Research › Search › Judgment

Madhya Pradesh High Court · body

2006 DIGILAW 47 (MP)

Sada Ram v. Satish @ Situ Maleware

2006-01-05

K.K.LAHOTI, MANJUSHA P.NAMJOSHI

body2006
ORDER 1. Appellants have challenged order dated 28.1.1996 passed by Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Balaghat, in MACT Case No.5/1995, by which the claim petition filed beyond the period of six months alongwith application under section 5 of the Limitation Act was considered and the Tribunal found that there is no sufficient cause for condonation of delay and rejected the application filed under section 5 of the Limitation Act. Consequently the claim petition filed by the appellants under section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as "Act" for short) was also dismissed. 2. The appellants challenged the aforesaid order on following grounds : (i) That the Tribunal erred in rejecting the application under section 5 of the Limitation Act. There was sufficient cause for non-filing the application within the limitation of 6 months. (ii) That the application was filed on 18.1.1995 when the provision of limitation enumerated under section 166(3) of the Act itself was repealed and there was no bar of the limitation on the date of filing of aforesaid application. In these circumstances the Tribunal erred in dismissing the claim petition. (iii) That the Claims Tribunal has not considered the effect of repeal of section 166(3) of the Act and the application ought not to have been dismissed on the ground of limitation. 3. Learned counsel for respondents supported the order and submitted that the cause of action arose on 23.3.1993, on which date provision of limitation was applicable and period of limitation was 6 months. Beyond this period the application was entertainable for a further period of six months provided the claimant is able to satisfy the Tribunal that there was sufficient cause in filing the belated application. Reliance is placed to apex Court judgment in Vinod Gurudas Raikar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. and others [ AIR 1991 SC 2156 ], and submitted that this appeal may be dismissed. 4. To appreciate rival contentions of the parties it is necessary to state some facts of the case. In this case the appellants are the claimants/parents of deceased Suneel Kumar (2 years old) who died in an accident on 23.3.1993 in village Naitara. The allegations are that on 23.3.1993 the respondent No.2 Babloo who was driving truck bearing registration No. MPI-254 rashly and negligently and dashed the child Suneel Kumar, who died on the spot. In this case the appellants are the claimants/parents of deceased Suneel Kumar (2 years old) who died in an accident on 23.3.1993 in village Naitara. The allegations are that on 23.3.1993 the respondent No.2 Babloo who was driving truck bearing registration No. MPI-254 rashly and negligently and dashed the child Suneel Kumar, who died on the spot. A criminal case was also registered at Police Station Balaghat as crime No. 165/93 under section 304A of IPC. The truck was owned by respondent No.1 Satish and insured with National Insurance Company-respondent No.3. The appellants were having 2 issues. The deceased was younger, elder son is also suffering with some deformity. After the death of Suneel Kumar the appellants suffered mental shock and appellant No.2 became sick and could not file an application within the limitation of six months. The claim petition was filed on 18.1.1995 before the Tribunal alongwith an application under section 5 of the Limitation Act. This application was contested by respondent No.3, the insurer. The trial Court recorded evidence on the application and thereafter by the impugned order found that the grounds stated in the application under section 5 of the Limitation Act are not sufficient grounds and rejected the application on the ground that the application was filed beyond the period of one year from the date of accident and the Tribunal has no power to condone the delay under section 166(3) of the Act. 5. The Motor Vehicle Act, 1988 came into force w.e.f. 1.7.1989. In the aforesaid Act the period of limitation of 6 months was provided under section 166(3) of the Act. For ready reference the relevant portion reads' thus : "166(3). No application for such compensation shall be entertained unless it is made within six months of the occurrence of the accident : Provided that the claims Tribunal may entertain the application after the expiry of the said period of six months but not later than twelve months, if it is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application in time." Thereafter, by Act No.54/1994, the section 166(3) of the Act was deleted w.e.f. 14.11.1994. Since 14.11.1994 the provision of limitation enumerated under section 166(3) is not in the statute. Though the accident occurred prior to 14.1.1994, but the claim petition was filed on 18.1.1995 on which date there was no provision for limitation. Since 14.11.1994 the provision of limitation enumerated under section 166(3) is not in the statute. Though the accident occurred prior to 14.1.1994, but the claim petition was filed on 18.1.1995 on which date there was no provision for limitation. the apex Court in Dhannalal v. D.P. Vijayvargiya and others [ AIR 1996 SC 2155 ], had an occasion to consider the similar problem and considering the scope of amendment held thus : "Before the scope of sub-section (3) of section 166 of the Act is examined, it