Before Mr. Justice Soumitra Sen ( 1 ) THE judgment of the Court was as follows: -This is an application under Sections 30 and 33 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 (hereinafter referred to as 'the said Act') for setting aside of an award dated 23rd January, 2002. ( 2 ) THE petitioner issued a notice inviting a tender on 13th of February, 1995 by the petitioner for construction of R. C. C cast in situ bored piling work including the pile cap. ( 3 ) THE respondent'submitted its tender on 4th of March, 1995. The estimated amount of the agreement was Rs. 63. 14. 464/ -. The rate quoted by the respondent was 12 per cent below the said estimated rate. ( 4 ) THE petitioner accepted the tender submitted by the respondent and issued the work order. In terms of the agreement entered into by and between the parties the work was to be completed within a period of 4 months from the date of commencement of work with effect from 1 st of June, 1995. The disputes and differences arose between the parties as the work could not be completed within the said period. ( 5 ) THE petitioner, on the one hand, contended that the respondent did not start the work in right earnest and delayed execution of the work. The respondent, on the other hand, contended that the delay was due to the fault on the part-of the petitioner. ( 6 ) THE respondent prayed for extension of time but such extension was not granted by the petitioner and claimed that the agreements stood rescinded date. The respondent invoked the arbitration clause of the agreement being clause 25 thereof. The respondent, on the other hand, contended that the delay was due to the fault on the part-of the petitioner. ( 6 ) THE respondent prayed for extension of time but such extension was not granted by the petitioner and claimed that the agreements stood rescinded date. The respondent invoked the arbitration clause of the agreement being clause 25 thereof. Having regard to the issues involved herein it would be necessary to look into the clause itself which is set out as under: - "clause 25 - Except where otherwise provided in the contract all questions and disputes relating to the meaning of specifications,-designs, drawings and instructions hereinbefore mentioned and as to the quality of workmanship of materials used on the work or as to any other question, claim, right matter or thing whatsoever, in-any way arising out of or relating to the contract, designs, drawings, specifications, estimates, instructions, orders or these conditions or otherwise concerning the works, or the execution, or failure to execute the same, whether arising during the progress of the work, or after the completion or abandonment thereof shall be referred to the sole arbitration of the Director of the Board. Should the Director be for any reason unwilling or unable to act as such arbitrator such questions and disputes shall be referred to an arbitrator to be appointed by the Director. The award of the arbitrator shall be final, conclusive and binding on all parties to this contract. In all cases where the total amount of all the claim in dispute is Rs. 75,000/- {rupees Seventy five thousand) only and above, the arbitrator shall give reasons for the award. Subject as aforesaid the provisions of the Arbitration Act, 1940, or any statutory modification of re-enactment thereof and the rules made thereunder and for the time being in force shall apply to the arbitration proceeding under this clause. It is also a term of the contract that the party invoking arbitration shall specify the dispute or disputes to be referred to arbitration under this clause together with the amount or amounts claimed in respect of each such dispute. It is also a term of the contract that the party invoking arbitration shall specify the dispute or disputes to be referred to arbitration under this clause together with the amount or amounts claimed in respect of each such dispute. It is also a term of the contract that if the contractor (s) do/does not make any demand of arbitration in respect of any claim (s) in writing within 90 days*of receiving the intimation from the Board that the bill is ready for payment, the claim of the contrator (s) will be deemed to have been waived and absolutely barred and the Board shall be discharged and released of all liabilities under the contract in respect of these claims. The arbitrator (s) may from time to time, if necessary, with consent of the parties enlarge the time, for making and publishing the award. " ( 7 ) THE petitioner appointed an Arbitrator in terms of the aforesaid clause and parties filed their statement and counter-statement before the arbitrator. The petitioner in its counter-statement also made a counter-claim against the respondent. After 44 sittings of the Arbitrator an award was published on 30th December, 1999 wherein the respondent