JUDGMENT As per Hon'ble Shri Sunil Kumar Sinha, J. : 1. This is the tenant's second appeal filed u/s 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It arises out of judgment and decree dated 04.5. J 988 passed by the First Addl. Judge to the Court of District Judge, Raipur in Civil Appeal No.47-A/1986 arising out of judgment and decree dated 15.7.1986 passed in Civil Suit No. 1-A/1980 by the 4th Civil Judge, Class II, Raipur. Against the said judgment and decree, initially this second appeal was filed in the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, Jabalpur on 24.6.1988 and was admitted for hearing on 28.11.1988 on the following substantial question of law: "Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case the first appellate Court erred in law in finding that the suit accommodation was required bona-fide by the plaintiff-respondent for starting his business of general provisions ?" It was heard by the M.P. High Court and ultimately by judgment dated 01.9. 1997, the appeal was allowed and the judgment and decree passed by the lower appellate Court was set aside and the Judgment and decree passed by the trial court regarding dismissal of the suit for eviction was restored. 2. Against the oforesaid judgment and decree passed by the M.P. High Court, the landlord filed S.L.P(c) No. 14232/1998 before Hon'ble Supreme Court which was heard as Civil Appeal No. 1724/2001. Hon'ble the Supreme Court allowed this appeal vide order dated 2.3.2001 and the judgment of the High Court dated 0 1.9.1997 passed in this appeal was set aside. The following is the operative part of the order passed by the Supreme Court : "On perusal of the judgment of the High Court under challenge and on consideration of the submissions made by learned Counsel for the parties, we are of the view that the interest of justice would be subserved if the judgment under challenge is set aside and the matter is remitted to the High Court to consider the question and to dispose of the second appeal ofresh. The High Court will consider whether any substantial question of law arises in the appeal and if satisfied formulate the question and dispose of the appeal on merits according to law. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed. The judgment of the High Court dated 01.9.1997 in Second Appeal No. 242 of 1988 is set aside. The High Court will consider whether any substantial question of law arises in the appeal and if satisfied formulate the question and dispose of the appeal on merits according to law. Accordingly, the appeal is allowed. The judgment of the High Court dated 01.9.1997 in Second Appeal No. 242 of 1988 is set aside. The appeal is remitted to the High Court for fresh disposal in the manner noted above. Since the suit was instituted in 1979 and the second appeal was filed in 1988, in our view, it is just and appropriate for the High Court to dispose of the appeal expeditiously. Hence we request the High Court to do so, within six months from the date of the receipt of the copy of this Order. Status quo regarding possession of the property as prevailing on date shall be maintained by the parties till the disposal of the appeal. There will be no order as to costs." 3. After remand of this matter from the Apex Court, the record of the second appeal was received on transfer to the High Court of C.G. on 16.7.2001. Though there was an observation of the Apex Court to dispose of this appeal expeditiously within six months from the date of receipt of the copy of this order, but the appeal could not be disposed of within the said period on which I shall come later on. 4. Firstly, I shall take up the matter on merits. As per the remand order, this Court ultimately framed the following substantial questions of law and called upon the parties to address: 1(a) Whether for any accommodation which is in possession of the landlord, in absence of specific pleading and evidence, regarding its unsuitability lawful presumption regarding its unsuitability on other factors can be drawn and accepted? I (b) Whether any such reasonably suitable non-residential accommodation of the landlord in his occupation in the township of Raipur was available with him? 5. Brief facts necessary for disposal of appeal are that the plaintiff/ landlord filed a suit for eviction, arrears of rent and damages against the tenant in relation to a tenanted premises situated in the township of Raipur, more specifically described in para I of the plaint. 5. Brief facts necessary for disposal of appeal are that the plaintiff/ landlord filed a suit for eviction, arrears of rent and damages against the tenant in relation to a tenanted premises situated in the township of Raipur, more specifically described in para I of the plaint. The plaint allegations were that the plaintiff is the owner of the suit accommodation and the said accommodation, let for non-residential purpose, is required bona fide by him for the purpose of starting his own business of general provision stores and the plaintiff has no other reasonably suitable non-residential, accommodation of his own in his possession in the city or township of Raipur. In feet, the suit was filed u/s l2(1)(f) of the M.P.