JUDGMENT B.P. Katakey, J. 1. This appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 31.7.2002 passed by the learned Single Judge in Civil Rule No. 116 of 1996 dismissing the writ petition filed by the present appellant challenging the order dated 21.7.1993 passed by the Chairman, Rubber Board, disciplinary authority, imposing the penalty of dismissal from service of the petitioner. 2. A disciplinary proceeding was initiated against the petitioner by issuing the charge sheet dated 9.11.1990 on the following allegations: (i) On 9.4.1990 at about 11 a.m. behaved in an unruly manner, abused Shri Sasidharan Nair, Surveyor and slapped him severely on his left cheek; (ii) mis-behaved with Shri Sudheer Babu, Asstt. Development Officer on 4.1.1990, 11.1.1990 and 2.2.1900 and with intention to cause bodily injuries attempted to beat him with a Chair on 4.1.1990; (iii) habitually absented from duty to perform his official duties properly/neglected his duties; (iv) on 17.4.1990, by misusing his official position obtained two Regd. Postal articles No. 08 Kottayam and No. 8354 Gauhati as per postal delivery slip, from shri ND Marak, Postman, Beet No. II of Diphu Post Office, respectively containing DD No. 791617 dated 9.4.1990 for Rs. 2,190 being DA arrears of the staff of the RO Diphu and 24 crossed A/C Payee cheques bearing Nos. 532923, 532924, 532925, 532926, 532927, 532928, 532929, 532930, 532931, 532932, 532933, 532934, 532935, 532936, 532937, 532938, 532939, 532940, 532941, 532942, 532943, 532944, 532945, 532946 dated 31.3.1990 for a total sum of Rs. 79,857.20 being subsidy amount due to various rubber growers coming under RO Diphu and failed to deliver these two Regd. Postal articles to the RO Diphu; (v) with intention to defraud the Board and the growers, managed to encash fictitiously 5 cheques bearing Nos. 532930 for Rs. 4,999.80, 532934 for Rs. 2,609.80,532936 for Rs. 4,034.80, 532937 for Rs. 4,499.80 and 532941 for Rs. 6,824.80 (total Rs. 22,969); and (vi) without obtaining previous permission of the Board and declaring the source, transferred a sum of Rs. 50,000 on 31.8.1990 to the Savings Bank Account opened by him in the State Bank of India, Diphu. 3. 532930 for Rs. 4,999.80, 532934 for Rs. 2,609.80,532936 for Rs. 4,034.80, 532937 for Rs. 4,499.80 and 532941 for Rs. 6,824.80 (total Rs. 22,969); and (vi) without obtaining previous permission of the Board and declaring the source, transferred a sum of Rs. 50,000 on 31.8.1990 to the Savings Bank Account opened by him in the State Bank of India, Diphu. 3. By memorandum dated 26.6.1991 issued by the disciplinary authority, the charges were amended by inserting the following in the statement of article of charges framed against the appellant: And Shri Subash Deb Nath while under suspension threatened Shri T. Anirudhan, Rubber Tapping Demonstrator, Rubber Board Regional Office, Diphu, and abetted/instigated the growers to threaten Shri Paribalan, Development Officer on 23.5.1991 for not issuing more than 500 polythene bags to them and he who knew well on 23.5.1991 that polythene bags are stored in the Regional Office, Diphu for distribution amongst the growers, stealthily removed 43 bundles of polythene bags worth more than Rs. 30,000 on 25.5.1991 night by breaking open the back window of the office, to make pecuniary advantage to himself and to cause corresponding loss to the Board apart from preventing the Board from serving the growers to that extent. 4. The disciplinary authority being not satisfied with the written statement submitted by the appellant decided to conduct a proceeding against him and accordingly an Inquiry Officer was appointed, who on 9.11.1992 submitted his report with the finding that the Charge No. 1 is partly proved, Charge Nos. 2, 3 and 5 have been proved and Charge No. 4 has not been proved. The disciplinary authority thereafter imposed the punishment of dismissal from service vide order dated 21.7.1993, against which a departmental appeal was preferred, which was also rejected by the appellate authority vide order dated 20.10.1995. The appellant therefore, filed the writ petition challenging the disciplinary action taken against him. 5. We have heard Mr. Sharma, learned Counsel for the appellant and Mr. B.D. Das, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent Nos. 2 and 3. 6. Mr. Sharma, learned Counsel for the appellant challenging the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge as well as the disciplinary action taken by the disciplinary authority against him, has submitted that he was not given reasonable opportunity to cross-examine all the management witnesses more particularly the witness Nos. 2 and 3. 