ORDER This Court ordered notice before admission on 10-3-2006 and the counsel was permitted to take out personal notice to the respondent and file proof of service. Though the respondent was served, none represents on his behalf. The interim stay was no doubt granted for a period of four weeks. Thus, the matter is coming up for admission to-day. 2. Sri O.Manohar Reddy, learned counsel representing the revision petitioners had pointed out that marking of documents Exs.A-6 and A-7 is contrary to law. The learned counsel also would maintain that the dcicument-Ex.A-7 is a compulsorily registrable document under Section 17 of the Indian Registration Act. The learned counsel also had taken this Court through the findings which had been recorded by the learned Judge and further placed strong reliance on a decision of the Division Bench of this Court in K. Bhavanarayana v. S. Venkataratnam and also yet another decision in Thota Venkata Narasamma v. S. V.M. Srinivasan2. 3. In fact even on 10-3-2006 submissions at length were made to the effect that there appears to be some conflict of opinions between the views expressed by the two Division Benches in the Judgment cited supra (1) and in Durga Emporium, Vijayawada v. Munaga Brothers3. In the light of the same, this Court had ordered notice before admission and thus the matter is coming up for admission to-day after service of notice on the respondent Andhra Bank, a Government of India Undertaking, represented by the Manager, Nakkalagutta Branch, Hanamkonda, Warangal District. 4. The defendants in OS.No.253 of 2002 on the file of the III Additional Senior Civil Judge, Fast Track Court, Warangal, filed the present CRP under Article 227 of the Constitution of India aggrieved by an order dated 13-9-2005. The respondent herein, the plaintiff in the suit, was permitted to mark Exs.A-6 and A-7. The only question raised is whether EX.A-7 is a compulsorily registrable document. The copy of the document-Ex.A-7, in fact, had been produced before this Court. EX.A-6 is the letter addressed to the Manager, Andhra Bank, which contains the signature of the owner of the property dated 27-6-1999. EX.A-7 under the list of documents refers to the registered Settlement Deed and also the encumbrance certificate. The copy of the document-Ex.A-7, in fact, had been produced before this Court. EX.A-6 is the letter addressed to the Manager, Andhra Bank, which contains the signature of the owner of the property dated 27-6-1999. EX.A-7 under the list of documents refers to the registered Settlement Deed and also the encumbrance certificate. In this it had been referred to the effect that "We have on 27-6-1999 deposited with you the following documents of title to immovable property with intent to secure the repayment to the Bank of moneys that are now due or shall from time to time or at any time be due from M/s. Unique Computers Proprietor P. John Nelson." 5. In United Bank of India v. Lekharam S. and Co.4, the Apex Court while dealing with sections 58 (f) and 59 of Transfer of Property Act, 1882 held at paras 7 and 8 as hereunder: "A mortgage by deposit of title deeds is a form of mortgage recognized by 8e,tion 58(f) of the Transfer of Property Act which provides that it may be effected in certain towns (including Calcutta) where a person "delivers to a creditor or his agent documents of title to immovable property with intent to create a security thereon. In other words, when the debtor deposits with the creditor title deeds of his property with an intent to create a security the law implies a contract between the parties to create a mortgage and no registered instrument is required under 8.59 as in other classes of mortgage. It is essential to bear in mind that the essence of a mortgage by deposit of title deeds is the actual handing over by a borrower to the lender of documents of title to immovable property with the intention that those documents shall constitute a security which will enable the creditor ultimately to recover the money which he has lent. But if the parties choose to reduce the contract to writing, this implication of law is excluded by their express bargain, and the document will be the sole evidence of its terms. In such a case the deposit and the document both form integral parts of the transaction and are essential ingredients in the creation of the mortgage. But if the parties choose to reduce the contract to writing, this implication of law is excluded by their express bargain, and the document will be the sole evidence of its terms. In such a case the deposit and the document both form integral parts of the transaction and are essential ingredients in the creation of the mortgage. It follows that in such a case the document which constitutes the bargain regarding securing requires registration under 8.17 of the Indian Registration Act, 1908, as a non-testamentary instrument creating an interest in immovable property, where the value of such property is one hundred rupees and upwards. If a document of this character is not registered it cannot be used in the evidence at all and the transaction itself cannot be proved by oral evidence either. In the case of Kedarnath Dutt v. Shamllal Khettry, 11 Beng LR (OC) 405, Couch, C.J. stated as follows: "The rule with regard to writings is that oral proof cannot be substituted for the written evidence of any contract which the parties have put into writing. And the reason is that the writing is tacitly considered by the parties themselves as the only repository and the appropriate evidence of their agreement. If this memorandum was of such a nature that it could be treated as the contract for the mortgage and what the parties considered to be the only repository and appropriate evidence of their agreement, it would be the instrument by which the equitable mortgage was created, and would come within S.17 of the Registration Act." In a latter case, in Pranjivandas Mehta v. Chan Ma Phee, 43 Ind App 122: (AIR 1916 PC 115), the Judicial Committee observed as follows: "The law upon the subject is beyond any doubt: (1) Where titles are