S. U. KHAN, J. This is landladys writ petition. It was earlier allowed on 13-5-2005 without hearing tenants-respondents as no one appeared on their behalf on that date. Thereafter, on the restoration/rehearing application, the said judgment and order was set-aside through order dated 18-11-2005 passed on the restoration application and learned Counsel for both the parties were heard on the merit of the writ petition on the same date i. e. 18-11-2005 and judgment was reserved. 2. Release application filed by the landlady under Section 21 of U. P. Act No. 13 of 1972 in the form of Rent Case No. 4 of 1989 was allowed by prescribed authority/munsif Banda on 10-5-1991. However- appeal filed against the said judgment and order being Rent Civil Appeal No. 2 of 1991 was allowed by A. D. J. /special Judge (E. C. Act), Banda through judgment and order dated 17-2- 1997. Appellate Court set-aside the judgment and order of the trial Court and dismissed the release application. This petition by the landlady is directed against order of Appellate Court dated 17-2-1997. 3. In the release application, it was stated that accommodation in dispute which is a shop was required by the landlady to settle her son in business. 4. Appellate Court held that the need stood satisfied, as the landlady had started coaching institute in the name of Era Convent School and Matchless Coaching Center. 5. Landlady pleaded that she had 12 issues out of whom four daughters had been married; that her husband due to problem of heart and blood pressure had stopped his practice of advocacy since July 1988; that shop in dispute was required to settle her eldest son Zulfiqar Haider in business of selling stationery. During pendency of appeal subsequent events were brought on record by the tenant and it was stated that landlady in her residential house had started the following institute: (1) Era Convent School, (2) Matchless Coaching Center, and (3) Mahila Hastha Shilp Prashikshan Kendra. 6. The tenant asserted that the said institutes were being managed by Zulfiqar Haider. It was also stated that new constructions had also been raised by the landlady in her house upon the first floor, above the shop in dispute. Appellate Court found that Basic Shiksha Adhikari had recognised New Era Convent School, which was a primary school. 6. The tenant asserted that the said institutes were being managed by Zulfiqar Haider. It was also stated that new constructions had also been raised by the landlady in her house upon the first floor, above the shop in dispute. Appellate Court found that Basic Shiksha Adhikari had recognised New Era Convent School, which was a primary school. Appellate Court held that, as landlady did not disclose that who was running the said school hence assertion of the tenant that Zulfiqar Haider was running the school was correct. Appellate Court further held that the averment of the tenant in his affidavit that Zulfiqar Haider was running the said school was not specifically denied and Zulfiqar Haider did not file his own affidavit. Appellate Court also found that Matchless Coaching Institute was also being run by Zulfiqar Haider. Appellate Court further found that school and coaching center were being run by Zulfiqar Haider hence this subsequent events either disproved his need or fulfilled the same. In respect of Handicraft Center Appellate Court noted that landlady stated that it was being run by her daughters but no specific names were mentioned. However, Appellate Court disbelieved the need for Zulfiqar Haider on the ground that he was running the aforesaid school and coaching institute. 7. Appellate Court did not record any finding that Zulfiqar Haider was other Manager of committee of management of the school or was a teacher of the school. Even if some one is Manager of committee of management of school it does not mean that he is permanently engaged. Being member of committee of management of school does not mean business or full time business. Even otherwise temporary, stop-gap arrangement does not disentitle a person from seeking release of commercial accommodation [vide Ram Kubai v. H. D. Chandak, 1999 (37) ALR 837 (SC)]. Until final decision of release proceedings particularly in U. P. where they take unduly long time a person for whose need release is sought is not expected to sit idle. Moreover landlady had stated that she had 12 issues. She is not expected to keep every avenue of employment available and reserved for one son i. e. Zulfiqar Haider. 8. It was brought on record that tenant had constructed two new shops. Moreover landlady had stated that she had 12 issues. She is not expected to keep every avenue of employment available and reserved for one son i. e. Zulfiqar Haider. 8. It was brought on record that tenant had constructed two new shops. Appellate Court noted this fact and did not disbelieve the same however the Appellate Court refused to grant any latitude to the landlady on this basis. Under Rule 16 (2) (b) of the Rules framed under the Act, it is provided as under: "where the tenant has available with him suitable accommodation to which he had shifted his business without substantial loss there shall be greater justification for allowing the application". (Release application under Section 21 of the Act ). 9. Prescribed authority had recorded the categorical finding that tenant was carrying on business from another tenanted accommodation situate in Dilhanganj. The said finding was not at all touched by the Appellate Court. 10. Accordingly, I find that while deciding the question of bona fide need of the landlady, Appellate Court was unduly charitable towards the tenants. The need of the landlady was not only bona fide but also pressing and dire. Appellate Court utterly misinterpreted the meaning of bona fide need. 11. As far as comparative hardship is concerned, tenant was not doing any business from the shop in dispute, he had constructed two shops and he did not show that he made any efforts to search alternative accommodation. The only reason of the anxiety of the tenant to retain the accommodation in dispute appears to be highly inadequate rent of Rs. 30/- per month. 12. In view of the above the argument of learned Counsel for the tenants that in view of the three institutes opened by the landlady and the new construction made by the landlady on the first floor during pendency of appeal fully satisfied the need is not tenable. Shops are usually not opened on first floor unless it is part of marketing complex. 13. Writ petition in therefore, allowed. Judgment and order passed by the Appellate Court is set aside. Judgment and order passed by the prescribed authority is restored. 14. Shops are usually not opened on first floor unless it is part of marketing complex. 13. Writ petition in therefore, allowed. Judgment and order passed by the Appellate Court is set aside. Judgment and order passed by the prescribed authority is restored. 14. Tenants-respondents are granted six months time to vacate provided that: (1) Within one month from today they file an undertaking before the prescribed authority to the effect that on or before the expiry of period of six months, they will willingly vacate and handover possession of the property in dispute to the landlady petitioner. (2) For this period of six months, which has been granted to the respondents to vacate they are required to pay Rs. 3,000 (at the rate of Rs. 500 per month) as damages for use and occupation. This amount shall also be deposited within one month before the prescribed authority and shall immediately be paid to the landlady petitioner. It is further directed that in case undertaking is not filed and deposit of Rs. 3,000 is not made within one month before the Prescribed Authority, then tenants shall be liable to pay damages at the rate of Rs. 1,000 per month since after one month till the date of actual vacation. Similarly, if after filing the aforesaid undertaking and depositing Rs. 3,000/- the accommodation in dispute is not vacated in six months then damages for use and occupation shall be payable at the rate of Rs. 1,000 per month since after six months till actual vacation Petition allowed. .