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2006 DIGILAW 449 (CAL)

JAGDISH LAL GAMBHIR v. PUNJAB NATIONAL BANK

2006-07-24

ASHIM KUMAR BANERJEE, TAPAN MUKHERJEE

body2006
ASHIM KUMAR BANERJEE, J. ( 1 ) THE controversies being the subject matter of the above two appeals flow from one Apex Court decision in the case of K. I. Shephard and Ors. vs. Union of India, reported in All india Reporter, 1987, Supreme Court Page 686. ( 2 ) THREE private banks were amalgamated with Punjab National Bank (hereinafter referred to as "pnb"), Canara Bank and State Bank of India respectively. One of them Hindustan Commercial Bank was merged with pnb. At the time of merger those three nationalized banks refused to give appointment to some of the officers of those three private banks. 29 officials of Hindustan Commercial Bank were amongst them. According to the nationalized banks as well as Reserve Bank of India they could not be absorbed and given employment in the nationalised bank at the time of amalgamation in view of specific allegations against them. One K. I. Shephard and others being the officers who were not taken in by the nationalised banks approached the Apex Court by filing writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India which was disposed of by the Apex Court, inter alia, observing that the banks were not entitled to refuse employment to the erstwhile employees of the private banks. The Apex Court directed their reinstatement, however gave liberty to the banks to initiate proceedings if they so like. There were connected appeals from the High Court judgments, those were also disposed of by the said common judgment. ( 3 ) THE writ petitioners in both the above two appeals were two officers of Hindustan Commercial Bank. Against both of them there were existing allegations of misconduct. However, the erstwhile bank did not initiate any disciplinary proceeding as against them. After the decision of the apex Court they were formally given employment and simultaneously put under suspension and disciplinary proceedings were also initiated as against both of them which resulted in-order of dismissal/removal in both the cases. ( 4 ) GAMBHIR: in the case of Gambhir the writ petition was filed initially before the apex Court under Article 32 challenging the disciplinary proceedings. The apex Court permitted the authority to proceed with the disciplinary proceedings and thereby rejected the pleas of Gambhir along with others raised in the said writ petition by an order dated April 22, 1988. The apex Court permitted the authority to proceed with the disciplinary proceedings and thereby rejected the pleas of Gambhir along with others raised in the said writ petition by an order dated April 22, 1988. After fine aider of the Apex Court Gambhir filed his reply to the charge sheet. An Enquiry Officer was appointed and Gambhir participated in the enquiry proceeding. On September 27, 1988 Gambhir filed the above writ petition for quashing of the charge sheet as well as the proceeding. The Learned single Judge by an order dated September 30, 1988 permitted the bank to proceed with the enquiry, however, not to give any effect to the said enquiry until further orders. His Lordship further granted liberty to file a. representation before the disciplinary authority with a corresponding diection to disciplinary authority to dispose of such representation. Accordingly Gambhir made a representation on October 18, 1988 which was rejected by the disciplinary authority by reasoned order dated november 16, 1988. On July 20, 1989 the respondent bank applied for vacating the interim order. The learned Single Judge vacated the interim order granting liberty to the respondent. bank to pass the final order coupled with a direction not to implement the same for a period of 10 days. The bank was also directed to supply copy of the enquiry report and the final order so that the writ petitioner could take appropriate step on that basis. The writ petition was ultimately heard by the learned single Judge on December 7, 2000 when the writ petition was dismissed by the judgment impugned. ( 5 ) PRABUDDHA Roy: prabuddha Roy (hereinafter referred to as "prabuddha") was an officer of hindustan Commercial Bank. By a letter dated July 9, 1985, the said bank advised him not to extend any credit facility to one of the constituents of the Bank Despite such advice being made by the Superior Authority, be made payment to the constituent by extending credit facility. He was asked to give explanation on that score by the Bank by a letter dated december 21, 1985. By the said letter, he was also asked to clarify his views with regard to certain issues. A reply was given by him on July 31, 1985 with regard to the statement of the concerned constituent. Prabuddha submitted his explanation by his letter dated January 10, 1986. By the said letter, he was also asked to clarify his views with regard to certain issues. A reply was given by him on July 31, 1985 with regard to the statement of the concerned constituent. Prabuddha submitted his explanation by his letter dated January 10, 1986. While such investigation was being carried on, he was kept under suspension. By the letter dated April 2, 1986, the order of suspension was withdrawn and be was reinstated in service with immediate