JUDGMENT K.K. Lahoti, J. The defendant/tenant has preferred this second appeal u/s 100 of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the Courts below, by which a decree for eviction u/s 12(1)(h) and section 20 of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as 'Act' for short) has been passed. This appeal was admitted on 24-9-1994 on following substantial question of law :- Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, Courts below could pass a decree for eviction u/s 12(1)(h) and section 20 of the Accommodation Control Act, 1961? Learned counsel appearing for appellant raised following contentions:- (i) That the plaintiff is a body corporate and not a public institution so the provision of section 20 as made applicable by the Courts below are not applicable. (ii) There is no pleading in the case that plaintiff is a public institution in absence of which, the Court below erred in decreeing the suit u/s 20 of the Act. (iii) That vide order dated 5-8-1991, the trial Court deleted issue No. 7 which relates to bona fide necessity for the residence of working staff of plaintiff in respect of suit accommodation and framed additional issue No. 9 and vide order dated 6-8-1991, the trial Court deleted issue No. 5 in respect of dilapidated and dangerous condition of accommodation on the ground that plaintiff has not raised any ground u/s 12(1)(g) of the Act, but the Court below has not considered the effect of deleting issue Nos. 5 and 7 while considering the case on merits. 5 and 7 while considering the case on merits. (iv) That the Court below has not properly constituted section 20 of the Act which is in two parts; first part which provides special provision for recovery of possession where the landlord is any Company or other body corporate or any local authority or any public institution and the accommodation is required for the use of the employees of such landlord, but in the case of public institutions for furtherance of its activities, then the Court on a suit being filed before it in this behalf by such landlord place the landlord in vacant possession of such accommodation by evicting the tenant if the Court is satisfied with either of 4 conditions enumerated in section 20, but in this case any of the condition was not proved and the Court below erred in decreeing the suit u/s 20 of the Act. The learned counsel appearing for respondent supported the judgment and decree passed by the Court below and submitted that the Court below has rightly decreed the suit of plaintiff/respondent who requires bona fidely the suit accommodation for the residence of its employees and for continuing its activity. The plaintiff is a registered institution registered under the M.P. Societies Registration Act. The Court below has found the case of plaintiff/respondent proved u/s 12(1)(h) and section 20, which is a finding of fact recorded by both the Courts below and needs no interference by this Court. Reliance is placed by the respondent to a Single Bench judgment of this Court in Mohanlal vs. Vastuvid Evam Parimapak Sangh (respondent herein) in S. A. No. 491/1999 decided on 28-8-2003 and submitted that identical matter has been decided by this Court in respect of respondent itself and this appeal may be dismissed. To appreciate the contentions raised by the parties, it will be appropriate if the facts of the present case are stated. Respondent filed a suit for eviction against appellant on 28-4-1986 on following grounds :- (a) That the plaintiff is a registered institution, registered under the M.P. Societies Act. This institution is not only protecting the interest of its members, but also involved in the protection of interest of public and its services. The plaintiff is having a house of its ownership at 14, Devi Ahilya Marg, Jail Road, in which defendant is tenant @ Rs. 17/- per month. This institution is not only protecting the interest of its members, but also involved in the protection of interest of public and its services. The plaintiff is having a house of its ownership at 14, Devi Ahilya Marg, Jail Road, in which defendant is tenant @ Rs. 17/- per month. His monthly tenancy runs from 25th to 24th of each English Calendar month, which is oral and the accommodation is residential. (b) That the tenant had not paid rent since 25-10-1984 and after issuance of notice dated 10-1-1986 respondent paid rent till 24-1-1986, thereafter the rent is due since 25-1-1986. (c) That the tenant is creating nuisance to the plaintiff and on demanding rent he is quarreling and is paying rent with difficulty. The act of defendant falls within the purview of nuisance. The house is old and in a dilapidated condition and has become unsafe for human residence and at any time it may fall resulting in loss to human life or property. One part of it has already fallen. The Municipal Corporation, Indore has declared it a dangerous building on two occasions. On 11-8-1983 again notice was issued by the Corporation. The plaintiff wants to reconstruct it fully which is not possible without eviction of defendant. (d) As the plaintiff is intending to demolish this dangerous building and to reconstruct it. For this estimate of expenditure has been prepared and necessary funds are available to the plaintiff. The map has been got sanctioned from the Municipal Corporation. (e) The aforesaid house after reconstruction is required for the working staff of the plaintiff institution. The plaintiff