6. Mr. Sharma, learned Counsel for the appellant challenging the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge as well as the disciplinary action taken by the disciplinary authority against him, has submitted that he was not given reasonable opportunity to cross-examine all the management witnesses more particularly the witness Nos. 4 to 9 as their depositions were recorded in his absence. It has further been contended by the learned Counsel that though he filed the application dated 2.5.1992 before the authority for change of the Inquiry Officer alleging bias, the inquiry proceeding proceeded against him without first disposing of said application filed by the appellant. The learned Counsel has further contended that the Inquiry Officer did not intimate the appellant regarding the closer of the inquiry proceeding, which resulted in depriving the appellant of his right to submit the written brief placing his defence. The disciplinary action taken against the appellant has also been challenged on the ground that the order of dismissal from service was passed without furnishing a copy of the inquiry report submitted by the Inquiry Officer thereby depriving the appellant to make representation against such report filed by the Inquiry Officer and the order imposing punishment was passed without proper application of mind. Lastly the learned Counsel has contended that in any case the order imposing punishment is shockingly disproportionate to the gravity of misconduct alleged and proved against him. The learned Counsel in support of his contention has placed reliance on S.P. Viswanathan v. Union of India and Ors. reported in Union of India and Ors. v. Mohd. Ramzan Khan reported in (1991) I LLJ 29 SC , Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad, etc. v. B. Karunakar, etc. reported in 1993 (5) SLR 532, State Bank of Patiala and Ors. v. S.K. Sharma reported in (1996) II LLJ 296 SC, M.A. Khalsa v. Union of India and Ors. reported in, Deputy Inspector General, Central Industrial Security Force, Eastern Zone, Govt. of India and Ors. v. Shib Kumar Ray reported in1995 (1) SLR 133, Shri Bhagwan LalArya v. Commissioner of Police, Delhi and Ors. reported in AIR 2004 SC 2131 . 7. Mr. Das, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent Nos. reported in, Deputy Inspector General, Central Industrial Security Force, Eastern Zone, Govt. of India and Ors. v. Shib Kumar Ray reported in1995 (1) SLR 133, Shri Bhagwan LalArya v. Commissioner of Police, Delhi and Ors. reported in AIR 2004 SC 2131 . 7. Mr. Das, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent Nos. 2 and 3 on the other hand supporting the judgment passed by the Single Judge as well as disciplinary action taken against the appellant, has submitted that all reasonable opportunities were given to the appellant in the proceeding conducted against him and in fact on a number of occasions because of non-appearance by the appellant the disciplinary proceeding had to be adjourned so as to give the appellant further opportunity to present himself in such disciplinary proceeding but in spite of such opportunity, the appellant has chosen not to be present in the disciplinary proceeding on some occasions and, therefore, the management had no alternative but to proceed ex parte against the appellant in the said disciplinary proceeding. The learned Counsel therefore, submits that the principles of natural justice have duly been complied with while conducting the proceeding against the appellant and no fault can be found in proceeding with the disciplinary proceeding in the absence of the appellant. It has further been contended that in fact the Management witness Nos. 1, 2 and 3 were examined in the presence of the appellant, who were duly cross-examined by the defence assistant. The learned Counsel submits that as the appellant chose not to appear before the Inquiry Officer, the Management witness Nos. 4 to 9 were examined in his absence, whose depositions were sent to the appellant by registered post along with the complete order sheet, which was returned with the postal remark 'refused'. Mr. The learned Counsel submits that as the appellant chose not to appear before the Inquiry Officer, the Management witness Nos. 4 to 9 were examined in his absence, whose depositions were sent to the appellant by registered post along with the complete order sheet, which was returned with the postal remark 'refused'. Mr. Das has further contended that as the appellant has chosen not to participate in the , subsequent stage of the inquiry, the Management on 21.6.1993 published the show cause notice in a local daily newspaper, namely, 'Assam Tribune' published from Guwahati asking him to submit the representation against the proposed punishment and as no explanation was received in spite of such publication of notice, the disciplinary authority passed the order of dismissal from service after taking into account the entire evidences on record as well as finding recorded by the inquiry officer, which was also published in the local daily newspaper, namely, Assam Tribune on 14.8.1993. Mr. Das, learned Counsel has further submitted that the appellant never at any point of time filed application before the disciplinary authority for change of the Inquiry Officer on the ground of bias and it is evident from the statement made by the appellant in the writ petition that such application was only filed before the Inquiry Officer. It has further been submitted that the appellant in fact in the departmental appeal preferred against the order of dismissal from service had not raised the question of bias nor alleged anything that prejudice was caused to him for non-supply of the copy of the inquiry report before taking the disciplinary action. Referring to the gravity of misconduct committed by the appellant, the learned Counsel, for the respondents has submitted that the order of dismissal from service cannot be termed as disproportionate do the gravity of misconduct proved, not to speak of shockingly disproportionate. The learned Counsel in support of his contention has placed reliance on Bharat Forge Co. Ltd. v. Uttam Manohar Nakate reported in (2005) I LLJ 738 SC, Mahindra and Mahindra Ltd. v. N.B. Narawade reported in (2005) I LLJ 1129 SC and M.P. Electricity Board v. Jagdish Chandra Sharma reported in (2005) II LLJ 156 SC . 