may be pointed out that the aforesaid sub-section (3) of section 166 of the Act has been omitted by section 54 of the Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act, 1994, which came in force w.e.f. 14.11.1994. The effect of the Amending Act is that w.e.f. 14.11.1994, their is no limitation for filing claims before the Tribunal in respect of any accident. It can be said that Parliament realised the grave injustice and injury which was being caused to the heirs and legal representatives of the victims who died in accidents by rejecting then claim petitions only on ground of limitation. It is a matter of common knowledge that majority of the claimants for such compensation are ignorant about the period during which such claims should be preferred. After the death due to the accident, of the bread earner of the family, in many cases such claimants are virtually on the streets. Even in cases where the victims escapes death some of such victim are hospitalised for months if not for years. In the present case itself the applicant claims that he met with the accident on 4.12.1990, and he was being treated as an indoor patient till 27.9.1991. According to us, in its wisdom the Parliament, rightly thought that prescribing a period of limitation and restricting the power of Tribunal to entertain any claim petition beyond the period of twelve months from the date of the accident was harsh, inequitable and in many cases was likely to cause injustice to the claimants. The present case is a glaring example where the appellant has been deprived by the order of the High Court from claiming the compensation because of delay of only four days in preferring the claim petition. In this background, now it has to be examined as to what is the effect of commission of sub-section (3) of section 166 of the Act. In this background, now it has to be examined as to what is the effect of commission of sub-section (3) of section 166 of the Act. From the Amending Act it does not appear that the said sub-section (3) has been deleted retrospectively. But at the same time, there is nothing in the Amending Act to show that benefit of deletion of subsection (3) of section 166 is not be extended to pending claim petitions where a plea of limitation has been raised. The effect of deletion of sub-section (3) from section 166 of the Act can be tested by an illustration. Suppose an accident had taken place two years before 14.11.1994, when sub-section (3) was omitted from section 166. For one reason or the other no claim petition had been filed by the victim or the heirs of the victim till 14.11.1994. Can a claim petition be not filed after 14.11.1994, in respect of such accident? Whether a claim petition filed after 14.11.1994, can be rejected by the Tribunal on the ground of limitation saying that the period of twelve months which had been prescribed when sub-section (3) of section 166, was in force having expired the right to prefer the claim petition had been extinguished and shall not be revived after deletion of sub-section (3) of section 166 w.e.f. 14.11.1994? According to us, the answer should be in negative. When sub-section (3) of section 166 has been omitted, then the Tribunal has to entertain a claim petition without taking note of the date on which such accident had taken place. The claim petitions cannot be thrown out on the ground that such claim petitions were barred by time when sub-section (3) of section 166 was in force. It need not be impressed that Parliament from time to time has introduced amendments in the old Act as well as in the new Act in order to protect the interest of the victims of the accidents and their heirs if the victims die. One such amendment has been introduced in the Act by the aforesaid. It need not be impressed that Parliament from time to time has introduced amendments in the old Act as well as in the new Act in order to protect the interest of the victims of the accidents and their heirs if the victims die. One such amendment has been introduced in the Act by the aforesaid. Amendment Act 54 of 1994, by subsisting sub-section (6) of the section 158, which provides : "As soon as any information regarding any accident involving death or bodily injury to any person is recorded or report under this section is completed by a police officer, the officer incharge of the police station shall forward a copy of the same within thirty days from the date of recording of information or, as the case may be, on completion of such report to the claims Tribunal having jurisdiction and a copy thereof to the concerned insurer, and where a copy is made available to the owner, of such report, forward the same to such claims Tribunal and insurer." In view of sub-section (6) of section 158 of the Act the officer incharge of the police station is enjoined to forward a copy of information/report regarding the accident to this Tribunal having jurisdiction. A copy thereof has also to be forwarded to the concerned insurer. It also requires that where a copy is made available to the owner of the vehicle, he shall within thirty days or receipt of such forward the same to the claims Tribunal and insurer. In this background, the deletion of sub-section (3) from section 166 should be given full effect so that the object of deletion of said section by the Parliament is not defeated. If a victim of the accident or heirs of the deceased victim can prefer claim for compensation although not being preferred earlier