( 1 ) THE judgment-debtors in c. M. A. No. 11 of 2005 pending in the Court of the learned Civil Judge (Senior Division), first Court, Cuttack have filed this writ application challenging the order dated 19-4-2006 passed by the learned Civil Judge rejecting their application filed under Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure. ( 2 ) THE judgment-debtors have filed C. S. (I) No. 418 of 2002 in the Court of the learned civil Judge (Senior Division), First Court, cuttack for declaration of their title, confirmation of possession over the suit land and for permanent injunction. The opposite parties who are defendants in the suit filed a counter claim seeking for a mandatory injunction. The suit filed by the petitioners was dismissed and the counter claim filed by the opposite parties was allowed by judgment-dated 25-8-2004. The aforesaid judgment and decree was challenged in appeal and the appeal was also dismissed. After dismissal of the appeal, no further appeal was carried and execution case was levied by the opposite parties on the basis of the decree passed by the learned Civil Judge on the counter claim. In the said Execution Case, the petitioners filed an application under section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure challenging executability of the decree on the ground that the decree being one for mandatory injunction, the same cannot be executed and therefore prayed to drop the proceeding. The said petition having been rejected, this writ application has been filed. ( 3 ) THE learned counsel for the petitioners challenges the order on the ground that a decree for permanent injunction is not executable and the Court has to take recourse to Order 21, Rule 32 of the Code of civil Procedure for violation of an order of mandatory injunction. According to the learned counsel, in case of such a decree the Court cannot take recourse to Order 21, rule 35 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Shn B. H Mohanty, the learned counsel appearing for the opposite parties, on the other hand, submitted that even if the Court is required to take recourse to Order 21, Rule 32 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the Execution case shall be maintainable for the purpose of eviction in view of the provisions contained in Order 21, Rule 32, sub-rule (5)of Code of Civil Procedure. ( 4 ) FROM the impugned order, it appears that while decreeing the counter claim the court passed the following order :- "the suit be and the same is dismissed on contest against the defendants. The counter claim of the defendants is allowed on contest against the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs are directed to leave possession of the suit land within two months hence, failing which, the defendants are at liberty to take possession of the suit property through the process of the Court. In the facts and circumstances of the case, parties are to bear their own cost. Advocate's fees at the contested scale. " ( 5 ) THE learned Civil Judge while rejecting the petition held that in the suit the counter claim was allowed and at the same time the Court also directed the petitioners to give possession of the suit land within two months, failing which, the defendant-opposite parties would be at liberty to take possession of the suit property through process of the Court. Since the learned Civil judge while allowing the prayer for mandatory injunction also directed the plaintiff-petitioners to vacate the premises within two months, failing which, it would be open for the defendant-opposite parties to take pos session of the suit property through process of the Court, the question raised before this court may not be relevant for the purpose of this case However, the learned counsel for the parties having argued on this point, the same is required to be dealt with ( 6 ) ORDER 21, Rule 32 of the Code of Civil procedure provides that where the party against whom a decree for injunction has been passed and such party had an opportunity of obeying the decree and has willfully failed to obey, such decree may be enforced in case of an injunction by detaining such person in civil prison or by attachment of properties of such person or by both. Sub-rule (5) to the aforesaid rule empowers the court to direct in lieu of or in addition to the aforesaid provision the act required to be done, may be done so far as practicable by the decree-holder or some other person appointed by the Court, at the cost of the judgment-debtor. Sub-rule (5) to the aforesaid rule empowers the court to direct in lieu of or in addition to the aforesaid provision the act required to be done, may be done so far as practicable by the decree-holder or some other person appointed by the Court, at the cost of the judgment-debtor. ( 7 ) THE learned counsel appearing for the judgment-debtor-petitioners relying on sub-rule (1) contended that in case of disobedience of the direction contained in a decree for mandatory injunction the only course open is to direct detention of the judgment-debtor in civil prison or attach the properties of such judgment-debtor or direct both. The Court cannot entertain the Execution case for eviction. The learned counsel also relied upon two decisions in support of his contention. Shn B. H. Mohanty, the learned counsel appearing for the decree-holder-opposite parties though fairly submitted that Order 21, Rule 35 C. P. C. may not be applicable in case of such a decree, there is no bar on the part of the Court to