JUDGMENT P. K. TRIPATHY, J. : This writ petition has been filed by the Divisional Forest Officer-cum-Authorised Officer, Ghumsur South Division, Bhanjanagar in the district of Ganjam, challeng¬ing the judgment passed in September, 1995 in Misc.Appeal No.76 of 1994. 2. A brief narration of the relevant facts would suffice in the context on which this writ petition has been filed. 3. On 21.03.1992, the Divisional Mobile Party of the Forest Department while performing patrol duty under Kodala range forest area, at about 11 p.m. detected transportation of 105 pieces of mango planks in the truck bearing Registration No.OAX-6349, belonging to opposite party No.1 Pandaba Patro. Driver and helper of the truck failed to produce any valid document or Timber Transit Permit for transporting such planks. Thus, Offence Report Case No.515 of 1991-92 was registered under Section 56 (2-1) of the Orissa Forest Act, 1972 (in short ‘the Act’). On com¬pletion of enquiry, the Authorized Officer on 23.07.1994 passed order to confiscate the vehicle and the seized mango plans. Opposite party No.1, i.e., the owner of the truck challenged that order in Misc. Appeal No.76 of 1994. Learned District Judge, Ganjam at Berhampur after hearing the parties, held that :- “...Therefore, there can be no escape from the conclusion that a forest offence has been committed and that the seized truck is to be confiscated.” Thereafter, learned District Judge recorded that - “However, in the facts and circumstances of this case, it will be appropriate to impose fine instead of confiscating the seized truck, keeping in view of the decisions referred to above.” Such decisions are the cases of Gurdev Singh Rai v. A.C.F.-cum-Authorized Officer, Rairakhol Division, Vol.76 (1993) C.L.T. 671 and Gopinath Sahu v. State of Orissa, Vol.77 (1994) C.L.T. 573. It is not disputed at the Bar that in both he cases (supra) it was decided that imposition of fine in lieu of confiscation of the vehicle is permissible and the amount of fine be determined by making due reference to the goods transferred unauthorized and illegally. 4. Learned Standing Counsel argues that the aforesaid judgment of the District Judge no doubt gains support from the above noted citations but that is contrary to the statutory provision in Section 56 and the case of State of Karnataka v. K. Krishnan, A.I.R. 2000 S.C.2729. 4. Learned Standing Counsel argues that the aforesaid judgment of the District Judge no doubt gains support from the above noted citations but that is contrary to the statutory provision in Section 56 and the case of State of Karnataka v. K. Krishnan, A.I.R. 2000 S.C.2729. He further argues that in view of the legal position stated in the cases of Sri Uday Chandra Patt¬naik v. State of Orissa and others, 2005 (I) OLR 132 and State of Jharkhand and another v. Govind Singh, A.I.R. 2005 S.C. 294, order of imposition of fine in lieu of confiscation is impermis¬sible. 5. Learned counsel for the owner-opposite party on the other hand, argues that the aforesaid decision of learned Dis¬trict Judge having been passed during the period when the ratio in the above two decisions of this Court were in force therefore, the impugned judgment cannot be termed as illegal. He also states that no useful purpose would be served by interfering with the impugned order. 6. Before dealing with the aforesaid contention of the parties, we fell it proper to put on record that on 15.7.1996 in Misc.Case No.2492 of 1996 this Court while admitting the writ petition passed order of stay in the following manner: “There shall be stay of operation of the direction given in the impugned judgment for release of the vehicle on deposit of fine.” The opposite party-owner of the truck filed Misc.Case No.8066 of 1997 with the prayer for order of interim release of the truck. On 24.7.1997 that Misc. Case was disposed of with the following order: “The truck bearing registration number OAX 6349 may be released in favour of Pandaba Patra opp.party No.1 in the writ petition on furnishing cash security of Rs.50,000/- and immovable property security of Rs.50,000/-.” Position of law, by now, is well settled that when subject of confiscation if found liable for confiscation, then in the absence of specific provision in the statute, a Court cannot allow release of such articles on payment of fine. 7. In the case of Govind Sigh (supra), while dealing with a similar fact situation, the Apex Court held that : “22. 7. In the case of Govind Sigh (supra), while dealing with a similar fact situation, the Apex Court held that : “22. It is then true that, “when the words of a law extend not to an inconvenience rarely happening, but due to those which often happen, it is good reason not to strain the words further than they reach, by saying it is causes omissus, and that the law intended quae frequentius accident.” “But”,on the other hand, “it is no reason, when the words of a law do enough extend to an inconvenience seldom happening, that they should not extend to it as well as if it happened more frequently, be¬cause it happens but seldom” (See Fenton v. Hampton 11 Moore, PC 345). A casus omissus ought not to be created by interpretation, save in some case of strong necessity. Where, however, a casus omissus does really occur, enter through the inadvertence of the Legislature, or on the principle quod semel aut bis exist it proe¬tereunt legislators, the rule is that the particular case, thus left unprovided for, must be disposed of according to the law as it existed before such statute - Casus omissus et oblivioni datus dispositioni communis juris relinquitur; “a casus omissus,” ob¬served Buller, J. in Jones v.Smart (1 TR 52), “can in no case be supplied by a Court of law, for that would be to make laws.” Their Lordships applying the aforesaid principle held that imposition of fine in lieu of confiscation is not permissible if not provided in the statute. Similar view has been taken by a Bench of this Court in the case of Udaya Chandra Pattnaik (supra). 