effect. The authority however, did not allow him to work as Manager any more and the functional allowance being enjoyed by him as manager was withdrawn. ( 6 ) LIKE Gambhir he was also not taken in by the bank at the time of merger. He also joined Shephard and filed writ petition which was ultimately disposed of by the Apex Court wherein the bank was direct to take all those excluded employees in service. Prabuddha was also given employment by Punjab National bank in terms of the order of the Apex court and simultaneously proceeding was drawn up against bint on the identical charge relating to his dealings with the constituents as pointed out by the earlier letter dated December 21, 1985. There were two other charges brought against him with regard to his functioning as an officer of the bank prior, to its amalgamation. Prabuddha filed another writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution before the Apex Court along with Gambhir and others challenging the subsequent order of suspension. The copy of the said writ petitioner it has been perused by us. On perusal it appears that Prabuddha was writ petitioner no. 13 in the writ petition the Apex Court did not interfere with the order of suspension and granted liberty to the bank to proceed with the disciplinary proceeding accordingly, Punjab National Bank proceeded with the disciplinary proceeding in case of Prabuddha. The Enquiring Officer ultimately found him guilty in respect of one of the three charges and exonerated him from two other charges. The Disciplinary Authority disagreed with the finding of the Enquiring Officer and imposed him punishment of removal of service on October 5, 1988. ( 7 ) AN appeal was preferred by Prabuddha, which was rejected by the appellate Authority by an order dated December 17, 1988. The Disciplinary Authority disagreed with the finding of the Enquiring Officer and imposed him punishment of removal of service on October 5, 1988. ( 7 ) AN appeal was preferred by Prabuddha, which was rejected by the appellate Authority by an order dated December 17, 1988. ( 8 ) AGAINST the order of the disciplinary authority so merged in the onler of the Appellate Authority, a writ petition was filed by Prabuddha, which was ultimately heard and disposed of by the ld. Single Judge by judgment and order dated December 15, 1998. The order of the ld. Single Judge was impugned in the appeal by the bank. His Lordship allowed the writ petition and directed reinstatement of Prabuddha. ( 9 ) K. I. Shephard Decision and our Analysis: decision in both these appeals would heavily depend upon a thorough analysis of the decision of the Apex Court in the case of K. I. Shephard (supra ). Let us consider the said decision in the light of the cases in our hand. Two writ petitioners being Gambhir and Prabuddha were not given employment after the merger or amalgamation of Hindustan commercial Bank with PNB. Objections were raised to the extent that there had been allegations of misconduct. The Apex Court negated such plea of the bank and observed that under the scheme of amalgamation employees of the transferor bank were to be fitted in the transferee bank according to their respective pay scales. The transferee bank could not discriminate between one employee with the other employee and could hive of some of the employees on the plea that they were "undesirable". The Apex Court considered the scheme in detail and found no scope either for the Reserve Bank of India or for the transferee bank to hive of those undesirable employees by denying them employment. The Apex court observed, the excluded employees were neither put to notice that their service were not being continued under the transferee blanks nor had they been given an opportunity of being heard with reference to allegations subsequently leveled against them. The Apex Court further. observed, natural justice has various facts and acting fairly is one of than. Reserve Bank of India which monitoried the amalgamation was required to act fairly in the facts of that case. The Apex Court further. observed, natural justice has various facts and acting fairly is one of than. Reserve Bank of India which monitoried the amalgamation was required to act fairly in the facts of that case. The Apex Court further observed that had they been afforded adequate opportunity they could have no grievance on that score. ( 10 ) THE Apex Court further observed, rules of natural justice apply to administrative action and in the instant case the decision to exclude a section of the employees when applying without requirement of natural justice was bad. It was further observed, it is common exercise that once decision has been taken there is a tendency to uphold it and a representation may not really yield any fruitful purpose. The Apex Court ultimately directed employment to be given to all those excluded employees by observing, "we leave it open to the transferee banks to take such action as they consider proper against these employees in accordance with law". ( 11 ) MR. Moitra appearing for Gambhir as well as Mr. Gupta appearing for Prabuddha contended before us that such proceeding was nothing but an attempt to circumvent the order of the Apex Court in case of k. I. Shephard, supra, It was contended that the observation of the Apex court as highlighted