8. The learned Counsel in support of his contention has placed reliance on Bharat Forge Co. Ltd. v. Uttam Manohar Nakate reported in (2005) I LLJ 738 SC, Mahindra and Mahindra Ltd. v. N.B. Narawade reported in (2005) I LLJ 1129 SC and M.P. Electricity Board v. Jagdish Chandra Sharma reported in (2005) II LLJ 156 SC . 8. The learned Single Judge has recorded the finding that the appellant himself voluntarily withdrawn from the disciplinary proceeding after filing an application on 2.5.1992 before the Inquiry Officer requesting him to stop the proceeding to enable him to take adequate steps for filing an application before the appropriate authority seeking change of the Inquiry Officer on the ground of bias. The learned Single Judge has also recorded the finding that after filing the said application the appellant neither participated in the disciplinary proceeding nor filed any application before the disciplinary authority seeking change of the Inquiry Officer and during that period some Management witnesses were examined. It has been found that in spite of the repeated opportunities given to the appellant he did not participate in the proceeding and therefore, he cannot be allowed to complaint that he was not given the adequate opportunity to defend himself. A finding has also been recorded by the learned Single Judge that though an attempt was made to serve the show cause notice asking the appellant to show cause against the proposed punishment, the disciplinary authority having failed in the said attempt published such notice in the newspaper, to which he also did not reply and as such the final order on the disciplinary proceeding has been passed by the authority by taking into account the entire materials on record. 9. It appears from the inquiry report submitted by the inquiry officer that though the notice of inquiry dated 20.2.1991 was issued and served fixing 25.3.1991 as the date for such disciplinary proceeding, the same was adjourned at the instance of the appellant and another date being , 10.6.1991 was fixed for holding inquiry at Calcutta, which was duly intimated to the appellant. The inquiry against the appellant on that date also had to be adjourned, as he neither turned up nor intimated the reasons for his absence, fixing 1.7.1991. The appellant thereafter sent the telegram seeking time on medical ground and also for holding the inquiry at Guwahati. The inquiry against the appellant on that date also had to be adjourned, as he neither turned up nor intimated the reasons for his absence, fixing 1.7.1991. The appellant thereafter sent the telegram seeking time on medical ground and also for holding the inquiry at Guwahati. The Inquiry Officer thereafter fixed 16.9.1991 as the next date of proceeding at Guwahati and then on 22.10.1991, on which dates the appellant along with his defence assistant was present in the proceeding, when the charges were read over, to which he denied. The Inquiry Officer also handed over the copies of all the relevant documents and when asked the appellant whether he has any document or any witness to produce, the appellant replied in negative. The hearing of the proceeding was thereafter postponed till 23.12.1991 at Kottyam and as the appellant and his defence assistant were absent without any reason, the inquiring authority with a view to give one more opportunity to the appellant adjourned the hearing of the proceeding till 28.2.1992, on which date also he remained absent. The Inquiry Officer thereafter with view to give a further opportunity fixed the hearing on 12.3.1992 at Guwahati, which was adjourned till 30.4.1992, on which date Management witness Nos. 1 and 2 were examined and cross-examined. It also appears from the inquiry report that the presenting officer on the close of the day's proceeding on 30.4.1992 submitted representation before Inquiry Officer alleging that the appellant threatened the Management witness No. 2 with a revolver and also threatened other witnesses not to give evidence in the inquiry against him. The Inquiry Officer having received such representation informed the police. The police accordingly on 1.5.1992, after examination and cross-examination of Management witness No. 3, was complete by interrogated the appellant about the incident. The inquiry report further reveals that on 1.5.1992 the inquiry proceeding was therefore, adjourned fixing 2.5.1992 but on which date, after filing an application for keeping the proceeding in abeyance on the ground that proper application would be filed before the disciplinary authority for change of Inquiry Officer, the appellant did not participate in the inquiry and the Inquiry Officer had, therefore, no alternative but to proceed with the inquiry. The appellant in the writ petition has not challenged the inquiry report submitted by the inquiry officer. 