JUDGMENT T. Vaiphei, J. 1. Heard Mr. Pralay Saran Chakraborty, the petitioner-in-person and Mr. S. Dutta, the learned Counsel for the respondent. This is an unfortunate case. The petitioner has since 1994 been driven from pillar to post for seeking justice. Despite winning his case from this Court to the Apex Court, spanning almost 10 years, he has been denied the fruits of his litigation till now. This Court can no longer remain a silent spectator to the ordeal faced by him. Written argument is submitted by the respondents and is perused. 2. To recapitulate the history of the case, the petitioner was an Officer in the rank of Junior Management Grade Scale-I in the State Bank of India. In the year 1989, he was allowed to officiate in the higher post of Middle Management Grade Scale-II at its Regional Office at Agartala. By the Memorandum dated April 28, 1993, he was transferred from the said Regional Office and was reverted to and posted as Officer in the rank of Junior Management Grade Scale-I at the Agartala Branch of the Bank. Aggrieved by this, the petitioner filed Suit No. 32 of 1993 before the learned Munsif, West Tripura (as it then was called) on May 7, 1993 challenging the Memorandum dated April 28, 1993. He also simultaneously filed Misc. Case No. 40 of 1993 for temporary injunction, which was, however, rejected by the learned Munsif by his order dated May 21, 1993. Thereupon, he preferred an appeal before the learned District Judge, West Tripura against the rejection of his application for temporary injunction, which was also dismissed. Thereafter, the petitioner filed a writ petition being Civil Rule No. 170 of 1994 before this Court praying, inter alia, for directing the respondents to allow him to resume his duties at the Regional Office of the Bank at Agartala as Middle Management Grade Scale-II (for short 'MMGS-IF) and to treat him as on duty in the said post at the Regional Office of the Bank w.e.f. May 8, 1993 and to pay him his salary and allowances for the months of October, November and December, 1993 and for the months of January, February and. March, 1994. A prayer was also made in the writ petition to the effect that the order of the learned Munsif rejecting his application for temporary injunction be quashed and the suit be transferred to this Court. 3. March, 1994. A prayer was also made in the writ petition to the effect that the order of the learned Munsif rejecting his application for temporary injunction be quashed and the suit be transferred to this Court. 3. While the writ petition was pending, the petitioner amended his writ petition for challenging the letter dated March 29, 1994 of the Assistant General Manager, State Bank of India, Regional Office at Agartala permitting him to retire voluntarily from service as at the close of business on March 31, 1994. It was the case of the respondents in their counter affidavit that since the petitioner had issued the notice dated December 31, 1993 to the appropriate authority expressing his intention to go on voluntary retirement on and from March 31, 1994 and the same having been accepted, he stood voluntarily retired from service with effect from March 31, 1994 and that with this development, the writ petition had become infructuous. The learned single Judge by his judgment dated September 10, 1996 dismissed the writ petition holding that the notice of voluntary retirement had been accepted and that the petitioner did not approach the Court with clean hands. Aggrieved by this judgment, the petitioner preferred Writ Appeal No. 44 of 1996 before this Court. This Court by the judgment and order dated May 5, 1998 disposed of the writ appeal in the following manner: 12. In the result, we dispose of this appeal by directing that the Deputy Managing Director (Personnel), Central Office, State Bank of India will take decisions on the voluntary retirement of the appellant and his promotion and his salary and allowances keeping in mind the observations made in this judgment as well as the notice dated June 27, 1994 of the appellant revoking his notice dated June 27, 1994 to retire voluntarily from service. The said decisions will be taken by the said competent authority within two months from today and the amounts paid to the appellant pursuant to interim orders passed by this Court will be adjusted against the salary or terminal benefits of the appellants, as the case may be. 13. This writ appeal is allowed to the extent indicated above. However, considering the facts and circumstances of the case, the parties shall bear their own costs. 4. 13. This writ appeal is allowed to the extent indicated above. However, considering the facts and circumstances of the case, the parties shall bear their own costs. 