would also construct a reading room, library for the members and also for public at large so that the object of institution may be achieved. The appellant contested the suit by filing written statement in which the appellant denied the allegations of the plaint and has raised following pleas :- (a) That previously the house belonged to Hiralal Suta which was taken by the maternal grand-mother of defendant Smt. Santok Bai for residential purposes. Hiralal Suta sold this house to Late M. R. Rudra, Advocate. Thereafter the maternal grand-mother paid rent to Shri Rudra, Advocate. After the death of maternal grand-mother Shri Rudra, Advocate continued to recover rent from the defendant. During life-time, Shri Rudra, Advocate collected the rent from the defendant and never transferred to the plaintiff. Hiralal Suta sold this house to Late M. R. Rudra, Advocate. Thereafter the maternal grand-mother paid rent to Shri Rudra, Advocate. After the death of maternal grand-mother Shri Rudra, Advocate continued to recover rent from the defendant. During life-time, Shri Rudra, Advocate collected the rent from the defendant and never transferred to the plaintiff. After his death legal heirs became the owners of the house. How the plaintiff has acquired the house, it has not been disclosed in the plaint. So the transfer of house in favour of plaintiff was denied and it is submitted that until and unless the plaintiff proves that the house was duly transferred in its favour, it is not entitled to claim tenancy of defendant in its favour. (b) Though it was admitted that since last some times the plaintiff is collecting rent from defendant on the assurance that he will show the entitlement to collect the rent, but till date nothing has been shown to the defendant and by merely collecting the rent, the plaintiff does not become landlord or owner of the house. Shri Rudra, Advocate had left behind him his wife, son and others. It was also stated that at one time Shri Rudra, Advocate disclosed to defendant that he has bequeathed this house in favour of some temple. If the legal heirs by suppressing the Will had transferred the house to the plaintiff, then they are not aware. The rate of rent @ Rs. 17/- per month was accepted, but the commencement of tenancy month from 25th of the month was denied. The rent was tendered by Money Order which was accepted, so in this regard plaintiff is not entitled to seek eviction of defendant. (c) It is denied that the house is old or in a dilapidated condition, or it is unsafe for human residence. (d) It is stated that Shri Rudra, Advocate had duly got it repaired and renovated. Though it is admitted that one part of the house fell, but if the Municipal Corporation has declared it as a dangerous house, then it is with the conspiracy of plaintiff. It is denied that plaintiff wants to reconstruct it. (e) That during the pendency of suit one tenant Smt. Kashibai who was residing evicted her tenanted accommodation and handed-over to the plaintiff on 19-12-1990. It is denied that plaintiff wants to reconstruct it. (e) That during the pendency of suit one tenant Smt. Kashibai who was residing evicted her tenanted accommodation and handed-over to the plaintiff on 19-12-1990. So if there is any need of the accommodation it has been fulfilled with the accommodation handed-over by Mst. Kashibai. The trial Court framed the issues. The plaintiff examined P.W. 1 P. C. Sharma, Architect, (who is a member of plaintiff institution), P.W. 2 Balkrishn Sharma, Record Keeper from Municipal Corporation, Indore, P.W. 3 Chandu, Photographer, P.W. 4 Avinash, Civil Engineer, (who is also a member of plaintiff institution), P.W. 5 Prabhakar Shastri, Consultant, (who is also a member of plaintiff institution). The defendant examined D.W.I Vallabhbhai, D.W.2 Radheshyam Sharma, a Journalist, D.W. 3 Ganesh Gatpade (on commission). The trial Court after appreciating evidence recorded following findings :- (i) The suit house belongs to the plaintiff institution, who is owner of the accommodation. (ii) The rent is due against the defendant since 24-1-1986. (iii) The suit accommodation is required to the plaintiff for reconstruction bona fidely. (iv) The plaintiff institution is a registered society and public institution and the suit accommodation is required for the activities of the institution and for the residence of the employees of the institution. On the aforesaid grounds the suit was decreed. Against the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court appellant preferred an appeal which was registered as Civil Appeal No. 26/1991. The aforesaid appeal was heard finally and dismissed by the impugned order on 22-3-1994. The Appellate Court after re-appreciating the entire evidence recorded following findings :- (1) That the plaintiff is a society registered under the M.P. Societies Registration Act, 1973 and as per the byelaws of the society it is a public institution within the meaning of section 20 of the Act. (2) That the accommodation is required by the Society for furtherance of its activities and also for the use of residence of employees. (3) That after appreciating the evidence, photographs produced in the case and notice issued by the Municipal Corporation, the condition of suit accommodation was found in a dilapidated condition. (4) That the plaintiff requires bona fidely the suit accommodation for its reconstruction. The plaintiff has duly prepared plan, estimate and