before, would show there had been violation of principles of natural justice for which the Apex Court intervened and directed employment to be given to those officers who were excluded on the alleged plea of misconduct. The charges brought against Gambhir as well as Prabuddha were repetition of the charges brought against them by the erstwhile management and those charges ultimately resulted in a logical conclusion. In case of Gambhir, the authority, being satisfied with the first explanation, cautioned him, whereas in respect of second charge, no step was taken against him. In case of Prabuddha, a formal charge-sheet was issued on December 21, 1985. He replied to the charge-sheet. He suffered the order of suspension and ultimately he was reinstated as an officer of the bank without managerial function and his functional allowance as Manager was withdrawn. Hence, there could not have been a further proceeding brought against him. ( 12 ) WE have carefully perused the judgment of the Apex Court in case of K. I. Shepherd, supra. We have considered the submissions of Mr. Hence, there could not have been a further proceeding brought against him. ( 12 ) WE have carefully perused the judgment of the Apex Court in case of K. I. Shepherd, supra. We have considered the submissions of Mr. Moitra on behalf of Gambhir and Mr. Gupta on behalf of Prabuddha on that score. ( 13 ) IT was true that there had been allegations of misconduct as against some erring officers of the transferee bank. The transferee bank wanted to get rid of them without a proper disciplinary, proceeding. Apex Court joined issue there and in most unequivocal term deprecated trie action on the part of the bank and directed employment to be given forthwith to those officers, at the same time gave liberty to the bank to proceed as against them, if they so wanted. Bank, in both the cases in hand gave employment to Gambhir as well as to Prabuddha and simultaneously proceeded against them departmentally by issuing appropriate charge sheets. Both of them approached the Apex Court again by filing a writ petition being writ petition no. 121 of 1988 challenging the action on the part of the bank for proceeding against them afresh. Gambhir was the petitioner no. 9 whereas Prabuddha was the petitioner no. 13. Their attempt failed. Action on the part of the bank was in effect approved by the Apex Court. Hence, the plea that this proceedings against Gambhir. and Prabuddha were bad in view of the judgment and order in K. I. Shepherd, supra was not at all tenable and as such is rejected. ( 14 ) GAMBHIR in the case of Gambhir the bank gave him employment in terms, of the order of the Apex Court by a letter dated November 2, 1987 and by the same letter he was placed under suspension. A charge sheet was issued on November 28, 1987 on the following allegations: i. There bad been financial irregularity committed by him while working in the transferor bank. He was asked to offer explanation by a letter dated February 3, 1983. ii. By a further letter dated July 1, 1986 explanation was asked for on another financial irregularity pointed out therein. ( 15 ) IN both the cases, according to Gambhir reply was given and the authority being satisfied with the reply in the first case cautioned him and in the second case did not proceed further. ii. By a further letter dated July 1, 1986 explanation was asked for on another financial irregularity pointed out therein. ( 15 ) IN both the cases, according to Gambhir reply was given and the authority being satisfied with the reply in the first case cautioned him and in the second case did not proceed further. ( 16 ) ACCORIDNG to the bank, before the second explanation was to be considered the bank got amalgamated. ( 17 ) THE charge sheet and the proceeding were challenged before the apex Court by Gambhir by filing a 'further writ petition before the Apex court. The Apex Court did not interfere and directed proceeding to be completed expeditiously. He filed further writ petition in this court for the identical purpose. This court again gave the bank liberty to proceed further. Hence, there was no illegality in the case of Gambhir committed by the bank in intiating the proceeding as against him for the charges brought against him prior to the merger. ( 18 ) LET us now consider the final order of the disciplinary authority so merged in the order of the appellate authority. Gambhir did not urge any controversy on merits. The order of the disciplinary authority was not challenged on merit either before the learned Single Judge or before us. Before us Mr. Kashi Kanta Moitra, learned counsel appearing for gambhir, contended as follows: i. Gambhir was entitled to be appointed in terms of the order of the Apex Court in K. I. Shephard (supra ). He was to be fitted in the appropriate post which he was holding earlier which was not done. ii. The disciplinary authority who issued the charge sheet was not properly authorized to act as such under the service rules. iii. No copy of the enquiry report was given to him. As a result he could not defend himself in the proceeding by offering his explanation to the disciplinary authority pointing out the illegality and irregularity which crept in the enquiry report. iv. No second show cause notice was issued to him. v. The charges were state and