JUDGMENT By the Court—This petition has been filed for setting-aside the order dated 31st January, 2006 passed by the learned Central Administrative Tribunal in Original Application No. 821 of 2005. The said Original Application had been filed by respondent No. 1 Sri Ravindra Nath Tripathi for quashing the charge-sheet dated 17th June, 2005 issued to him by the petitioner. A preliminary objection was raised on behalf of the petitioners by means of an affidavit that the Original Application which had been filed for quashing the charge sheet was not maintainable. The said preliminary objection was rejected by the impugned order and it was further ordered that till the disposal of the case further proceedings by the Enquiry Officer shall remain stayed. The matter was directed to be listed on 10th March, 2006 and the respondents were directed to file counter affidavit within four weeks failing which their rights to file the same would be forfeited. 2. Sri Amit Sthalekar, learned Counsel for the petitioners submitted that the Original Application filed before the Tribunal itself was not maintainable in view of the decisions of the Supreme Court in Union of India and another v. Ashok Kacker, 1995 Supp (1) SCC 180 and Secretary to Government, Prohibition & Excise Department v. L. Srinivasan, (1996) 3 SCC 157 . He, therefore, submitted that the Tribunal was not justified in passing the interim order and that in any view of the matter the Tribunal should not have stayed the enquiry proceedings. 3. Sri C.L. Pandey, learned Counsel appearing for the respondent No. 1, however, submitted that the Tribunal was justified in passing the interim order in the facts and circumstances of this case particularly when the disciplinary proceedings had been initiated at a belated stage and that the petitioner should file a counter affidavit so that the matter can be finally heard by the Tribunal. 4. We have carefully considered the submissions advanced by the learned Counsel for the parties, 5. A bare perusal of the order passed by the Tribunal shows that the preliminary objection raised by the petitioners through the affidavit has been rejected without giving any reasons. 6. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ashok Kacker (supra) clearly held in a matter where the employee had challenged the charge-sheet that the Tribunal entertained the application at a premature stage. A bare perusal of the order passed by the Tribunal shows that the preliminary objection raised by the petitioners through the affidavit has been rejected without giving any reasons. 6. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ashok Kacker (supra) clearly held in a matter where the employee had challenged the charge-sheet that the Tribunal entertained the application at a premature stage. It was observed as follows : “............In our opinion, this was not the stage at which the Tribunal ought to have entertained such an application for quashing the, charge-sheet and the appropriate course for the respondent to adopt is to file his reply to the charge-sheet and invite the decision of the disciplinary authority thereon. This being the stage at which the respondent had rushed to the Tribunal, we do not consider it necessary to require the Tribunal at this stage to examine any other point which may be available to the respondent or which may have been raised by him.” 7. In L. Srinivasan (supra) the Supreme Court set-aside the order of the Tribunal by which the departmental enquiry and the charge-sheet were quashed on the ground of delay in initiation of the disciplinary proceedings and it was observed as follows : “Order dated 12.11.1993 in Nos. 1702 of 1993 and 2206 of 1993 of the Tamil Nadu Administrative Tribunal, Madras is in question before us. The respondent while working as Assistant Section Officer, Home, Prohibition and Excise Department had been placed under suspension. Departmental inquiry is in process. We are informed that charge-sheet was laid for prosecution for the offences of embezzlement and fabrication of false records etc. and that the offences and the trial of the case is pending. The Tribunal had set aside the departmental enquiry and quashed the charge on the ground of delay in initiation of disciplinary proceedings. In the nature of the charge, it would take a long time to detect embezzlement and fabrication of false records which should be done in secrecy. It is not necessary to go into the merits and record any finding on the charge levelled against the charged officer since any finding recorded by this Court would gravely prejudice the case of the parties at the enquiry and also at the trial. Therefore, we desist from expressing any opinion on merit or recording any of the contentions raised by the Counsel on either side. Therefore, we desist from expressing any opinion on merit or recording any of the contentions raised by the Counsel on either side. Suffice it to state that the Administrative Tribunal has committed grossest error in its exercise of the judicial review. The member of the Administrative Tribunal appears to have no knowledge of the jurisprudence of the service law and exercised power as if he is an appellate forum dehors the limitation of judicial review. This is one such instance where a member had exceeded his power of judicial review in quashing the suspension order and charges even at the threshold. We are coming across such orders frequently putting heavy pressure on this Court to examine each case in detail. It is high time that it is remedied.” (emphasis supplied) 8. It was, therefore, emphasised by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that even by way of final order the departmental enquiry or the charge-sheet could not have been quashed. Thus, what could not have been done even at the final stage certainly could not have been done by way of any interim measure by the Tribunal. 9. It must also be remembered that it is a settled legal proposition of law that even if the inquiry is initiated at a belated stage or there is a delay in the conclusion of the inquiry within a reasonable period the Court/Tribunal should not quash the charges without considering the gravity of the charges. Thus, the facts and circumstances of a particular case have to be examined and only after considering the gravity/magnitude of the charges the order should be passed. [Vide State of Madhya Pradesh v. Bani Singh and another, AIR 1990 SC 1308 ; State of Punjab and others v. Chaman Lal Goyal, (1995) 2 SCC 570 and Deputy Registrar. Cooperative Societies Faizabad v. Sachindra Nath Pandey and others (1995) 3 SCC 134 . Thus, while entertaining the submissions that inquiry should not be proceeded with such charge-sheet which had been issued at a belated stage or the inquiry stood vitiated on account of the inaction of the employer, the Court has to consider the seriousness and magnitude of the charges and while doing so the Court must “weigh all the facts, both for and against the delinquent officers and come co the conclusion which is just and proper in the circumstances”. 10. 10. In State of Andhra Pradesh v. N. Radhakishan, (1998) 4 SCC 154 , the Hon’ble Supreme Court was observed as under : "It is not possible to lay down any predetermined principles applicable to all cases and in all situations where is a delay in concluding the disciplinary proceedings. Whether on that ground the disciplinary proceedings are to be terminated, each case has to be examined on the facts and circumstances in that case. The essence of the matter is that the Court has to take into consideration all the relevant factors and to balance and weight then to determine if it is in the interest of clean and honest administration that the disciplinary proceedings should be allowed to terminate after delay......” (Emphasis added) 11. A similar view has been reiterated in Food Corporation of India Ltd. v. V.P. Bhatia, (1998) 8 SCC 131. 12. However, as the matter is pending before the Tribunal we do not propose to express any final opinion in the matter as to whether the Original Application was maintainable and leave it to the Tribunal to consider this issue also while finally deciding the Original Application filed by the respondent No. 1 but in our considered opinion the learned Tribunal was not justified, in such circumstances, in passing the interim order staying the departmental proceedings. 13. In this view of the matter we quash that part of the order dated 31st January, 2006 which rejects the preliminary objection raised by the petitioners through the affidavit dated 12th September, 2005 and also stays further proceedings before the Enquiry Officer till the disposal of the case by the learned Tribunal. 14. We further make it clear that in case the petitioners have not filed counter affidavit to the Original Application, they may do so within a period of three weeks from today. 15. The Writ Petition, therefore, succeeds and is allowed to the extent indicated above. Petition Allowed. ———