PRADEEP NANDRAJOG, J. ( 1 ) BEFORE deciding the main issue, the preliminary issue, whether the writ petition suffers from gross delay and laches, and on account thereof is not maintainable needs to be decided at the first instance. ( 2 ) PETITIONERS are the parents of late Sanjay Kumar who died at the young age of 24 years. On the fateful day, 24. 8. 95, at about 8 A. M. when the deceased was in the process of parking his tempo, live wire from an electricity pole touched the vehicle of the deceased and as a result thereof deceased was electrocuted. ( 3 ) PRESENT petition was filed on 10. 11. 2000 i. e. after a gap of 5 years and approximately 3 months. ( 4 ) EXPLAINING the delay, learned counsel for the petitioners stated that the petitioners had earlier on filed a claim petition before the District consumer Forum, being Claim Petition No. 413/97. Proceedings dragged on before the said forum till the year 1999. Complaint was withdrawn on 5. 8. 1999 with liberty to file a petition in an appropriate court. Thereafter, petitioners moved the National Human Rights Commission vide a complaint dated 31. 5. 2000. On 30. 6. 2000 the complaint was dismissed. Thereafter, in the month of November, 2000 the present petition was filed. ( 5 ) LEARNED counsel for the petitioner urged that the period spent by the petitioners in prosecuting the petition before the District Consumer Forum has to be taken note of while considering the issue of delay and laches. Counsel urged that the petitioners were bona fide litigating before the District consumer Forum. ( 6 ) LEARNED counsel for the respondent urged that objection was raised before the District Consumer Forum by the respondents when the reply was filed in the year 1997 to the effect that the Consumer Court had no jurisdiction. In spite thereof, petitioners continued with the litigation. Counsel urged that the claim petition was ultimately withdrawn by the petitioners in the year 1999. ( 7 ) IT is true, and as has been held by their Lordships of the Supreme court in the decision reported as AIR 1993 SC 802 M/s. Dehri Rohtas Light railway Company Limited Vs. District Board, Bhojpur and Ors. Counsel urged that the claim petition was ultimately withdrawn by the petitioners in the year 1999. ( 7 ) IT is true, and as has been held by their Lordships of the Supreme court in the decision reported as AIR 1993 SC 802 M/s. Dehri Rohtas Light railway Company Limited Vs. District Board, Bhojpur and Ors. the rule which says that the court may not inquire into belated and stale claim is not a rule of law but a rule of practice based on sound and proper exercise of discretion. Each case must depend upon its own facts; it will all depend on what the breach of the fundamental right and the remedy claimed are and how the delay arose, but where the delay is enormous, additional consideration from the point of view of limitation, if civil suit was to be filed, has to be taken note of as was observed by the Constitution Bench of the Hon ble Supreme Court in the decision reported as AIR 1964 SC 1006 State of M. P. Vs. Bhailal Bhai. (see para 21) It was observed as under :-"learned counsel is right in his submission that the provisions of the limitation Act do not as such apply to the granting of relief under Article 226. It appears to us however that the maximum period fixed by the legislature as the time within which the relief by a suit in a civil court must be brought may ordinarily be taken to be a reasonable standard by which delay in seeking remedy under Article 226 can be measured. This court may consider the delay unreasonable even if it is less than the period of limitation prescribed for a civil action for the remedy, but where the delay is more than this period, it will almost always be proper for the court to hold that it is unreasonable. " ( 8 ) BUT, principles enshrined under Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 would also guide this court while deciding on the issue of delay and laches. Under Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 when a party has been bona fide pursuing a wrong remedy, it would be a fit case for applying the principle that while computing limitation, period spent in prosecution of a proceeding before a wrong court should be excluded. Under Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 when a party has been bona fide pursuing a wrong remedy, it would be a fit case for applying the principle that while computing limitation, period spent in prosecution of a proceeding before a wrong court should be excluded. ( 9 ) PETITIONERS were guided by their counsel when they approached the consumer Court. They were mis-guided in approaching the Consumer Court for the reason the cause on which the action was filed was not maintainable before the district Consumer Forum. It is true that the respondent, at the first instance pointed out to the petitioners that they were prosecuting a remedy before a wrong forum, but the petitioners were guided by the advise of their counsel, which unfortunately was a wrong advise. ( 10 ) REALITY dawned upon the petitioners when during course of hearing, district Consumer Forum, as pleaded in the writ petition, verbally opined that the claim petition was not maintainable. At that stage, petitioners withdrew the petition before the District Consumer Forum. ( 11 ) EXCLUDING the time spent by the petitioners before the District consumer Forum, it cannot be said that the petition suffers from gross delay and laches. ( 12 ) I accordingly hold that the petition is not liable to be rejected on account of delay and laches. ( 13 ) ON merits, factum of death of the deceased due to electrocution is an admitted position between the parties. It is further an admitted position that electrocution took place due to leakage of current from the main supply line maintained by the respondent. What was the status of the electricity supply line and whether the same was in compliance with the rules framed under the indian Electricity Act, 1910? ( 14 ) THE answer is to be found in the report of the Electrical Inspector (Annexure P. 4 ). Relevant part of the same reads as under:-"the information about the said accident was given to this office on 4. 9. 1995 by Sh. Umed Sing, Asstt. Sub Inspector - Police Station - Tilak Nagar, Delhi. The said case was investigated by the undersigned along with Sh. Arun Aggarwal, electrical oversear of this inspectorate, in the presence of Sh. Umed Singh, asstt. Sub-Inspector and Sh. Harbans Lal, father of the deceased, on 5. 9. 1995. 9. 1995 by Sh. Umed Sing, Asstt. Sub Inspector - Police Station - Tilak Nagar, Delhi. The said case was investigated by the undersigned along with Sh. Arun Aggarwal, electrical oversear of this inspectorate, in the presence of Sh. Umed Singh, asstt. Sub-Inspector and Sh. Harbans Lal, father of the deceased, on 5. 9. 1995. xxxxxxxxx at the time of inspection, from the said electric pole, 14 nos. , twin core overhead service lines and 2 nos. underground service cables had been taken for feeding the different consumers. Out of these two underground service cables, one was a twin core cable, feeding the house No. NW-12b and the other one was a 4 core PVC armoured cable and was meant for feeding the electricity supply to M/s shugna Enterprises, NW-148, Vishnu Garden, Delhi. At the time of inspection this cable was found disconnected from the pole as well as from the consumers meter side. The insulation resistance of the electrical installation of the said underground PVC 4 core armoured cable was tested with 500 Volts insulation tester and leakage was observed. Due to this leakage of current, the metallic armouring enclosing the 3 cores of the cable became electrically charges and thus the wet earth which was directly in contact with the said charge metallic armouring of the cable also became electrically charged. xxxxxxxxxx at the time of inspection, the following provisions of the Indian Electricity rules, 1956 had not been found complied with by the DESU staff:- 1) The 4 core PVC armoured cable feeding the electric supply to M/s Shugna enterprises, NW - 148, Vishnu Garden, Delhi had not been found installed, protected and maintained in such a manner as to ensure safety of personnel and property in contravention of the provisions of Rule 29 (i) of the said Rules:- a) The cable had been found laid underground at a depth of 35 cms. whereas it should have been laid at a depth of 1. 00 mtr. as prescribed in the DESU manual and specifications no. 6. 3. 2 of IS Code no. 1255-1983. b) The PVC Sheath and the metallic armouring enclosing the 4 - Cores the said cable were found worn out and damaged at one place. whereas it should have been laid at a depth of 1. 00 mtr. as prescribed in the DESU manual and specifications no. 6. 3. 2 of IS Code no. 1255-1983. b) The PVC Sheath and the metallic armouring enclosing the 4 - Cores the said cable were found worn out and damaged at one place. 2) The Insulation resistance of the electrical installation of the said 4 core PVC, armoured cable and was tested, 500 Volts Insulation tester and its insulation resistance was found to be so low as to prevent safe use of energy, in contravention of the provisions of the rule 49 (2) of the said rules. 3) The said 4-Core PVC armoured cable feeding the M/s Enterprise, NW- 148, Vishnu Garden, Delhi had not been protected against excess energy by means of a suitable cut out or circuit breaker of requisite breaking capacity as required under the provisions of rule 50 (1) (c) of the said rules. 4) The metallic armouring of the said four core, PVC armoured cable had not been earthed, in contravention of the provisions of Rule 61 (3) of the said rules. " ( 15 ) POWER given to a public authority is often coupled with a duty. In the instant case, evidenced by the report of the Electrical Inspector, there has been violation of the Indian Electricity Rules, 1956. In my opinion, principles of strict liability stands attracted. ( 16 ) REVIEWING a large number of decisions, Division Bench of this Court in lpa No. 2451/05 DJB Vs. Raj Kumar and Ors. , taking note of various judicial pronouncements on the issue vide its decision dated 28. 10. 2005 held as under :-"10. It is well settled that when a power is given to a public authority that power is often coupled with a duty. Raj Kumar and Ors. , taking note of various judicial pronouncements on the issue vide its decision dated 28. 