JUDGMENT L. MOHAPATRA, J. : This writ application is directed against the order dated 12.4.2005 by the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), Puri in T.S. No.30 of 1997 allowing an application filed by the plaintiff for amendment of the plaint under Order 6, Rule 17 C.P.C. The plaintiff opposite party No.1 had filed the suit for eviction of the defendant-petitioner from the suit schedule property and also claimed mense profits and damages. The schedule of the disputed property having not been described prop¬erly, an application for amendment of the same was filed. The proposed amendment was objected to by the defendant-petitioner on the ground that the properties having not been described properly in the suit, no decree could be passed and a right having accrued in favour of the defendant-petitioner, such amendment should not be allowed. The learned Civil Judge in the impugned order allowed the amendment. 2. Shri Mohapatra, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner challenges the impugned order on the ground that the description of the property given in the plaint schedule is such that the disputed property cannot be identified and, therefore no decree can be passed. The disputed property having not been described properly, a right has accrued in favour of the defend¬ant-petitioner and at a belated stage such amendment could not have been allowed. The learned counsel relied on a decision of this Court in the case of Lucy Narona vs. Sri Raghunath Jew Bije, Chauni Math reported in 74(1992) C.L.T. 463. Shri Pattnaik, the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the opposite party No.1-defendant on the other hand submitted that inadvertently the description of the suit property had not been given in the schedule in the manner, it should have been given as there was a communication gap between the petitioner and his counsel. It was also contended by Shri Pattnaik, the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the plaintiff-opposite party No.1 that in another suit filed by the defendant-petition¬er, the suit property has been properly described and the same description is sought to be brought in by way of amendment and, therefore no prejudice would be caused to the defendant petition¬er, if the amendment is allowed. The learned counsel relied on a decision of the Apex Court in the case of Pankaja and another vs. Yellappa (D) by L.Rs. and others reported in 98(2004) CLT 612 (SC). 3. The learned counsel relied on a decision of the Apex Court in the case of Pankaja and another vs. Yellappa (D) by L.Rs. and others reported in 98(2004) CLT 612 (SC). 3. undisputedly, the plaintiff-opposite party No.1 filed the suit for eviction claiming to be the owner thereof and, therefore, the suit property should have been described in such manner that the same is identifiable. Unfortunately, in the plaint the suit property has been described in the following manner. “A brick built dwelling house with out-house and kitchen together with piece of leasehold land being part of two acres of land in Mouza-Balukhanda in the district of Puri”. The property has been described as “CHAKRATIRTHA HOUSE” and the boundary description is also given. In the proposed amendment the plain¬tiff sought for including the plot numbers. Though it cannot be said that with the description given in the plaint schedule the property can never be identified, at the same time the plaintiff should have given plot numbers while filing the suit. The disput¬ed house in question can be identified from the description given in the original plaint schedule. Since not only the description is given but also the name of the house as well as its boundary has been given, in my view, only addition of plot numbers will make it more clear and shall not change the nature and character of the suit. In the decision relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioner in the case of Lucy Narona vs. Sri Raghunath Jew Bije, Chauni Math (supra) this Court was of the view that if the description of the immovable property in the plaint is not suffi¬cient to identify, any amendment to the suit schedule property, if allowed, will lead the parties to litigate afresh with regard to subject matter of the suit. The learned counsel for the petition¬er relying on this decision submitted that once the description of the property has not been given so as to make it identifiable, no prayer for amendment with regard to description of the suit property should be allowed as the same will lead the parties to litigate afresh with regard to subject matter of the suit. On perusal of the aforesaid decision, it appears that the applica¬tion for amendment was filed at the stage of second appeal. On perusal of the aforesaid decision, it appears that the applica¬tion for amendment was filed at the stage of second appeal. Considering the circumstances under which both the Courts had disposed of the case, this Court held that amendment of the plaint schedule sought for at the stage of second appeal should not be allowed as it would lead the parties to litigate afresh with regard to subject matter of the suit. In this connection, a decision of the Apex Court relied upon by the learned counsel for the plaintiff-opposite party No.1 is relevant. The Apex Court in the case of Pankaj and another (supra) held as follows : “The law in this regard is also quite clear and consistent that there is no absolute rule that in every case where a relief is barred because of limitation an amendment should not be al¬lowed. Discretion in such cases depends on the facts and circum¬stances of the case. The jurisdiction to allow or not allow an amendment being discretionary, the same will have to be exercised in a judicious evaluation of the facts and circumstances in which the amendment is sought. If the granting of an amendment really sub-serves the ultimate cause of justice and avoids further litigation, the same should be allowed. There can be no straight¬jacket formula for allowing or disallowing an amendment of pleadings. Each case depends on the factual background of that case. xxx xxx xxx Factually in this case, in regard to the stand of the de¬fendant that the declaration sought by the appellants is barred by limitation, there is dispute and it is not an admitted fact. While the learned counsel for the defendant-respondents pleaded that under Entry 58 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, the declaration sought for by the appellants in this case ought to have been done within 3 years when the right to sue first ac¬crued, the appellant-plaintiff contends that the same does not fall under the said Entry but falls under Entry 64 or 65 of the said Schedule of the Limitation Act which provides for a limita¬tion of 12 years, therefore, according to them, the prayer for declaration of title is not barred by limitation, therefore, both the Courts below have seriously erred in not considering this question before rejecting the prayer for amendment. In such a situation where there is a dispute as to the bar of limitation, this Court in the case of Ragu Thilak D. John vs. S. Rayappan and others, 2001(2) SC 472 (supra) has held : “The amendment sought could not be declined. The dominant purpose of allowing the amendment is to minimize the litigation. The plea that the relief sought by way of amendment was barred by time is arguable in the circumstances of the case. The plea of limitation being disputed could be made a subject-matter of the issue after allowing the amendment prayed.” 4. In view of that has been decided by the Apex Court in the aforesaid decision and in view of the fact that in another suit filed by the petitioner the description of the suit property has been admitted by the petitioner, which is sought to be brought in by way of amendment, it cannot be said that by incom¬plete description of the suit property in the plaint schedule any right has been accrued in favour of the defendant-petitioner. I therefore do not find any merit in the writ application. The writ application is accordingly dismissed. Application dismissed.