JUDGMENT 1. - Heard learned counsel for the appellant. 2. This appeal is directed against the order of the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Jodhpur Bench, Jodhpur, dated February 7, 2005 and relates to the assessment year 1996-97. The facts which have led to filing of this appeal are that the respondent-assessee had constructed a house at Abu Road. The construction of a house was spread over from the financial years 1992-93 to 1998-99 progressively. The assessee has shown investment made by him in the construction of a house in the books of account for each year. The total construction cost according to the books of account of the assessee came to be Rs. 16,21,484. For the first time, during the assessment year 1997-98, the Income-tax Officer referred the question about valuation of property under construction to the Departmental Valuation Officer because the assessee has not produced the valuation report from an approved valuer about the house under construction. On the basis of the report of the Departmental Valuation Officer, proceedings for reassessment were initiated for the assessment years 1993-94, 1994-95 and 1996-97. By adopting valuation submitted by the Departmental Valuation Officer, additions were made on account of investment made in the construction of house. The reason which led the Assessing Officer to believe that income has escaped assessment for the aforesaid assessment years was that the Departmental Valuation Officer estimated the value of construction to be higher than the cost of construction shown in the books of account. 3. The additions were partly deleted by the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals) and partly sustained. 4. Appeals were preferred before the Tribunal by the Revenue as well as by the assessee to the extent each was aggrieved with the order passed by the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals). 5. The Tribunal found that merely on the basis of the Departmental Valuation Officer's report the reassessment proceedings could not have been initiated in the absence of the Assessing Officer's own satisfaction about escapement of income from tax. The Tribunal found that the opinion about the escapement of income from tax ought to be of the Assessing Officer himself and not of a borrowed opinion of the Departmental Valuation Officer. The Tribunal found that the opinion about the escapement of income from tax ought to be of the Assessing Officer himself and not of a borrowed opinion of the Departmental Valuation Officer. The principle cannot be accepted in abstract inasmuch as though the Departmental Valuation Officer's opinion in respect of cost investment may not be final, but prima facie in some cases circumstances if otherwise relevant can provide some material, like an audit report on the basis of which the Assessing Officer could have framed his own opinion. It is, however, true that the opinion about escapement of income from tax must be of the Assessing Officer alone and of none else. It is also trite to say that the sufficiency or adequacy of material on the basis of which such opinion is formed cannot be a ground for formation of reason to believe. At the same time, it is equally true that the material on the basis of which such opinion is framed must have some relevant nexus with the formation of opinion about escapement of income from tax. The opinion cannot be formed on non-existent material or wholly irrelevant and extraneous material. To that extent exercise of jurisdiction by the Assessing Officer is justiciable, apart from the question of limitation within which such jurisdiction can be exercised by the Assessing Officer. 6. If the Tribunal would have rested its decision on abstract doctrine about relevancy of the Departmental Valuation Officer's report, perhaps it would have needed a close examination in view of conflicting opinion of the different High Courts, and there being no precedent of this court. However, in the facts and circumstances of the present case and on the basis of finding reached by the Tribunal, this question would not arise. 7. The Tribunal has clearly found that the only basis for reopening the assessment for the assessment years 1993-94 to 1996-97 was the report of the Valuation Officer obtained during the assessment year 1997-98. It has also found that the Departmental Valuation Officer has valued the construction raised by the assessee on the basis of the B. S. R. rates of 1998. It has also found that the Departmental Valuation Officer has valued the construction raised by the assessee on the basis of the B. S. R. rates of 1998. On this premise, the Tribunal has further found that since the entire construction was not made in 1998 proposing even a number of years from the financial year but was made in 1992-93 onwards the BSR rates of 1998 cannot form the basis of the estimate of investment shown in the books of account by the assessee for periods prior to 1998. There being no other material on the basis of which the Assessing Officer could have reason to believe that the assessee has under-disclosed the cost during the relevant assessment years, the formation of belief was founded on no material. 8. This finding in our opinion, is a finding of fact based on material available with the Tribunal and does not give rise to a question of law. It is obvious that the BSR rates of 1998 can have no relevant bearing on assessment of investment made for the financial year relevant to the assessment year 1996-97 and earlier years. 9. In these circumstances, the formation of belief by the Assessing Officer about the under disclosure of investment in construction of the house being founded on no material, the Tribunal was right in holding that the initiation of reassessment proceedings were without jurisdiction. 10. That being the case, in our opinion, in the facts and circumstances, no substantial question of law arises for consideration in this appeal. 11. The appeal, therefore, fails and is hereby dismissed. *******