J. K. BISWAS, J. ( 1 ) THE writ petitioner is questioning the order of the epf - Appellate Tribunal dated December 29, 2000 allowing the appeal of the second respondent against his order dated June 30, 2000 levying damages under section 14b of the Employees' Provident Funds and miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952. ( 2 ) THE second respondent is an establishment governed by provisions of the Employees' Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952. Praying for exemption from the operation of certain schemes framed under that Act, it applied to the appropriate authority. During pendency of the application made in terms of section 17 of the Act. the component authority granted relaxation in terms of Provisions of the scheme. ( 3 ) WHEN it was enjoying the benefits of relaxation, the Employees pension Scheme, 1995 came into force with effect from November 16, 1995. In terms of provisions in para 39 of that scheme it applied for exemption. The application submitted on February 15, 1996. was forwarded to the appropriate authority, and for the purpose the petitioner made the requisite order on June 30, 1998. ( 4 ) WHILE such application remained pending, the petitioner Initiated proceedings under section 7a of the Act for determining the dues payable by the second respondent under provisions of the pension scheme. By order dated March 22, 1999 the amount payable was determined. The second respondent paid the amount on May 14, 1999. Its application for exemption from the pension scheme was rejected by the competent authority on November 17, 1999. ( 5 ) THE petitioner issued show cause notice dated June 30, 1999 initiating the proceedings under section 14b of the Act. He alleged that dues payable under the pension scheme for the period from November 1995 to January 1999 had been belatedly paid by the second respondent. In the proceedings the petitioner made the final order dated June 30. 2000 levying rupees sixteen lakh thirty thousand seventeen on account of damages for delay in depositing the dues under the scheme. ( 6 ) ALTHOUGH the second respondent moved the appellate tribunal, in the face of coercive measures taken by the petitioner, it deposited the amount on September 18, 2000. 2000 levying rupees sixteen lakh thirty thousand seventeen on account of damages for delay in depositing the dues under the scheme. ( 6 ) ALTHOUGH the second respondent moved the appellate tribunal, in the face of coercive measures taken by the petitioner, it deposited the amount on September 18, 2000. Appeal filed by it was finally allowed, and the tribunal ordered the petitioner to refund the amount deposited by the second respondent on account of damages, with interest at the rate of 12%. ( 7 ) ADVOCATE argues that admittedly dues payable by the second respondent under the scheme were deposited after the due dates, and hence damages were rightly levied by the petitioner. His argument is that the tribunal did not consider the fact that application for exemption was ultimately rejected by the competent authority. ( 8 ) THE position is disputed by advocate for the second respondent his argument is that the tribunal correctly held that in view of provisions in para 39 of the scheme. There was no scope to say that the second respondent had committed any default. He argues that since the application had not been disposed of within the statutory period, the legal fiction contemplated by provisions in para 39 automatically came into force. ( 9 ) IT seems to me that the tribunal correctly held that during pendency of the application seeking exemption from the provisions of the scheme, the second respondent was not under any obligation to remit the contributions, and hence for not depositing the dues during the period in question, it could not be said that it committed any default within the meaning of para 5 of the scheme. ( 10 ) PROVISIONS in para 39 are absolutely clear regarding this. They say that an establishment submitting requisite application for exemption from the operation of the pension scheme is not liable to remit its contributions payable under the scheme during the period its application remains pending before the authority concerned. ( 11 ) IT seems to me that advocate for the second respondent has correctly pointed out the position regarding the legal fiction contemplated by para 39. But that has new become insignificant, because of the final order given by the competent authority rejecting the application for exemption. ( 11 ) IT seems to me that advocate for the second respondent has correctly pointed out the position regarding the legal fiction contemplated by para 39. But that has new become insignificant, because of the final order given by the competent authority rejecting the application for exemption. ( 12 ) THE fact, however, remains that till November 17, 1999 (at that date the application for exemption was rejected) the second respondent was not under any obligation to remit the contributions. Nevertheless it deposited the dues on May 14, 1999, since