proceed with an Execution case for eviction in view of sub-rule (5)of Order 21, Rule 32 C. P. C. According to Shn mohanty, when a decree for injunction has not been obeyed, the Court may take recourse to the aforesaid rule and direct such act to be done so far as practicable either by the decree-holder or by a person appointed by the Court. Shn Mohanty also relied upon two decisions in support of his contention. ( 8 ) A Full Bench of Delhi High Court in the case of Sarup Singh v. Daryodhan Singh reported in AIR 1972 Delhi 142 while dealing with the Order 21, Rule 32 of the C. P. C. held as follows (Paras 6 and 7) :- "sub-rule (5) of Rule 32, under which the decree-holder seeks relief, authorises the court to direct that the act required to be done, may be done, so far as practicable, by the decree-holder or some other person appointed by the Court at the cost of the judgment-debtor. The statutory illustration illustrates the scope of the rule by an instance that where a person of little substance erects a building which renders a family mansion uninhabitable and the judgment-debtor, in spite of his detention in prison and attachment of property, declines to obey the decree, the Court may remove the building which the decree has directed to do and may recover the cost from the judgment-debtor in execution proceedings. This shows that the act which is authorized by sub-rule (5)to be done consists of something, which may be done so far as practicable by the decree-holder himself at the expense of the judgment-debtor. The decree of the Court directing the judgment-debtor to quit and vacate the premises cannot constitute an act which may, without the will and volition of the judgment-debtor, be done by the decree-holder. Obviously, the decree-holder cannot vacate the premises in place of the judgment-debtor and deliver its possession to himself and recover its costs. Reference may also be made to the distinction in the language of sub-rule (3) of Rule 35 and former, the possession is to be delivered through its officers, in the latter the act is to be done by the decree-holder or by (and not through) another person. Consequently, obedience of the injunction to vacate cannot be done by any officer or other person appointed by the court as well. As such, the conclusion is inevitable that sub-rule (5) of Rule 32 can, in the nature of things, not come to the aid of the decree-holder to obtain dispossession of the judgment-debtor and it would be impossible to convert a suit and a decree for injunction into a suit and decree for recovery of possession and afford consequential relief in the execution department. " this Court in the case of Sudarsan Panda and another v. R. D. Dhawan and others reported in Volume (1974) 40 Cut LT 1298, observed as follows :-"on the above considerations the specific direction contained in the decree cannot be specifically enforced by the execution of this decree. " this Court in the case of Sudarsan Panda and another v. R. D. Dhawan and others reported in Volume (1974) 40 Cut LT 1298, observed as follows :-"on the above considerations the specific direction contained in the decree cannot be specifically enforced by the execution of this decree. Of course if the executing Court and that there has been a disobedience of the injunction order contained in the decree then it can at first issue a direction on the judgment debtors to obey the specific directions contained therein, and in case of default it can, if properly moved, commit the judgment-debtors to civil prison or attach their property as provided in sub-rule (1) of rule 32 of Order 21, Civil Procedure Code. Moreover, for the enforcement of the specific prayer as made by the decree holder in column 10 of his execution petition the decree holder can file a separate suit for the proper enforcement of the decree in question. " ( 9 ) SHRI B. H. Mohanty, the learned counsel appearing for the decree-holder opposite parties also referred to a decision of the High court of the Jammu and Kashmir in the case of Mst. Hajra v. Abdul Majeed Matoo and others reported in AIR 1986 Jammu and Kashmir 84. The Court interpreting Order 21. Rule 32 sub-rules (1) and (5) observed as follows :- "a decree for injunction of any kind cannot be executed in any other manner than provided under S. 51 read with. 21, R. 32. Therefore, a decree for mandatory injunction directing the judgment debtor to vacate the property and for permanent injunction restraining him from causing any interference with the possession of the decree holder with respect to the suit property can be executed only in the manner provided under o. 21, Rule 32 and not under O. 21, R. 35 or R. 36 which relate to execution of decrees for possession. If the decree holder satisfies the Court that the judgment debtor has had an opportunity of obeying the decree but has willfully failed to obey it, the decree can be executed under O. 21, R. 32 (1) by detention of the judgment debtor in civil prison or by attachment of his property or by both and in lieu of or in addition to the above the court under O. 21, R. 32 (5) can direct the decree holder or some other person to enforce compliance of the decree at the costs of the judgment debtor. That means that even if the judgment debtor is in possession, which possession he has to vacate under the decree, he can be compelled to vacate the property under O. 21, R. 32 (5 ). The Court will give the decree holder all possible assistance to occupy possession if it is practicable for the decree