was awarded a sum of Rs. 15,97,358/- and the counter-claim of the petitioner was rejected the petitioner challenged the said order before this Court on various grounds and also on the ground that the Arbitrator had no jurisdiction to pass any award on account of loss of profit being Claim No. 14. ( 8 ) HOWEVER, before the Court the parties agreed that except for the question of jurisdiction no other issues could be challenged and the award, therefore, on all other issues was affirmed and the matter was remanded back to the Arbitrator by an order dated 26th of June, 2000, only to consider whether the Arbitrator has jurisdiction to pass any award in respect of Claim No. 14. The claim No. 14 in statement of claim is as follows : claim No. 14. Anticipatory profit at the rate of 20 per cent on the value of work for rs. 54,95,956/-which remained unexecuted for the recovery of termination of agreement. The amount claimed under the aforesaid claim was rs. 10,99,191/- and the Arbitrator has awarded Rs. 5,51,635/ -. The claim No. 14 in statement of claim is as follows : claim No. 14. Anticipatory profit at the rate of 20 per cent on the value of work for rs. 54,95,956/-which remained unexecuted for the recovery of termination of agreement. The amount claimed under the aforesaid claim was rs. 10,99,191/- and the Arbitrator has awarded Rs. 5,51,635/ -. ( 9 ) THEREFORE, by reason of the order of remand passed by this Court the arbitrator was only required to consider the validity of the aforesaid Claim no. 14. The aforesaid claim is such that on fact the Arbitrator had to come to the conclusion that the agreement was wrongfully terminated by the petitioner and without coming to such a conclusion the said claim could not have been allowed in favour of the respondent. ( 10 ) AFTER the matter was remanded it was again heard by the Arbitrator on the question of jurisdiction of the Arbitrator to pass an award in respect of the said claim and after hearing the parties the Arbitrator passed the impugned order holding that he has jurisdiction to entertain the said claim and, accordingly, confirmed his earlier finding on fact and the quantum awarded. ( 11 ) THE petitioner has challenged the said impugned award principally on the ground that in terms of Clauses 2 and 3 of the agreement the Arbitrator did not have any jurisdiction to entertain the said claim as it was kept outside his purview under the said clauses. It was also submitted that the Arbitrator has not given any reasons in passing the impugned award and that there was no evidence before the Arbitrator with regard to the quantum of profit and that the arbitrator considered evidence behind the back of the respondent without giving any opportunity to deal with the same. ( 12 ) THEREFORE, the issues raised by the petitioner may be summarized as follows: - (1) Jurisdiction with regard to the question of jurisdiction it is necessary to consider the clauses relied upon by the petitioner which are set out as under: "clause 2 - The time allowed for carrying out the work as entered in the tender shall be strictly observed by the contractor and shall be reckoned from the date on which the order to commence work is given to the Contractor. The work shall throughout the stipulated period of the contract be proceeded with, all the due diligence (time being deemed to be of the essence of the contract, on the part" of the Contractor) and the Contractor shall pay as compensation an amount equal to one percent or such smaller amount as the Joint Director, (whose decision in writing shall be final) may decide on the amount of the tendered amount of the whole work as shown by the tenderer for every day that the work remains uncommenced or unfinished after the proper dates. The Contractor shall commence execution of such part of the work as may be notified to him within 7 days from the date of order for commencement for work and diligently continue such work and he shall be bound in all cases in which the time allowed for any work exceeds one month, to complete one-fourth of the work, before one-fourth of the whole time allowed under the contract has elapsed, one half of the work, before one half of such time has elapsed, and three-fourth of the work, before three-fourth of such time has elapsed. In the event of the Contractor failing to comply with any of the conditions herein, he shall be liable to pay as compensation an amount equal to the one percent or such smaller amount as the Joint Director (whose decision in writing shall be final) may decide, on the said tendered amount of the whole work for every day the due quantity of work remains incomplete, provided always that the entire amount of compensation to be paid under the provision of this clause shall not exceed ten percent on the tendered amount of the work as shown in the tender. Clause 3 - In any case in which