JUDGMENT Vinod K. Sharma, J. - The petitioner by way of present revision petition has challenged the orders passed by the learned Civil Judge (Sr. Divn.), Kurukshetra and affirmed by the learned Additional District Judge, Kurukshetra, dismissing the application filed by the petitioner for setting aside the judgment and decree dated 19th of September, 1998. 2. The land measuring 20 kanals situated within the revenue estate of village Parra-Khera, Tehsil Thanesar, District Kurukshetra was owned by Sarvshri Krishan Chand and Ved Pal. Shri Ved Pal for himself and as a General Attorney of his brother Krishan Chand, executed an agreement to sell dated 2.11.1992 and received a sum of Rs. 3 lacs in advance out of the total sale consideration of Rs. 10 lacs. The possession of the land was transferred to the prospective vendees. The suit was filed by the prospective vendees against the vendors seeking a decree for permanent injunction restraining them from dispossessing the vendee-plaintiffs as also from interference in their possession or in raising of further construction on the suit land. The suit was contested by the defendants and subsequently the suit was got amended and relief of specific performance of agreement was also sought. The suit was decreed in favour of the plaintiffs on 19th of September, 1998 and a decree for specific performance of the agreement was passed in their favour and against the defendants. 3. During the pendency of the suit, part of the suit land was gifted to Vaish Aggarwal Panchayat (Regd.) Thanesar, vide two gift deeds dated 5.3.1997 and 6.3.1997 respectively. The donee was not made a party in the pending litigation. During the execution proceedings, the donee filed an objection petition under Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The same was dismissed on 4th of November, 2000. Though it is noticed in the order that the order was unsuccessfully challenged by the objector in the Honble High Court, this fact was, however, disputed by the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner. After dismissal of the objection petition, an application was moved for setting aside the judgment and decree dated 19th of August, 1998 and also for its substitution in place of donors Krishan Chand and Ved Pal, who had been litigating with the vendees as defendants. After dismissal of the objection petition, an application was moved for setting aside the judgment and decree dated 19th of August, 1998 and also for its substitution in place of donors Krishan Chand and Ved Pal, who had been litigating with the vendees as defendants. This application of the donee was also dismissed by the learned trial Court and appeal against that order was filed by the petitioner which also met with the same fate. 4. It is not in dispute that the gift deeds in favour of the petitioner were made during the pendency of the litigation between the donors/vendors and the prospective vendees, wherein specific performance of the agreement to sell dated 2.11.1992 was involved. It has also been noticed that no permission of the Court was sought before executing the gift deeds in favour of the petitioner. The Court also took notice of the fact that the knowledge of the pendency of the litigation regarding the lis came to the notice of the petitioner in view of the objection petition filed by it. 5. The application was contested on the ground of limitation as also on the question of locus standi to challenge the decree by way of simple application. It was claimed that the application for setting aside the decree by the petitioner was not maintainable. The plea of res judicata was also raised in view of the rejection of the objections by the executing Court. During the pendency of the appeal before the Appellate Court, an application for staying further proceedings was made by respondent No. 3 Krishan Chand on the ground that an application under Order 9 Rule 13 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure was filed and, therefore, the continuation of proceedings in appeal was likely to affect his right in the said application. 6. On merits, the case set up by the petitioner was that Krishan Chand, respondent No. 3 herein, was not residing in India and had not been served and represented properly. It was also claimed that Ved Pal had suffered paralysis and had appointed his son Manoj Kumar as his General Power of Attorney on 15th of May, 1997, but he colluded with the plaintiffs and did not contest the case properly which resulted in decree of the suit against the defendants. It was also claimed that Ved Pal had suffered paralysis and had appointed his son Manoj Kumar as his General Power of Attorney on 15th of May, 1997, but he colluded with the plaintiffs and did not contest the case properly which resulted in decree of the suit against the defendants. It was further claimed that the judgment and decree dated 19th of September, 1998 was obtained by concealment and practising a fraud upon the Court in collusion with the attorney of respondent No. 4 herein and thus the same were liable to be set aside. 7. The Courts below took notice of the fact that in the gift deed dated 6th of March, 1997, Krishan Chand had given his address of Thanesar in the Power of Attorney executed by him on 27th of June, 1997. The fact of pending litigation about subject matter of gift deeds was specifically mentioned. The learned Courts below also came to the conclusion that the petitioner had been sitting silent watching the proceedings and it was thereafter that it had moved the Court for setting aside the decree. 8. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the principle of lis pendens was not applicable as the transfer in favour of the petitioner was bona fide, was rejected. It was held that doctrine of lis pendens does apply to the gift deeds made in favour of the petitioner. Reliance for this purpose was placed on the judgments of this Court reported in the case of Rajinder Kumar v. Smt. Devi and others, 2001(1) PLR 647 (P&H); Santokh Singh others v. Balbir Singh and others, 2000 HRR 162 (P&H) and Jai Chand v. Gopal, 2004(3) CCC 116 (P&H). 9. The learned Appellate Court further came to the conclusion that even if it is taken that the petitioner had come to know about the decree on 24th May, 1999, which resulted in filing of objection petition, still the application for setting aside the ex parte judgment and decree dated 19th of September, 1998 was made on 10th of May, 2001. Thus, it was clearly barred by limitation. The learned Appellate Court also came to the conclusion that the time taken in pursuing the objection petition by the petitioner in the execution proceedings could not be ignored and advantage can be taken in the matter of limitation for entertaining the present application. Thus, it was clearly barred by limitation. The learned Appellate Court also came to the conclusion that the time taken in pursuing the objection petition by the petitioner in the execution proceedings could not be ignored and advantage can be taken in the matter of limitation for entertaining the present application. The Court further held that the applicant (petitioner) had the knowledge of the judgment and decree, still it did not choose to challenge the same. Accordingly, the application made by the petitioner for setting aside the judgment and decree as well as for substitution was dismissed. 10. Mr. O.P. Goyal, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner, by placing reliance on the judgment of the Honble Supreme Court in the case of Raj Kumar v. Sardari Lal and others, 2004(2) Civil & Rent Judicial Reports 72, contended that a lis pendens transferee though not brought on record under Order 22 Rule 10 of the CPC was entitled to move an application under Order 9 Rule 13 CPC to set aside a decree passed against his transferor, the defendant in the suit. However, this contention is totally misconceived as the learned Courts below have not rejected the application on the ground of maintainability, but keeping in view the fact that the objection petition filed by the petitioner against the execution of the decree on similar grounds had already been dismissed and the said decision operated as res judicata. The second ground for dismissal was that the application was barred by time. As already referred to above, the judgment and decree sought to be set aside were passed on 19th of September, 1998, whereas the objections against the said decree were filed and the executing Court dismissed the same on 4th of November, 2000. The application under Order 9 Rule 13 of the CPC for setting aside the judgment and decree was thereafter filed on 10.5.2001 which was hopelessly time barred even if the benefit of time spent in pursuing the execution proceedings was given to the petitioner. Thus, there is no error in the impugned orders passed by the learned Courts below which may call for interference by this Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction. Dismissed. Petition dismissed.