could not be proceeded with. As a result he could not defend himself in the proceeding by offering his explanation to the disciplinary authority pointing out the illegality and irregularity which crept in the enquiry report. iv. No second show cause notice was issued to him. v. The charges were state and could not be proceeded with. ( 19 ) FIRST and second ground in our view were not available to Gambhir to urge at the stage of final hearing of the writ petition or before us in vjew of the order of the Apex Court dated April 22, 1988 whereby the Apex court permitted the bank to proceed with the disciplinary proceeding on the basis of the charge sheet issued by the concerned authority. In any event, Gambhir was working as Assistant General Manager in the transferee bank. He was enjoying a particular scale in the said bank. In terms of amalgamation he was given the proper scale and he was placed as scale -3 officer. It was not the case of Gambhir that he was not given appropriate fitment. According to him as he was designated as Assistant General manager in the transferor hank, he should have been designated as such in the transferee bank. Such plea was not tenable at all. The transferor bank was a small bank compared to the transferee bank. The designation of Assistant General Manager in the transferor bank could not be equated with the corresponding designation in transferee bank. These issues were considered at the time of finalisation of the scheme wherein it Was provided that the employee of the transferor bank would be properly fitted in the transferee bank as per "their respective pay scales. Accordingly, Gambhir was placed. In terms of the service rules of the transferee bank disciplinary authority of the scale three officers was Assistant General Manager (Personnel) and the charge sheet was issued by him. Hence, such plea being not tenable is rejected. ( 20 ) WITH regard to the third contention we feel that there was no scope for supply of enquiry report prior to Ramjan Khan case reported in All india Reporter, 1991, Supreme Court, Page 471. Hence, such plea being not tenable is rejected. ( 20 ) WITH regard to the third contention we feel that there was no scope for supply of enquiry report prior to Ramjan Khan case reported in All india Reporter, 1991, Supreme Court, Page 471. In the case of Ramjan (supra) the Apex Court for the first time observed that it was obligatory on the part of the disciplinary authority to forward copy of the enquiry report to the delinquent so that he could offer his views with regard to the finding of the enquiry ana submit the same to the disciplinary authority for his consideration before passing the final order. In the case of Karunakar reported in All India Reporter, 1994, Supreme Court, Page 1074 the Apex court clarified the views in Ramjan (supra) and observed that mere non-furnishing of the enquiry report would not vitiate the disciplinary proceedings unless a prejudice had been caused to the delinquent. In these two cases the Apex Court made it clear that the Judgment would be applied prospectively. In the instant case, the enquiry was conducted prior to ramjan (supra ). Hence, no copy was given. In any event, as and by way of interim protection copy of the enquiry report was directed to be given by the learned Single Judge. Accordingly, copy of the enquiry report was given and Gambhir was allowed to make representation on that. Hence, such plea was not tenable. In any event, Mr. Moitra did not point out from the enquiry report whether any illegality had been caused by the enquiry officer or that there had been any perverse folding of the enquiry officer. Hence, third contention being not tenable is rejected. ( 21 ) THE fourth contention is also not tenable in view of our observation made while deciding the third contention of Mr. Gambhir. On perusal of the chorological events it would appear that adequate opportunity was given to Gambhir to defend himself in the proceeding and as such the fourth contention is also rejected. ( 22 ) WITH regard to the 5th contention we are of the view that in case of Gambhir the irregularities were pointed out by the transferor bank by two separate letters asking for his explanation. In both the cases he offered explanation. ( 22 ) WITH regard to the 5th contention we are of the view that in case of Gambhir the irregularities were pointed out by the transferor bank by two separate letters asking for his explanation. In both the cases he offered explanation. In the first case he was cautioned and in the second case before a decision could be taken the merger took place. In neither of the cases admittedly there had been any disciplinary proceeding initiated by the transferor bank. The Apex Court in the case of K. I shephard (supra) specifically permitted the transferee bank to initiate proceeding. The Apex Court again in the subsequent writ petition filed, by Gambhir and others permitted the bank to proceed with the disciplinary proceeding on the basis of the charge sheet issued to him. Hence, this plea is also not tenable. ( 23 ) HENCE, we do not find any scope of interference with the judgment and order of the learned Single Judge in the case of Gambhir and the appeal filed by Gambhir being FMA No. 388 of 2001 fails and is hereby dismissed without, however, no order