under any clause or clauses of this contract the Contractor shall have rendered himself liable to pay compensation amounting to the whole of this security deposit (whether paid in one sum or deducted by instalments) the Deputy Director on behalf of the Board shall have power to adopt any of the following courses, as he may deem best suited to the interests of the Board: (a) To rescind the contract (of which rescission notice in writing to the Contractor under hand of the Deputy Director shall be conclusive evidence), and in which case the security deposit of the Contractor shall stand forfeited and be absolutely at the disposal of the Board. (b) To employ labour paid by the Board and to supply materials to carry out the work, or any part of the work debiting the contractor with the cost of the labour and the price of the material (of the amount of which cost and price a certificate of the Deputy Director shall be final and conclusive against the Contractor) and crediting him with the value of the work done, in all respects in the same manner and at the same rates as if it had been carried out by the Contractor under the terms of his contract; the certificate of the Deputy director as to the value of the work one, shall be final and conclusive against the Contractor. (c) To measure up the work of the Contractor, and to take such part thereof as shall be unexecuted, out of his hands, and to give it to another contractor to complete, in which case any expenses which may be incurred in excess of the sum which would have been paid to the original Contractor, if the whole work had been executed by him (of the amount of which excess the certificates in writing of the Deputy Director shall be final and conclusive) shall be borne and paid by the original contractor and may be deducted from any money due to him by the Board under the contract or otherwise, or from his security deposit or the proceeds of sale thereof, or a sufficient part thereof. In the event of any of the above courses being adopted by the deputy Director, the Contractor shall have no claim to compensation for any loss sustained by him by reasons of his having purchased or procured' any materials or entered into any engagements, or make any advance on account of, or with a view to the execution of the work or the performance of the contract. And in case the contract shall be rescinded under the provision aforesaid the Contractor shall not be entitled to recover or be paid any sum for any work therefore actually performed under this contract, unless and until the Deputy Director will have certified in writing the performance of such work and the value payable in respect thereof, and he shall only be entitled to be paid the value so certified. " Relying upon the aforesaid clauses it was submitted on behalf of the petitioner that in the event the agreement is rescinded the contractor meaning thereby the respondent herein can have no claim towards compensation for any loss sustained. It appears to me that upon a true and proper construction of both the clauses the clear meaning which emerges is that under Clause 2 a contractor was required to pay compensation for a specified amount if the work is not completed within the stipulated period and in terms of clause 3 if the contractor has made himself liable to pay compensation in terms of clauses of the agreement the petitioner could adopt various courses including recession of agreement and in that event the contractor can have no claim for compensation. Therefore, in order to rescind the agreement the liability of the contractor is required to be fixed. In case, it is established that the contractor is liable for compensation then the agreement could be rescinded but before fixing the liability of the contractor the question of rescinding the agreement cannot and does notarise. It appears to me that under the agreement the petitioner's right to rescind the agreement was dependent upon the fact as to whether the respondent was liable to pay compensation to the petitioner for causing delay in executing the work under the agreement. It appears to me that under the agreement the petitioner's right to rescind the agreement was dependent upon the fact as to whether the respondent was liable to pay compensation to the petitioner for causing delay in executing the work under the agreement. This case, in my opinion, does not amount to a clause, which can be interpreted as amounting to an inherent lack of jurisdiction on the part of the Arbitrator to entertain a claim for loss of profit or compensation. Furthermore, the arbitration clause which is set out as hereinbefore makes it clear that it is of a widest possible amplitude and any question claim, right, matter or thing arising out of or in relation to the agreement could be the subject-matter of arbitration. It is true that the clause begins