10. The appellant in the writ petition has not challenged the inquiry report submitted by the inquiry officer. 10. From the aforesaid narration of facts it is, therefore, evident that the appellant in spite of having notice about the dates fixed for holding the inquiry has chosen not to participate in the proceeding, by filing an application dated 2.5.1992 before the Inquiry Officer requesting him to stay further proceeding on the ground that he will file the appropriate application before the disciplinary authority for change of the Inquiry Officer, but no such application in fact has been filed by the appellant before the disciplinary authority seeking change of Inquiry Officer. Under the said circumstances the authority had no other alternative but to proceed against the appellant ex parte and, therefore, it cannot said that no reasonable opportunity was given to the appellant to defend himself. The contention of the appellant that as the application dated 2.5.1992 was filed before the Inquiry Officer, before passing any order, the inquiry should not have proceeded, also cannot be accepted in view of the discussion made above. Moreover, the appellant in the department appeal has not stated any thing in that regard alleging that in spite of filing an application for change of Inquiry Officer, the inquiry proceeded without disposing of such application. 11. The contention of the appellant that he was not informed about the closer of the inquiry proceeding thereby depriving him to submit the written brief in defence cannot be accepted as in the subsequent stage the appellant did not participate in the proceeding, for which the proceeding against him proceeded ex parte. Moreover in spite of publication of notice in the newspaper asking the appellant to make representation, if any, against the proposed punishment, no representation was submitted by him. The appellant has also failed to demonstrate any prejudice that has been caused to him. 12. The appellant further contended that the disciplinary action taken against him cannot be sustained in law as he was not given the opportunity to make representation against the finding recorded by the Inquiry Officer in the inquiry report by not supplying such report to him. It is a settled position of law that non-furnishing the inquiry report to the delinquent officer before taking the disciplinary action will not automatically render the disciplinary action invalid in law. It is a settled position of law that non-furnishing the inquiry report to the delinquent officer before taking the disciplinary action will not automatically render the disciplinary action invalid in law. The delinquent must show what prejudice has been caused to him in not supplying such inquiry report and in not affording the opportunity to make representation against the finding recorded by the Inquiry Officer. 13. The learned Counsel in support of the contention that non-supply of the inquiry report and not affording opportunity to make representation against the finding recorded by the Inquiry Officer in such report vitiate the disciplinary action taken pursuant to such inquiry, has placed reliance in S.P. Viswanathan (I) (supra), in Mohd. Ramzan Khan (supra), in Managing Director, ECIL, Hyderabad (supra) and in State Bank of Patiala (supra). There is no dispute that even after 42 amendments to the Constitution of India the delinquent officer is entitled to a copy of the inquiry report so that he can make representation against the finding recorded by the Inquiry officer, which is held to be a part of natural justice. The Apex Court, however, has held that mere non-supply of the copy of the inquiry report to the delinquent officer will not ipso facto vitiate the order of punishment passed by the disciplinary authority unless prejudice is caused to the officer for non-supply of such inquiry report. One may refer to the decision of the Managing Director, ECIL as well as the decision in the Divisional Manager, Plantation Division, Andaman and Nicobar Islands v. Munnu Barrick and Ors. reported in AIR 2005 SCW 109 in that respect. The appellant never raised this plea in the departmental appeal filed before the appellate authority and in fact filed the appeal knowing fully well the contents of the inquiry report and, therefore, no prejudice has been caused to the appellant in not furnishing the inquiry report. Hence the contention of the learned Counsel for the appellant that non-supply of inquiry report vitiate the order of punishment cannot be accepted and hence rejected. 14. The next question, which requires consideration is whether the punishment of dismissal from service is shockingly disproportionate to the gravity of misconduct proved against the appellant. 15. It appears from the charges levelled against the appellant that those are of very serious nature. 14. The next question, which requires consideration is whether the punishment of dismissal from service is shockingly disproportionate to the gravity of misconduct proved against the appellant. 