10. 2005 held as under :-"10. It is well settled that when a power is given to a public authority that power is often coupled with a duty. In the classic observation of Lord cairns in Julius v. Lord Bishop of Oxford, (1874-80) All ER Rep 43, p. 47 (HL) it was stated: there may be something in the nature of the thing empowered to be done, something in the object for which it is to be done, something in the conditions under which it is to be done, something in the title of the person or persons for whose benefit the power is to be exercised, which may couple the power with a duty and make it the duty of the person in whom the power is reposed to exercise the power when called upon to do so . 11. The same view was taken by the Supreme Court in State (Delhi Administration) v. I. K. Nangia, air 1979 SC 1977 (vide para 15); Tara Prasad Singh v. UOI, AIR 1980 SC 1682 (vide para 14) ; Ambica Quarry Works v. State of Gujarat, (1987) air 1987 SC 1073 (vide para 13); Superintending Engineer, Public Health v. Kuldip Singh, AIR 1997 SC 2133 , p. 2137. 13. The theory of strict liability for hazardous activities can be said to have originated from the historic judgment of Blackburn, J. in. Rylands v. Fletcher, (1866) LRI Ex 265. 14. Before this decision the accepted legal position in England was that fault, whether by an intentional act or negligence, was the basis of all liability (see salmond on tort , 6th Edn P. 12) and this principle was in consonance with the then prevailing Laissez Faire Theory. 15. With the advance of industrialization the Laissez Faire Theory was gradually replaced by the theory of the Welfare State, and in legal parlance there was a corresponding shift from positivism to sociological jurisprudence. 16. It was realized that there are certain industrial activities which though lawful are so fraught with possibility of harm to others that the law has to treat them as allowable only on the term of insuring the public against injury (vide American Jurisprudence, 2nd Edn. Vol. 74 P. 632 ). 16. It was realized that there are certain industrial activities which though lawful are so fraught with possibility of harm to others that the law has to treat them as allowable only on the term of insuring the public against injury (vide American Jurisprudence, 2nd Edn. Vol. 74 P. 632 ). As stated above, the origin of this concept of liability without fault can be traced back to blackburn, J s historic decision in Rylands v. Fletcher (supra ). 19. Strict liability focuses on the nature of the defendants activity rather than, as in negligence, the way in which it is carried on (vide torts by michael Jones, 4th Edn. P. 247 ). There are many activities which are so hazardous that they may constitute a danger to the person or property of another. The principle of strict liability states that the undertakers of these activities have to compensate for the damage caused by them irrespective of any fault on their part. As Fleming says "permission to conduct such activity is in effect made conditional on its absorbing the cost of the accidents it causes, as an appropriate item of its overheads (see Fleming on torts , 6th Edn. P. 302) 22. As pointed out by Clerk and Lindsell (see torts , 14th Edn.) "the fault principle has shortcomings. The very idea suggests that compensation is a form of punishment for wrong doing, which not only has the tendency to make tort overlap with criminal law, but also, and more regrettably, implies that a wrongdoer should only be answerable to the extent of his fault. This is unjust when a wholly innocent victim sustains catastrophic harm through some trivial fault, and is left virtually without compensation. 24. The Rule in Rylands v. Fletcher (1868 LR 3 Ex 330) was subsequently interpreted to cover a variety of things likely to do mischief on escape, irrespective of whether they were dangerous per se e. g. water, electricity, explosions, oil, vibralious, noxious fumes, colliery spoil, poisonous vegetation, a flagpole, etc. (see winfield and Jolowicz on tort , 13th Edn. P. 425) vide National Telephone Co. v. Baker, (1893) 2 Ch 186, Eastern and South african Telegraph Co. Ltd. v. Cape Town Tramways Co. Ltd. , (1902) AC 381; hillier v. Air Ministry, (1962) CLY 2084, etc. (see winfield and Jolowicz on tort , 13th Edn. P. 425) vide National Telephone Co. v. Baker, (1893) 2 Ch 186, Eastern and South african Telegraph Co. Ltd. v. Cape Town Tramways Co. Ltd. , (1902) AC 381; hillier v. Air Ministry, (1962) CLY 2084, etc. In America the rule was adapted and expressed in the following words "one who carries on an ultra hazardous activity is liable to another whose person, land or chattels the actor should recognize as likely to be harmed by the unpreventable miscarriage of the activity for harm resulting thereto from that which makes the activity ultra hazardous, although the utmost care is exercised to prevent the harm" (vide restatement of the Law of Torts, Vol. 3, P. 41 ). 