with the expression "except where otherwise provides to the agreement" but it leaves no manner of doubt that under the said clause the Arbitrator was perfectly within his right to examine the right of the parties in relation to the agreement and, therefore, the agreement itself could be looked into by the Arbitrator. Form the Clause 3, it further appears that the bar of compensation is on account of specified heads like purchase of raw materials entered into other engagements or making any advance or with a view of execution of the work of the performance of the worker. It does not include a claim for compensation towards loss of profit. Therefore, it appears that a claim for compensation on account of loss of profit is not covered by Clause 3. Therefore, on this issue also it could not be said the Arbitrator lacked inherent jurisdiction to entertain the claim for loss of profit. Though initially it was contended on behalf of the petitioner that the Arbitrator lacked inherent jurisdiction, but subsequently, however, in course of argument it was contended that, this is not a case of inherent lack of jurisdiction but a case of improper exercise of jurisdiction. It is well settled that it is one thing that the Arbitrator lacks inherent jurisdiction and it is quite a different matter to say that the Arbitrator has made an improper exercise of jurisdiction. In case of inherent lack of jurisdiction the mere entertainment of a claim itself makes the award bad. It is well settled that it is one thing that the Arbitrator lacks inherent jurisdiction and it is quite a different matter to say that the Arbitrator has made an improper exercise of jurisdiction. In case of inherent lack of jurisdiction the mere entertainment of a claim itself makes the award bad. But in case of improper exercise of jurisdiction the Arbitrator can certainly entertain the claim but will not be able to award a claim, which is outside the purview of the arbitration. In the instant case, having regard to the clauses as referred above, I am of the opinion that it could not be said that there is any inherent lack of jurisdiction or an improper exercise of jurisdiction by the Arbitrator. Another significant fact which is required to be noted here is that while deciding the claim for loss of profit and to see whether the said claim is barred in terms of Clauses 2 and 3 as above it is to be first established that the respondent has committed default and/or breach of the agreement for which the agreement could be rescinded by the petitioner. But on facts the Arbitrator has already come to the conclusion that the delay in executing the agreement is attributable to the petitioner and such finding of fact has not been challenged. The only question which was raised by the Court when the first award was challenged that the arbitrator lacked jurisdiction to entertain the claim in view of Clauses 2 and 3 and the order of remand is also restricted to the question of jurisdiction alone. Even while deciding the question of liability under the Claim no. 14, the other claims made by the respondent also involved the question of finding of fact as to which of the party was responsible for delay in executing the agreement, on those claims the Arbitrator has come to a clear finding of fact that the petitioner was responsible for the delay. The award in respect of those claims has not been challenged and has been upheld. Therefore, before me this issue is now already settled and is res integra as between the parties. 2. The award in respect of those claims has not been challenged and has been upheld. Therefore, before me this issue is now already settled and is res integra as between the parties. 2. No Evidence it was submitted on behalf of the petitioner that while arriving at the quantum with regard to loss profit there was absolutely no evidence before the Arbitrator and, therefore, he could not have come to any conclusion with regard to the quantum. It was submitted that in the first award the Arbitrator has clearly held that no evidence was produced by the respondent in support of his claim and in the impugned award also no evidence was recorded. The claim of the respondent for loss of profit was due to wrongful rescission of the agreement. Had the respondent completed the work, the respondent would have received a total amount of Rs. 55,16,353/- ' which obviously included an element of profit as the respondent could not have accepted a tender for a value, without first taking care of the element of profit. But by reason of the rescission of the agreement by the petitioner the respondent was deprived of completing the agreement and receiving the entire value of agreement. On facts it is now concluded as between the parties that the rescission of the agreement by the petitioner was wrongful. Once this fact is established the next question is