Judgment Heard Sri SK Jain, Advocate for the petitioner, Standing Counsel for the respondent no.1 and Sri Arvind Vashisth, Advocate for the respondent no.2. 2. By the present writ petition the petitioner has prayed for a writ of certiorari quashing the order dated 28-03- 2006 passed by the respondent no.1 (Annexure-7 to the writ petition). 3. Briefly stated, according to the case of the petitioner, respondent no. 2/ Kishan Lal Arora is owner of House No. 61, Lunia Mohalla, Dehradun, of which the petitioner is the tenant of a part, which consists of two rooms, bathroom and Kitchen. 4. Briefly stated, a suit before the Small Causes Court being Suit No.3 of 1993 Kishan Lal Arora Vs. Surendra Kumar Anand was filed before the Judge Small Causes Court, Dehradun claiming the arrear of rent under Section 20 (2) (a) of the U.P. Act No. XIII of 1912 since April, 1987. 5. Respondent no. 3 has submitted that the petitioner/tenant had stopped the payment of rent since 1987, hence on 07-12-1992 a notice under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act was sent to the petitioner, which was served upon the tenant on 11-12-1992. The details of the description of arrears, which were claimed by the respondent no. 2 in the plaint, are quoted below :- 6. The petitioner has denied the aforesaid averments and has stated in his "written statement that he has sent the rent to the landlord by Money Order @ 100/- p.m. for the month of October and November, 1992 and on his refusal, the same was deposited under Section 30 of the U.P. Act No. XIII of 1972. The oral statement of the parties was also recorded by the Court. 7. However, the SCC Suit No.3 of 1993 Kishan Lal Arora Vs. Surendra Kumar Anand was dismissed on 02-07-1996 by the III Additional Civil Judge (Senior Division), Dehradun by observing that the petitioner is in arrears since April, 1987 @ Rs. 100/- p.m. Finding to that effect are quoted below:- 8. However, Judge Small Cause Court has dismissed the suit on the ground that there is no relationship of landlord and tenant on account of the fact that the petitioner has occupied the premises without any allotment order in view of the judgment of Nutan Kumar V. IInd Additional District Judge, Banda 1993 (2) ARC 204. 9. However, Judge Small Cause Court has dismissed the suit on the ground that there is no relationship of landlord and tenant on account of the fact that the petitioner has occupied the premises without any allotment order in view of the judgment of Nutan Kumar V. IInd Additional District Judge, Banda 1993 (2) ARC 204. 9. So far as the question of occupying the premises without the allotment order is concerned, in Mohd. Tayyab Vs. ADJ (E.C. Act), Dehradun 1999 (2) ARC 748 it has been held that suit for eviction is maintainable even when there is no allotment in favour of the tenent. Relevant observations are quoted below :- "41. Learned Counsel for the contesting respondents disputed the above proposition and submitted that there was, in the facts of the present case, no need to remand the same to the trial Court. He places reliance on the following decisions. 1. 1988 (2) ARC 45 (Pr. 9) (S.D. Aggarwal, J.) Ram Milan Singh v. D.J. Basti & others). 2. 1992 ALJ 870 (Pr. 5) 1992 (2) ARC 193 (GP. Mathur, J.) (Smt. Protima Chatterji v. Special Judge, Kanpur) 3. 1996 ALJ 1221 (Pr.8) (Pr. To 711) 1996 (1) A.R.C. 165 (SudhirNarain, J.) (B.N.S. Hajela v. IIIrd Additional District Judge & others). 42. In the aforesaid decision, it has been held that once landlord-tenant relationship is admitted to the parties than tenant, cannot plead contrary and claim to be unauthorized occupant. Reference may be made to paragraph 5 of the judgment in the case of Protima Chatterji (supra) and then followed in the case of B.N.S. Hajela (supra). 43. The underlying idea and the logic of the Courts appears to be of consensus tollit errorema, which means 'a man who does not speak where he ought to, shall not be heard later when he desires to speak. " 10. Against the order dated 02-07-1996, respondent no. 2/ landlord has preferred a J.S.C.C. Revision No. 27/1996 and the petitioner / tenant has also filed a J.S.C.C. Revision No.33 of 1996 challenging the finding of the trial Court to the effect that rate of rent is 400/- p.m. 11. Revision No. 27 of 1996 filed by the respondent no. 2 was allowed and revision no. 33 of 1996 filed by the petitioner / tenant was dismissed on 28-03-2006 and the suit was decreed. 12. Revision No. 27 of 1996 filed by the respondent no. 2 was allowed and revision no. 33 of 1996 filed by the petitioner / tenant was dismissed on 28-03-2006 and the suit was decreed. 12. So far as arrears of rent is concerned, the revisional Court has also confirmed the findings of the revisional Court are quoted below :- 13. So far as finding with regard to the maintainability of the suit is concerned, the revisional Court on the basis of the subsequent decision of the Apex Court reported in 2002 AIR SCW Page 4040 Nutan Kumar Vs. IInd Additional District Judge Banda has held that the suit was maintainable for the eviction of the petitioner. 