handed over with nothing said except that they are to be security, the law supposes that the scope of the security is the scope of the title. (2) Where, however, titles are handed over accompanied by a bargain, that bargain must rule. (3) Lastly, when the bargain is a written bargain, it, and it alone, must determine what is the scope and extent of security. (2) Where, however, titles are handed over accompanied by a bargain, that bargain must rule. (3) Lastly, when the bargain is a written bargain, it, and it alone, must determine what is the scope and extent of security. In the words of Lord Cairns in the leading case of Shaw v. Foster (1872) 5 HL321, 341), although it is a well established rule of equity that a deposit of a document of title without more, without writing or without word of mouth, will create in equity a charge upon the property referred to. I apprehend that that general rule will not apply when you have a deposit accompanied by an actual written charge. In that case you must refer to the terms of the written document and any implication that might be raised, supposing there was no document, is put out of the and reduced to silence by the documents by which alone you must be governed." In Sundarachariar v. Narayan Ayyar, 58 Ind App 68: (AIR 1931 PC 36), the plaintiff had verbally agreed at Madras to make a further advance to the defendants, making Rs.60,000 in all upon the deposit of certain documents of title. The defendants agent signed and handed to the plaintiff a memorandum stating "As agreed upon in person I have delivered to you the under mentioned documents as security" - a list of the documents following, also a promissory note for Rs.60,000. After examination of the documents the agreed amount was handed over to the plaintiff. It was held by the Judicial Committee that the memorandum was not a document which required registration, even if the agreed advance was conditional upon it being given; and that, there being no written agreement, the memorandum as well as oral evidence, was admissible in evidence to prove the intent to create a security by deposit of the documents named. The same view was expressed by this Court in Rachpal Mahraj v. Mahraj v. Bhagwandas, 1950 SCR 548 : ( AIR 1950 SC 272 ), in which it was pointed out that the question whether a memorandum of deposit of title deeds is compulsorily registrable under S17 of the Indian Registration Act, 1908 depends on whether the parties intended to reduce their bargain regarding the deposit to the form of a document. If so, the document required registration. If so, the document required registration. If, on the other hand, its proper construction and the surrounding circumstances lead to the conclusion that the parties did not intend to do so, there being no express bargain, the document being merely evidential did not require registration. In that case, accounts were taken relating to the appellants dealings with the respondents on a certain date and the appellant gave certain title deeds to the respondents for being held as security for the amounts then found due and which may become due, and on the same day the appellant gave a memorandum to the respondents in the form of a letter addressed to the respondents which stated as follows: "We write to put on record that to secure the repayment of the money already due to you from us on account of the business transactions between yourselves and ourselves and the money that may hereafter become due on account of such transactions we have this day deposited with you the following title deeds in Calcutta at your place of business at No.7, Sambhu Mullick Lane, relating to our properties at Samstipur with intent to create an equitable mortgage on the said properties to secure all moneys including interest that may be found due and payable by us to you on account of the said transactions......" It was held by this Court that the parties did not intend to create a charge by execution of the document, but merely to record a transaction which had already been concluded and under which rights and liabilities had already been created and the document did not require registration. Applying the principle to the present case, we consider that the letter at Ex.7(a) was not meant to be an integral part of the transaction between the parties. The letter does not mention what was the principal amount borrowed or to be borrowed. Neither does it refer to rate of interest for the loan. It is important to notice that the letter does not mention details of title deeds which are to be deposited with the plaintiff-bank. We are, therefore" of the opinion that the view of the High Court with regard to the construction of Ex. 7 (a) is erroneous and the document was not intended to be an integral part of the transaction and did not, by itself, operate to create an interest in the immovable property. We are, therefore" of the opinion that the view of the High Court with regard to the construction of Ex. 7 (a) is erroneous and the document was not intended to be an integral part of the transaction and did not, by itself, operate to create an interest in the immovable property. It follows, therefore, that the document- Ex.7 (a) did not require registration under S.17 of the Indian Registration Act". 