an order determining the dues had been made by the petitioner under section 7a. It is therefore clear that there was no reason to say that the second respondent had committed any default in the payment of the dues during the period from November 1995 to January 1999. ( 13 ) THESE being the factual and legal positions, the petitioner was not empowered to levy damages. I therefore find that the tribunal correctly held that order of the petitioner dated June 30, 2000 levying damages was liable to be set aside. Hence to this extent, I find no reason to interfere with the order of the tribunal. ( 14 ) THE next question that has arisen for consideration is whether the tribunal was empowered to grant interest to the second respondent. The admitted position is that no provision of law specifically provided for grant of interest to an establishment in such a case. Advocate for the second respondent has cited to me a Division Bench decision of the Orissa High Court in Bhubaneswar City Distribution Division v. Union of India and Anr. . reported at 1998 (2) LLJ 1044. On the strength of that decision he submits that interest is to be paid when it is found that damages levied are to be refunded to the establishment. ( 15 ) WITH great respect, I am unable to agree with their Lordships that in view of provisions in para 60 of the Employees' Provident Funds scheme, 1952, the organization is under an obligation to pay interest on the amount to be refunded, once order made under section 14b of the Act is set aside, and order is made for refund. In my view, those provisions cannot be employed for the purpose of granting such relief. In my view, those provisions cannot be employed for the purpose of granting such relief. Para 60 of that scheme made provisions for grant of interest to a member of the fund. To my mind, they can have no manner of application to a case where question of refund of amount levied in terms of section 14b arises. ( 16 ) ADVOCATE for the second respondent places strong reliance on the apex Court decision in South Eastern Coalfields Limited v. State of M. P and ors. , reported at (2003) 8 SCC 648 . He reads out to me paras 21, 22 and 24 of the report, and submits that in view of the principles explained by their Lordships of the Apex Court, for deprivation of the user of the amount concerned, the second respondent is entitled to get interest from the organization. He says that in any case, being the Court of equity, the writ Court should not interfere with the relief given by the tribunal. ( 17 ) IN my view, the Apex Court decision given to me cannot also be pressed into service in the present case. The principles explained by their Lordships of the Apex Court are unexceptionable, and there can be no dispute that in a fit and proper case the Courts, including the writ Court, can grant interest for compensating the person who is deprived of the user of his money. The question here is whether the second respondent was deptived of the use of its money by the petitioner. ( 18 ) THE petitioner exercised his statutory power leading to an order made by him levying damages. It is not the case that the power was exercised mala fide. It is to be presumed that the power was exercised by the petitioner bona fide. He acted in the capacity of a quasi judicial authority. The second respondent moved the appellate tribunal, but did not obtain any order staying the operation of the order made by the petitioner. Instead it decided to pay the amount levied by way of damages. The appellate tribunal ultimately found that order made by the petitioner was erroneous. ( 19 ) IN my considered view, in such a situation payment of interest cannot be automatic, unless the statue provides for it or the appellate tribunal possesses the requisite power to grant it. Instead it decided to pay the amount levied by way of damages. The appellate tribunal ultimately found that order made by the petitioner was erroneous. ( 19 ) IN my considered view, in such a situation payment of interest cannot be automatic, unless the statue provides for it or the appellate tribunal possesses the requisite power to grant it. No provision of the statute provides for grant of interest in such a case. In my opinion, section 7-L of the Act, conferring the requisite powers on the appellate tribunal, did not confer the power to grant interest. It possessed the powers to confirm, modify or annul the order appealed against or to remit the case to the petitioner. Hence, in the face of the limits of its powers, specifically mentioned by section 7-L of the Act. in my view, it was not competent to make an order directing payment of interest. ( 20 ) FOR these reasons I allow the writ petition in part. While I sustain the order of the tribunal regarding direction given by it for refund of the amount paid by the second respondent on account of damages, I set aside that part of the impugned order whereby it directed the petitioner to pay interest at the rate of 12%. There shall be no order for costs in the writ petition. Petition allowed in part.