14. The revisional Court has revered the finding to the extent of the rate of rent and has held that rate of rent was Rs. 400/- per month. 15. Counsel for the petitioner Sri S.K. Jain has pointed out that in view of the evidence on the record, the trial Court has recorded a finding that the arrears of rent is due on the tenant @ 100/- per month. He has further submitted that revisional Court has no jurisdiction to reassess the evidence while exercising the jurisdiction under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Causes Court Act. He has referred Leeladhar Kandpal Vs. D.J., Almora, 2003 U.D. Page 251. Relevant portion of the said judgment is quoted below:- "13. Similar view has been taken by the Division Bench of Allahabad High Court in Laxmi Kishore and others Vs. Har Prasad Shukla 1979 ACJ 473. Their Lordships have observed as under : "The Court deciding a revision under section 25 of the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act has to satisfy itself that the Trial Court's decree or order in according to law. Of course, the Revisional Court should keep in mind the Supreme Court's dictum in Naicker's case (supra) that a wrong decision on facts is along a decision according to law. 14. If it finds that there is no evidence to sustain a finding on a particular issue of fact, it can ignore that finding. Same will be the case where the finding is based only in admission evidence. In such cases the Court will be justified in deciding the question of a fact itself, because the evidence is all one way. No assessment is needed. Same will be the case where the finding is based only in admission evidence. In such cases the Court will be justified in deciding the question of a fact itself, because the evidence is all one way. No assessment is needed. The Court can also decide the revision if only a question of law or some preliminary point of law viz. validity of notice is sufficient for its decision: But, if it finds that a particular finding of fact is vitiated by an error of law, it has power to pass such order as the justice of the case requires; but it has not jurisdiction to reassess or reappraise the evidence in order to determine an issue of act for itself. It cannot dispose of the case adequately without a finding on a particular issue of fact, it should send the case back after laying down proper guidelines. It cannot enter into the evidence, assess it and determine an issue of fact." 15. The aforesaid Division Bench has been followed in the case of Om Prakash and others v. IInd Additional District Judge, Saharanpur 2000 (41) ALR 532. Referring to the judgments of Apex Court in Hari Shankar and others v. Rao Girdhari Lal Chaudhary AIR 1963 SC 698, State of Kerala v. K.M. C. Abdullah and Company AIR 1965 SC 1585, Malini Ayappa Naicker v. Seth Manghraj Udhavdas AIR 1969 SC 1344, Dr. D. Sankaranarayanan v. Punjab National Bank 1995 Supp. (4) SCC 675, and Rafat Ali v. Sugni Bai and others JT 1998 (8) SC 157, it has been held as under: "After making the above noted observation, the Court below has reassessed the entire evidence oral and documentary, on the record and wrote judgment spreading over 52 (typed) pages substituting its own findings for Court below the findings recorded by the Trail Court were not legal, after setting aside the said findings, it could at the best remand the case to the Trial Court for decision afresh. It has acted illegally and in excess of its jurisdiction in allowing the revision and decreeing the suit for ejectment on the ground of material alternation and structural changes. " 16. It has acted illegally and in excess of its jurisdiction in allowing the revision and decreeing the suit for ejectment on the ground of material alternation and structural changes. " 16. Considering the aforesaid limited jurisdiction of the revisional Court, so far as the rate of rent is concerned, I find force in the argument of the petitioner, that the findings with regard to rate of rent could not have been interfered by the revisional Court under Section 25 of the Provincial Small Causes Court. 17. So far as the finding of the arrears of rent is concerned, both the courts below have recorded the finding of fact that the petitioner has not paid the rent since 1987. He has failed to discharge the burden of payment of rent. Merely depositing the rent for the month of September and October will not relieve the petitioner from the liability of eviction. The petitioner has also claimed the benefits of Section 20 (4) of the U .P. Act No. 13 of 1972 in order to relieve himself from eviction, but has failed to deposit the rent under Section 20 (4) of the U.P.Act No. 13 of 1972. 