4. The respondents preferred a special leave petition from the aforesaid judgment to the Apex Court in Civil Appeal No. 1137 of 1999 (arising out of SLP (C) No. 10356/1998), but the appeal was dismissed. A review petition being Review Petition No. 5 of 1999 was then filed before this Court seeking clarification of the aforesaid judgment and order dated May 5, 1998. This Court, after elaborately discussing the contentions of the respondents, by the judgment and order dated September 3, 1999 dismissed the review petition holding that its findings and directions on the question of the voluntary retirement of the petitioner were sufficiently clear and that the application for clarification sought for in the review petition was misconceived. When the aforesaid directions were not implemented by the respondents, the petitioner filed an application for initiating contempt proceedings against the respondents. It would appear that following the dismissal of this review petition, the Deputy Managing Director & CDO of the State Bank of India passed the order dated September 22, 1999, which is reproduced thus: Order Shri P.S. Chakraborty. Jmgs-I Voluntary Retirement From March 31, 1994 In accordance with the direction of the Hon'ble High Court in Review Petition No. 5 of 1999, I have examined the note No. CDO/ADM/289/99-2000 dated September 21, 1999, put up by Personnel Department and the papers placed therewith, I pass the following orders: (a) Shri Chakraborty may be allowed to rejoin the Bank and he may be paid salary and allowances from the date he reports to the Branch where he was transferred. He will, however, not be entitled to back wages i.e. from the date he was relieved from Agartala ZO i.e. April 1, 1994 to the date of his rejoining duty on 'no work no pay basis' for the reason that the entire problem has been created because of his first seeking voluntary retirement and then seeking extension that too after the expiry of the notice period and then revocation of the request for the voluntary retirement. However, subject to approval of the Trustees in terms of Rule 21(1) of SBI Employees Pension Fund Rules, this period may be counted for service for limited purpose of payment of pension. However, subject to approval of the Trustees in terms of Rule 21(1) of SBI Employees Pension Fund Rules, this period may be counted for service for limited purpose of payment of pension. This period will also be counted for the purpose of seniority and will not be treated as break in service. He will be entitled to other consequential benefits as per rules governing his service including for consideration of his promotion etc. (b) The amounts so far paid to him from time to time under Court's order including pension from April 1, 1994 till August 1999 and gratuity etc. are to be recovered at the earliest/adjusted. However, the gratuity paid will attract interest. STATE BANK OF INDIA Personnel Management Dept. (NBG) Central Office, Mumbai, September 22, 1999. Sd/- September 23, 1999 Dy. Managing Director & CDO 5. Apparently dissatisfied with this order, the petitioner filed an application for initiating contempt proceedings against the respondents claiming that the judgment in W.A. No. 84 of 1996 passed by the Division Bench of this Court had impliedly directed the respondents to pay his salary and that the respondents had deliberately violated the said directions by denying the back wages from April 1, 1994 onwards. The contempt petition was registered as Cont. Case (C) No. 18 of 1999. This Court by the order dated July 31, 2000 closed the contempt proceedings and at the same time made it clear that it would be open for the petitioner to challenge the order dated September 22/September 23, 1999 passed by the Deputy Managing Director & CDO in such proceeding as he thought fit and proper. This Court had observed therein that the respondent/contemnor (the Deputy Managing Director & CDO) was only directed to take a decision as regards the pay and allowances of the petitioner keeping in mind the observations made in the judgment and that no direction had been given in the said para-12 of the judgment to the contemnor to take a decision for making payment of salary and allowances for the period from April 1, 1994 when he was relieved from Agartala Zonal Office. The Court had also indicated therein that it had not expressed any opinion on the merits of the decision of the contemnor in the order dated September 22/September 23, 1999 not to pay any back wages to the petitioner from April 1, 1994 till he rejoined duty and further that the question whether the said decision of the contemnor was right or wrong was a matter which could only be adjudicated by the Court in a separate proceeding if initiated by the petitioner. This was how this Court decided that the contemnor did not commit civil contempt. 6. This much is crystal clear, that following the order dated September 22/September 23, 1999 issued by the Deputy Managing Director & CDO, the petitioner rejoined the Bank's service on January 31, 2001 by submitting his joining report and has now retired from service. He has also not been paid his salary and allowances with effect from April 1, 1994 till he rejoined his duty on January 31, 2001. This prompted him to file the three cases viz. (i) C.M. Appl. No. 54 of 2000 for amendment of the order dated July 31, 2000 in Cont. Case (C) No. 18 of 1999, (ii) W.P. (C) No. 50 of 2001 for quashing the aforesaid order dated September 22/September 23, 1999, for allowing him to rejoin his duty and for directing the respondents to pay his back wages and (iii) Exhibit P. No. 1 of 2001, which are now being disposed of by this common judgment. In the course of hearing, the petitioner, however, submitted that he did not wish to press Cont. Case (C) No. 18 of 1999 and would confine his submissions to his grievances projected in the remaining two cases. In view of this submission, C.M. Appl. No. 54 of 2000 does not survive for consideration and is, accordingly, disposed of as not pressed. It may also be noted that since the prayers made in Exhibit P. No. 1 of 2001 and W.P. (C) No. 50 of 2001 are substantially one and the same, if not overlapping, a decision rendered in W.P. (C) No. 50 of 2001 would govern the former case, and, as such, suffice it to refer to and examine the contentions raised in the writ petition. 