(C.G.) Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). The defendant/tenant denied the contentions of the plaintiff. It was pleaded by him that the plaintiff was neither the landlord nor the owner of the tenanted premises. It was also pleaded that the plaintiff was not an unemployed person and the tenanted premises is not suitable for opening a general provision stores. He specifically pleaded that the plaintiff use to do some business along-with his father and they constitute a joint Hindu Family. It was also pleaded by the tenant that the plaintiff is in possession of other alternative vacant accommodation suitable for starting his proposed business. In fact, in so many words, the ownership, tenancy as well as the bona-fide requirement and non availability of reasonably suitable accommodation, all were denied by the defendant 6. The learned trial Judge framed various issues in this case and after recording evidence of both the parties, dismissed the suit of the plaintiff holding that the said accommodation was not required bonofide by the landlord for the purposes of starting his business. However, the trial Court also recorded the findings vide issue no. I that the plaintiff was the Owner of tenanted premises. Vide issue no.2(a) and (b), it also recorded the finding that there was a relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties and the tenanted accommodation was given on monthly rent of RS.255/- to the defendant which commences from 19th of every month and ends on 18th of Subsequent month. 7. Against the oforesaid judgment and decree passed by the trial Court, the plaintiff filed First Appeal before the lower appellate Court. 7. Against the oforesaid judgment and decree passed by the trial Court, the plaintiff filed First Appeal before the lower appellate Court. Before the lower appellate Court, the plaintiff pressed his appeal on the adverse findings on issues no.4 & 5 only which were in relation to his bonofide requirement and non-availability of alternative reasonably suitable accommodation as all other issues were decided in his favour. The defendant also contested the appeal on the findings of the above two issues only and an observation to this effect has been made by the first appellate Court in para 4 of the impugned judgment as follows: ^^mHk;i{k bl vihy esa dsoy okn in Øekad 4 vkSj 5 ij gh fookn djrs gSaA vU; okn inksa ij vofdr fu’d’kZ ij i{kdkjksa ds chp dksbZ fookn ugha gSA blfy;s bl U;k;ky; dks dsoy okn in Øekad 4 vkSj 5 ij vofdr fu’d’kZ ds gh vkSfpR; ij fopkj djuk gSA** 8. It is important to mention that the defendant did not file any cross-objection or cross appeal, in the plaintiffs appeal, against the issues decided against him nor he challenged the findings recorded against him by filing a separate appeal particularly in relation to the finding of ownership and that of relationship as landlord and tenant between the parties. The first appellate Court, reversed the findings of the trial. Court in relation to bonofide requirement and set aside the judgment of the trial Court and allowed the appeal of the plaintiff decreeing his suit for eviction. It is against this judgment and decree passed by the first appellate court, the .defendant/tenant had preferred this second appeal in which the matter traveled upto the Apex Court and ultimately after remand, it has come for fresh decision. 9. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the Appellant firstly argued that in a suit for eviction on the ground of bona fide requirement, plaintiff must be dealt with strict rule of pleading and proof. Referring to para 10 of the decision of the M.P. High Court, rendered in the matter of Shankarlal and another Vs. Smt. Kanda Devi Nayak, learned counsel argued that the pleadings in relation to bona-fide need are vague arid they do not properly spell out the requirement as per section 12(1)(f) of the Act. He also referred to the decision of the M.P. High Court, rendered in the matter of Vikas Kumar Onkar Prasad Gupta Vs. Smt. Kanda Devi Nayak, learned counsel argued that the pleadings in relation to bona-fide need are vague arid they do not properly spell out the requirement as per section 12(1)(f) of the Act. He also referred to the decision of the M.P. High Court, rendered in the matter of Vikas Kumar Onkar Prasad Gupta Vs. Radhamal, Htrtunal Sindhi, and argued that' the plaintiff had not pleaded that the nonresidential accommodation available to him (the accommodation in which his father is running a money lending business) was not reasonably suitable for him to run his business, therefore in feet he could not establish his bonofide requirement, as also the non availability of reasonably suitable accommodation for the same and the judgment of the first appellate Court was not sustainable. He further supported his arguments by the decision rendered by the Apex Court in the matter of Hasmat Rai and another Vs. Raghunath Prasad. He also relied on the decision of the Apex Court in the matter of Shiv Sarup Gupta Vs. Dr. Mahesh Chand Gupta in support of his contentions. His contention was that about the premises in which the father is doing money lending business, the landlord should have specifically pleaded and have led evidence regarding its unsuitability and if the same has not been done, no presumption regarding its unsuitability on other factors can be drown and accepted. He also argued that the premises referred to above shall be held to be the reasonably suitable non-residential accommodation of the landlord being a Co-owner of it and in this manner, the second limb of section 12(1)(f) was not established and the decree passed by the lower appellate court vitiates. 10. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent argued about the scope in a suit on bonofide need. About the scope of section 12(1)(f) of the Act, he referred to the decision rendered by the Apex Court in the matter of Baldev Singh Bajwa Vs. Manish Saini. He further argued that since the alleged alternative accommodation was not in possession of the landlord as his father was doing a money lending business in it, question of making specific pleading regarding unsuitability of this premises, was not necessary and further there is no question of drawing any lawful presumption in this regard. 11. Manish Saini. He further argued that since the alleged alternative accommodation was not in possession of the landlord as his father was doing a money lending business in it, question of making specific pleading regarding unsuitability of this premises, was not necessary and further there is no question of drawing any lawful presumption in this regard. 11. I have heard learned counsel for the parties at length and have also perused the reconstructed and admitted records of the case. 12. In Hasmat Rai's case (supra), the Apex Court held that section 12 of the M.P. Accommodation Control Act 1961 is an enabling section. The burden to establish both the requirements of Section 12(1)(f) is squarely on the landlord. And before an allegation of fact to obtain the relief required is permitted to be proved, the law of pleadings requires that such facts have to be alleged and must be put in issue. Ordinarily, therefore, when a landlord seeks eviction u/s 12(1)(f), the Court after satisfying itself that there are proper pleadings must frame two issues namely (i) whether the plaintiff landlord proves that he bonofide requires possession of a building let to the tenant for non-residential purpose for continuing or starring his business, and (ii) whether he proves that he has no other reasonably suitable non-residential accommodation of his own in the city or town concerned. Any amount of proof offered without pleadings is generally of no relevance. 13. In Shiv Sarup Gupta's case (supra), the Apex Court held that the term "bonofide" or "genuinely" refers to a state of mind. Requirement is not a mere desire. The degree of intensity contemplated by "requires" is much higher than in mere desire. The phrase "required bona fide" is suggestive of legislative intent that a mere desire which is the outcome of whim or fancy is not taken note of by the rent control legislation. The Apex Court further held that the failure on the part of land lord to substantiate the pleaded need, or, in a given case, positive material brought on record by the tenant enabling the Court drawing an inference that the reality was to the contrary and the landlord was merely attempting at finding out a pretence or pretext for getting rid of the tenant, would be enough to persuade the Court certainly to deny its judicial assistance to the landlord. The Apex Court also said that the judge of facts should place himself in the armchair of the landlord and then ask the question to himself - whether in the given facts substantiated by the landlord the need to occupy the premises can be said to be natural, real, sincere and honest. If the answer be in the positive, the need is bona fide. 14. In Baldeo Singh Bajwas cases (supra), referred to by learned counsel for the respondent, the phrase "bona fide requirement" has been considered referring to many earlier decisions. It has been held by the Apex Court that the phrase "bona fide requirement" or "bona fide need" or "required bonofidely in good faith" or "required", occur in almost all Rent Control Acts with the underline legislative intent which has been considered and demonstrated innumerable times by various High Courts as also by the Apex Court. The Apex Court referred to the decision of Ram Dass Vs. Ishwar Chander in which it is said that the bonofide need should be genuine and honest, conceived in good faith. The law also indicated that the landlord's desire for possession, however honest it might otherwise be, has inevitably, a subjective element in it, and that desire, to become a "requirement" in law must have the objective element of a "need" which can be decided only by taking all the relevant circumstances into consideration so that the protection offered to a tenant is not rendered illusory or whittled down. The Apex Court also referred to the decision rendered in the matter of Bega Begum and others Vs. Abdul Ahad Khan (dead) by L.Rs. and others' where it was held that the words "reasonable requirement" undoubtedly postulate that there must be an element of need as opposed to a mere desire or wish. The distinction between desire and need should doubtless be kept in mind but not so to make even the genuine need as nothing but a desire. In this case, the Apex Court also referred to the decision of Shiv Sarup Gupta s case (supra). 