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2006 DIGILAW 4551 (PNJ)

Ashok Kumar v. Raj Kumar

2006-12-23

ARVIND KUMAR

body2006
Judgment Arvind Kumar, J. 1. This is tenants revision directed against judgment dated 20.7.2000 passed by the Appellate Authority, Chandigarh, whereby he has been ordered to be ejected on the ground of personal necessity. 2. In brief, the facts are that Raj Kumar, Krishan Kumar and Vijay Kumar (respondents herein) are owners and landlords of the shop No. 150, Old Ropar Road, Mani Majra, (UT) Chandigarh, having purchased the same vide sale-deed dated 10.5.1996 from its previous owners/landlords, namely, Gopal and Mohan Lal. Ashok Kumar (petitioner herein) is the tenant in the said premises of the previous owners/landlords. On purchase of the shop in dispute by the respondents, the said Ashok Kumar is tenant under them. Since the respondents required the shop in dispute for their personal use and occupation, they accordingly requested the appellant to vacate the same but the appellant- tenant refused to do so and further, did not pay the rent thereby falling in arrears of rent. This led to filing of an ejectment petition by the landlords against the tenant-appellant. Upon notice of the ejectment petition, the tenant put in appearance and filed written statement denying the averments made in the ejectment petition. It was alleged that the ejectment petition has been filed with an intention to get the shop vacated and to sell it at a higher price. Other pleas have also been taken including the one that his father had entered into agreement with the previous owner for which suit for specific performance is pending. It was further alleged that Krishan Kumar, landlord, owns a factory in Chandigarh which is manufacturing Almirahs. Replication too was filed by the landlords-respondents controverting the allegations made in the written statement and reiterating those in the ejectment petition. 3. On the pleadings of the parties, issues were struck, whereafter, the parties led their respective evidence. Rent Controller on appreciation of the evidence so adduced, vide judgment dated 23.12.1999 dismissed the eviction application filed by the landlords against the tenant, claiming arrears of rent in respect of Shop No. 150, Old Ropar Road, Manimajra and on the ground of personal necessity, holding that both the grounds on which ejectment has been sought have not been proved by the landlords. Feeling aggrieved, the landlords preferred an appeal. Feeling aggrieved, the landlords preferred an appeal. The Appellate Authority, Chandigarh, on reappreciation of the evidence led by the parties to the lis, allowed the appeal of the landlords after setting aside judgment dated 23.12.1999 passed by Rent Controller, Chandigarh, on the ground of personal necessity of the landlords alone as the ground of non-payment of rent was not pressed by the landlords at the time of arguments. Accordingly, the appellate Authority directed the tenant to vacate the shop in dispute within two months failing which the landlords were at liberty to get the same vacated in accordance with law. It is against this judgment, the tenant has come up by way of present revision petition. 4. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties. 5. It is not in dispute that the appellant-tenant was inducted as a tenant in the shop in dispute vide rent note dated 21.4.1989, Exhibit PW-6/1 by the previous owner/landlords, namely, Gopal and Mohan Lal. It has also not been disputed that the present landlords-respondents have purchased the shop in dispute vide sale-deed dated 10.5.1996, Exhibit P-1 which is consequently entered in the municipal record vide Exhibit P-2. Therefore, respondents- landlords stepped into the shoes of earlier landlords. Undisputedly, it is settled proposition of law as per dicta of the Honble Supreme Court in Harbilas Rai Bansal and another v. State of Punjab, 1995(2) RCR(Rent) 672 : 1996(1) RRR 69 : (1996-1)112 PLR 227 (SC), that the landlord can eject a tenant even from a non-residential building on the ground of bona fide requirement. 6. The only question to be decided is whether the respondents-landlords wanted the demised premises for bona fide requirement. It is again a settled proposition of law that bona fide requirement of the landlord does not give rise to substantial question of law and it has to be decided on the appreciation of evidence. Emphasis is from Ram Prasad Rajak v. Nand Lal and Bros. and another, 1998(2) RCR(Rent) 249 (SC). 7. Learned counsel for the appellant-tenant has pointed out that initially, the previous landlords had entered into an agreement on 25.3.1996 with their father Sobh Raj to sell the shop for Rs. 4.25 lacs out of which Rs. Emphasis is from Ram Prasad Rajak v. Nand Lal and Bros. and another, 1998(2) RCR(Rent) 249 (SC). 