JUDGMENT I.A. Ansari, J. 1. This application, made under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, seeking condonation of delay in filing the review application, has to be considered in the backdrop of the facts and circumstances, which have led to the making of the application seeking condonation of delay in making the application for review. 2. I have heard Mr. N.C. Das, learned senior Counsel for the review Petitioner/applicant, and Mr. C.K. Sarma Baruah, learned senior Counsel, assisted by Mrs. A. Bhattacharyaa and Mrs. A. Devi, advocates, appearing on behalf of the opposite party. 3. Sri Jagat Chandra Sarma (since deceased), who was predecessor-in-interest of the opposite parties herein, instituted Title Suit No. 178/1969, in the court of Sadar Munsiff, at Dibrugarh, against Sri Jyanendra Nath Das, the predecessor-in-interest of the applicants herein and some others, as Defendants, seeking declaration of his rights, title and interest to the suit land and for recovery of khaas possession thereof by ejecting the Defendants therefrom, the case of the Plaintiff being, briefly stated, thus: The suit land, originally, belonged to late Hemakanti Das, mother of the Defendant Nos. 1 to 5, and she, being in need of money, sold the suit land to Defendant No. 7 and, in turn, the Defendant No. 7, on 10.11.1953, sold the said land to the Defendant No. 2 by executing a registered sale deed and delivered possession thereof to the Defendant No. 2, whereupon the Defendant No. 2 got his name mutated in the relevant revenue records. In course of time, the periodic patta was granted in favour of Defendant No. 2. However, on requests made by the Defendant No. 1, the Defendant No. 2 allowed the Defendant No. 1 to live on a part of the suit land temporarily and on condition that the Defendant No. 1 would not make any permanent structure on the said land and vacate the same, whenever required. Subsequent thereto, when the Defendant No. 2 himself fell in need of money, he sold his entire purchased land, as indicated hereinbefore, to the Plaintiff, by executing a registered sale deed, on 8.1.1957, and accordingly delivered possession thereof to the Plaintiff. Except the portion of the suit land, which was in possession of Defendant No. 1, the Plaintiff received vacant possession of the remaining land. Except the portion of the suit land, which was in possession of Defendant No. 1, the Plaintiff received vacant possession of the remaining land. Having been, thereafter, granted periodic patta in respect of the said land, the Plaintiff became possessor and owner thereof and accordingly has been paying land revenue for the same. 4. In Title Suit No. 178/69 aforementioned, the Defendant No. 1 as well as Defendant No. 2 filed their written statement. In his written statement, Defendant No. 1 did not dispute the factum of sale of the suit land, initially, to the Defendant No. 7 and, then, to Defendant No. 2; but the Defendant No. 1 asserted that though the Defendant No. 2 had become the owner of the suit land by virtue of its purchase from Defendant No. 7 and because of granting of periodic patta in his favour, yet the Defendant No. 1 remained in possession of the suit land without recognizing anyone's title thereto and the title, if any, of anyone to the suit land, thus, stood extinguished by his adverse possession. In fact, while stating as to what the true facts of the case were, the Defendant No. 1, in paragraph 25 of his written statement, stated, "Late Hemakanti Das sold the suit land along with other lands without the knowledge of this Defendant and his brother to Defendant No. 7 Md. Sarafat Ali." In the face of the statements so made in his written statement, the Defendant No. 1 did not, it is clear, dispute the sale of the suit land by his mother, who was, admittedly, the owner of the said land, in favour of Defendant No. 7 and, then, the sale thereof by the Defendant No. 7 to the Plaintiff. 5. Before proceeding further, what may also be noted is that though the Defendant No. 7 filed his written statement, he did not, eventually, contest the suit. In his written statement, this Defendant stated to the effect that the land, in question, was given, in mortgage, to him by Hemakanti Das (i.e., the predecessor-in-interest of Defendant Nos. 1 to 5), by a registered Deed of Mortgage, being Deed No. 1025/1941 of Dibrugarh Sub-Registry, for a sum of Rs. In his written statement, this Defendant stated to the effect that the land, in question, was given, in mortgage, to him by Hemakanti Das (i.e., the predecessor-in-interest of Defendant Nos. 1 to 5), by a registered Deed of Mortgage, being Deed No. 1025/1941 of Dibrugarh Sub-Registry, for a sum of Rs. 500, but the possession of the land remained with the mortgager and her sons and as Hemakanti Das could not repay her mortgage and the Defendant No. 2 wanted to purchase the mortgaged land, this Defendant (i.e., Defendant No. 7) executed a sale deed in favour of Defendant No. 2. 