Rosebell Kachhap v. State Of Jharkhand Through Secretary, Secondary Education, Govt. Of Jharkhand
2006-04-24
R.K.MERATHIA
body2006
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT R.K. Merathia, J. I.A. No. 1438 of 2005 1. By the amendment petition filed on 18.5.2005, petitioner has prayed also for quashing the order of termination dated 30.10.2001 (Annexure-10). It is submitted on behalf of the petitioner that in substance, the petitioner had challenged the order of termination, but in view of the objection taken by the respondent No. 5, this Amendment Petition was filed. Mr. Singh, objected the prayer for amendment. 2. In my opinion, the Amendment should be allowed, as it will not cause any prejudice to any party. Accordingly, the Amendment is allowed by incorporating the prayer made in paragraph-4 of the Amendment Petition, by adding paragraph-1 (D) of the main writ petition. 3. LA. No. 1438 of 2005, stands disposed of. W.P. (S) No. 64 of 2004 4. Petitioner filed a Writ Petition being C.W.J.C. No. 519 of 2001 for a direction to the District Education Officer, Ranchi for payment of arrears/difference of salary, in terms of fixation of pay in the replacement scales. Without going into the merits, the said writ petition was disposed of on 7.2.2001, directing the District Education Officer to dispose of the representation filed by the petitioner, by a speaking order, in accordance with law. Pursuant to the said order, the District Education Officer, passed order on 12.5.2001, rejecting the petitioners claim. He found that she had tried to get the said benefits on the basis of forged documents and by twisting the facts and misleading this Court. It was observed in the order that the Managing Committee could initiate a departmental proceeding against her, in accordance with law. 6. Petitioner was suspended on 23.5.2001 and a departmental proceeding was started. She complained before the Director, Secondary Education, who referred the matter to the Deputy Commissioner, who in his turn, referred the matter to one Executive Magistrate; who found that the action of the Managing Committee was unjustified and mala fide, 7. On completion of the departmental proceeding, petitioner was terminated by order dated 30.10.2001 (Annexure-10). 8. Against the order of termination. she represented before the Regional Deputy Director of Education, who reported to the Director. Secondary Education, on 1.2.2002 (Annexure-11) that the action of the Managing Committee was illegal. Accordingly, the Director, Secondary Education, by order dated 12.4.2002 (Annexure-12) set aside the termination order and directed her reinstatement. 9.
8. Against the order of termination. she represented before the Regional Deputy Director of Education, who reported to the Director. Secondary Education, on 1.2.2002 (Annexure-11) that the action of the Managing Committee was illegal. Accordingly, the Director, Secondary Education, by order dated 12.4.2002 (Annexure-12) set aside the termination order and directed her reinstatement. 9. Petitioner has prayed for quashing the order of termination (Annexure-10) and/or for implementation of the said order for her reinstatement. 10. Mr. Anwar, learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that the Management has been acting mala fide against the petitioner in order to accommodate other teacher; and that the authorities having found her termination to be illegal, has ordered for her reinstatement. He further submitted that the order of termination is also bad on account of violation of the principles of natural justice, as inquiry report was not served on her and she was not heard on the point of the punishment. He relied on paragraphs 25 to 30 of the judgment , Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad and Ors. v. B. Karunakar and Ors. He further submitted that no approval of the competent authority was taken, as provided in Section 18(3)(d) of the Bihar Non-Government Secondary School (Taking over of Management and Control) Act, 1981 (the Act for short). He lastly submitted that the petitioner was not paid anything during her suspension period which itself is a ground for quashing the order of termination. 11. Mr. V.P. Singh, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the School (respondent No-5), submitted that pursuant to the order passed by this Court (Annexure-6), the District Education Officer, while considering the mater regarding the pay scale etc, of the petitioner, found that she had forged documents to get benefit and had tried to mislead the authorities and the High Court. He even recommended departmental proceeding against her. A departmental proceeding was held in which the charges were proved. Thus he submitted that the termination was not mala fide as alleged. He further submitted that the petitioner cannot pray before this Court under its writ jurisdiction to execute the order passed by the authorities. He relying on the judgment reported in 1988 PLJR 7 (S.C.), All Bihar Christian Schools Association and Anr. v. State of Bihar and Ors.
Thus he submitted that the termination was not mala fide as alleged. He further submitted that the petitioner cannot pray before this Court under its writ jurisdiction to execute the order passed by the authorities. He relying on the judgment reported in 1988 PLJR 7 (S.C.), All Bihar Christian Schools Association and Anr. v. State of Bihar and Ors. submitted that the Managing Committee was not required to obtain approval from the School Service Board before termination and it could seek approval subsequently. He further submitted that as per proviso to 18(3)(d) of the Act, the Board had limited jurisdiction about the-quantum of punishment; compliance of Rules of the Management, and compliance of Rules of natural Justice. 12. Mr. Singh further submitted that after creation of Jharkhand, the Bihar School Service Board had no Jurisdiction and, therefore, respondent No. 5 could not apply for approval of petitioners termination. He lastly submitted that the Service Rules of School were sent to the State Government for approval but the school has not received any information in this regard. 13. In the counter affidavit filed on -behalf of the Director, Secondary Education on 8.3.2006, it is stated that as per provisions contained in Section 85 of Bihar Reorganization Act, 2000, the Government of Jharkhand vide its Notification No. 4402 dated 14.11.2002 (Annexure-A) has adopted the Act. By amendment in the Bihar Act in place of "School Service Board", "any authority appointed by the State Government" has been substituted. It is further stated that by Notification No. 3050 dated 17.12.2004 (Annexure-B), all the powers of "School of Service Board" has been vested in the "State Government." 14. There is nothing to show that the School took any action for approval of the order of termination of the petitioner, before any authority, if the Bihar School Service Board had not jurisdiction as claimed by the School. Even after coming into force of the said Notification dated 14.11.2002, which was given retrospective effect w.e.f. 15.11.2000, the school has not taken any action about approval of the order of termination. 15. In the circumstances, the only question which remains to be decided is whether the rules of natural justice were complied, before terminating the petitioner. 16. Apparently, the inquiry report was not served on the petitioner, which has caused prejudice to her, specially in view of the contradictory reports of the Government officials.
15. In the circumstances, the only question which remains to be decided is whether the rules of natural justice were complied, before terminating the petitioner. 16. Apparently, the inquiry report was not served on the petitioner, which has caused prejudice to her, specially in view of the contradictory reports of the Government officials. Moreover, petitioner was not heard on the proposed punishment. Thus, the order of punishment cannot be sustained in law. 17. In the result, the impugned order of termination is set aside. The respondent No. 5 is directed to reinstate petitioner with 50% of the salary for the period she was out of service, including the period of suspension. However, this order will not prevent the Management in proceeding afresh, in accordance with law, from the stage of service of the inquiry report. No costs.