15. The distinction between desire and need should doubtless be kept in mind but not so to make even the genuine need as nothing but a desire. In this case, the Apex Court also referred to the decision of Shiv Sarup Gupta s case (supra). 15. In light of the decisions referred to above, it is apparent that to succeed in a case for eviction filed u/s 12(1)(f) of the Act, the landlord must plead and prove the following facts: (i) the accommodation from which the tenant is sought to be evictee has been let out for non-residential purposes; (ii) the landlord is the owner thereof and requires the accommodation bonofide for the purpose of continuing or starting (i) his business or (ii) business of any of his major sons or unmarried daughters; (iii) the landlord requires the accommodation for any person for whose benefit the accommodation is held by him; and (iv) the landlord or such person has no other reasonably suitable non-residential accommodation of his own in his occupation in the city/town concerned; 16. In the present case, the tenanted premises was given for non-residential purpose to the defendant, in which the defendant was running a business of general provision stores. Vide para 3 of the plaint, it is pleaded that the plaintiff is an unemployed person and he wishes to start the business of general provisions in the said accommodation situated in Malviya Road, Raipur and this place is most suitable for the proposed business of the plaintiff Vide para 4, he has pleaded that he has no suitable accommodation of his own vacant in his possession in the township of Raipur for the above said business. In reply to the above pleadings, the defendant has pleaded that the plaintiff owns and possesses several non residential accommodations in the city of Raipur and his main business is to acquire properties and let out the same to tenants on exorbitant rents. It is specifically pleaded that the bona fide need set forth by the plaintiff is false and the same has been pleaded to lay down a foundation for eviction of the defendant For proving these facts, the plaintiff has examined himself as P. W.I. He has stated vide paras 4 & 5 of his evidence that he wants to open a provision stores in Raipur. He has further stated that he is an unemployed and for opening a provision stores, he has no other shop of his ownership in the township of Raipur. The Trial Court, has disbelieved the factum of bona fide requirement and that of non-availability of reasonably suitable accommodation on the evidence of P.W.4 Natmal who has stated that the plaintiff also use to do money lending business alongwith his father. The shop in which the money lending business of the father is going on is on the main road in which there is a Gaddi and a Khota. He has stated that the area of Khota is equivalent to the size of court room. He has also stated that the plaintiff is the only son of his father. Believing this statement, the trial Court, has decided above two issues against the plaintiff and has dismissed the suit holding that the plaintiff was not unemployed and he has not established as to why he does not want to open his shop in the said premises of Kotha, these all are un replied by the plaintiff. It was also held that the plaintiff has suppressed the factum of availability of a premises like Kotha, therefore, his need was not bonofide and he was having an alternative accommodation like Kotha with him. The appellate Court has reversed the finding on the ground that when the father of the plaintiff is doing money lending business in Khota, as stated above, how the plaintiff can start his own business in the said pre-occupied premises. The first appellate Court has also taken this view that against the evidence led by the plaintiff saying that he has no other accommodation in the township of Raipur, there is no cross examination on this point except that a suggestion was given to him that he has other accommodation in township at Raipur, to which the plaintiff has denied. There appears to be no wrong in taking such a view by the first appellate court. There appears to be no wrong in taking such a view by the first appellate court. The plaintiff has clearly pleaded vide paras 3 & 4 of the plaint regarding his bonofide requirement and also regarding non-availability of reasonably suitable accommodation with him and in the frame work of section 12(1)(1) of the Act, he had no occasion to plead about the said accommodation i.e., Khota occupied by his father in his business and in absence of specific pleading and evidence regarding its non-availability and unsuitability the plaintiffs suit does not fail because the