6. What is of immense importance to note, now, is that in respect of his case, as set up in his written statement, the Defendant No. 7 did not adduce any evidence. No evidence, thus, existed on record to show that the suit land was ever mortgaged to Defendant No. 7 by Hemakanti Das. Viewed, thus, the admission of the Defendant No. 1 to the effect that the suit land was sold by his mother to the Defendant No. 7 and, then, by the Defendant No. 7 to Defendant No. 2 remained admitted in the said suit. 7. Since the Defendant No. l, in the opinion of the trial court, had failed to establish his claim of adverse possession over the suit land, and the Plaintiff title to the suit land stood admitted, the suit was decreed, on 29.6.1977, accordingly in favour of the Plaintiff. 8. In short, the rights, title and interest of the Plaintiff to the suit land were, thus, declared in the suit and he (Plaintiff) was also held entitled to recover the khaas possession thereof by ejecting therefrom Defendant No. 1. This decree came to be impugned in Title Appeal No. 34/77. By judgment and decree, dated 12.3.1981, the learned First Appellate Court set aside the impugned decree and held to the effect that a mortgaged land cannot be sold in the way in which it was done in the instant case inasmuch as "once a mortgage it is always a mortgage". Dissatisfied with the judgment and decree, dated 12.3.1981, so passed by the learned First Appellate Court, the Plaintiff preferred a second appeal, which gave rise to Second Appeal No. 106/81. 9. During the pendency of the second appeal, as the Plaintiff died, his legal heirs and successors were substituted and the appeal proceeded. Dissatisfied with the judgment and decree, dated 12.3.1981, so passed by the learned First Appellate Court, the Plaintiff preferred a second appeal, which gave rise to Second Appeal No. 106/81. 9. During the pendency of the second appeal, as the Plaintiff died, his legal heirs and successors were substituted and the appeal proceeded. This appeal was heard on 31.7.1990. In the hearing, so held, the learned Counsel for both the parties (i.e., the Appellants as well as the Defendant No. 1 aforementioned) participated and no information was laid before the court with regard to the fact that the Defendant No. 1 had already died. The Defendant No. 7's plea that he had obtained the suit land by a mortgage deed and not by sale remained, thus, unproved and the factum of sale of the land by Hemakanti Das to Defendant No. 7 remained admitted. In the second appeal, the court concluded that the sale of the land by Hemakanti Das, who was, admittedly, the original owner of the suit land, to the Defendant No. 7 and, thereafter, the sale of the land by Defendant No. 7 to Defendant No. 2 also remained admitted and when the Defendant No. 1 had failed to prove his plea of adverse possession, the reversal of the decree granted in favour of the Plaintiff by the learned trial court was incorrect. On the conclusions so reached, this Court, on 31.7.1990, allowed the appeal and, in consequence thereof, the decree granted by the learned trial court got restored. 10. In the facts and circumstances as narrated hereinabove, the successors-in-interest of the Defendant No. 1 have, now, filed a review application on 25.7.1992. This review application has given rise to Review Petition No. 50/94. For the delay, which has crept in filing the review petition, the review applicants have sought for condonation of delay by making the present application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. 11. While considering the present application for condonation of delay, what needs to be noted is that in this miscellaneous case, the court, on 10.8.1992, directed notice to be issued to the opposite party and, on an application made by the review applicants for stay of the decree in question, Misc. Case No. 1288/02 was registered and though direction was given to the review applicants to take requisite steps within 3(three) days, no such steps were taken within the stipulated time. Case No. 1288/02 was registered and though direction was given to the review applicants to take requisite steps within 3(three) days, no such steps were taken within the stipulated time. 12. What may, now, noticed is that the review petition, as already mentioned hereinbefore, has been made, on 25.7.1992, under Article 124 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, which describes the period of limitation for review of the judgment of the court other than the Supreme Court, as 30(thirty) days, from the date of the decree or order, which is sought to be reviewed and not from the date of the knowledge of the decree or order. In view of the fact that the second appeal was decreed, on 31.7.1990, the review petition ought to have been made within thirty days therefrom. The review petition has, however, been made after a delay of about two years short of six days. 13. Be that as it may, according to the review applicants, they had no knowledge with regard to the pendency of the second appeal nor were they ever aware of filing of the title suit No. 178/69 