assessment of the quantum of loss of profit. The loss of profit claimed by the petitioner is in the nature of general damages for breach of agreement and not special damage. Therefore, if upon examination it is found that the assessment made by the Arbitrator towards loss of profit is reasonable and plausible it should not be interfered with. 3. Consideration of evidence behind the back of the parties it was submitted on behalf of the petitioner that in the impugned award the Arbitrator has recorded that the quantum of profit has again reviewed by him by way of an independent analysis based on item of schedule of rates of Public Works Department, West Bengal of 1996 and standard practices and standard data-book for analysis of rates published by Indian Road Congress. It was, therefore, submitted that consideration of this material was done independently by the Arbitrator behind the back of the parties which is in clear violation of principle of natural justice. It was, therefore, submitted that consideration of this material was done independently by the Arbitrator behind the back of the parties which is in clear violation of principle of natural justice. Therefore, it was an arbitrary exercise of the authority by the Arbitrator and the award should be set aside on this ground alone. Though the award does not contain in detail, reasons on this issue but the intention of the Arbitrator is explicit on the face of it. The rate on which the tender was awarded was 12 per cent below the estimated rates. The estimated rate itself was based on the schedule of rates of the public Works Department, like in ail other Government contractors. It is- needless to mention that the rates quoted by the petitioner was, indeed, based upon the standard schedule of rates which includes an element of profit. The price quoted by the intending tenderers is always a percentage below the schedule of rates and whoever quotes the highest below rate is declared to be the lowest tendered. Therefore, before quoting the rate at a percentage below the schedule of rate the contractors arrive at a commercial decision with regard to the element of profit. The standard practices and standard data-book published by the Indian Road Congress is a well-established material to arrive at a conclusion with regard to calculation of schedule of rates. These are not evidence produced by the parties in an adversary litigations which the Arbitrator has considered behind the back of the parties but are established material in the field of government agreement and calculation based thereon are already accepted in the nature as a whole as a standard measure of calculation. Therefore, in my opinion, I do not think the Arbitrator has committed any mistake by taking help of the established materials to arrive at a just and proper calculation and conclusion. The awarded sum on account of loss of profit is 10 per cent of the unexecuted value of work which, in my opinion, is a perfectly reasonable amount. 4. No Reasons the learned Advocate for the petitioner was a great pains to establish before me that the impugned award is without any reason. It is well settled that the Arbitrator is not required to give elaborate and/or detailed reasons but his reasons should be such that his mind is expressed and is intelligible. 4. No Reasons the learned Advocate for the petitioner was a great pains to establish before me that the impugned award is without any reason. It is well settled that the Arbitrator is not required to give elaborate and/or detailed reasons but his reasons should be such that his mind is expressed and is intelligible. In the impugned award the Arbitrator has referred to the first award with regard to the reasons for ascertaining as to which of the parties had committed breach of the agreement. Since, there are already reasons recorded in the first award the Arbitrator accepted the same which, therefore, automatically becomes a part of impugned award. The Arbitrator is not required to give the reasons twice over oh this issue. Furthermore, while deciding the question of jurisdiction has considered all the submissions, documents and arguments made by the parties and have obviously accepted the submissions, arguments and documents made on behalf of the respondent. The minutes of the arbitration reference disclosed in this proceeding clearly indicates that elaborate argument made on behalf of the parties which has been considered by the Arbitrator and those are part of the records of the arbitration proceeding. Therefore, in my opinion, there was no need for the Arbitrator to reiterate those elaborate reasons once again accepting the contention of the respondent on the issue of jurisdiction. The Arbitrator has clearly stated in the impugned award that he has jurisdiction with regard to the question of loss of profit in accordance with the tender