18. The two courts •below have also held that initial burden is on the tenant to prove that the amount has been paid or deposited as per demand notice issued by the landlord 19. Relying upon various decisions, the Apex Court in Mohd. Siddiqui Vs. IInd Additional District Judge, Unnao and others 1997(2) ARC Page 400 has held as under:- "21. As pointed out by the Apex Court in its decision in the case of Madan Mohan and another v. Mohan Kumar Sood, reported in 1993 (1) JT 162: 1993 SCFBRC 133 (SC), whatever protection the Rent Acts give they do not give blanket protection for non-payment of rent. This basic minimum has to be complied with by the tenants. The Rent Acts do not contemplate that if one takes a house on rent he can continue to enjoy the same without payment of rent. 22. This basic minimum has to be complied with by the tenants. The Rent Acts do not contemplate that if one takes a house on rent he can continue to enjoy the same without payment of rent. 22. In the aforesaid view of the matter, the petitioner once having been informed that he had fallen in arrears in regard to payment to rent for more that the requisite period, was duty bound to clear the arrears if any by tendering the same to the landlord or deposit the same in Court as provided under the Act, if he wanted the protection of the Act. He could not just ignore the notice on the ground that if contained an inflated demand and on that ground continuer to enjoy the accommodation let out to him without payment of rent, it may be observed that once after receiving notice informing the tenant that he has been defaulting in the payment of rent for the prescribed period and he may be evicted, the tenant in order to save his default, if there be any, must pay the rent due according to him, to the landlord or deposit the same in accordance with the provisions of the Act otherwise he has to face the consequences. This it seems to me is the underlying policy of the Act and amply safeguards the interest of both the landlord and the tenant, maintaining a just balance between their competing interests. 23. The learned Counsel for the petitioner has next contended that the defendant was seriously prejudiced on account of the wrong placing of the burden of proof on him in regard to the question relating to the existence of the arrears of the rent which is fact of the denial of the defendant stood shifted on to the plaintiff. So far as this aspect is concerned the Apex Court in its decision in the case of Mohan Lal V. Laxman Das, reported in 1991 HRR 510, had observed that the onus to show payment lies in a case where the tenant comes forward with a case that the rent was paid by him but no receipt was issued by the landlord, without there being any explanation for sending the rent by money order, the tenant's version cannot be believed. In the present case, the landlord had come up with the definite allegation that the tenant was in arrears of rent for more than the prescribed period and no rent had been paid by him for the period 1-11-1974 to 30-5-1978. In view of the assertion of the land on oath in this regard, the onus of proof stood shifted on to the tenant to show payment or rent as claimed. The trial Court recorded a clear and categorical finding to the effect that the defendant has failed to prove the payment of rent for the period prior to 1-4-1978. This finding stands affirmed in revision. In face of the aforesaid finding based on an appraisal of evidence on the record which finding does not appear to suffer from any such infirmity which may justify any interference therein, while exercising the extraordinary jurisdiction envisaged under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, there could be no impediment in the grant of the decree for ejectment against the petitioner as prayed for specifically when the rent for the period subsequent to 1-4-1975 which was admittedly due was not admittedly due was not entered or paid within the time prescribed." 20. In Surya Dev Rai Vs. Ram Chander SCC 2003 Vol-6 675, the Apex Court has held as under:- "Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the subordinate courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. In Surya Dev Rai Vs. Ram Chander SCC 2003 Vol-6 675, the Apex Court has held as under:- "Supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution is exercised for keeping the subordinate courts within the bounds of their jurisdiction. When a subordinate Court has assumed a jurisdiction which it does not have or has failed to exercise a jurisdiction which it does have or the jurisdiction though available is being exercised by the Court in a manner not permitted by law and failure of justice or grave injustice has occasioned thereby, the High Court may step in to exercise its supervisory jurisdiction." "Be it a writ of certiorari or the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, none