JUDGMENT I.A. Ansari, J. 1. This second appeal has arisen out of the judgment and decree, dated 18.05.2004, passed, in Title Appeal No. 6/2003, by the learned District Judge, Kamrup, Guwahati, upholding the judgment and decree, dated 30.05.2003, passed, in Title Suit No. 254/1998, by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division) No. 1, Guwahati, whereby the plaintiff-appellant's suit was dismissed on the ground that the plaintiff was not entitled to any relief. It is, thus, against such concurrent findings of the learned two Courts below that this second appeal has been preferred by the plaintiff as the appellant. 2. The plaintiff-appellant's case is, in brief, thus : The plaintiff is the absolute owner and possessor of the suit land, the possession having been received by the plaintiff from the defendants, on 29.11.1985, by virtue of an agreement, whereunder the defendants had agreed and promised to sell the suit land in consideration of a sum of Rs.40,000.00 to the plaintiff. The defendants, who are husband and wife, accepted a sum of Rs. 12,000.00 on the date of the agreement for sale i.e., on 29.11.1985, and handed over the possession of the suit land to the plaintiff accordingly on that very day. The defendants, thereafter, received from the plaintiff the balance consideration amount for sale and obtained the requisite permission for effecting the sale. However, as the defendants did not execute the requisite sale deed, despite repeated demands raised, in this regards, by the plaintiff, the requisite sale deed was registered, on 13.04.1995, at the office of the Sub-Registrar, Panighat, on 13.04.1995. The suit land has, thereafter, been mutated in the name of the plaintiff and she has been paying land revenue therefor. However, all of a sudden, on 08.12.1998, the defendants, accompanied by some others, trespassed into the land in the absence of the plaintiff and damaged a part of the bamboo fencing, which had been erected by the plaintiff, the damage to the bamboo fencing having been done by the defendants in order to forcibly occupy the suit land. When the plaintiff and her husband objected to the illegal activities of the defendants, the defendants threatened the plaintiff with dire consequences. In these circumstances, the plaintiff sought for, inter alia, declaration of her rights, title and interest to the suit land and confirmation of her possession thereon. When the plaintiff and her husband objected to the illegal activities of the defendants, the defendants threatened the plaintiff with dire consequences. In these circumstances, the plaintiff sought for, inter alia, declaration of her rights, title and interest to the suit land and confirmation of her possession thereon. At the same time, the plaintiff also sought for ejectment of the defendants from a part of the suit land and also recovery of possession thereof. 3. The defendants contested the suit, the case of the defendants being, briefly stated, thus: The defendants, as owners of the suit property, had entered into an agreement for sale with the plaintiff, as alleged by her, on 29.11.1985; and received the said sum of Rs. 12,000 as advance. Under the said agreement, the plaintiff was to make payment of the balance amount before 10.02.1986 so as to get execution of the sale deed completed. However, as the plaintiff failed to pay the balance amount of Rs.28,000 within the stipulated date, the defendants forfeited the advance, which had been paid by the plaintiff, and did not execute the sale deed. Prior to November 1993, the plaintiff illegally occupied 5 lechas of the land and, despite objections having been raised by the defendants, constructed a cowshed thereon. It is only on appearing, in the suit, that the defendants have come to know that the plaintiff has got a sale deed in respect of the suit land registered projecting that the same had been executed by the defendants. The sale deed, in question, is a forged one inasmuch as the defendants never executed the said sale deed in favour of the plaintiff. 4. Because of the denial of the defendants that they had executed the sale deed, in question, the trial court framed an issue in this regard. This issue, (i.e., the issue No.5), read as follows: 5. Whether the defendant executed the registered sale deed No.34/1995, dated 13.04.1995 in favour of the plaintiff in respect of the A Schedule land and if as whether the sale deed is forged and illegal and inoperative and liable to be cancelled? 6. In support of their respective cases, each of the parties to the suit has adduced evidence. Whether the defendant executed the registered sale deed No.34/1995, dated 13.04.1995 in favour of the plaintiff in respect of the A Schedule land and if as whether the sale deed is forged and illegal and inoperative and liable to be cancelled? 6. In support of their respective cases, each of the parties to the suit has adduced evidence. In her evidence, the Plaintiff (PW1) has deposed that they contacted the defendants on three different occasions requesting them to execute the sale deed and on the fourth occasion, the defendants told her husband. "In the agreement, we have written everything, you get the sale deed registered and we have no objection thereto". The plaintiff has also deposed that according to what the defendants had told her husband, she (plaintiff) got the sale deed registered, on 13.04.1995, at Sub-Registrar's Office, Panighat, Ext.4 being the sale deed in this regard. The evidence, so given by the plaintiff herself, clearly reflects that it is the plaintiff herself, who got the sale deed (Ext.4) registered. There is absolutely nothing in the evidence of the plaintiff that the defendants were the ones, who had executed the said sale deed or got the same registered. 7. In view of the fact that the defendants denied that they had executed the sale deed, incumbent it was upon the plaintiff to prove, in accordance with law and by adducing cogent and convincing evidence, that the sale deed, in question, which appears on the record as Ext.4 was executed by the defendants. For proving the execution of the said sale deed by the defendants, it wag necessary for the plaintiff to prove that the signatures, appearing on the said sale deed, as executants, were of the defendants or that the defendants, as vendors, had executed the said sale deed. No such evidence was, however, adduced by the plaintiff. Thus, execution of the sale deed, in question, by the defendants remained unproved. 