agreement meaning thereby the clauses of the agreement. In my opinion, it cannot be contended that the award without reasons. ( 13 ) ON behalf of the petitioner the following decisions were relied upon: - (1) Steel Authority of India Ltd. v. J. C. Budharaja, Government and Mining Contractor, 1999 (8) SCC 122 , (2) M/s. A. T. Brij Paul Singh and Bros. v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1984 sc1703, (3) Raipur Development Authority v. Chokhamal Contractors, AIR 1990 SC 1426 , (4)' Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. v. M/s. L. K. Ahuja and Co. , AIR 2001 sc1179, (5) Jajodia (Overseas) Pvt. Ltd. v. Industrial Development corporation of Orissa Ltd. , 1993 (2) SCC 106 , (6) M/s. Kirpal Singh Khurana and Sons v. Union of India and Ors. , 1996 Arbitration Law Report Supplement (24) 374. , AIR 2001 sc1179, (5) Jajodia (Overseas) Pvt. Ltd. v. Industrial Development corporation of Orissa Ltd. , 1993 (2) SCC 106 , (6) M/s. Kirpal Singh Khurana and Sons v. Union of India and Ors. , 1996 Arbitration Law Report Supplement (24) 374. ( 14 ) THE principle laid down in the decision of Steel Authority of India (supra) is well settled but it has to be seen whether the principle applies in the facts of this case. In the facts and circumstances of the instant case, it cannot be said that the Arbitrator has disregarded any terms of the agreement. On the contrary, having regard to the terms of the agreement the Arbitrator was perfectly within his right to entertain the claim of the respondent and to pass an award in respect thereof. There is no prohibition whatsoever in. the clauses which bars the Arbitrator from entertaining a claim or passing an award for the same. ( 15 ) IN the said decision of Brij Paul Singh (supra) the Supreme Court has held that the contractor would be entitled to claim damage for loss of profit, which he is expected to earn by undertaking, the works under the agreement and a claim under this head is certainly admissible. The trial Court awarded compensation for loss of profit at 20 per cent of the estimated cost. The High court set aside the said finding on the ground the appellant has not proved the said damage by any primary documents. The Supreme Court set aside the finding of the High Court by observing that in another appeal arising out of a similar agreement, the High Court had held that 15 per cent loss of profit of the price of the balance work was a reasonable measure of damage. But, in the appeal, which was the subject-matter before the Supreme Court, the High Court held otherwise. Therefore, it was held by the Supreme Court that the High Court was in error in disregarding its own finding in the other appeal. The Supreme court has further held that ordinarily a contractor by submitting his tender in response to an invitation to tender for works agreement reasonably expects to make profit. What would be the measure of profit would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case but that, there should be a reasonable expectation of profit is implicit in works agreement. What would be the measure of profit would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case but that, there should be a reasonable expectation of profit is implicit in works agreement. That loss has to be compensated by way of damages if the other party to the agreement is guilty to breach of contract cannot be gainsaid. The Supreme Court has taken note of the fact that in respect of another work in the vicinity for identical type of work, the same High Court has accepted 15 per cent of the value of the balance of the work as a reasonable measure of damages for loss of profit. In the instance case, the Arbitrator has awarded 10 per cent as the measure of damage of the unexecuted value of the agreement. . Therefore, in doing so the Arbitrator has not committed any error or legal misconduct. ( 16 ) IN the decision of Raipur Development Authority (supra) the Supreme court has held that an award passed under the Arbitration Act, 1940 an award is not liable to be set aside merely on the ground that it is without reasons except where the obligation agreement, or terms of reference or law requires giving of reasons. In the instant case, the arbitration clause makes it clear that if the claim in dispute is over Rs. 75,000/-, the Arbitrator is required to reasons for the award. I have already held that the award in question cannot be said to be without reasons. The impugned award has to be read with the first award which has been upheld on all issues except for claim No. 14 on the question of jurisdiction of the Arbitrator. The first award was not challenged on the ground that it did not contain any reason. Under the 1940 Act, there was no legal compulsion on the Arbitrator to give reasons as opposed to the provisions contained in the Arbitration Act, 1996 which requires