because of the expiry of the period of limitation prescribed, how the victim or the heirs of the deceased shall be in a worse position if the question of condonation of delay in filing the claim petition is pending either before the Tribunal, High Court or the Supreme Court. The present appeal is one such case. The appellant has been pursuing from Tribunal to this Court. His right to get compensation in connection with the accident in question is being resisted by the respondents on the ground of delay in filing the same. The present appeal is one such case. The appellant has been pursuing from Tribunal to this Court. His right to get compensation in connection with the accident in question is being resisted by the respondents on the ground of delay in filing the same. If he had not filed any petition for claim till 14.11.1994, in respect of the accident which took place on 4.12.1990, in view of the Amending Act he became entitled to file such claim petition, the period of limitation having been deleted, the claim petition which has been filed and is being pursued up to this Court cannot be thrown out on the ground of the limitation." The apex Court in Dhannalal (supra) considering the question of limitation held that after sub-section (3) of section 166 of the Act has been omitted which came into force w.e.f. 14.11.1994 there is no limitation for filing claim petition before the Tribunal in respect of any accident. The Parliament realised the grave injustice and injury which were being caused to legal heirs of the victims who died in the accidents by rejecting their claims petitions only on ground of limitation. The apex Court has also found that it is a matter of common knowledge that majority of the claimants of such compensation are ignorant about the period during which such claims should be preferred. After the death due to the accident, of the bread earner of the family, in many cases such claimants are virtually on the streets. Even in cases where the victims escape death some of such victims are hospitalised for months if not for years. The Court observed that the Parliament rightly though that prescribing a period of limitation and restricting the power of Tribunal to entertain any claim petition beyond the period of twelve months from the date of the accident was harsh, inequitable and in many cases was likely to cause injustice to the claimants. The apex Court also considered the effect of deletion of section 166(3) of the Act and held that the application should not be dismissed on the ground that it was barred by limitation under sub-section (3) of the Act from the date of filing. 6. The apex Court also considered the effect of deletion of section 166(3) of the Act and held that the application should not be dismissed on the ground that it was barred by limitation under sub-section (3) of the Act from the date of filing. 6. Though learned counsel for respondent No.3 has placed his reliance to Vinod Gurudas Raikar (supra), in which the apex Court considering the question where the accident took place when old Act of 1939 was in force, in that case the claim petition was filed after repeal of the Act of 1939 and new Act of 1988 came into force and held that the question of condonation of delay would be covered by the new Act and delay for a longer period than 12 months could not be condoned. But the position has been changed after 14.11.1994 when the Parliament had deleted the provision in respect of limitation under section 166(3) of the Act. In these circumstances the law laid down by the apex Court in Vinod Gurudas Raikar (supra), is inapplicable and the appellants appeal deserves to be allowed in the light of Dhannalal (supra), which covers the field. 7. Consequently, the impugned order passed by the Tribunal dated 28.11.1996 is hereby set aside and the matter is remitted back to the Tribunal with a direction to decide the application on merits in accordance with law. Parties present herein are directed to remain present before the Tribunal on 1st March, 2006, for which date no notice shall be necessary to the parties. 8. At this stage, learned counsel for respondent No.3 submits that the claim petition was filed beyond the period of limitation, which was dismissed. Thereafter the present appeal has been filed after a period of 5 years delay. Though it has been condoned, but today the case has been remanded back to the trial Court for deciding the case on merits, then the respondent No.3 should not be saddled with interest in case the claim petition is allowed by the Tribunal. Though the prayer is opposed by the appellants on the ground that the application was rejected because of raising objection by insurer which has been found unsustainable and appellants are entitled for the interest on the award amount. 9. This question at this stage cannot be decided. Though the prayer is opposed by the appellants on the ground that the application was rejected because of raising objection by insurer which has been found unsustainable and appellants are entitled for the interest on the award amount. 9. This question at this stage cannot be decided. The trial Court while deciding the claim petition on merits, if any such objection is raised by respondent No.3, shall be free to deal and decide the aforesaid question in accordance with law, after hearing the parties. 10. With the aforesaid direction, this appeal is allowed with costs. Counsel fee Rs.1,000/- (Rupees one thousand only), if certified.