6. The Division Bench of this Court in Durga Emporiums case (3 supra) at para 24 held as hereunder: "The cumulative effect of the discussion is that the 1st respondent had deposited the title deed-Ex.A-12 with the appellants and created equitable mortgage as a measure of security for the payment of the amounts due to them. EX.A-13 is only a letter evidencing the factum of such deposit, which has already taken place, and, as such, it does not require registration. Since there existed an equitable mortgage in favour of the appellants for the suit amounts, there shall be preliminary decree under Order XXXIV, Rule 1 of CPC as prayed for in the suit. The decree under appeal is accordingly modified and the suit shall stand decreed as prayed for". It is needless to say that the plaintiff-Andhra Bank filed the suit praying for the relief of preliminary decree for the amount advanced as against the defendants and for sale of mortgaged property by giving time for redemption, passing of final decree with penal costs. It may be appropriate to have a look at paras 3 and 4 of the plaint, which are as hereunder: "III. The plaintiff submits that during June, 1999, the first defendant along with his father Late Polepaka Nelson Israel and the defendants No.1 to 4 approached the plaintiff bank for the financial assistance to the unit of the first defendant being established under the name and style of M/s. Unique Computers at Warangal. The father of the first defendant offered his house property bearing H.No.11/6/21, as security and the defendants NO.1 to 4, offered to become co-obligants. The father of the first defendant offered his house property bearing H.No.11/6/21, as security and the defendants NO.1 to 4, offered to become co-obligants. The plaintiff bank verified their project and after finding the legality of the documents of title deeds of property, sanctioned term loan of RS.6.5Iakhs to the said unit of the first defendant with many terms and conditions that the loan should be repaid in 60 monthly instalments together with interest @ Rs.16,86% per annum with quarterly rests and that the movable assets Le., Computers, its accessories and the furniture should be hypothecated to the bank and the loan should also be secured by the personal guarantee of the defendants No.1 to 4 and by mortgaging the above said house property of Late . P. Nelson Israel as collateral security. 9. The plaintiff submits that in compliance of the terms of the sanction the Late Nelson Israel on 27-6-1999 has deposited title deeds of his house property bearing H.No.11-6-21, with an intention to create equitable mortgage securing the loan granted to the first defendant. On 28-6-1999, the defendants 1 to 4 along with Late P. Nelson Israel executed documents promising to repay the said loan in 60 monthly instalments with interest @ RS.16.86% per annum together with penal interest @ Rs.2% p.a. in the event of default and also executed documents hypothecating the computers, its accessories and the furniture of the said unit. They also executed other documents authorizing the bank to cancel the limits during the course of loan period. Further Late P. Nelson Israel on 28-6-1999 confirmed the deposit of title deeds and thus created equitable mortgage securing the said loan. The details of the mortgage are Name of the Mortgagor P.Nelson Israel Name of the Mortgagee Andhra Bank, Nakkalagutta Branch. Date of Mortgage 28-6-1999 Amount secured RS.65 lakhs together with interest and costs accrued thereunder. Rate of interest @ Rs. 16.86% p.a. with quaterly rests together with penal interest @ Rs.2% p.a. in the event of default. Property mortgaged All that house property bearing house No.11-6-21 described in the schedule in detail.” 7. Date of Mortgage 28-6-1999 Amount secured RS.65 lakhs together with interest and costs accrued thereunder. Rate of interest @ Rs. 16.86% p.a. with quaterly rests together with penal interest @ Rs.2% p.a. in the event of default. Property mortgaged All that house property bearing house No.11-6-21 described in the schedule in detail.” 7. Strong reliance was placed on the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in Bhavanarayanas case (1 supra), wherein the Division Bench held that when the mortgage by deposit of title deeds can be created by mere deposit of title deeds without any written contract between parties but once the bargain or contract is reduced to writing, it must be registered. As can be seen from Ex.A-7, the deposit of title deeds and the communication, the letter addressed, these are all of different dates. The decision of the Division Bench referred to supra is distinguishable on facts. Even otherwise following the view expressed by the Apex Court in United Bank of Indias case (4 supra), yet another Division Bench expressed clear opinion at para 24 referred to supra in Durga Emporiums case (3 supra). Hence, it is needless to say that the said decision of the Division Bench on which strong reliance was placed is definitely distinguishable on facts, at any rate. 8. In H.G. Nanjappa v. MFG. Industries (P) Ltd.5 it was held at para 17, which is extracted hereunder: "The question, therefore, which must be posed in a case like the present one is, did the parties intend to reduce their bargain regarding the deposit of title deeds to the form of a document? It is he who has executed the memorandum and the memorandum merely states that he has deposited with the said company lithe deeds security......" It is not the case of the defendant that there was an agreement between the parties that the mortgage was to tale effect only on the execution of this memorandum. The memorandum clearly and plainly appears to me to be something in the nature of a forwarding letter or acknowledging the fact that the defendant has deposited the said deeds of title as security which is obvious, because, according to the plaintiff, there is admittedly a promissory note which has been executed much earlier and a sum of money was due on the basis of the said promissory note. The mere statement that a deposit is made byway of security for the repayment of the loan cannot be read as a contract which is arrived at by the document itself. The document, therefore, cannot be read as recording an agreement between the parties, namely, the agreement to create a mortgage by deposit of title deeds. It is at best an evidence of the fact that the title deeds have been deposited with the plaintiff." 9. Reliance also was placed on a decision of this Court in Thota Venkata Narasammas case (2 supra) .In the light of the view expressed by the Apex Court in the judgment supra 4 or the view expressed by the Division Bench in the Judgment cited supra 3is applicable to the facts of the present case. Hence the reasons recorded by the learned Judge cannot be found fault with in any way. 10. Accordingly the CRP shall stand dismissed at the stage of admission. No costs.