as to costs. ( 24 ) PRABUDDHA several grounds were taken in the writ petition. Those were considered by the ld. Single Judge. Ld. Single Judge, however, allowed the writ petition on two counts: i. The charge no. 3 was identical to the charge brought against prabuddha by charge-sheet dated December 21, 1985, which culminated in a logical conclusion by reinstating htm in the post of officer after withdrawal of his managerial power and functional allowance. Hence, despite leave being given by the apex Court in K. I. Shepherd, supra, Prabuddha could not be proceeded against in respect of the third charge. it. With regard to charge nos. 1 and 2, since the disciplinary authority disagreed with the finding of the Enquiry Officer, he should have recorded reasons therefor. Having not done so, the proceeding was vitiated by illegality. ( 25 ) HIS Lordship granted reinstatement with 50% back wages from the date of dismissal. ( 26 ) WE have perused the judgment of His Lordship. While in complete agreement with the 2nd part of His Lordship's Judgment, we are of the view that the first part of the judgment is not liable to be sustained. The ground on which His Lordship set aside the charge no. ( 26 ) WE have perused the judgment of His Lordship. While in complete agreement with the 2nd part of His Lordship's Judgment, we are of the view that the first part of the judgment is not liable to be sustained. The ground on which His Lordship set aside the charge no. 3 and the proceeding brought, therefor, could have been valid, had there been no second writ petition filed before the Apex Court by Prabuddha. Once prabuddha approached the Apex Court and thereafter failed to obtain any -order of stay of the proceeding, the proceeding became valid but for the order of the Apex Court. ( 27 ) MR. Gupta, learned Counsel appearing for Prabuddha in usual. fairness did not place much emphasis on the first part of His Lordship's judgment because of the incidents subsequent to the issuance of the chargesheet as discussed by us hereinbefore. ( 28 ) EVEN if we accept the view of the learned Single Judge that there had been some sort of disciplinary proceedings which culminated in the order of punishment we would find on perusal of the facts that after issuance of the charge sheet and receipt of the reply thereto the authority passed an order reinstating him as officer of the bank. We are told that under the Service Rules of the transferor bank the officers who were posted as Manager did enjoy the same pay scale with other officers. However, the officers who were posted as Managers used to draw additional functional allowance while acting as Manager. In this case. the Authority after considering his reply reinstated him in the post of officer which he was enjoying. Hence, there was neither any demotion in the rank nor any curtailment of pay scale. Since he was not posted as Manager functional allowance was automatically withdrawn. This could not be termed "benefit" as such. Hence, the disciplinary proceeding, if any, initiated by issuance of the said charge sheet did not result in a logical conclusion as we find on perusal of the facts. Hence, the learned judge's on that score was not correct. ( 29 ) HENCE, the first. part of the Judgment and order in our view in case of Prabuddha should be set aside. Hence, the learned judge's on that score was not correct. ( 29 ) HENCE, the first. part of the Judgment and order in our view in case of Prabuddha should be set aside. ( 30 ) WITH regard to the second part of the judgment, it was contended on the part of the Punjab National Bank before us that under the rules, there was no scope for issuance of any second show cause notice or recording of reasons in case of disagreement of the disciplinary authority with the enquiry report. In this regard, it was contended on behalf of the Punjab National Bank that the subsequent decision in case of ramzan Khan (All India Reporter 1991 Supreme Court 471) or in case of Karunakar (All India Reporter 1994 Supreme Court 1074) could not be applied retrospectively in the cases, which were disposed of prior to those decisions being had Such submission on the part of the bank cannot be accepted in view of the Apex Court decision in the case of State of assam os. Bimal Kumar Pandit, reported in AIR 1993 SC 1612. The apex Court therein observed that a Public Officer against whom disciplinary proceedings were intended to be taken was entitled to have two opportunities. He would have the first opportunity to adduce evidence before the Enquiry Officer as well as to cross examine the prosecution witness. It was also provided that in case the finding of the enquiry report was against the Public Officer and the disciplinary authority agreed with the finding, a subsequent opportunity was to be given to the delinquent to offer his views on the enquiry report as well as to show cause why he should not be punished. Such a second opportunity is commonly known as second show cause notice, which was admittedly not given in the instant case. If, there was no rule contemporaneously to give any second show cause notice, that was contrary to the Apex Court decision and that itself vitiated the proceeding and the final order culminated therefrom. Similarly, we feel that once the disciplinary authority disagreed with the finding