7. The respondent No. 1 i.e., the respondent Chairman, State Bank of India contested the writ petition by filing his counter affidavit. 7. The respondent No. 1 i.e., the respondent Chairman, State Bank of India contested the writ petition by filing his counter affidavit. It is asserted therein that the petitioner has misinterpreted the direction given by this Court and that the Bank has already complied with the same by issuing the order dated September 23, 1999. It was the petitioner who had been absenting from duty even after the said order dated September 23, 1999 and had resumed duty only on March 31, 2001. According to the respondent, the Bank never treated him as retired for any period, and for the reason thereof, he had been asked to refund gratuity, pension, provident fund etc. paid to him in terms of the order dated July 30, 1999 treating him to have retired from service as on April 1, 1994 and the period of his absence would be counted for the purpose of pension. It is further stated by the respondents that the petitioner unauthorisedly absented himself from duty with effect from May 10, 1993 after he was transferred from the Regional Office, Agartala to Agartala Branch vide the order dated April 28, 1993 and that while remaining unauthorisedly absent, he submitted three months' notice for voluntary retirement from service with effect from April 1, 1994 and further that he continued to remain unauthorisedly absent even after the DMD & CDO issued the order dated September 23, 1999 and reported for duty at Agartala Regional Office only on January 31, 2001. According to the respondents, the petitioner was never debarred from rendering service right from May 9, 1993 when he was transferred to the Agartala Branch till the expiry of the notice period for voluntary retirement and, as such, he was not paid any back wages on the principle of "no work, no pay". It is also the case of the respondents that the petitioner was advised by the letter dated April 28, 1993 that he would be relieved of his duties as at the close of the business on May 8, 1993, which date was subsequently declared as a public holiday by the State Government but even then, he should have reported for duty at the Agartala Branch on May 10, 1993 since no separate order for relieving him from duty was required to be issued. It is also the case of the respondents that the petitioner, instead of seeking clarifications, should have joined duty in terms of the order dated September 23, 1999 and that he was indulging in such exercises to avoid resuming duties, for which he had to blame himself if salary and allowances were not paid to him for that period. It is contended by the respondents that the acceptance of the voluntary retirement of the petitioner was quashed by this Court only on the technical ground that the acceptance was not made by the competent authority. According to the respondents, this Court in the contempt petition filed by the petitioner being Cont. Case (C) No. 18 of 1999 had already considered all the points relating to his back wages and dismissed the contempt petition by upholding the order dated to September 22/September 23, 1999 issued by the DMD & CDO denying payment of his back wages and, as such, this matter cannot be reopened in this writ petition. It is, therefore, contended by the respondents that the petitioner is not entitled to the back wages for the period from April, 1994 to the date he resumed his duty as claimed by him. 8. Despite numerous facts pleaded by both the parties, for which we are in danger of missing the woods for the trees, the only point worthy of examination here is whether, on the facts and circumstances of the case, the petitioner is entitled to the back wages claimed by him. In my considered view, instead of dragging the issue into another cesspool of legal tangle, the respondents should have paid the back wages to the petitioner for the period from April, 1994 to January 31, 2001 or challenged the interim order dated January 31, 2001 of this Court directing them to allow him to rejoin duty. It is significant to recall that the petitioner issued the notice of his voluntary retirement on December 31, 1993 to be effective from March 31, 1994, but subsequently issued the notices dated April 4, 1994 and dated April 28, 1994 for deferring the date of his retirement. However, he thereafter issued another notice dated June 27, 1994 revoking his earlier notice for voluntary retirement dated December 31, 1993. However, he thereafter issued another notice dated June 27, 1994 revoking his earlier notice for voluntary retirement dated December 31, 1993. The Assistant General Manager by his letter dated March 29, 1994 accepted the notice, which was communicated to and received by the petitioner thereby treating him as retired from service with effect