aforementioned. The review applicants, therefore, claim that they had absolutely no knowledge bout the institution of the said suit or pendency of the said second appeal. The review applicants further claim that it was only on 28.6.1992 that they came to know from a family friend of theirs, who works in the court, about the filing of the Title execution case No. 8/92, in the court of Sadar Munsif, Dibrugarh, and as soon as the review applicant No. 1 came to know about the said execution proceeding, he consulted his advocate at Dibrugarh, who advised him to approach this High Court for the purpose of the review of the judgment and decree passed in second appeal No. 106/91 and, thereafter, the review application has been filed and that in filing the review application, there has been no latches or negligence on the part of the review applicants. 14. While considering the review applicants' explanations for delay in making the review application within time, it is necessary to point that it is difficult to readily believe that the review applicants were wholly unaware of the fact that litigation, involving their property, was pending in the courts. 14. While considering the review applicants' explanations for delay in making the review application within time, it is necessary to point that it is difficult to readily believe that the review applicants were wholly unaware of the fact that litigation, involving their property, was pending in the courts. Even if, for a moment, it is assumed that they did not know about the institution of the suit or about the pendency of the second appeal and, that they came to know about the suit and the second appeal only on 28.6.1990, as claimed by them, from a family friend of theirs, who works in the court at Dibrugarh, it was incumbent, on the part of the review applicants, to disclose the particulars of the person from whom they came to know about the execution proceedings. 15. Thus, the claim of the review applicants as to how they came to know about the pendency of the execution proceeding has not been satisfactorily established and it cannot be implicitly relied upon. 16. Above all, what is of paramount importance to note is that the review applicants' claim, as already pointed out above, that they came to know about the execution proceeding on 28.6.1992. However, this made the review application as late as on, 25.7.1992. As to why they filed the review application on 25.7.1992 and not earlier, no explanation has been offered by the review applicants and no discernible material is on record explaining as to why review application was not filed for a month, i.e., from 28.6.1992 to 25.7.1902. It may also be noted that no material has been furnished by the review applicants to show that the Defendant No. 1 died, on 10.1.1986, as claimed by them. 17. Referring to, and relying on, the decision in State of Nagaland v. Lipok and Ors. (2005) SCC 75, Mr. N.C. Das, learned senior Counsel, appearing on behalf of the review applicants, has emphasized upon the need to consider ah application for condonation of delay liberally in order to do substantial justice. While considering the decision in Lipok Ao (supra), what may be noted is that in this case, the Apex Court has, in accordance with its earlier decisions, emphasized the need to construe an application made under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, liberally, so as to do justice to the parties. While considering the decision in Lipok Ao (supra), what may be noted is that in this case, the Apex Court has, in accordance with its earlier decisions, emphasized the need to construe an application made under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, liberally, so as to do justice to the parties. While it is true that on the ground that while considering an application for condonation of delay, not the length of delay, but the causes shown to explain the delay are to be taken into consideration, it is imperative to note that in the case at hand, as already pointed out above, no credible material exists to show that the review applicants were wholly unaware of the litigation, which their father had been facing in respect of the very land on which the review applicants reside. This apart, the review applicants have not been able to provide adequate particulars to convincingly show that they came to know about the suit, appeals or execution proceedings, only on 28.6.1992. The review applicants have also failed to give any explanation whatsoever for not making the review application promptly after 28.6.1992. Though the court, in a case of the present nature, should not adopt pedantic approach, a vague and wholly unconvincing explanation offered for making an application for condonation of delay can be given no credence at all. 18. Because of what have been pointed out above, I do not find any merit in this application for condonation of delay. This application, therefore, fails and the same shall accordingly stand dismissed with a cost of Rs. 500. 19. Send backs the LCR. Application dismissed.