the arbitrator to give reasons otherwise agreed by the parties. The legal position with regard to giving reasons is well settled but in the facts of this case, I am of the opinion that the award passed by the Arbitrator cannot be held to be an unreasoned award. The legal position with regard to giving reasons is well settled but in the facts of this case, I am of the opinion that the award passed by the Arbitrator cannot be held to be an unreasoned award. ( 17 ) IN the decision of Bharat Coking Coal (supra) the Supreme Court has held that in cases where the Arbitrator has given reasons, the Court can interfere if there is an error apparent on the face of the award itself. In the said case, the claim, which was awarded by the Arbitrator, was towards escalation in the cost of materials, the Arbitrator has awarded a lump-sum amount. Under those circumstances, the Supreme Court held that on what account the escalation was assessed was not discernable from the award. It was also held that the particular clause of the agreement was disregarded by the Arbitrator. Accordingly, the Supreme Court held that there was an error apparent on the face of the award. In the instant case, the claim is not towards escalation and, therefore, there was no need to individually assess particular claims on any specific head. The claim for escalation will have to be actually proved but, in the instant case, the claim is towards loss of profit based upon the unexecuted value of the agreement. Therefore, the measure of damage has assessed by the Arbitrator, in the instant case, does not appear to be unreasonable and is, therefore, not an error apparent on the face of the award. ( 18 ) IN the decision of Jajodia (Overseas) Pvt. Ltd. (supra) what is a reasoned award has been interpreted by the Supreme Court. There is no cast iron formula at to what would constitute a reasoned award. What is required of the Arbitrator is to make his intention clear in the award so that the reasons can be understood. I have already held that the impugned award contains sufficient reasons so as to understand the mental process of the arbitrator and, therefore, the reasons not being erroneous on the face of the award it cannot be interfered with. I have already held that the impugned award contains sufficient reasons so as to understand the mental process of the arbitrator and, therefore, the reasons not being erroneous on the face of the award it cannot be interfered with. ( 19 ) IN the case of M/s. Kirpal Singh Khurana (supra) the Supreme Court has held that if the Arbitrator looks into any document or paper not being part of the record of the proceedings behind the back of the parties to come to a finding it will be an amount to a legal misconduct. In the instance case, the Arbitrator has not looked into any document of the parties to come to the conclusion but has accepted the schedule of rates which was the basis for fixing the quantum of the agreement and in doing so the Arbitrator has not committed any legal misconduct. Therefore, the said decision is of no assistance to the petitioner. ( 20 ) THE petitioner has also contended that since the petitioner had already come to the conclusion that the respondent was guilty of breach and thereby Clause 3 was invoked, the Arbitrator had no authority or jurisdiction to entertain the claim for compensation. This submission, in my opinion, is thoroughly misconceived whether or not the conclusion of the petitioner that the respondent was guilty of committing breach is itself a dispute covered under the arbitration clause and the Arbitrator having held that the petitioner is guilty of breach, it cannot be said that mere invocation of Clause 3 by the petitioner would preclude the Arbitrator from entertaining a claim for compensation for loss of profit. Even on facts I have held that the question of loss of profit is not covered under Clause 3. ( 21 ) ON behalf of the respondent the decision of Gujarat W. S. and S. B v. Unique Erectors (Gujarat) (P) Ltd. , reported in AIR 1989 SC 973 and Indian Oil corpn. Ltd. v. Indian Carbon Ltd. , reported in AIR 1988 SC 1340 were relied upon for the proposition that the Arbitrator is not required to give a detailed judgment. Ltd. v. Indian Carbon Ltd. , reported in AIR 1988 SC 1340 were relied upon for the proposition that the Arbitrator is not required to give a detailed judgment. If there is no error of fact and the view taken by the Arbitrator is a plausible view and the Arbitrator makes his mind known on the basis of which he has acted, it cannot be said that the award is without any reasons and cannot be set aside. ( 22 ) THE proposition laid down in the aforesaid two decisions is well settled. In the instant case, with regard to the finding of fact as to which the party was responsible for the breach there is no dispute whatsoever. The finding of fact by