necessary funds for this purpose are available with the landlord. (3) That after appreciating the evidence, photographs produced in the case and notice issued by the Municipal Corporation, the condition of suit accommodation was found in a dilapidated condition. (4) That the plaintiff requires bona fidely the suit accommodation for its reconstruction. The plaintiff has duly prepared plan, estimate and necessary funds for this purpose are available with the landlord. (5) That after appreciating the evidence it was found that plaintiff is owner and landlord of the suit accommodation. (6) That in para 16 of the judgment found that by the proposed construction though there would be change of user, but the plaintiff is entitled to convert the use of accommodation. The Appellate Court after recording aforesaid findings, dismissed the appeal. Now the first objection that the plaintiff is not a public institution and in absence of which the provision of section 20 of the Act cannot be made applicable may be seen. To appreciate this contention provisions of section 20 may be seen. For ready reference section 20 of the Act reads thus:- Special provision for recovery of possession in certain cases. - Where the landlord in respect of any accommodation is any company or other body corporate or any local authority or any public institution and the accommodation is required for the use of employees of such landlord, or, in the case of a public institution, for the furtherance of its activities, then, notwithstanding anything contained in section 12 or in any other law, the Court may, on a suit being filed before it in this behalf by such landlord, place the landlord in vacant possession of such accommodation by evicting the tenant and every other person who may be in occupation thereof, if the Court is satisfied - (a) that the tenant to whom such accommodation were let for use as a residence at a time when he was in the service or employment of the landlord, has ceased to be in such service or employment; or (b) that the tenant has acted in contravention of the terms, express or implied, under which he was authorised to occupy such accommodation; or (c) that any other person is in unauthorised occupation of such accommodation; or (d) that the accommodation is required bona fide by the public institution for the furtherance of its activities. Explanation - For the purposes of this section, "public institution" includes any educational institution, library, hospital and charitable dispensary. The aforesaid provision very specifically provides that where landlord is a body corporate or public institution and accommodation is required for the use of employees of such landlord or in the case of public institution for furtherance of its activities, the Appellate Court on being satisfied that the accommodation is required bona fidely for the public institution for furtherance of its activities placed the landlord in vacant possession of such possession by evicting the tenant. In this regard the plaintiff has proved that it is a society registered under the M.P. Societies Registration Act, 1973. This is proved by Ex. P-2(C), which is certificate issued by the Registrar of Societies and this fact is not disputed before this Court. The Court below has found that the respondent is a public institution. Though the byelaws of plaintiff are not exhibited, but it appears that witness P.W. 5 Prabhakar Shastri while stating about the functioning of plaintiff, stated in para 27 that he brought the regulation of the society with him. From the perusal of constitution and rules of the society which is available in the file on page 13 of the Para-V it is apparent that the entire object of the Society is for the welfare of public. It is also apparent that the membership is also open to all the Architects, Engineers, Draftsmen, etc., and there is no restriction for the aforesaid persons for membership. Looking to the object of the society it can very well be presumed that the entire object of the society is for the welfare of public and it may be treated as a public institution. For ready reference objects of the society are quoted hereinunder :- "Public Institution" cannot be construed in a narrow sense. The public institution may be those institutions which belongs to a section of public and is dedicated for the welfare of the public. Any institution which is dedicated to the public and also working for the benefit of public would be treated as public institution. Merely the plaintiff is a society of particular class of Architects, Engineers, Draftsmen, etc., will not lose its public character while the object of plaintiff institution is for the interest and welfare of public. Any institution which is dedicated to the public and also working for the benefit of public would be treated as public institution. Merely the plaintiff is a society of particular class of Architects, Engineers, Draftsmen, etc., will not lose its public character while the object of plaintiff institution is for the interest and welfare of public. If the object is welfare of public at large the institution may be treated as a public institution for the purpose of section 20 of the Act. In view of aforesaid, if the Court below after appreciating the entire evidence recorded a finding that the plaintiff is a society and is a public institution no fault can be pointed out. The objection of appellant is that this fact has not been pleaded by