holder to do so. That would inevitably mean that the judgment debtor could be thrown out of the property from which he is directed to be evicted, by force. It is not correct to say that the decree for mandatory injunction cannot be executed under O. 21, R. 32 (5) merely because the judgment debtor is in possession and without evicting the judgment debtor the decree cannot be satisfied and therefore, the decree holder must bring a fresh suit for possession. Thus when the decree holder applies for delivery of possession in execution of the decree for mandatory injunction directing the judgment debtor to vacate the property the executing Court should proceed strictly in accordance with O. 21, R. 32 and put the decree holder in possession of the property by getting the property vacated by the judgment debtor in the manner prescribed under O. 21, R. 32 (1) and (5 ). The pendency of any suit for cancellation of the decree and the temporary injunction against the decree-holder directing him to maintain status quo will not stand in the way of the executing Court to execute the decree. AIR 1972 Delhi 142 (FB ). " Reliance was also placed in the case of fakir Pradhan v. Urdharba Pradhan reported in ILR 1979 (1) Cuttack 474. This court in the aforesaid decision observed as follows :- "sub-rule (1) of Rule 32 of Order 21, Civil procedure Code applies both to mandatory as well as prohibitory injunctions. AIR 1972 Delhi 142 (FB ). " Reliance was also placed in the case of fakir Pradhan v. Urdharba Pradhan reported in ILR 1979 (1) Cuttack 474. This court in the aforesaid decision observed as follows :- "sub-rule (1) of Rule 32 of Order 21, Civil procedure Code applies both to mandatory as well as prohibitory injunctions. Sub-rule (5) of Rule 32 on the language used applies to mandatory injunctions only. The word 'injunction' under sub-rule (5) has been qualified by the words 'has not obeyed' and the rule says that in the event of disobedience of the injunction the Court may, direct that the act required to be done may be done so far as practicable by the decree-holder. This could only be a mandatory direction. A prohibitory direction would be not to do any act. A prohibitory injunction is a negative one restraining the defendant from doing a particular act. The difference between the two is obvious and Rule 32 (5) can only be construed as applying to mandatory injunctions and not to prohibitory injunctions. " ( 10 ) HOWEVER reference may be made to the decision of the Apex Court in the case of samee Khan v. Bindu Khan reported in AIR 1998 SC 2765 . The Apex Court in the aforesaid case dealt with Order 21, Rule 32, sub-rule (1) as well as sub-rule (5) and settled the position of law in the following manner (Para 11):- "at the first blush the above interpretation appeared attractive. But on closer scrutiny, we feel that such interpretation is not sound and may lead to tenuous results. No doubt the wording as framed in Order 21 rule 32 (1) would indicate that in enforcement of the decree for injunction a judgment-debtor can either be put in civil prison or his property can be attached or both the said courses can be resorted to. But sub-rule (5) of Rule 32 shows that the Court need not resort to either of the above two courses and instead the Court can direct the judgment-debtor to perform the act required in the decree or the Court can get the said act done through some other person appointed by the Court at the cost of the judgment-debtor. But sub-rule (5) of Rule 32 shows that the Court need not resort to either of the above two courses and instead the Court can direct the judgment-debtor to perform the act required in the decree or the Court can get the said act done through some other person appointed by the Court at the cost of the judgment-debtor. Thus, in execution of a decree the court can resort to a threefold operation against disobedience of the judgment-debtor in order to compel him to perform the act. But once the decree is enforced the judgment-debtor is free from the tentacles of rules 32. A reading of that Rule shows that the whole operation is for enforcement of the decree. If the injunction or direction was subsequently set aside or if it is satisfied the utility of Rule 32 gets dissolved". In view of what has been decided by different High Courts and the Apex Court, it is clear that in execution of decree, the Court can resort to a threefold operation against disobedience of the judgment-debtor in order to compel him to perform the act. Two of the remedies are provided for in Order 21, Rule 32, sub-rule (1) and the third remedy is provided in Order 21, Rule 32, sub-rule (5) of the C. P. C. ( 11 ) COMING to the facts of the present case as indicated earlier, the Court while passing the decree on the counter claim not only passed a decree for permanent injunction but also directed the plaintiff-petitioners to leave possession of the suit land within a specified time failing which, it would be open for the defendant-opposite parties to take possession of the suit property through process of Court. Since there is a decree to the above effect, the Execution Case can be maintained for the above purpose of eviction in the event there is disobedience of the direction contained in the decree by the plaintiff-petitioners. I am, therefore of the view that the impugned order does not suffer from any illegality and accordingly this court declines to interfere with the same. The writ application is accordingly dismissed. Application dismissed.