basic requirement of second limb of Section 12(1)(f) is to show that the Landlord has no other reasonably suitable non-residential accommodation of his own in his occupation in the city or town concerned and in this case the said Kotha, as it comes from the evidence, was in possession of the father of the plaintiff who was carrying his business in the same. A Landlord may have number of accommodations but for the sake of ref us in;; eviction it must come on record to show that any of such shop/premises was vacant and suitable for the purpose of proposed business. Unless the premises is occupied by the Landlord, the Landlord is not required to specifically plead and proof either about its non¬availability or about it \Insuitability. If the accommodation is not in possession of the Land lord, there is no question of making pleading about it and further there is no question about drawing presumption in this regard and I hold it accordingly. 17. Further, in the facts and circumstances, for the reasons stated above, the alleged premises, Kotha about which the arguments have been advanced by learned Sr. Counsel for the appellant, would not fall within the meaning of reasonably suitable non-residential accommodation of the landlord in his occupation which may disentitle him from claiming a decree for eviction, if he otherwise proves the bonofide requirement under section 12(1)(f) of the Act, which has been proved by him and I accordingly hold it also. 18. There is no force in arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant. The conclusion drawn by the lower appellate Court does not appear to be erroneous or contrary to the mandatory provisions of law applicable or based upon inadmissible evidence or arrived at without evidence. There is no merit in the second appeal. The same is dismissed. 18. There is no force in arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant. The conclusion drawn by the lower appellate Court does not appear to be erroneous or contrary to the mandatory provisions of law applicable or based upon inadmissible evidence or arrived at without evidence. There is no merit in the second appeal. The same is dismissed. The judgment I and decree passed by the lower appellate Court are hereby confirmed. However, there shall be no orders as to cost. 19. Before parting with the judgment, I am writing with pains that even after observations made by the Apex Court for disposal of this appeal within a period of six months from the date of receipt of the copy of the appellate order, the same could not be disposed of in time. The reasons are that as an effect of reorganization this matter was received on transfer from the High Court of M.P., Jabalpur to the High Court of Chhattisgarh, Bilaspur on 16.7.2001 and was listed for the first time before this Court on 20.7.2001. Notices were issued to the parties and the Registry was directed to take all possible steps for service of notice on the parties at the earliest and the matter was directed to be listed on 26th July 2001. When the matter was taken up on subsequent dates i.e., 26.7.2001 and 08.8.2001, nobody had appeared and ultimately on 11.9.2001, counsel for the parties caused their appearance. Thereafter when the matter was taken up on 19.9.2001, it could not be heard as the records of the court below were not made available and then it was listed on 26.9.2001 and a detailed order was passed for making the records available through the Court of District Judge, Raipur. On 20.6.2002, this matter was again taken up for hearing and the order sheet of the said date would show that on 28.7.2001, the Registry received a memo from the office of the District and Sessions Judge, Raipur that the record was sent to the High Court of M.P. Jabalpur and it has not yet been received back. On further persuasion, again on 02.8.2001, a letter was received from the office of the District and Sessions Judge, Raipur, informing that the record has not yet been received from the M.P. High Court, Jabalpur. On further persuasion, again on 02.8.2001, a letter was received from the office of the District and Sessions Judge, Raipur, informing that the record has not yet been received from the M.P. High Court, Jabalpur. On 18.8.2001, the Additional Registrar (Judicial) received a letter from the M.P. High Court, Jabalpur, showing that the record has been returned to the District & Sessions Judge, Raipur, vide Regd. Parcel No. 4080 on 05. 