the plaintiff in the plaint is concerned, the plaintiff in para 1 of the plaint has very specifically stated that it is a registered society under the M.P. Societies Registration Act and the object of institution is not only to protect the interest of members, but also of public at large for its interest and service. When this fact has been specifically pleaded and proved in the Court the aforesaid contention of appellant that the finding recorded by the Court below without pleading has no substance. Another contention of the appellant is that whether provision of section 20 may be made applicable in this case. The plaintiff in this case has very specifically proved that the accommodation is required for the use of the society, for its activities and also for residence of its working employees. This fact has been found proved by both the Courts, which is a finding of fact. A Single Bench of this Court, while considering the case of plaintiff respondent in another case against one Mohanlal (supra) has held thus :- Though the issue as projected in this appeal was not raised in specific terms before the two Courts below, yet in my considered opinion, it has no merit. It is not in dispute that plaintiff being a juristic person is entitled to take benefit of section 20 of the Act. In other words, the plaintiff being a "body incorporate" has every right to file a suit by taking recourse to the provisions of section 20 ibid for seeking eviction of their tenant if they require the suit accommodation for the use of their employees. In other words, the plaintiff being a "body incorporate" has every right to file a suit by taking recourse to the provisions of section 20 ibid for seeking eviction of their tenant if they require the suit accommodation for the use of their employees. In such case, the provisions of section 12 will not apply but the provisions of section 20 will have its overriding effect in favour of such landlord. The requirement of section 20 of the Act is that firstly, landlord should be either a company or body corporate, or local authority or any public institution. Secondly, the accommodation is required for the use of employees of such landlord. Thirdly, if the landlord happens to be a public institution then, they can claim eviction of their tenant for furtherance of their activities. The Court while considering the case of eviction falling u/s 20, can neither import, nor apply the requirement of section 12(1)(e) or (f) but has to confine the inquiry to the requirement provided in section 20 ibid. In other words, the requirements of section 12(1)(e) or (f) which deals with the cases of bona fide requirement cannot be applied while considering the cases falling in section 20 ibid for the reason that the phraseology and the language employed in both these sections i.e. section 12(1)(e)/(f) and section 20 ibid are entirely different in all respect. Coming to the facts of this case, it is not in dispute as has been held proved by the two Courts below that plaintiff is a registered society formed by the persons who are engaged in the vocation/profession of Engineers/Architects. It is also not in dispute that plaintiff being a registered society is regarded as legal entity (juristic person) and thus can be regarded as body corporate as specified in section 20 of the Act. In other words the plaintiff being a "body corporate" is entitled to take benefit of section 20 ibid of seeking eviction of the tenant if they require the tenanted accommodation for the use of their employees. It cannot be disputed that both the Courts below have recorded a categorical finding of fact that the plaintiff require the suit accommodation for the staff as also for their members. This is a finding of fact and being concurrent in nature is binding on the second Appellate Court. It cannot be disputed that both the Courts below have recorded a categorical finding of fact that the plaintiff require the suit accommodation for the staff as also for their members. This is a finding of fact and being concurrent in nature is binding on the second Appellate Court. It cannot be interfered with, nor any fault can be found in such finding. So far as the issue regarding condition of the suit accommodation as also the need of plaintiff for its reconstruction is concerned, both the Courts have come to a factual conclusion that condition of suit accommodation has become very bad and it may fall down at any time due to its dilapidated condition. This again a finding based on fact and being concurrent in nature is binding on me while hearing this second appeal. But that apart, in my considered opinion, this issue does not fall exclusively u/s 12(1)(h) because the eviction in question is claimed and is infact granted u/s 20 i.e. for the use of the employees of the plaintiff. It is thus, a decree for eviction granted u/s 20 and u/s 12(1)(h). Even assuming for the sake of submission, it is considered to be a decree falling u/s 12(1)(h) even then in my opinion it does not satisfy the requirement of section 12(1)(h). The plaintiff has proved with reference to estimate and Map that they have requisite requirements to reconstruct the suit house whose condition has become bad. No fault can be found in this finding too. In this case also the plaintiff has specifically stated that the accommodation is required bona fide by the landlord for the purposes of rebuilding which cannot be carried out without the accommodation