15. It appears from the charges levelled against the appellant that those are of very serious nature. The Charge No. I, which was found to be partly proved is relating to abusing and slapping of a superior officer. Charge No. II relates to mis-behaving with Assistant Development Officer and attempt to beat him with a chair, Charge No. III relates to habitual absenteeism without prior intimation and/or leave and failure to perform the official duties as well as neglect of duties and Charge No.v.relates to the instigating the growers to threaten the development officer, which the charges were found to be proved by the Inquiry Officer in the inquiry proceeding. 16. The learned Counsel for the appellant in support of his contention that the punishment is shockingly disproportionate has placed reliance in M.A. Khalsa (supra) wherein the Apex Court keeping in view the allegation against the appellant therein of making a false claim for payment of Rs. 156.80 as honorarium payable to one Smt. S.A. Pandya, though in fact no such honorarium was payable to her, has even held that the appellant rightly deserved the order of dismissal. However, because of long years of service that he had put in the Apex Court on compassionate ground directed re-instate in service without back wages. The learned Counsel has also placed reliance in Sri Bhagwan Lal Arya (supra) wherein the Apex Court has held that if the punishment inflicted on the delinquent is highly excessive and disproportionate, court can interfere with such order of punishment in a given case. A division Bench of Calcutta High Court in Deputy Inspector General, Central Industrial Security Force (supra), on which the learned Counsel for the appellant has also placed reliance, has held that the gravity of charge is required to be considered in its true perspective while imposing punishment. 17. The learned Counsel for the respondents on the other hand has placed reliance on the decision of the Apex Court in Bharat Forge Co. Ltd. wherein Apex Court has held that if the punishment inflicted by the disciplinary authority is harsh, albeit a lesser punishment may be imposed but such order cannot be passed on an irrational or extraneous factor and certainly not on compassionate ground. Ltd. wherein Apex Court has held that if the punishment inflicted by the disciplinary authority is harsh, albeit a lesser punishment may be imposed but such order cannot be passed on an irrational or extraneous factor and certainly not on compassionate ground. It has further been held that it is not normal jurisdiction of the superior courts to interfere with the quantum of sentence unless it is wholly disproportionate to the misconduct proved. The Apex Court in the said case having regard to the facts and circumstances has held that the dismissal from service for the misconduct committed by the respondents therein by sleeping while on duty cannot be termed as disproportionate. In Mahindra and Mahindra Ltd. (supra), the Apex Court while dealing with the Section 11A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 has explained the scope of such provision and when such power is to be exercised and held that if the punishment is so disproportionate to the gravity of misconduct so as to disturb conscience of court or there exit any mitigating circumstances, which require reduction of the sentence or by taking into account the past conduct of the workman, the labour court may reduce the punishment. In the said case the Apex Court has held that the punishment from dismissal from service for using abusive and filthy language against the superior cannot be termed as disproportionate punishment. The similar view has also been taken by the Apex Court in M.P. Electricity Board (supra), in which case also dismissal for physical assault on superior was held to be not disproportionate. 18. As discussed above, the charges against appellant are of very serious nature. The authority with a view to maintain discipline is required to take stern action against such erring officer, without which it may be difficult on the part of the Management to curb indiscipline in the establishment. Therefore, the order dismissing the appellant from service cannot be termed as disproportionate to the gravity of misconduct proved against him, not to speak for shockingly disproportionate. In view of the above, the said contentions of the appellant also cannot be accepted and hence rejected. 19. Therefore, the order dismissing the appellant from service cannot be termed as disproportionate to the gravity of misconduct proved against him, not to speak for shockingly disproportionate. In view of the above, the said contentions of the appellant also cannot be accepted and hence rejected. 19. It is evident from the order imposing punishment of dismissal from service passed by the disciplinary authority that the said authority has taken into consideration all the relevant factors and also all the materials available on record of the disciplinary proceeding before passing the order of dismissal from service, therefore, it cannot be said that there was no proper application of mind by the disciplinary authority in passing the order of dismissal from service. 20. In view of the aforesaid discussions, we do not find any reason to interfere with the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge, dismissing the writ petition filed by the appellant. The appeal filed by the appellant is, therefore, devoid of any merit and as such dismissed. No cost. Appeal dismissed