case No.512/05 was registered which was subsequently converted to G.R. Case No.993/05 in the Court of the SDJM, Bargarh. Opposite party No.2 asserted in the said FIR that she had married petitioner No.1 according to caste customs and that after the marriage she went to her in-laws’ house situated at Talcher and stayed there with her husband. At the time of marriage, necessary ornaments and other articles were given to her by her parents at the time of marriage, but in spite of that her husband petitioner No.1 and other petitioners who are her in-laws tortured her and demanded her to bring a sum of Rs.1,00,000.00 from her father. On that account they used to torture her and on 23.5.2002 made an attempt to murder her by pushing her down from the terrace of their house. Consequently she was injured and was hospitalized. There¬after she returned to her parental house and is staying there at present. As she learnt that her in-laws are arranging a second marriage of her husband petitioner No.1, she filed the aforesaid FIR. 2. According to the petitioners, the marriage between petitioner No.1 and opposite party No.2 had taken place on 17.1.2000 at Bargarh. Thereafter both the husband and wife stayed together in the house of the petitioners at Talcher. The happy conjugal life lasted only for three months whereafter opposite party No.2 started misbehaving with petitioner No.1 and her other in-laws and in spite of best efforts, she did not mend her man¬ners. She was arrogant and she refused to have conjugal relation¬ship with her husband and maintained her relationship with her boy friends and often used to leave the house of her own. When these facts were confronted to her she got annoyed and left for her parental house in August, 2000. She insisted that petitioner No.1 should take a separate house so that she would stay with him. Accordingly to save the marriage, petitioner No.1 took a separate house at Talcher and opposite party No.2 returned to him in November, 2000, but then her manners did not change. She insisted that petitioner No.1 should take a separate house so that she would stay with him. Accordingly to save the marriage, petitioner No.1 took a separate house at Talcher and opposite party No.2 returned to him in November, 2000, but then her manners did not change. She became more adamant and tried to lead her life according to her own sweet will. She kept relationship with her boy friends and due to such fact the relationship between petitioner No.1 and opposite party No.2 became more strained. It is alleged that opposite party No.2 was caught red handed by petitioner No.1 while moving with her boy friends and added to that he also found some love letters from the possession of opposite party No.2 written to her by her boy friends. On being questioned, opposite party No.2 used to abuse him in filthy language. Thus the rela¬tionship between the husband and wife became more and more strained leading to a break even point and ultimately opposite party No.2-wife left her husband’s house at Talcher for her parental house at Bargarh on 2nd May, 2002. In spite of best efforts of petitioner No.1, opposite party No.2 having refused to return to him, the former was constrained to file O.S. No.36 of 2001 before the Civil Judge (SD), Talcher praying for annulling the marriage and passing a decree of di¬vorce. Opposite party No.2 though received notice of the said suit chose not to appear and contest the same. Consequently she was set ex parte and by judgment dated 17.4.2002 the marriage was annulled and decree of divorce was passed. After lapse of almost three years, as stated earlier, on 5.10.2005 the aforesaid FIR was filed by opposite party No.2. The petitioners who are accused in the aforesaid G.R. Case have approached this Court invoking inherent jurisdiction under Sec¬tion 482 CrPC with a prayer to quash the said FIR and so also the proceedings of G.R. Case No.993/05 pending before the SDJM, Bargarh mainly on the ground that none of the incidents alleged, as would be evident from the FIR itself, did take place at Bar¬garh. As such neither the police at Bargarh nor the SDJM, Bargarh had territorial jurisdiction to entertain the FIR or the G.R. Case and that continuance of the case at Bargarh will amount to abuse of the process of law and will subject the petitioners to prejudice and harassment. 3. After receiving notice opposite party No.2 has entered appearance and has repudiated the averments made by the petitioners. According Mr. Suraj Mohanty, learned counsel appear¬ing for opposite party No.2, the offences alleged are continuous in nature and in consonance with the provisions of Section 178(c) CrPC, inasmuch as opposite party No.2 is subjected to mental torture day in and day out by the petitioners and as such Bargarh police as well as the Court at Bargarh had jurisdiction to enter¬tain the case. 4. I have heard learned counsel for the parties at length. I have also carefully gone through the averments made in the FIR, a copy of which has been filed as Annexure-2 to this Criminal Misc. Case petition. A perusal of the FIR reveals that marriage between petitioner No.1 and opposite party No.2 had taken place on 17.1.2000 in consonance with Hindu rites and customs and thereafter opposite party No.1 left for her matrimonial house at Talcher. It is alleged that opposite party No.1 had taken with her all her belongings and other articles given by her parents. Soon after the marriage her husband and the in-laws who are the petitioners in this case alleged to have coerced her to bring a sum of Rs.1,00,000.00 from her parents. They tortured her and even threatened to murder her if she failed to bring the said amount from her father. It is stated in the FIR that the father of opposite party No.2 being a poor man, it was not possible for him to pay the demanded amount of