7. Learned counsel for the appellant-tenant has pointed out that initially, the previous landlords had entered into an agreement on 25.3.1996 with their father Sobh Raj to sell the shop for Rs. 4.25 lacs out of which Rs. 1,00,000/- was paid as earnest money and the balance amount was paid on 3.5.1996 but he mala fidely sold it to the present respondents-landlords for which suit for specific performance is pending and has developed the argument that after his ejectment, if subsequently the suit is decreed, a great injustice would be caused to him. In support of his contention, he has referred to judgment of the Honble Supreme Court in R. Kanthimathi and another v. Beatrice Xavier (Mrs.), (2000)9 Supreme Court Cases 339. The contention is meritless for variety of reasons. The legal position, referred to above, has no application to the facts of the present case. In the ejectment petition, only relationship of landlord and tenant is to be seen. Firstly, the appellant-tenant is not shown to be a party to the said agreement. No copy of the alleged agreement has been placed on record to stipulate the terms and conditions. Concededly at the bar, the said suit has been dismissed in default in the year 2003 and now, it has been claimed that a restoration application is pending from which it appears that the same has been done only to have this plea alive, to be raised in this case. This argument is also legally not tenable. It has been held in Gajendra Prasad Sinha v. Man Mohan Prasad Sinha, 2000(1) RCR(Rent) 322 (Patna) that only because a suit for specific performance is pending wherein the plaintiff is also a party, the same alone can be said to be barrier for granting an eviction decree in favour of the plaintiff. 8. Coming to the other limb of argument, it has been argued that the respondents-landlords have been dealing in manufacturing of trunks in 5 Khokhas at a little distance, say about 15 yards, from the disputed shop paying less rent and have also other properties to which reference of sale- deeds dated 29.4.1991 (Exhibit D-1) and 28.4.1991 (Exhibit D-2) has been made and as such, respondents-landlords do not have any bona fide requirement of the shop in dispute. In support of the argument, reliance has been placed upon a judgment of this Court in Karnail Singh v. Vidya Devi wife of Gaggan Ram, 1980(1) RCR(Rent) 592 : (1980)82 PLR 613, wherein it has been laid down that even if the landlord is living in a rented house he is not entitled to eject the tenant from the house owned by him in the same urban area, unless the house occupied by him is utterly unsustainable. He has also referred to a judgment in Romesh Kumar v. Atma Devi and others, 1987(1) RCR(Rent) 101 : (1985-1)87 PLR 751 (FB). The contention is meritless. The said legal position referred to above has no application to the circumstances of the present case. It is a settled proposition of law that the landlord is the best judge of his requirement for residential or business purpose and he has got complete freedom in the matter. In Kay Iron Works (P) Ltd. v. Molar Mal, 1998(2) RCR(Rent) 404 : (1998-3)120 PLR 579, it has been held that sufficiency or insufficiency of the premises already in occupation of the landlord is a question which can be judged from the view point of the landlord. Tenant cannot create a clog on the extension of business of landlord or dictate terms to the landlord. Tenant Ashok Kumar when appeared as RW-3 himself admitted that Krishan Kumar had taken the Khokha on rent from Madan Puri. Madan Puri has also been examined as PW-5, who has stated that Khokha No. 25 is on rent with Krishan Kumar. Thus, there is nothing to suggest that Krishan Kumar etc. had been running their business in five khokhas. Sale deeds Exhibits D1 and D2 no doubt are in favour of Raj Kumar-respondent and the other one in favour of Baldev Raj and Kishan Kumar-respondent but therein they are shown to have purchased some share in the land comprised in Khasra numbers. The learned Appellate Authority has rightly concluded that there is nothing in the documents to show that they pertain to commercial properties. The learned Appellate Authority has rightly concluded that there is nothing in the documents to show that they pertain to commercial properties. Further, on the basis of statement of tenant-Ashok Kumar as RW-3, admitting that his father owns shop No. 152 and also an industrial plot No. 958, Phase-II, Ram Darbar, Chandigarh, which is vacant, it has further come to the right conclusion that rather the appellant-tenant has a commercial property at his disposal which is in the name of his father and is lying vacant. It may be apt to mention here that non-examination of Vijay Kumar does not affect the landlords case in view of deposition of PW-7 Krishan Kumar as what is required is the quality of the witness and not the quantity. 9. For the reasons recorded above, there is no infirmity in the judgment passed by the appellate Authority. No interference is, thus, called for. The present revision petition is accordingly dismissed. Two months time is granted to the appellant-tenant to vacate the premises. No costs.