1 1.l997 after disposal of Second Appeal No.242/1988. Later on, the High Court sent a memo dated 03.9.2001 to the District & Sessions Judge, requesting him to look into the matter personally and expedite the dispatch of the said record treating the matter as "Most Urgent". This Court, after making observations regarding efforts made by the Registry to obtain the record from the Office of District and Sessions Judge, ultimately directed that since the records appears to have been lost, let counsel for the parties submit in the Registry all relevant documents i.e., pleadings, depositions, documents that may be available with them at the earliest where-after both the learned counsel should inspect the documents filed by each other far the purpose of reconstitution of the record. Thereafter the matter was fixed an many dates and ultimately after consumption of various dates in reconstruction of the records, the matter was listed an 09.11.2005 with reconstructed paper book and the counsel were directed to satisfy themselves as to whether the record is complete in all respects or not and whether an the basis of it the matter can be argued and it was directed to. be listed an 16.11.2005. On 16.11.2005, counsel far the appellant raised objections that number of applications and documents were filed in the trial court but those documents were not in the said paper book. His contention was that the record was not complete far hearing. After considering contentions of bath the parties, this court directed that the appellant may file copies of the documents and applications which he feels necessary far hearing of this appeal within 3 weeks. In case he fails to do so., it will be treated that the copies of the documents/papers submitted by the respondent as paper book is sufficient far hearing of this appeal. After this, the matter came up far hearing on 21.12.2005. In case he fails to do so., it will be treated that the copies of the documents/papers submitted by the respondent as paper book is sufficient far hearing of this appeal. After this, the matter came up far hearing on 21.12.2005. On the said date, the parties gave their consent and the matter was pasted far hearing an admission. It is then only, this appeal came up far hearing an admission with reconstructed records for the first time an 17.4.2006. 20. The entire summary of the orders sheets, as recorded in this case, would show that the delay was caused due to. the lass of original records and the whale time was consumed in reconstitution of the records and ultimately a paper book was reconstructed and filed by the respondent along-with an affidavit, an which, after objections by the counsel far the appellant, finally bath the parties consented and then only the hearing could be expedited in the above manner. As per the contentions of the District Judge, Raipur vide his Memo dated 02.8.2001, the records of the Courts be law were not received from the M.P. High Court. However, an 18.8.2001, the Addl. Registrar (Judl.), received a letter from M.P. High Court wherein it is mentioned that the record has been returned to the District and Sessions Judge, Raipur vide Regd. Parcel No.4080 on 15.11.1997 after disposal of S.A. Na.242/1988. On one hand, it is stated by the M.P. High Court that the record was dispatched to. the District and Sessions Judge, Raipur, and an the other hand, the District and Sessions Judge, Raipur, states that the record has not been received by his Office and to this effect an 29.11.200 I, the record keeper of the Office of District and Sessions Judge, Raipur, submitted an affidavit that the record is not traceable as it has not yet been received from the High Court of M.P. Jabalpur. This event is a serious event which needs a thorough enquiry in the opinion of this Court and the responsibility is required to be fixed as to who is responsible for loss of the judicial records of the above civil suit/first appeal. 21. In these circumstances, I direct the District & Sessions Judge, Raipur, to conduct a detailed enquiry regarding loss of the judicial records and to fix the responsibility on the person/persons who are responsible for the same. 21. In these circumstances, I direct the District & Sessions Judge, Raipur, to conduct a detailed enquiry regarding loss of the judicial records and to fix the responsibility on the person/persons who are responsible for the same. While conducting the enquiry the learned District & Sessions Judge, (i) may obtain the record from the High Court of M.P. Jabalpur about the dispatch and handing over the parcel to the postal department; (ii) He may acquire the official records of the concerned Post Office to know as to when the parcel was received by the Post Office at Jabalpur and also when it was dispatched to Raipur; (iii) The learned District Judge should also obtain the record of the Postal Department from the concerned Post Office at Raipur regarding the receipt of the parcel from Postal Department of Jabalpur and also the records relating to handing over of the said parcel to the Staff of the District Court, Raipur; (iv) If the record shows that the parcel was already handed over to the staff of the District Court, then the learned District Judge shall ascertain about the person who received the parcel containing the record and thereafter how he had dealt with the records. Apart from the above procedure, the learned District Judge can also adopt other procedure which he thinks necessary for fixing the responsibility on the person responsible for loss of the record. The learned District Judge after fixing the responsibility shall submit his report to this Court. This all shall be done within a period of 4 months from the date of communication of this order for further action. Appeal Dismissed.