8. In the case of K. Krishnan (supra) while dealing with the matter relating to interim release of the property involving a forest offence, the Apex Court express the view that : “... We agree that the provisions of the Act are required to be strictly complied with and followed for the purposes of achieving the object for which the Act was enacted. Liberal ap¬proach in the matter with respect to the property seized, which is liable to confiscation, is uncalled for as the same is likely to frustrate the provisions of the act. Liberal ap¬proach in the matter with respect to the property seized, which is liable to confiscation, is uncalled for as the same is likely to frustrate the provisions of the act. Before passing an order for releasing the forest produce or the property used in the commission of the forest offence, the Authorized Officer or the Appellate Authority has to specify the reasons which justify such release, apparently, prima facie excluding the possibility of such forest produce or the property being confiscated ultimately. Generally, therefore, any forest produce and the tools, boats, vehicles, cattles, etc., used in the commission of the forest offence, which are liable to forfeiture, should not be released. This, however, does not debar the officers and the authorities under the Act including the Appellate Authority to pass appropri¬ate orders under the circumstances of each case but only after assigning valid reasons. The liberal approaching the matter would perpetuate the commission of more offences with respect to the forest and its produce, which, if not protected, is surely to affect the mother-earth and the atmosphere surrounding it. The Courts cannot shut their eyes and ignore their obligations indi¬cated in the Act enacted for the purposes of protecting and safeguarding both the forests and their produce.” 9. It is not necessary to burden this judgment with the statutory provision in Section 56 of the Act. That provision of law does not provide for imposition of fine in lieu of confis¬cation. The decision of the Apex Court, as noted above, provides that Court should make simple interpretation to the ambiguous expression used in the statute. Therefore, there cannot be an order of payment of fine in lieu of confiscation and if any such approach is made, then that is not in accordance with law. 10. In the preceding paragraph, we have taken note of the submission of learned counsel for the owner-opposite party that learned District Judge passed order for payment of fine in lieu of confiscation by following the ratio in the cases of Gopinath Sahu (supra) and Gurdev Singh Rai (supra). In the case of Gopi¬nath Singh, the Division Bench taking note of the fact situation in that case thought of following the ratio in the case of Guru¬dev Singh Rai. No ratio independently laid in the said judgment to have a binding precedent. In the case of Gopi¬nath Singh, the Division Bench taking note of the fact situation in that case thought of following the ratio in the case of Guru¬dev Singh Rai. No ratio independently laid in the said judgment to have a binding precedent. In the case of Gurudev SIngh Rai while stating that in exceptional circumstance Court can inter¬pret the provision and aid expression to the statutory provision in the interest of justice (though that ratio does not hold good in view of the ratio in the case of Govind Singh (supra)). In Gurdev Singh Rai, after discussing the scope and ambit of inter¬pretation of the statutes, it was held that : “17. Having deeply reflected over the question at hand, we are of the firm view that if the deficiency in Section 56 (2-a), of which reference has been made above, would have come to the knowledge of the legislature, it would have definitely provided for imposition of fine as an alternative punishment in those cases where the authorities may not be satisfied about the de¬sirability of confiscation and may not also feel happy in allow¬ing the owner of the vehicle to go scot-free. We, therefore, read in the aforesaid Section a power to impose fine in lieu of con¬fiscation in appropriate cases. What could be the appropriate cases cannot be laid down with rigidity the same has to be left to the satisfaction of the appropriate authority.” (Underlined by us to put emphasis) Therefore, it is readable from the above quoted ratio that the Division Bench did not ask for universal application of the principle of imposition of fine in lieu of confiscation. In the impugned judgment before or after recording his satisfaction about a forest offence having been committed making the seized property liable for confiscation, learned District Judge did not consider, as to for what reason he wanted to impose fine in lieu of confiscation. In other words, he followed the aforesaid ratio without deciding if the case at hand is an appropriate case for imposition of fine in lieu of confiscation. 11. We thus find that opposite party cannot take shelter of the cases referred to in the impugned judgment relating to ille¬gal order of payment of fine in lieu of confiscation after learned District Judge decided that the seized goods and the vehicle are liable to confiscation. 11. We thus find that opposite party cannot take shelter of the cases referred to in the impugned judgment relating to ille¬gal order of payment of fine in lieu of confiscation after learned District Judge decided that the seized goods and the vehicle are liable to confiscation. Apart from that, from the two quoted interim orders passed by this Court, we find that order of the impugned judgment as not so far been implemented. In other words, the vehicle has not been released on acceptance of fine. The foregoing discussion leads to the consequence that order of the District Judge being illegal and contrary to the statutory provision, the same is set aside and the order of confiscation of the Authorized Officer is maintained. The writ petition is ac¬cordingly allowed. It is for the petitioner to take appropriate steps for securing custody of the truck or else to proceed in the matter in accordance with law. No cost. A. K. PARICHHA, J. I agree. Petition allowed.