from March 31, 1994. Had there been no dispute on the competency of the Assistant General Manager to accept the notice, the subsequent notices issued by the petitioner on April 4, 1994, April 28, 1994 and June 27, 1994 would have been rendered odious since these notices were issued after the expiry of three months' notice of voluntary retirement. Thus, challenging the legality of the letter of the Assistant General Manager, the petitioner filed a writ petition being C.R. No. 170 of 1994 before this Court as adverted to earlier. The learned single Judge dismissed the writ petition as noticed earlier. The petitioner took the matter in appeal in W.A. No. 84 of 1996, which resulted in the judgment dated May 5, 1998 delivered by the Division Bench of this Court. This is what the appellate Court says: 6. The question therefore is as to whether the appellant was permitted by the competent authority to retire from Bank's service with effect from March 31, 1994 pursuant to his notice dated December 31, 1993 for voluntary retirement. According to the case of the respondents, the competent authority to grant such permission for voluntary retirement of the appellant was the Deputy Managing Director (Personnel), Central Office. According to the case of the respondents, the competent authority to grant such permission for voluntary retirement of the appellant was the Deputy Managing Director (Personnel), Central Office. In the impugned letter dated March 29, 1994, the Assistant General Manager, Tripura Region, Agartala has stated that it has been decided by the appropriate authority to permit the appellant to retire voluntarily from the Bank's service as at the close of business on March 31, 1994, to find out who was the appropriate authority who had permitted the appellant to retire voluntarily from the Bank's service as at the close of business on March 31, 1994 as stated in the impugned letter dated March 29, 1994 of the Assistant General Manager, Tripura Region, Agartala, this Court called for the original of the orders of the concerned authority permitting the appellant to retire from service with effect from March 31, 1994 and the respondents have filed before this Court a note dated June 25, 1994 of the Deputy General Manager (Personnel-Admn.), Central Office, submitted to the Deputy Managing Director (Personnel). The first paragraph of the said note dated June 25, 1994 of the Deputy General Manager (Personnel-Admn.) is to the following effect: ...We have to advise that Sri P.C. Chakraborty, JMGS-I of our Guwahati Head Office had submitted his application dated December 31, 1993 (Flag-A) for voluntary retirement from Bank's service to Guwahati Local Head Office and sent a direct copy to us. We had sent his representation to Guwahati Local Head Office for their comments. Our Local Head Office advised that they have permitted him to retire from Bank's service as at the close of business on March 31, 1994 (Flag-B). The facts stated in the aforesaid note of the Deputy General Manager (Personnel-Admn.) would show that it was the Guwahti Local Head Office which had permitted the appellant to retire from Bank's service as at the close of business on March 31, 1994 and not the Deputy Managing Director (Personnel) who was the competent authority for permitting such retirement. The facts stated in the aforesaid note of the Deputy General Manager (Personnel-Admn.) would show that it was the Guwahti Local Head Office which had permitted the appellant to retire from Bank's service as at the close of business on March 31, 1994 and not the Deputy Managing Director (Personnel) who was the competent authority for permitting such retirement. In the said note, however, a proposal was made by the Deputy General Manager (Personnel-Admn.) that the competent authority may grant post facto approval to the Local Head Office's action in permitting the appellant to retire from the Bank's service as at the close of business on March 31, 1994, but no orders of the Deputy Managing Director (Personnel) have been produced before us showing that the appellant was permitted to retire from the Bank's service at the close of the business on March 31, 1994. The finding of the learned single Judge in the impugned judgment dated September 10, 1996 that the appellant's notice for voluntary retirement with effect from March 31, 1994 was accepted by the competent authority of the Bank is therefore liable to be set aside. 9. It was on the basis of the aforesaid findings that the Division Bench of this Court directed the respondents to take decisions on the voluntary retirement of the petitioner and his promotion and his salary and allowances keeping in mind the observations made therein as well as the notice dated June 27, 1994, his notice dated June 27, 1994 revoking his notice of voluntary retirement from service. In compliances with those directions, the respondents issued the order dated September 22/23, 1999 allowing the petitioner to rejoin the Bank, to draw salary and allowances from the date he reported to the Branch where he was transferred sans back wages. What has indisputably emerged from the aforesaid facts and circumstances is that the petitioner did not retire from service voluntarily or otherwise on or from April 1, 1994 and that he continued to remain in the service