being vacated. The plaintiff has proved that it has prepared the plan and estimate for reconstruction and necessary funds for the purpose are available with him. Now the question remains whether the reconstruction will radically alter the purpose for which the accommodation is let out. In this case it is not in dispute that the accommodation was let for residential purpose and pleading of plaintiff is that such accommodation is required for residence of employees also. Now the question remains whether the reconstruction will radically alter the purpose for which the accommodation is let out. In this case it is not in dispute that the accommodation was let for residential purpose and pleading of plaintiff is that such accommodation is required for residence of employees also. Though the plaintiff could not prove that at the place where the defendant is residing after the reconstruction, that place will be used for the purpose of residence of employees of the plaintiff, but one among the ground is that it will be used for the purpose of residence of employees. Even if for a moment it is presumed that after reconstruction of suit accommodation that place will not be used for the residence of employees or it will be used for other activities of plaintiff, even then the alter of purpose is in the public interest as it is found that plaintiff is a society and is public institution. If to achieve the object of the institution there is change of user of premises after reconstruction it cannot be said to be a mala fide intention of the plaintiff or it can very well be presumed that the change of user is in the public interest. In this regard, the contention of appellant has no substance. So far as deletion of issue No. 7 in respect of necessity of working staff of plaintiff is concerned, while re-framing issue No. 9 this issue was included in issue No. 9, so the deletion of issue No. 7 was proper. For ready reference issue No. 7 (deleted) and issue No. 9 are quoted as under :- 7. Whether the suit accommodation is bona fidely required for the residence of working staff of plaintiff institution? Whether the plaintiff institution is a public institution and suit accommodation is required for the activities of institution or for bona fide necessity of residence of the employees? The issue No. 9 covers previously framed issue No. 7 and deletion of issue No. 7 will not affect the merits of the plaintiffs case. When this issue was re-framed the trial Court on 5-8-1991 asked to the parties whether they are having any objection for framing of additional issues? The defendant had not objected to it. On 6-8-1991 issue No. 5 was deleted without any objection of the parties. When this issue was re-framed the trial Court on 5-8-1991 asked to the parties whether they are having any objection for framing of additional issues? The defendant had not objected to it. On 6-8-1991 issue No. 5 was deleted without any objection of the parties. The defendant has specifically stated that both the parties had adduced their evidence in respect of additional issues and no further evidence is required and the arguments already advanced in the matter may be treated arguments in respect of additional issue. In view of aforesaid order of the trial Court, the contention of appellant in this regard has no substance. To sum up the Court below has considered the case of plaintiff/respondent in the light of section 12(1)(g) and section 20 of the Act. Both the Courts below have recorded a finding that the plaintiff has made out a case u/s 12(1)(g) and also u/s 20 of the Act for eviction of appellant from the suit accommodation. The suit accommodation is required bona fidely to the landlord for the residence of its employees after reconstruction and also for the furtherance of its activities. The Court below has considered both the limbs of section 20 while considering the case of plaintiff/respondent on merits. In this appeal I do no find any merit to interfere in the judgment and decree passed by the Court below, this appeal is without merit and accordingly it is dismissed. While dismissing the appeal, it is found appropriate to allow some time to the appellant to vacate the suit accommodation as the appellant is residing since long in the accommodation and may face some difficulty in getting another accommodation. u/s 12(1)(h) and section 20 of the Act there is no statutory provision for providing some time to vacate the accommodation, however, in the interest of justice, appellant is allowed three months time to vacate the suit accommodation on following terms :- (1) That the appellant shall file an undertaking before the trial Court that he shall vacate the suit accommodation on or before 30th June, 2006 without creating any hindrance or third party interest in the accommodation. (2) That appellant shall deposit all arrears of rent and costs incurred in the Court below, (if already not deposited) and continue to deposit rent in the trial Court, as required under sectinB of the Act. (2) That appellant shall deposit all arrears of rent and costs incurred in the Court below, (if already not deposited) and continue to deposit rent in the trial Court, as required under sectinB of the Act. (3) On compliance of aforesaid directions, the executing Court shall permit appellant to occupy the suit accommodation upto 30th June, 2006, but in default of which the respondent shall be entitled to get the decree executed forthwith.