Rs.1,00,000.00. However oppo¬site party No.2 came to her parents and reported the matter to them but then they expressed their inability to comply with the said demand. She then went back to her in-laws’ place. On 23.5.2002 night her husband and the in-laws pushed her from the terrace of their house with an intention to kill her. Due to this she broke her two legs and sustained injury on the spine. She was treated at the NALCO Hospital at Talcher for twenty-two days. She then went back to her in-laws’ place. On 23.5.2002 night her husband and the in-laws pushed her from the terrace of their house with an intention to kill her. Due to this she broke her two legs and sustained injury on the spine. She was treated at the NALCO Hospital at Talcher for twenty-two days. After receiving information her parents came to her and after her recovery she went to her in-laws who did not accept her and drove her out. Consequently she came back to her parents and is staying with them since 2002. Of late she came to know that her in-laws who are accused in the G.R. Case are trying to get her husband married for a second time, for which she filed the FIR. 5. Section 177 CrPC provides that every offence shall ordinarily be inquired into and tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction it was committed. Sections 177 to 186 deal with place of trial and the venue thereof. Section 178 deals with place of inquiry or trial. The word “ordinarily” used in Section 177 indicates that the provi¬sion is a general one and must be read subject to the special provisions contained in the Code. 6. The Supreme Court in the case of Purushottamdas Dalmia v. State of W.B., reported in AIR 1961 SC 1589 , observed that the exception implied by the word “ordinarily” need not be limited to those specially provided for by the law and exceptions may be provided by law on consideration or may be implied from the provisions of law permitting joint trial of offences by the same Court. But then the facts of the present case are quite differ¬ent. 7. In the case of State of Bihar v. Deokaran Nenshi, reported in AIR 1973 SC 908 , it was observed by the Supreme Court that a continuing offence is one which is susceptible to continu¬ance and is distinguishable from one which is committed once for all, i.e. one of those offences which arises out of failure to obey or comply with a rule or its requirement and which involves a penalty, liability continues till compliance, that on every occasion such disobedience or non-compliance occurs or recurs, there is the offence committed. 8. 8. In the case of Sujata Mukherjee v. Prashant Kumar Muk¬herjee, reported in (1997) 5 SCC 30 , which deals with alleged commission of offences punishable under Sections 498A, 506 and 323 IPC, the Supreme Court held that though the dowry demands were made earlier, the husband of the complainant went to the police where the complainant was residing and had assaulted her and therefore on the factual background clause (c) of Section 178 was attracted. But in the case at hand, as would be evident from the narra¬tion made in the FIR, the informant-opposite party No.2 had left her matrimonial house on 22nd May, 2001 on account of alleged demand of dowry by her husband and in-laws. The FIR does not reveal allegation about demand of dowry thereafter. In other words, according to the FIR story, no demand of dowry was made at Bargarh nor is there any whisper with regard to any act by the petitioners constituting commission of offences at Bargarh. In the aforesaid backdrop Section 178(c) CrPC cannot be attracted to the facts of the present case. 9. In the case of Y. Abraham Ajith and others v. Inspector of Police, Chennai and another, reported in (2004) 8 SCC 100 , the Supreme Court held as follows : “The expression “cause of action” is generally understood to mean a situation or state of facts that entitles a party to maintain an action in a Court or a tribunal; a group of operative facts giving rise to one or more bases for sitting; a factual situation that entitles one person to obtain a remedy in Court from another person. In Black’s Law Dictionary a “cause of ac¬tion” is stated to be the entire set of facts that gives rise to an enforceable claim; the phrase comprises every fact, which, if traversed, the plaintiff must prove in order to obtain judgment. The Words and Phrases (4th Edn.), the meaning attributed to the phrase “cause of action” in common legal parlance is existence of those facts, which give a party a right to judicial interference on his behalf.” In Halsbury’s Laws of England (4th Edn.) it has been stated as follows :- “ ‘Cause of action’ has been defined as meaning simply a factual situation, the existence of which entitles one person to obtain from the Court of remedy against another person. The phrase has been held from earliest time to include every fact which is material to be proved to entitle the plaintiff to suc¬ceed, and every fact which a defendant would have a right to traverse. ‘Cause of action’ has also been taken to mean that a particular act on the part of the defendant which gives the plaintiff his cause of complaint, or the subject-matter of griev¬ance founding the action, not merely the technical cause of action.” 10. Considering the facts of the present case in the touch-stone of the aforesaid legal provisions, the irresistible conclu¬sion would be that no part of the cause of action did arise at Bargarh and therefore the SDJM, Bargarh had no jurisdiction to deal with the case. In view of such position, this Court has no hesitation to quash the proceedings of G.R. Case No.993 of 2005 pending in the Court of learned SDJM, Bargarh and I direct ac¬cordingly. 11. In the result, the CRLMC is allowed and the proceedings of G.R. Case No.993 of 2005 pending before the SDJM, Bargarh are quashed. CRLMC allowed.