of the Bank. But for the letter dated March 29, 1994 issued by the Assistant General Manager of the Bank, the petitioner would have attended the office and discharged his duties. The letter dated March 29, 1994 prevented him from attending the office and made him persona non grata in his establishment for no fault of his. But for the letter dated March 29, 1994 issued by the Assistant General Manager of the Bank, the petitioner would have attended the office and discharged his duties. The letter dated March 29, 1994 prevented him from attending the office and made him persona non grata in his establishment for no fault of his. He had the right to seek voluntary retirement and also had the right to revoke/withdraw his notice of voluntary retirement before its acceptance by his employer in accordance with law. For some reason or another, his notice of voluntary retirement was not accepted in accordance with law and, therefore, the incompetent order accepting his voluntary retirement was quashed by this Court. Hence, the respondents cannot have any legitimate grievance in that behalf and deny back wages to the petitioner. The period commencing from April 1, 1994 till January 31, 2001, when he was allowed to rejoin duty could not be treated as the period of unauthorized absence from duty. The petitioner cannot by any stretch of imagination be faulted for not attending the office during that period. By virtue of the interim order dated January 30, 2001 passed by this Court in this case that the petitioner was allowed to join at the Regional Office of the Bank at Agartala. The validity of this interim order has never been challenged by the respondents. Under the circumstances, it cannot be said that the petitioner was in unauthorized absence during that period. 10. Relying on the decision of the Apex Court in Bank of India v. T.S. Kelawala 1990 (2) LLJ 39 SC, the respondents submitted that the petitioner has not been allowed back wages on the ground of "no work, no pay". I have carefully gone through the judgment and examination thereof indicates that the facts in that case are clearly distinguishable. What the Apex Court stated therein, to my mind, is that deliberate abstinence from work, whether by resort to strike or go-slow or any other method, legitimate or illegitimate, resulting in no work the whole day, or days or part of a day or days would entitle the management to deduct pro rata or otherwise wages of the participating workmen notwithstanding absence of any stipulation in the contract of employment or any provision in the service Rules, Regulations or Standings Orders. On the other hand, the true legal position is laid down by the Apex Court in Srikantha S.M. v. Bharat Earth Movers Ltd. (2005) 8 SCC 314 . In this case, the employee tendered his resignation and sought to be relieved from I duties from a particular date as per Company Rules. The appellant's resignation was accepted on January 4, 1993 itself with immediate effect. By another letter of even date, however, the appellant was informed that his casual leave had been sanctioned from January 5, 1993 to January 13, 1993. January 14, 1993 being a holiday, the appellant would be relieved by the close of working hours on January 15, 1993. On January 8, 1993, by a letter, the appellant withdrew his resignation. On January 15, 1993, the service certificate in original along with a cheque for a certain amount was given to him at 17.30 p.m. He was not allowed to work thereafter. Contending that in view of the withdrawal of his resignation on January 8, 1993, the Company could not have accepted the same and ought to have continued him in service, the appellant filed a writ petition before the High Court. The writ petition was dismissed on the ground that in view of the acceptance of the resignation on the date of submission thereof, no illegality had been committed by the Company. The decision was challenged in an appeal, which was dismissed by the Division Bench. Thereupon, the appellant took the matter in appeal before the Apex Court by special leave. Allowing the appeal, this is what the top Court says 2006 I LLJ 3 at p. 9: 29. The next question is, as to what benefits the appellant is entitled to. As he withdrew the resignation and yet he was not allowed to work, he is entitled to all consequential benefits. The learned Counsel for the respondent Company no doubt contended that after January 15, 1993, the appellant had not actually worked and therefore, even if this Court holds that the action of the respondent Company was not in consonance with law, at the most, the appellant might be entitled to other benefits except the salary which should have been paid to him. According to the counsel, the principle of "no work, no pay" would apply and when the appellant has admittedly not worked, he cannot claim salary for the said period. 30. According to the counsel, the principle of "no work, no pay" would apply and when the appellant has admittedly not worked, he cannot claim salary for the said period. 