is available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless the following requirements are satisfied: (i) The error is manifest and apparent on the face of the proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance or utter disregard of the provisions of law, and (ii) a grave injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby." "A patent error is an error which is self-evident i.e. which can be perceived or demonstrated without involving into any lengthy or complicated argument or a long-drawn process of reasoning. Where two inferences are reasonably possible and the subordinate court has chosen to take one view, the error cannot be called gross or patent." "The power to issue a writ of certiorari and the supervisory jurisdiction are to be exercised sparingly and only in appropriate cases where the judicial conscience of the High Court dictates it to act lest a gross failure of justice or grave injustice should occasion. Care, caution and circumspection need to be exercised, when any of the abovesaid two jurisdictions is sought to be invoked during the pendency of any suit or correction is yet capable of being corrected at the conclusion of the proceedings is an appeal or revision preferred there against and entertaining a petition invoking certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court would obstruct the smooth flow and or early disposal of the suit of proceedings. The High Court may feel inclined to intervene where the error is such, as if not corrected at that every moment, may become incapable of correction at a letter stage and refused to intervene would result in stravesty of justice or where such refusal itself would result in prolonging of the lis." “The High Court in exercise of certiorari or supervisory jurisdiction will not convert itself into a court of appeal and indulge in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or correct errors in drawing inferences or correct errors of mere formal or technical character. " 21. Relying upon the Judgment of Surya Dev Rai Vs. Ram Chandra 2003 (6) SCC 675, the Apex Court in Ranjeet Singh Vs. Ravi Prakash 2004 (3) SCC 682, has held as under :"As to the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction of (he High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India also, it has been held in Surya Dev Rai that the jurisdiction was not available to be exercised for indulging in reappreciation or evaluation of evidence or correcting the errors in drawing inferences like a court of appeal." 22. In the case of M/s India Pipe Fitting Co. V. Fakruddin M.A. Baker and another reported in 1978 A.I.R. (S.C.) Page 45, the Apex Court has held as under:- "The limitation of the High Court while exercising power under Art. 227 of the Constitution is well settled. Power under Art. 227 is one of judicial superintendence and cannot be exercised to upset conclusions off acts however, erroneous those may be. It is well settled and perhaps too late in the day to refer to the decisions of the Constitution Bench of this Court in Waryam Singh v. Amarnath 1954 SCR 565; (AIR 1954 SC 215) where the principles have been clearly laid down as follows :- (at p. 217 of AIR). "This power of superintendence conferred by Art. 227 is. As pointed out by Harries C.J., in Dalmia Jain Airways Ltd. V. Sukumar Mukherjee AIR 1951 Cal193 (SB) to be exercised most sparingly and only in appropriate cases in order to keep to Subordinate Courts within the boundary of their authority and not for correcting mere errors." 23. Both the courts below have recorded findings of fact that the petitioner is in arrears since 1987 and therefore, no interference is required under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India. 24. Both the courts below have recorded findings of fact that the petitioner is in arrears since 1987 and therefore, no interference is required under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India. 24. So far as rate of rent to the extent of Rs. 400/- p.m. is concerned, the same is modified to this extent that the rate of rent will be to the extent of Rs. 100/- per month. 25. Subject to the aforesaid modification, writ petition lacks merit. However, petitioner has sought time to vacate the premises. Petitioner is granted time to vacate the premises in question by 315t of May, 2007 subject to the following conditions:- (a) petitioner furnishes the undertaking by 30th August, 2006 to vacate the premises by or before 31 5t May, 2007. (b) petitioner pays the entire damages by or before 15th September, 2006. (c) petitioner pays the damages in the 1 5t week of every month regularly. On failure of the aforesaid conditions, no relief will be available with the petitioner/tenant and the respondent/landlord shall proceed with for eviction of the petitioner. 26. Writ petition is dismissed. No order as to costs.