the Arbitrator that the petitioner was responsible for the breach has been upheld by this Court when the first award was challenged in an application for setting aside. The basis of which the Arbitrator has acted is clearly stated in the impugned award. Therefore, in my opinion, the award cannot be set aside on the ground that it is an unreasoned award and contrary to the agreement between the parties. ( 23 ) THE decision of Deo Kumar Saraf v. Union of India, reported in 1988 (2) CLJ 325 was relied upon on behalf of the respondent in support of the proposition that the Court's jurisdiction to award damages cannot be confined to the evidence on record only and the Court is entitled to award damages on any other reasonable basis even on the basis of the mere guess work. In the instant case, it cannot be said that the Arbitrator has acted on guess work. What was required to be considered by the Arbitrator, was the quantum of general damage by reason of breach of agreement and he has come to the conclusion that 10 per cent of the value of the unexecuted work would be a reasonable measure. This, in my opinion, is a possible and reasonable way of assessing damage once the liability on account of breach on the part of the petitioner had already been fixed. ( 24 ) THE decision of Gambhirmall Mahabir Prasad v. Indian Bank Ltd. and anr. , reported in AIR 1963 Cal. This, in my opinion, is a possible and reasonable way of assessing damage once the liability on account of breach on the part of the petitioner had already been fixed. ( 24 ) THE decision of Gambhirmall Mahabir Prasad v. Indian Bank Ltd. and anr. , reported in AIR 1963 Cal. 163 was relied upon on behalf of the respondent in support of the proposition that in terms of Section 73 of the Indian Evidence act while assessing damage the Court is entitled to from conclusion on matters on which there is no evidence and to make allowances for contingencies even to the extent of making a pure guess work. In the said decision of Gambhirmall (supra) the Court has held that when damages are difficult to estimate and cannot be assessed with certainty, the wrong doer cannot be relieved of its obligation of committing damages for breach of duty. However, when the cause of damage itself cannot be assessed due to remoteness, of course, it will not be proper for the Court to assess damage on materials which were not before the Court. But, when the cause of damage is established and the quantum cannot be assessed with any mathematical accuracy, the Court is empowered to assess damage on a reasonable basis. The petitioners have sought to contend that in the instant case, there is no evidence whatsoever towards loss of profit, therefore, the principle enunciated in the said decision of Gambhirmall (supra)does not apply in the facts of the instance case. I am unable to accept the contention for the reasons that it is already established beyond any doubt that the petitioner was guilty of committing the breach. There was no lack of evidence to come to such a conclusion once the fact of breach of the terms of the agreement has already been established and the liability of the party fixed, it is now only a question of assessing the quantum. Even without any specific proof of the same, a reasonable basis can be resorted to for assessing the quantum. T6'contend to the contrary would militate against the very fundamental concept of awarding compensation or damage for breach of agreement which is in the nature of general damage. ( 25 ) THE Court's power to arrive at a conclusion for the interest of justice is ingrained in Section 73 of the Indian Evidence Act. T6'contend to the contrary would militate against the very fundamental concept of awarding compensation or damage for breach of agreement which is in the nature of general damage. ( 25 ) THE Court's power to arrive at a conclusion for the interest of justice is ingrained in Section 73 of the Indian Evidence Act. It empowers the Court to look into documents which has not been proved or produced in the proceedings so that the interest of justice is sub-served. ( 26 ) MORE often than not mathematical accuracy in the matter of assessing general damage proves to be extremely difficult. To bind the Court to strict rules of evidence and to arrive at a precise mathematical accurate figure for assessing general damage would be too burden sum and would go against the very object of interest of justice. There should be a room for some amount of exercise of discretion in assessing general damage or otherwise the whole object of adjudicating the breach of an agreement and consequential damage to be awarded would be rendered nugatory. For the reasons as aforesaid, I am of the opinion that this application is without any merit. The same is, accordingly, dismissed with costs assessed, at rs. 5,000/- (Rupees Five Thousand) only. .