30. We must frankly admit that we are unable to uphold the contention of the respondent Company. A similar situation had arisen in J.N. Srivastava (supra) and a similar argument was advanced by the employer. The Court, however, negatived the argument observing that when the workman was willing to work but the employer did not allow him to work, it would not be open to the employer to deny monetary benefits to the workman who was not permitted to discharge his duties. Accordingly, the benefits were granted to him. In Shambhu Murari Sinha (supra) also, this Court held that since the relationship of employer and employee continued till the employee attained the age of superannuation he would be entitled to "full salary and allowances" of the entire period he was kept out of service. In Balaram Gupta in spite of specific provision precluding the Government servant from withdrawing notice of retirement, this Court granted 1 all consequential benefits to him. The appellant is, therefore, entitled to salary and other benefits. 31. For the foregoing reasons, in our opinion, the appeal deserves to be allowed and is accordingly allowed. The action of the respondent Company in accepting the resignation of the appellant from January 4, 1993 and not allowing him to work is declared illegal and unlawful. It is, therefore, hereby set aside. The orders passed by the learned single Judge and the Division Bench upholding the action of the Company are also set aside. The respondent Company is directed to treat the appellant in continuous service up to the age of superannuation i.e. December 31, 1994 and give him all benefits including arrears of salary. The Company may adjust any amount paid to the appellant on January 15, 1993 or thereafter. The appeal is accordingly allowed with costs. 11. In my considered view, the principles laid down by the Apex Court in the aforesaid case are squarely applicable to the facts of this Court. No more need be said. The petitioner is entitled to all the back wages for the period from April 1, 1999 to January 31, 2001. Moreover, it is not the case of the respondents that the petitioner was gainfully employed during the period in question. No more need be said. The petitioner is entitled to all the back wages for the period from April 1, 1999 to January 31, 2001. Moreover, it is not the case of the respondents that the petitioner was gainfully employed during the period in question. The other contention of the respondents that all the points relating to back wages have already been dealt with by this Court in Civil Cont. Case. (C) No. 18 of 1999 and that the matter cannot accordingly be reopened in this writ petition are to be noted only for rejection since this Court at the end of the same judgment made it clear that it would be open for the petitioner to challenge the order dated September 22/23, 1999 passed by the Deputy Managing Director & CDO (contemnor) in such proceeding as he thought fit and proper. Apparently taking cue from this, the petitioner filed a series of petitions including this writ petition, perhaps, as a matter of abundant caution. 12. Before parting, I am constrained to observe that this is one litigation which could have been easily avoided had the respondents taken the trouble of applying their mind to the notice of voluntary retirement sent by the petitioner on December 31, 1993. The petitioner does not exactly appear to be a model employee and should have been allowed to retire voluntarily after the expiry of the three months' notice period by following due process of law. This should have conveniently been used as an opportunity for the respondents to give a golden handshake to the petitioner. Apparently due to ill-advice or for want of proper legal advice, a series of mistakes was committed thereafter by the respondents, with the result that the petitioner, instead of snatching the victuals from the table, will in all probability, be content to have them served to him course by course. This is a game of litigation in the worst form. This is a trifling forensic battle of one-upmanship in which no one has emerged a winner. The loser is certainly the public. Considerable public money has been wasted by the respondents in the avoidable litigations for committing one bungling after another. This is a game of litigation in the worst form. This is a trifling forensic battle of one-upmanship in which no one has emerged a winner. The loser is certainly the public. Considerable public money has been wasted by the respondents in the avoidable litigations for committing one bungling after another. It will not now be justified to direct the respondents to hold an inquiry into this sordid affair for fixing responsibility and to recover the entire expenses incurred by the Bank from the official(s) found to be responsible for the same. I refrain from doing so, so that the case is hopefully closed forever. 13. The net result of the aforesaid discussion is that this writ petition W.P. (C) No. 50/2001 is allowed. The respondents are, therefore, directed to pay to the petitioner his salary and allowances for the period commencing from April 1, 1994 to January 31, 2001 within a period of two months from today, Tailing which the due amounts will carry a simple interest at the rate of 12% per annum on the said amounts. Liberty is, however, given to the respondents to deduct any amount lawfully recoverable from petitioner by virtue of the orders passed by this Court from time-to-time. Both C.M. Appl. No. 54/2000 and Exhibit P. No. 1/2001 also stand disposed of accordingly. No order as to costs.