25. Rylands v. Fletcher (1868 LR 3 Ex 330) gave English Law one of its most creative generalizations which, for a long time, looked destined to have a successful future. Yet, after a welcome start given to it by Victorian Judges the rule was progressively emasculated, until today it has almost become obsolete in England. According to Dias and Markesins (see Tort Law 2nd Edn. P. 355) one reason for this may well be that as a generalization justifying a shift from fault to strict liability it may have come prematurely. The 19th Century had not yet fully got over laissez faire, and it was only in the 20th Century that the concepts of social justice and social security, as integral parts of the general theory of the Welfare State, were firmly established. As already mentioned above, the rule of strict liability laid down by Blackburn J. In rylands v. Fletcher was restricted in appeal by Lord Cairns to non-natural users, the word natural meaning that which exists in or by nature, and is not artificial , and that was the sense in which it was used by Lord Cairns. However, later it acquired an entirely different meaning i. e. that which is ordinary and usual, even though it may be artificial vide Rickards v. Lothian, (1913) AC 263 followed in Read v. Lyons, (1947) AC 156. Thus the expression non-natural was later interpreted to mean abnormal , and since in an industrial society industries can certainly not be called abnormal the rule in rylands v. Fletcher was totally emasculated in these subsequent rulings. Such an interpretation, as Prof. Thus the expression non-natural was later interpreted to mean abnormal , and since in an industrial society industries can certainly not be called abnormal the rule in rylands v. Fletcher was totally emasculated in these subsequent rulings. Such an interpretation, as Prof. Newark writes, would have surprised Lord Cairns and astounded Blackburn, J . (see article entitled non-natural User and Rylands v. Fletcher, published in Modern Law Review, 1961, Vol. 24, P. 557 ). 26. In Read v. Lyons (1947 AC 156) (supra), which was a case of injury due to a shell explosion in an ammunitions factory, Lord Macmillan while rejecting the claim of the plaintiff made further restrictions to the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher by holding that the rule ``derives from a conception of mutual duties of neighbouring landowners `, and was therefore inapplicable to personal injuries. He also held that to make the defendant liable there should be escape from a place under the defendant s control and occupation to a place outside his occupation, and since the plaintiff was within the premises at the time of the accident the injury was not due to escape therefrom. In this way Read v. Lyons destroyed the very spirit of the decision in Rylands v. Fletcher by restricting its principle to the facts of that particular case, instead of seeing its underlying juristic philosophy. 29. As Winfield remarks, because of the various limitations and exceptions to the rule ``we have virtually reached the position where a defendant will not be considered liable when he would not be liable according to the ordinary principles of negligence ` (see Winfield on Tort, 13th Edn. P. 443 ). 30. This repudiation of the principle in Rylands v. Fletcher is contrary to the modern judicial philosophy of social justice. The injustice may clearly be illustrated by the case of Pearson v. North Western Gas Board, (1968) 2 All ER 669. In that case the plaintiff was seriously injured and her husband killed by an explosion of gas, which also destroyed their home. Her action in Court failed, in view of the decision in Dunne v. North Western Gas Board (1964 (2) QB 806) (supra ). Thus the decline of the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher left the individual injured by the activities of industrial society virtually without adequate protection. Her action in Court failed, in view of the decision in Dunne v. North Western Gas Board (1964 (2) QB 806) (supra ). Thus the decline of the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher left the individual injured by the activities of industrial society virtually without adequate protection. " ( 17 ) A perusal of the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in Delhi jal Board s Case (Supra) shows that the rule in Rylands Vs. Fletcher as read down in Read Vs. Lyons as being inapplicabe to personal injuries was not followed by the Division Bench and the Division Bench preferred to give full force to the rule of strict liability laid down in Rylands Vs. Fletcher. ( 18 ) NO material has been placed on record by the petitioners qua the income of the deceased. No material has been placed on record qua the educational or technical qualifications of the deceased. Taking guidance from the case law pertaining to award of compensation in motor accident cases, considering the age of the deceased and the fact that the deceased would have in all probability got married and in such eventuality would have spent at least 1/3rd of his income on his parents, I award a compensation of Rs. 2. 5 lakhs to the petitioners. The said sum shall be shared equally between petitioner No. 1 and 2. The sum awarded shall carry interest @ 6% per annum with effect from 10. 11. 2000 till date of payment. No costs. .