8. Coupled with the above, it is worth noticing that the plaintiff, in her cross-examination, admitted, at the end, that the defendant No. 1 had not permitted the plaintiff, in writing, to get Ext.4 registered, but she (plaintiff) had got the sale deed registered. Thus, execution of the sale deed, in question, by the defendants remained unproved. 8. Coupled with the above, it is worth noticing that the plaintiff, in her cross-examination, admitted, at the end, that the defendant No. 1 had not permitted the plaintiff, in writing, to get Ext.4 registered, but she (plaintiff) had got the sale deed registered. The evidence given by PW 1, thus, clearly reveals, as already noted by the learned Courts below, that the sale deed, in question, i.e., Ext.4, was not executed by the defendants; rather, the same was executed by the plaintiff herself. The impression that this finding is, in the context of the evidence on record, correct gets reinforced, when one carefully considers, the evidence of PW2, who has been examined by the plaintiff to prove that the suit land stood sold in her favour by the defendants. The evidence of this witness (PW2) is that Uma Ram Bhuyan, i.e., defendant No. 1 had told the plaintiff that she could get the sale deed registered and the plaintiff accordingly got the sale deed registered. This categorical admission made by PW2 is also reflective of the fact, as correctly noted by the learned Courts below, that the sale deed, in question, i.e., Ext.4, was never executed. by the defendants and that the Ext.4 was nothing, but a forged sale deed inasmuch as it did not bear the signatures of the defendants as executants of the sale deed or as vendors. I do not find that the findings, so reached, by the learned Courts below were incorrect or perverse. 9. When the execution of the sale deed had been denied, onus rested on the plaintiff to prove that Ext.4 (i.e., the sale deed) was executed by the defendants. This execution could have been proved in terms of the requirement of section 67 of the Evidence Act. No evidence has, however, been adduced by the plaintiff to show that the sale deed, in question having signatures of the defendants as executants. In short, none has proved the signatures of the defendants on the said sale deed. 10. This execution could have been proved in terms of the requirement of section 67 of the Evidence Act. No evidence has, however, been adduced by the plaintiff to show that the sale deed, in question having signatures of the defendants as executants. In short, none has proved the signatures of the defendants on the said sale deed. 10. When the plaintiff sought for declaration of rights, title and interest to the suit land and confirmation of her possession on the basis of the sale deed and the sale of the suit land by the defendants to the plaintiff was not found proved, the learned Courts below had no option, but to dismiss the suit. Thus, the concurrent findings of the learned Courts below that the said sale deed was a forged one and that the same was not executed by the defendants cannot be said to be perverse or against the weight of the evidence on record or contrary to law. 11. It may, now be pointed out that it has been submitted by Mr.S.Medhi, learned counsel for the plaintiff-appellant, that since the sale deed, in question was allowed to be introduced into the evidence on record, the learned Courts below ought not to have held that the execution of the sale deed by the defendants had not been proved. While considering this aspect of the submission, made on behalf of the plaintiff-appellant, what needs to be noted out is that there is a distinction between evidence and proof. A piece of evidence may be allowed to be brought on record, but bringing of the evidence on record would not amount to proof thereof. According to section 3 of the Evidence Act, the fact is said to be proved, when, after considering the matters before it, the court either believes it to exist or considers its existence so probable that a prudent man ought, under the circumstances of the particular case, to act upon the supposition that it exists. 12. It was, thus, the onus of the plaintiff to prove that the sale deed, which she claims to have been executed by the defendants, was actually executed by the defendants. 12. It was, thus, the onus of the plaintiff to prove that the sale deed, which she claims to have been executed by the defendants, was actually executed by the defendants. Far from the fact that the plaintiff did not adduce any evidence to show that the said sale deed bears signatures of the defendants as vendors or executants thereof, the plaintiffs own evidence, as discussed above, clearly reveals that it was the plaintiff, who had herself got the said sale deed executed and registered. 13. Though an attempt has been made, at the time of admission hearing of this appeal, to show, on behalf of the plaintiff-appellant, that the plaintiff is protected under section 53 A of the Transfer of Property Act, suffice it to mention here that section 53 A works as a shield and not as a weapon of assault. This apart, the plaintiff has not based her case on the doctrine of part performance of contract as envisaged by section 53 A; rather, her case is that the contract already stands executed inasmuch as the requisite sale deed has already been executed. In the face of such a case, which the plaintiff has herself set up, she cannot fall back on section 53 A to seek her rights, title and interest declared to the suit land on the strength of a sale deed, such as Ext.4. 14. In the face of the denial by the defendants that Ext.4 was executed by them and in the absence of any proof that Ext.4 was really executed by them, there could have been no escape from the conclusion that the plaintiff could not have sought for declaration of her title and/or any other relief. 15. Situated, thus, this appeal cannot be said to have raised any question, far less substantial question of law for determination. 16. Because of the conclusions reached above, I see no reason to admit this appeal. This appeal, therefore, fails and the same shall accordingly stand dismissed with cost of Rs.500.00 (Rupees five hundred). Appeal dismissed