of the Enquiry Officer, mere disagreement would not be sufficient enough to hold him guilty and punish him, recording of reason was a must. Once the Enquiry Officer found him not guilty of two charges, there was no occasion for the authority to proceed further on that score. Similarly, we feel that once the disciplinary authority disagreed with the finding of the Enquiry Officer, mere disagreement would not be sufficient enough to hold him guilty and punish him, recording of reason was a must. Once the Enquiry Officer found him not guilty of two charges, there was no occasion for the authority to proceed further on that score. It was proceeded only because of disagreement on the part of the disciplinary authority. Hence, opportunity at that stage should have been given and that too after recording of reasons of disagreement. ( 31 ) LOT of argument was advanced on behalf of the Punjab National bank relying on the decisions of the Apex Court on the issue of prejudice. We, however, view this from a different angle. In the case before us, the enquiry Officer excluded him from two charges out of three. The disciplinary authority, however, was of the view that all the three charges were proved and as such imposed punishment, that itself in our view was prejudice caused to the petitioner as he was denied opportunity to offer his views. Hence, the Apex Court decisions on that score cited by the bank including one reported in 2001 Vol. 9 Supreme Court Cases page 575 (Syed Rahimuddin vs. Director General, CSIR and Ors.) would have no application. ( 32 ) WHEN the learned Judge was of the opinion that the proceeding suffered from irregularity and illegality because of non-issuance of the second show cause notice and non-disclosure of the reasons for disagreement His Lordship should have considered Rule 12 (4) of the service Regulation which provided for a subsequent procedure to be adopted in such circumstances. His Lordship should have granted leave to the bank to proceed de novo from the stage of submission of the enquiry report by treating the writ petitioner under deemed suspension. Reinstatement of the writ petitioner and that too with back wages was contrary to Rule 12 (4) of the Service Regulations of the Bank. Hence, even if we agree with the observation of His Lordship on the issue of irregularity. Reinstatement of the writ petitioner and that too with back wages was contrary to Rule 12 (4) of the Service Regulations of the Bank. Hence, even if we agree with the observation of His Lordship on the issue of irregularity. In the disciplinary proceedings we are of the view that the ultimate decision of His Lordship was erroneous, ( 33 ) UNDER Rule 12 (4), when a penalty of removal is set aside in consequence of decision of a court of law and the disciplinary authority on consideration of the circumstances, decides to proceed further, such employees would be under deemed suspension from the date of original order of dismissal and would remain under suspension until further orders or till the completion of the said proceedings. In this regard, reference may be had to the Apex Court decision in the case of Karunakar, supra wherein the Apex Court quashed the final order on the ground of non-furnishing of the copy of the enqully report and placed the delinquent under deemed suspension so that proceeding could start de novo from that stage. Such course should have been applied by His Lordship. ( 34 ) APPEAL filed by Punjab National Bank succeeds in part. ( 35 ) THE judgment and order of the ld. Single Judge impugned herein in case of Prabuddha is quashed and set aside. The final order dated october 5, 1988 so merged in the order of the Appellate Authority dated december 17, 1988 is set aside. ( 36 ) PUNJAB National Bank is directed to reinstate Prabuddha who would be under deemed suspension. Punjab National Bank is directed to start the proceeding de novo against Prabuddha from the stage of submission of the enquiry report. ( 37 ) THE authority would issue a second show cause notice proposing the punishment to be imposed upon Prabuddha. The authority would also communicate the reasons for disagreement on account of the charge nos. 1 and 2 to him. Such communication of reasons for disagreement as well as show cause notice must be served upon him within a period of two weeks from the date of communication of this order. Prabuddha would be entitled to reply to the same offering his views on the enquiry report, reasons for disagreement as well as the proposed punishment, within a period of three weeks thereafter. Prabuddha would be entitled to reply to the same offering his views on the enquiry report, reasons for disagreement as well as the proposed punishment, within a period of three weeks thereafter. The disciplinary authority would consider such explanation and reply and would pass a reasoned order to be communicated to him within a period of four weeks thereafter. ( 38 ) WE further direct the disciplinary authority to consider the issue of back wages at the time of passing the final order. Result: fma No. 388 of 2001 is dismissed. FMA No. 1447 of 2000 is disposed of in terms of the directions given herein before. There would be no no order as to costs. Urgent xerox certified copy would be given to the parties, if applied foer. Appeals allowed in part.